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Problems of Implementation and Enforcement of EC Environmental Law at Community and
Member State Levels - France and Spain as case studies.
Despite a considerable body of environmental legislation, environmental degradation continues.
The failure of environmental legislation to attain its protective goals is in part due to the
widely acknowledged poor compliance with legal provisions. This thesis aims to discern the
causes of the complex phenomenon of poor implementation and enforcement of environmental
rules within the framework of European Community law.
A pragmatic approach has been chosen. In order to narrow the scope of the research, and yet to
examine a wide spectrum of the types of problems that may arise, two very different types of
Community environmental legislation have been selected: one all-encompassing and
administrative in nature (the Environmental Impact Assessment directive), the other narrow
and technical (the Large Combustion Plants directive). These are followed from the flaws
embedded in the legal text that may give rise to subsequent problems, through difficulties
inherent in implementing the rules, to enforcement where infringements are suspected.
Part I examines the role played by the institutions at Community level. The first chapter deals
with the decision-making process, which affects the final quality of environmental law,
thereby influencing its subsequent application. Next, the involvement of Community institutions
and the pressures placed upon them in monitoring the performance of Member States are
investigated. The final chapter of Part I concentrates upon attempts at supra-national level to
enforce these rules where infringements arise.
The lion's share of implementation and enforcement tasks fall to the Member States, therefore
Part II traces the same Community rules at national level. Insight into the variation that may
exist across Member States is sought by following their progress in two significantly different
national contexts (France and Spain). The purpose of Part II is to achieve an understanding of
what happens to Community norms once injected into national legal systems, where they become
national law. This implies a study of the various factors which undermine implementation,
both formal and practical, and enforcement of environmental rules. Indeed, no single dramatic
factor empties the Community rules of their substance or impedes their application. Rather the
purpose of the Community rules is chipped away as various actors apply their discretion during
the implementation and enforcement processes.
It emerges that the more predominant and intractable problems stem from an underlying
obstacle: for the moment, environmental protection is low on the hierarchy of political
priorities. Where margins of discretion exist, political considerations intrude into the
application, at every stage, of environmental law. Nonetheless, other problems stem simply
from the fact that frequently administrative situations and legal rules, without discriminating
against environmental interests, are poorly adapted to the recent concern of environmental
protection. It is suggested that progress in this latter area is more straightforward and less
dependent on a fundamental societal change of perception. It is proposed that certain issues be
addressed to adapt the legal situation, if often only in a piecemeal manner, permitting
incremental improvements that will set the stage more positively.
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to the problems that emerge at the national level, taking two Member States, France and
Spain, as case studies.
Examination of these contexts is undertaken with a view, first, to obtain a wide
perspective on the types of difficulties that arise in implementation and enforcement and to
understand why they arise. With an understanding of the problems and, perhaps, of their
causes, the issue of whether possible solutions present themselves is examined, in order to
investigate whether co-operation between the European Union and the Member States can be
rendered more efficient and ultimately more successful in achieving the goal of environmental
protection.
1. General difficulties of a legal approach to environmental problems:
Prior to the discussion of the specific subject of implementation and enforcement of
Community environmental law, awareness of general issues is beneficial. Various obstacles
are inherent to the study of environmental issues and present difficulties even before a legal
approach to an environmental problem is chosen.
Environmental protection is a complex, multi-disciplinary field that must establish a
balance among many interests. The legislative route is one among several possible
approaches. The use of market mechanisms is another approach increasing in popularity, for
instance2; as is the increased concern for use of non-authoritative, or 'soft-law' type
2 See, for instance, Turner, R.K., Pearce, D., Bateman, I., Environmental Economics:
An Elementary Introduction, Harvester Wheatsheaf (division of Simon & Schuster), 1994;
pearce, D., Markandya, A., Barbier, E., Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan
Publications Ltd, London, 1989; Pearce, D., Blueprint 4: Capturing global environmental
value, Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, 1995; Anderson, V., Alternative Economic
Indicators, London: Routledge, 1991.
Particularly concerning economic instruments designed to achieve the same goals as
the large combustion plants directive, see Pearce, D., "Toward the Sustainable Economy:
Environment and Economics," Royal Bank of Scotland Review, Special Environment Issue,
1991; and Estevan Bolea, M-T, Implicaciones economicas de la Proteccion Ambiental de la
CEE: Repercusiones en Espafla, Informes del Instituto de Estudios de Prospectiva, Secretaria
de Estado de Economfa, Ministerio de Economfa y Hacienda, 1991, pp.330-34.
2
instruments3. However the relative benefits between legal and non-legal approaches are not
debated here. Rather, the use of legal rules once a legislative approach has been chosen is
emphasised.
The state of scientific knowledge influences the legal approach and its validity, since
the quality of legal rules is a function of the scientific certainty surrounding proposed
solutions (which is itself affected by political priority concerning the types of scientific
research that receive attention and funding). Scientific opinion on environmental issues is
often far from static or concrete4. Unfortunately, at times a response to an environmental
problem must be elaborated urgently, and waiting for complete scientific certainty is a luxury
that cannot be afforded (as witnessed by the increased attention given to the precautionary
principle). In such circumstances distinguishing the optimal role of law — whether it should
regulate, offer incentives, impose prohibitions — is another problem that arises, and choices
taken in this respect carry consequences for implementation and enforcement. Determining the
substance of the law, particularly where it depends on scientific opinions that are
contradictory, or data that are incomplete or rapidly changing, is a territory fertile in
potential for error. While these difficulties are acknowledged as important, whether the
As an aside, where market instruments are chosen, it must be recalled that, "the
market itself is always likely to lead to a degree of contamination or depletion whose
acceptability (or indeed, sustainability) will need to be assessed from some other
perspective"; Steele, Jenny, "Remedies and Remediation: Foundational Issues in
Environmental Liability," 58 (1995) MLR 615-36, at p.635.
The Commission, in the Fifth EAP has itself pointed out that "the legislative
approach may not always be the best choice as a first step although it may have an essential
role to play in the longer term" (OJ 1993 C138/81).
Two voluntary schemes have been adopted at Community level (Eco Labels,
Regulation 880/92 (OJ 1992 L99) and Eco Audits in industry, Regulation 1896/93 (OJ 1993
L168)) in an attempt to put the commercial interest of undertakings at the service of
environmental protection. It is hoped that companies, taking 'green' consumers into
consideration, will find it useful to promote an ecological image.
4 Climate change illustrates the rapidity of shifts in scientific knowledge. In the mid-
Eighties scientists estimated a general termperature increase of nine degrees Centigrade over
the next decades. By the mid-Nineties, using advanced computer models capable of factoring
in the climatic impact of the ocean depths, a more reassuring figure of 1.5 to 1.9 degrees
Centigrade is estimated; Sir John Mason, of the Meteorological Office, discussion Climate
Change, Edinburgh Science Festival, 1 April 1995.
3
legal choices made on the basis of scientific opinion were the appropriate ones is only
mentioned in so far as this affects implementation and enforcement of the rules studied here.
Finally, a question that arises in judicial proceedings related to environmental matters
surrounds an issue so basic as determining when grounds for a dispute exist, given the basic
consideration that terms such as 'pollution', or 'environmental damage' are open to a variety
of interpretations5. For example, Rio Principle 13 adds the idea of "adverse effects of
environmental damage"; the European Commission's Green Paper on Remedying
Environmental Damage6 discusses the degree of impact that should be considered
environmental damage and the point at which emissions are to be considered "pollution".
This debate is not continued in this research.
2. The Choice of Community Law:
Environmental problems can have a transboundary nature (atmospheric pollution,
pollution of water courses, protection of migratory fauna) or be firmly grounded at the local
level (land planning, waste treatment). One of the advantages of examining issues of
implementation and enforcement of environmental law at Community level is that it affords
the opportunity to look at both local and international perspectives; both levels must be
examined.
Particularly in its transboundary context, the European Community is unique in that it
presents the advantages of a supranational perspective while overcoming some of the
disadvantages of international law. Within the Community context, the issue of consent7
that is often the downfall of international environmental law is side-stepped.
5 Handl, Gunther, "Balancing of Interests and International Liability for the Pollution
of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisted," 13 (1975) Canadian
Yearbook of International Law 156 at p.173.
6 Com(93)47 final, at p.10.
For instance, Member States of the European Community, through the procedures of
qualified majority voting, may find themselves bound by legislation which they had voted
against. Likewise, within the Community context, the Commission can bring infringement
4
The distinctive feature of Community law lies in the fact that, through the doctrines of
direct effect and supremacy, and through the preliminary ruling procedure, it becomes an
integral part of the national legal systems of the Members States. Member States cannot hide
behind their sovereignty: in areas of Community competence, Community law is paramount.
In accordance with the doctrine of direct effect, Community legislation that is sufficiently
clear and precise, unconditional, and leaves no room for discretion in implementation8,
imposes obligations upon emanations of the state9 even where the Community rule has not
been, or not been correctly, transposed. Natural or legal persons can rely directly upon such
provisions where individual rights are conferred. The presence of Community law at national
level is reinforced by Article 17710 on preliminary rulings, an option for any court or tribunal
that deems a reference necessary, but obligatory for a court "against whose decisions there is
no judicial remedy under national law"H. The Verholen^and KraaijeveldI3 rulings indicate
even that national judges are expected to bring up points of Community law of their own
motion if the parties in question have not done so. Thus, in disputes involving Community
proceedings without the concerned Member State's consent. In international law, the
possibilities to bind a State against its will, or to bring it before a court or arbitration body
are greatly restricted.
8 Case 41/71 Van Duyn 1974 ECR 1337
9 Case 152/84 Marshall 1986 ECR 723.
Article 177 EEC: "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council,
where those statutes so provide."
11 Article 177(3) EEC.
12 Joined Cases C87/90, C88/90, C89/90: A Verholen e.a. v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank:
1991 ECR 1-3757 at para.16: "The answer to the first question in case C-88/90 must therefore be
that Community law does not preclude a national court from examining of its own motion
whether national rules are in conformity with the precise and unconditional provisions of a
directive, the period for whose implementation has elapsed, where the individual has not
relied on that directive before the national court."
13 In an environmental case, C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV and others
and Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid Holland, judgment 24 October 1996, not yet reported,
para.57:"...where by virtue of national law courts or tribunals must, of their own motion, raise
points of law based on binding domestic rules which have not been raised by the parties, such
an obligation also exists where binding Community rules are concerned...".
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issues, the national judge must become a Community judge. Where national measures conflict
with Community law they must be interpreted in the light of Community legislation14, and
if necessary, set aside115.
While at various points Member States have protested that the Court's development of
these doctrines was not only bold but brazen ("megalomanie maladive16"), over-reaching the
limits defined by the Treaty of Rome, they have thus far succeeded in slowing17 but not
halting this creeping acquis communautaire. The result is that European Community law
pervades the national systems down to even the level of the individual in a mariner
unimaginable in international law1®. By their willingness to make references to the European
Court of Justice and by adhering to its rulings in deciding the case before them, national judges
have lent Community law the respect formerly reserved for their own systems1 It is
nonetheless evident that, at least where Community environmental rules are concerned, the
respect Member States accord Community law is far from adequate.
The Community level is also of particular interest because national law is very much a
presence in the implementation and enforcement of Community rules. Community directives
14 Case 14/83 Von Colson 1984 ECR 1891: "It follows that in applying national law and
in particular the provisions of a national law specifically introduced in order to implement a
directive the national court is required to interpret its national law in the light of the
wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the results referred to in the third
paragraph of Article 189."15 Case C-213/89 R v Secretary for Transport, ex parte Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433 at
para 23: "...Community law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in a
case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it
from granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule."
Cf. Michel Deb re, former prime minister, as cited in Mancini, G. F., "The Making of a
Constitution for Europe," 1989 CMLRev 595, at p.595.
17 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health
Authority 1986 ECR 723; confirmed in Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Sri, 1994 ECR
1-3325.
4® It must be noted that the Court's development of the supremacy doctrine was
successful because it was accepted by the judiciaries and the administrations of "both the
original and the new Member States, with the exception of some grumblings by the French
Conseil d'Etat, the Italian Corte costituzionale and a couple of English law lords" (Mancini,
op.cit., p.600); not to forget concern on the part of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht about
Community protection of fundamental rights (Solange, BVerGE 37, 271)
111 Mancini, op.cit., p. 597.
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must be transposed into national rules; their practical implementation requires concrete action
within the Member States; and to a great extent, where enforcement is necessary, this hinges
upon national procedural rules.
This is not to imply that the Community constitutes the perfect context for
implementation and enforcement of environmental law. However, it is here considered to
provide a unique opportunity to regulate environmental matters on a transboundary plane2",
while at the same time maintaining close contact with national realities.
Emerging Awareness of Problems in the Application of Community Environmental
Legislation:
Without specific Treaty foundation, environmental action programmes and a considerable
body of Community environmental rules21 were nonetheless adopted — an achievement in
itself. However, as early as 1983 the Third Environmental Action Programme (EAP) hints at
the beginnings of a realisation that implementation of these rules is presenting real
difficulty. It notes a variety of factors that have stalled the implementation of projects, and
stresses the importance of continuing and completing the projects already undertaken. Despite
this small acknowledgement, it still took many years for attention to focus on
implementation. In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted, adding an Environment
20 Caldwell, L.K., International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions,
Duke University press, 1990, pp.116-22; blrnie, P., and Boyle, A., International Law and the
Environment, Clarendon Press, 1992, at p. 79. A contrario, see Allot, P., "State Responsibility
and the Unmaking of International Law," 1988 Harvard International Law Journal 1, at p.10.
21 Justified often by the need to approximate Member State rules affecting the
functioning of the common market or the need to achieve the Community objective of
environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of life based on Article 2 of the
Treaty, and later the first EAP). Frequently Articles 100 (approximation of laws) or 235 (for
action necessary to attain Community objectives were the Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers) provided the legal foundations for early legislation, at times used
together; see the Environmental Impact Assessment directive, below.
Occasionally, however, legal bases were borrowed from other titles in the Treaty: for
example, Directive 80/51 on the limitations of noise emissions from aircraft (OJ 1980 L26) was
adopted on the basis of Article 84(2) of the Transport Title.
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Title and specifically environmental principles and legal bases to the Treaty. Ironically,
despite the increasing attention given to environmental matters, and although at this time
there was a growing realisation that effectiveness of general Community law was being
undermined by poor Member State application, still awareness of the state of environmental
law's implementation — one of the worst areas of Member State performance — was not yet
apparent22.
A fourth EAP22 adopted after the SEA amendments continues and expands upon the
themes developed in the first three programmes24. A deficiency had been spotted, however:
poor application in Member States particularly of Community environmental rules.
Consequently the fourth EAP stresses the importance of implementation and enforcement of
existing rules and asks the Commission systematically to review application in order to
assess the effectiveness of Community environmental rules and policy22. A small section22
scratches the surface of the problems surrounding application, stressing the need to promote
better compliance, to intensify dialogue with national and regional administrations, and to
initiate infringement procedures against delinquent Member States.
Starting in the mid- and late- Eighties, therefore, concern began to shift away from the
creation of environmental legislation to a growing realisation that its application in the
various Member States was far from satisfactory. An illustration of the shift in focus is
provided by an increase in infringement proceedings on environmental (and consumer) matters
22 For instance the "First report on the application of Community law 1983",
(Com(84)181) contained only a fleeting and unhelpful reference to environmental legislation,
pointing out that "Overall the application of these Directives in the Member States would
appear not to present any major problems".25 OJ 1987 C328/1 (Fourth EAP).
24 In view of the criticism subsequently levelled at the Commission concerning its lack of
consideration of the costs of legislation, it is interesting that this programme includes a brief
discussion of costs to industry of applying environmental rules and of possibilities of job
creation (OJ 1987 C328/14 point 2.4.6).
25 OJ 1987 C328/1 (Fourth EAP), at C328/2.
26 Section 2.2 on Implementation of Community Directives.
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undertaken against Member States in the late Eighties22. Parliament was among the first to
sound the alarm over application issues, particularly regarding the Seveso disappearance of
toxic wasted The situation was, as former Commissioner for the Environment Ripa di Meana
phrased it, "intolerable"2^. Many authorities have commented upon the fact that EEC
environmental legislation was implemented "not in time, not correctly, not at all"30.
Attempts were made to assess the situation and to uncover the reasons behind the failure to
implement environmental directives31.
The Fifth EAP32 acknowledges the ineffectiveness of Community environmental
legislation. Chapter 9, on "Implementation and Enforcement"33 focuses on the problems that
have emerged, citing a variety of factors from "lack of policy coherence" to "management
inadequacies at all levels, from Community down to local authorities". The discussion does
27 Figures include consumer protection: 43 in 1981; 100 in 1984; 155 in 1986; 221 in 1990;
Eighth Application Report 1990, OJ 1991 C338/54.
23 In connection with Seveso, Parliament attacked specifically "the cavalier attitude
displayed by the companies responsible", the Commission's "failure to perform fully and
properly its role of guardian of the treaties"; OJ 1984 C127/67 at 68.
It has continued to register its concern at widespread failure to implement
environment legislation through such texts as its "Resolution on the application of
Community environment legislation," OJ 1990 C68/183.
20 Bulletin Europeen du Moniteur ,19 fevrier 1990. p.3.
30 Klatte, E., "Environmental and Economic Integration in the EC," in Frontiers of
Environmental Law, Owen Lomas ed., Chancery Law Publishing, 1991, p.47 (Klatte, 1991); see
also Ludwig Kramer, "Du Controle de l'application des directives communautaires en matiere
d'environnement," 1988 RMC 22; Macrory, R., "The Enforcement of Community Environmental
Laws: Some Critical Issues," 19 (1992) 29 CMLRev 347.
31 Eighth Application Report 1990; the water (PE 116.085, 1988) and air reports of the
European Parliament Environment Committee.
32 OJ 1993 C138. The programme generally reflects the climate of UNCED at Rio and
the commitments undertaken there by the Community. A weightier document than the
previous programmes, it purports to set the course — for the Community as for "the rest of the
world" — for sustainable development. To do so, the Fifth Programme has changed the
Community's tack: rather than attempt to repair environmental problems (merely the
"symptoms of mismanagement and abuse"; (OJ 1993 C138/13) as they emerge or to try to
prevent them from emerging, the goal has become to attack the harmful trends themselves.
Conduct, thinking, consumption patterns — all must be transformed, at all levels of society. A
broader range of tools to encourage awareness and change is indicated, including financial and
marketing tools, rather than just legislative instruments. (The sectoral approach is not
completely abandoned: certain priority target sectors are listed.) The programme emphasizes
shared reponsibility among all actors; OJ 1993 C138/17.
33 OJ 1993 C138/80-82.
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not seek to excuse past deficiencies but to apply their lessons to future action, showing that
some account has been taken of previous criticisms34. This section of the fifth EAP singles out
areas for attention: improvement in legislation, integration of policies, involvement of public,
environmental liability, involvement of the European Environment Agency, reports on
implementation.
Years after discovering the extent of poor implementation of environmental rules, the
situation is unchanged33. Indeed, the Commission has noted that in 1993 environmental
infringements composed 28.5% of all infringements of Community law registered, in 1994
environmental infringements counted for 25%, and in 1995 they were still more than 20%36.
The personal estimate of DG-XI's Dr. Ludwig Kramer37 is that only about 20% of all
environmental plans elaborated at the Community level are actually implemented38, an
enormous expenditure of effort for a paltry result. As MEP Ken Collins sums up, "...there is a
fair bit of evidence to suggest that there is no Member State that is particularly good at
implementation or they are certainly not as good as they themselves say. The trouble is that
they frequently believe their own propaganda."3^
Despite the successful introduction of a considerable body of environmental law and the
adoption of firm Treaty foundation, often the potential of the Community environmental
34 For instance, in the creation of three dialogue groups; see Chapter 2 point 3.2.
Creation of information sources.
35 PE 152.144, rapporteur Vernier, J; MEP Ken Collins, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-
92, p.33.
36 Commission, "Implementing Community Environmental Law," Communication to the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, at p.2; Com (96)600, Thirteenth
Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (1995),pp.103-105.
Incongruously when compared to the number of infringements, in 1994, for instance,
only three cases were referred to the ECJ for failure to notify, and one referral was made
regarding the conformity of national implementing measures; Com(95)500 final, Twelfth
Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (1994), p.59 points 1.2. and
1.3.
3 7 Former Head of Legal Matters and Application of Community Law in DG-XI.
38 kramer, Ludwig, Focus on European Environmental Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1992, p.215.
39 HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.37.
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rules is not fulfilled. At present, environmental rules frequently fail to attain the Community
goals both of environmental protection and of establishing equitable conditions for the
Internal Market, thereby defeating the purpose for which they were adopted.
3. 'Implementation' and 'Enforcement':
Implementation and, by extension, enforcement are crucial: without these protection of
the environment cannot be guaranteed, even if high standards are embodied in environmental
rules. Also, the economic impact of failure to implement and enforce is not to be
underestimated. The fact that national measures cannot practically be adopted and applied
simultaneously in all fifteen Member States undermines not only an abstract ideal of
"harmonisation" but, more to the point, threatens to distort competition, deflect trade, and
jeopardise the balanced development of the regions40 — all of which are objectives of the
Community41. Furthermore, it is inefficient to devote resources to the creation of legislation
that cannot or will not subsequently be given force and the effects of which are negligible;
where implementation is not stressed, it would be more efficient simply not to use a regulatory
approach to the environmental problem at issue. Finally, widespread disregard of
Community environmental obligations bears negative consequences not only for the
environment but for the force and authority of Community law itself: as one source put it, this
"converts existing [Community] legislation into wet paper."42
On examining various texts it becomes apparent that a variety of meanings with subtle
differences are attached to the terms 'implementation' and 'enforcement'. Implementation
40 Article 130r(3) EEC: "In preparing its action relating to the environment, the
Community shall take account of...(iv) the economic and social development of the
Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions."
41 Ironically, this is the justification that served in some cases as the basis for adoption
of the measures in the first place.
42 "...convierte en papel mojado la legislacion existente"; Martinez Aragon, "Aplicacion
del derecho medioambiental en Espaiia: El papel de vigilancia y control de las Comunidades
europeas," 1993 GJCE , Serie D, p.193 at p.198.
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and enforcement are aspects of the same process of application of Community law — of
ensuring that black letter law achieves an effective result. As one author notes, "the notion of
enforcement...does not seem to be subject to a precise definition which would distinguish it
from 'implementation'"43: indeed the two concepts share common territory44. In this work an
attempt is made to use the terms consistently. Definitions are in order.
Implementation: The Commission has separated its tasks of monitoring implementation
into formal implementation, which refers to the transposition of Community obligations into
the national legal order; and practical implementation, which refers to the subsequent
realisation of a complex range of practical activities necessary to meet the legal obligations.
The latter includes, for instance, the correct administration of the legislation, the actions of
private actors necessary to comply with their obligations, the potential involvement of the
public, undertaking the appropriate follow-up activities to ensure compliance with the rules.
In this research the Commission's division of its tasks is carried over to the national level in
order to provide a framework for the in-depth examination of Member State treatment of
Community rules that remains compatible with a Community perspective.
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has ruled, in Royer45, that in implementing
Community directives
The Member States are consequently obliged to choose, within the bounds of the freedom left to
them by Article 189, the most appropriate forms and methods to ensure the effective functioning of
the directives, account being taken of their aims... (emphasis added).
More recently in a case involving the Environmental Impact Assessment directive, the ECJ
ruled that "the duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is
43 Kramer, Focus..., p.209n.
44 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.207.
43 Case 48/75 Royer 1976 ECR 497 para. 73; see also para.75: "The freedom left to the
Member States by Article 189 as to the choice of forms and methods of implementation of
directives does not affect their obligation to choose the most appropriate forms and methods
to ensure the effectiveness of the directives."
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binding on all the authorities of Member States...".46 As shall be seen in the national
chapters, often Member States choose methods that fall short of those "most appropriate" to
ensure the effective functioning of Community environmental directives.
At Community level, 'implementation' refers to the process of monitoring Member State
compliance with Community rules. The Commission must ensure that Member States have
notified their formal transposition and that this is correct; it must also undertake the more
difficult task of verifying that the necessary practical actions have also been carried out.
Enforcement: Curtin and Mortelmans provide a very useful definition of enforcement to
describe
the role played by the Commission, the Member States or exceptionally private parties forcing — in
accordance with the weapons in their arsenal — other actors to fulfil obligations imposed on them
by Community law. Enforcement is in fact a 'stick' in the cupboard, to be utilised only in case of
real necessity4''.
The concept includes action taken at the Community level against a Member State when a
violation of a Community rule is alleged (the various stages of Article 169 infringement
proceedings) as well as the rarer instances where a Community institution is itself alleged to
have acted in violation of its obligations and an attempt is made to redress the situation
(actions under Article 173).
Similarly, at Member State level enforcement refers to the stage of compelling actors to
fulfil their obligations, i.e.: principally48 to judicial action before administrative, civil or
penal jurisdictions that is commenced where violations of national measures transposing
Community law or of Community law itself (where capable of direct effect) are alleged.
46 Case C-72/95 Aannenersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV and others and Gedeputeerde
Staten van Zuid-Holland, judgment of 24 October 1996, not yet reported, para.55.
4^ Curtin, D., and Mortelmans, K., "Application and Enforcement of Community Law by
the Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script," in Institutional Dynamics
of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol II., eds. Deirdre Curtin
and Ton Heukels, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994.
48 A clarification is in order: here a request to the Aministration to reconsider a decision
is included in enforcement. This is because usually the Administration confirms its earlier
decision, and therefore this request can, eventuality, be viewed in practice as a procedural
step prior to bringing an action before the courts.
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While acknowledging that grey areas exist and draconian separations can be unhelpful,
this work is structured on the above divisions also because a good compliance record in one
area does not necessarily mean that obligations have been fulfilled in another area. For
instance, emphasis is usually placed upon black letter transposition and accuracy in this is
frequently equated with adequate implementation. Performance in the 'messier' area of
practical implementation, which is much more difficult to examine and verify, is often
played down. It shall be seen that accurate and even positive formal implementation can be
negated by extremely poor performance in practice. Moreover, at times even where violations
are noted they are not enforced: again Community obligations are unfulfilled. In order to have
a meaningful view of compliance, regard must be had to all three stages.
4. Choice of specific Community rules:
To investigate the implementation and enforcement of the entire body of Community
environmental rules would represent a vast and unwieldy task; this is not attempted here. A
choice must be made concerning what type of legal instrument to examine, and then more
specifically, which actual environmental rules.
Choice of Legal Instrument: The legal instrument overwhelmingly used to regulate
environmental matters4^, the directive, itself gives rise to problems in subsequent
implementation and enforcement. As defined in Article 189 EEC^O, directives set the goals to
be achieved while leaving Member States free to choose the form and methods most
appropriate to their national legal system and culture for achieving them. Member States are
expected to transpose the provisions of a directive into binding national legislation; to notify
4y And required by Article 100 of the Treaty.
Article 189 EEC: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods."
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the Commission of the transposition by the deadline specified in the directive; and to carry
out, at a practical level, the measures the directive requires51.
Paradoxically, directives have been criticised both for being too uniform52 and not
uniform enough52. The principle of institutional autonomy — the margin for action on the part
of the Member States — is perceived by some to be a source of potential strength that enables
national authorities to develop decision-making procedures appropriate to their own
systems54. Flexibility and respect for local customs, legal traditions and administrative
sensibilities are invaluable assets when attempting to harmonise measures across fifteen
disparate national systems55. Directives are one way of providing that decisions are taken at
a closer level to the citizen56, in accordance with the principle of Subsidiarity.
On the other hand, as shall be seen in the national chapters, the freedom of Member
States embodied in directives is one of the principal challenges in implementing Community
environmental law, starting the chain of legislative command with a very 'flexible' link.
National legislatures are occasionally reluctant to amend what they perceive to be superior
national rules57, have the (mistaken) impression that they are at liberty to modify the goals
set58, or tend to transpose those elements of the original directive which suit their purposes
and to "forget" the rest59. At present, the freedom to choose the forms and methods of
52 For example, to set up procedures necessary to sample waters or test air quality, for
example, or to define licencing procedures for industrial emissions, or enforce limit values.
52 "For example not taking into account traditional hunting rights and the fact that
wolves are widespread in Spain"; Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.9.
52 This specifically when it comes to variations in implementation: Member States are
not eager to apply legislation which they believe other Member States are not applying;
Heseltine, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p. 189.
54 Macrory in EC Environment..., 1991, at p.43.
55 Dr. Caroline Jackson, MEP, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.40; Collins and
Earnshaw, 1993, p.226,
56 Collins and Earnshaw, 1993, p.226.
57 Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.16.
58 Simon and Rigaux, p.293.
59 Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.13.
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implementation of Community directives is often abused by the Member States with the
result that improper implementation, both formal and practical is extremely common^.
Given the awkwardness of directives, a wider use of another authoritative Community
instrument, the regulation, has been suggested61. Although in recent years a trend can be
discerned to resort more frequently to regulations6-^, they are still rarely used in
environmental matters63. The main advantage of regulations64 is that they do not require
implementing legislation and must be applied as they are63. The Commission itself holds the
opinion that regulations would, in some cases, "contribute to transparency and the sound
application of the rules, without adversely affecting the features of national legal or
administrative systems"66 although it continues to resort principally to directives.
6U Kramer, Focus..., p. 195.
61 Particularly as the legal bases most commonly used for environmental legislation,
Articles 130s and, more rarely, 100a, since the Treaty of European Union no longer dictate
which legal instrument to use.
63 Collins and Earnshaw, 1993, p.226.
63 Being reserved here principally:
- to implement obligations derived from international conventions (such as the CITES
implemented by regulation 3626/82; OJ 1982 L384);
- to regulate matters between the Community and third countries (such as Regulation
2219/89 OJ 1989 L211/4 on exportation of foodstuffs following a nuclear accident);
- to establish a Community-wide response, as for example, to prohibit certain
activities deemed unacceptable (for instance, Regulation 3254/91 on leghold traps, OJ 1991
L308/1);
- or to establish Community institutions (e.g. Regulation 1210/90 (OJ 1990 L120/1) on
the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European environment
information and observation network) or financial instruments (e.g. Regulation 1872/84, on
financial support for clean technologies, et cetera, OJ 1984 L176).
64 Article 189 EEC: "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States".
65 Case 93/71 Leonesio v Italian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1972 ECR 287 at
para.22.
66 Com(93)256 final, "Reinforcing the Effectiveness of the Internal Market" at p.12. The
examples referred to concern the consolidation of directives in the form of a regulation where
provisions of a strictly technical nature and when the work of harmonization has been
completed in that area; and to simplify transposition of implementation measures of
directives where the national systems have already been adapted as part of the
transposition of the requirements of the directive, such as those implementing the procedures
for intervention in the areas of veterinary or plant health rules.
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The Choice of Directives examined:
The implementation and enforcement of two directives are investigated here in order to
narrow the scope of the thesis while providing consistent examples and points of reference
that can be followed throughout the research. The directives that have been selected are the
Environment Impact Assessment directive (EIA85/337)7! and the Large Combustion Plants
directive (LCP88/609)77. Being very different types of legislation, it is hoped that they will
illustrate a wide range of problems in implementation and enforcement and permit broader
conclusions. Also, as Macrory has pointed out73, where directives are market driven (have
significant implications for the competitive position of similar industries, such as
LCP88/609), competing companies tend to be vigilant with each other. On the other hand,
procedural-type instruments such as the EIA85/337 pose a much greater challenge for
implementation and enforcement.
Environment Impact Assessment directive: The aim of the first directive, EIA85/337, is to
ensure that public authorities of all Member States take into account the possible harmful
environmental effects of large projects prior to granting planning permission or authorisation,
and to encourage them to prescribe measures to minimise these. The scope of its application is
among the widest in environmental law: it affects many areas of public intervention —
transport, town planning, public works -- as well as a vast number of initiatives taken by the
private sector. Thus it represents an approach to harmonisation that cuts across several
sectors — a horizontal approach, in Community jargon. Used effectively, it has the potential
to be an important tool of environmental protection, since its goal is to integrate
71 EIA85/337, OJ 1985 L175/40 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private projects on the environment.
LCP88/609, OJ 1988 L336/1, on the limitations of emissions of certain pollutants into
the air from large combustion plants.
73 Macrory, R., "The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law Against Member States,"
Conference: The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom, London, 3
November 1995.
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environmental concerns into the execution of other policies that are usually at the root of
environmental damage.
The directive's preamble notes that the rule is intended to put into practice the
Preventive Principle as put forth by the first three Environmental Action Programmes74, and
subsequently, Article 130r(2) as added by the Single European Act. It stresses that the most
effective environmental policy consists of preventing pollution from occurring rather than
expending resources on cleaning up pollution after the fact, typically more difficult and less
fruitful. To that end, it seeks to require authorities to "take effects on the environment into
account at the earliest possible stage in all the technical planning and decision-making
processes"7^ (although it never actually requires that harmful projects be prevented7^.)
The interest of a rule such as EIA85/337 lies also in that it touches upon many of the issues
inherent to the Community's approach to environmental regulation. It is a procedural
measure: the obligation involves not a specific result, but rather a process that must be
undertaken, involving the intervention of a variety of actors, both public and private.
Implementation of the directive depends to some extent upon the involvement of an informed
public; it therefore extends procedural rights to the public to be consulted and to give their
opinion at a certain stage of the process. Furthermore, since the value of the public's input
74 Council Declaration on the programme of action of the European Communities on the
environment, OJ 1973, C112/1 (First EAP). It introduced the objectives and principles of the
Community Environment Policy, among them: that the environment be taken into account in
early stages of town planning, land use and other decision-making processes; that scientific
knowledge be improved; that action be taken at an appropriate level (from local to
international); the need for cooperation at the global level; and in accordance with
Stockholm Principle 21, that care be taken to ensure that activities in one state do not cause
damage in another.
The second EAP (OJ 1977 C139/1), while reiterating the principles and objectives of
the first, shifts somewhat more towards prevention and for the first time mentions the
desirability of environmental impact assessments. (See also Rehbinder and Stewart, p. 18;
Brusasco, M-K., and Kiss, A-C, p.320. )
The third EAP (OJ 1983 C46/1 places emphasis on the development of a more
encompassing approach to environmental protection, whilst for the first time the integration
of environmental considerations in the Community's other policies is mentioned.
75 Preamble, EIA85/337, OJ 1985 L175/40.
76 Chapter 1, point 2.5.1. Adopted version.
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depends largely on its level of information, the practical implementation of EIA85/337 is
affected also by another area of Community concern: the right of individuals and associations
to access environmental information, as required by directive 90/31377 and whether in
practice its implementation has proceeded smoothly.
More technical details are also worthy of note. EIA85/337 was adopted prior to the
inclusion in the Treaty of legal bases specific to the environment. The directive reflects a
move towards achieving Community objectives in the sphere of protection of the environment
and quality of life, as put forth in Article 2 of the Treaty78. Article 23579 (for action
necessary to attain Community objectives where the Treaty has not provided the. necessary
powers) was one of the legal bases relied upon.
In addition to these motivations, economic grounds more closely relevant to the European
Economic Community provided a central justification for developing environmental policy
and law, and proved useful here. Variations in national environmental legislation and in the
costs incurred by businesses implementing it have the power to distort competition.
Community legislative intervention, on the basis of Article 10080, was justified in order to
" Directive 90/313 (OJ 1998 L158/56).
/ S Article 2 Treaty: "The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous
and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between the States belonging to it."
Moreover, the first Environmental Action Programme asserted in its preamble that
these "cannot now be imagined in the absence of an effective campaign to combat pollution
and nuisances or of an improvement in the quality of life and the protection of the
environment," adding that "particular attention will be given to intangible values and to
protecting the environment so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind";
First EAP,C112/1,5.
79 Though significantly wider than Article 100, Article 235, used often in early
Community environmental rules, does not cover everything: a link must still exist with the
operation of the Common Market, although this need not be 'direct'. Unanimity is again
required although the legislative form is not limited to the directive; rather the Council is
authorized to take 'appropriate measures'.
8^ Article 100 was initially interpreted as authorising approximation of laws only in
response to a member state's legislation; accordingly much of the initial Community
legislation regarding environmental matters based on Article 100 came in reaction to a
unilateral move by a Member State. For example, Directive 70/220 on air pollution from
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approximate national measures and to preserve the internal market's "level playing field".
Compared to other environmental rules, EIA85/337 is relatively inexpensive to implement
(independent consultants have judged the cost of EIA to be between 5% and 10% of total project
design, excluding actual construction8^). Nonetheless, the Commission points out that
"disparities between laws in force in various Member States...may create unfavourable
competitive conditions and thereby directly affect the functioning of the Common Market."82
Consequently, EIA85/337 was adopted using Article 100 as its other legal basis.
Large Combustion Plants directive: The second directive followed throughout this work,
LCP88/609, contrasts with EIA85/337 in that it corresponds to a more traditional sectoral, (in
Community terms 'vertical') approach: it affects principally one industry, the energy
industry, and is thus narrow in its immediate scope. It aims to address the problem of acid
precipitation by progressively reducing emissions of SO2, NOx and dust particles produced by
the operation of large combustion plants.
Whereas EIA85/337 puts the Preventive Principle into practice, a point of interest with
LCP88/609 is that it arguably gives effect to the Precautionary Principle83. Ecological
problems can be such that their treatment cannot wait until science offers conclusive evidence.
Acid precipitation, the targeted problem of LCP88/609, was known to be closely linked to
emissions of SO2 and NOx84 although the complex reactions in the atmosphere that these
motor vehicles (OJ 1970 L76/1, Special English edition at p.171) cites German and French
regulations due to enter into force.
81 Com(93)28, p.85; the Commission itself has said that "[o]nly in exceptional cases for
small projects requiring heavy capital investment will they be more than 1% of the total cost
of the project; Com(93)575, p.5.
32 Preamble, EIA85/337, OJ 1985 L175/40.
83 Nor formally incorporated by the TEU into Article 130r(2)EC: "Community policy on
the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of
situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay...".
84 That acid deposition causes damage was apparently well enough understood in the
1950s to inspire Britain's tall stack policy. Emitting gases at a higher point, the policy
shielded local towns and forests from the effects of acid precipitation. However, sulphur
dioxide has the capacity to travel long distances, as indicated by the OECD/Nordic
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underwent, requiring the presence of oxidants, was "far from well understood"85. In a case
such as this, where more perfect knowledge cannot be awaited, the goal must be to apply the
precautionary principle in making the best use possible of the data available even if full
certainty is impossible. This is not explicitly stated in the preamble of LCP88/609, which
simply says that "...the damage to the environment owing to air pollution makes it urgent to
reduce and control emissions from new and existing large combustion plants." However, in fact
a precautionary approach seemed justified and had been taken in the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, to which LCP88/609 gives effect86.
LCP88/609 was proposed prior to the Single European Act, but adopted after the SEA had
added to the Treaty a title on the environment8^ as well as Article 100a, to be applied in
derogation from Article 10088. Although the two fundamental reforms of the Single European
Act, qualified majority voting and the co-operation procedure, were not included in the
Environment Title's Article 130s8^, they were stipulated in Article 100a. This directive
illustrates the practical effect of the new procedural choices offered by the SEA that affect
both institutional involvement in the preparation of legislative texts, and in turn, the
quality of the rules, introducing new tensions between Community institutions.
Council's research (1977). Not surprisingly, in the late 1960s Norway and Sweden grew
concerned about the decline of fish in their inland waters and by the damage to their forests
which had been attributed to the long-range transport of industrial emissions produced.
85 HL Select Committee on the European Communities, 22nd Report Session 1983-84,
"Air Pollution,"at p.ix (HL Air Pollution Report, 1983-84).
86 To which the Community is party; Decision 81/462 (OJ 1981 L171/11).
8^ Title VII (now Title XVI), Articles 130r-130t.
88 Thus the use of Articles 100 and 235 became largely obsolete in the area of
environmental protection.
y'l> Article 130s EEC authorizes the Council to legislate within the limits set in the
previous article, still on a unanimous basis, unless it agrees — unanimously — to act on a basis
of qualified majority.
Significantly, the Council must consult the European Parliament, a procedure less
onerous than cooperation. However, disregard of even so limited a power as this (which may
amount to no more than the Council's waiting for an opinion from the Parliament) will render
the measure so adopted void (Case 138/79 Roquette Freres 1980 ECR 3333 at para 33). By
limiting the legal effect of Parliament's often perspicacious remarks, use of Article 130s as a
base for most environmental legislation adopted during this period affected the quality of
legislation.
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As seen with the relatively inexpensive EIA85/337, before the SEA the Commission was
disposed to be generous in seeing implications for competition which would justify use of
Article 100 as a base, since this bolstered the competence of the Community to regulate the
matter. From the point that Article 100a was adopted, stipulating vote by qualified majority
and increasing Parliament's role, it became more expedient occasionally to play down the
link to competition, and to use Article 130s, requiring unanimous voting and only consultation
with Parliament90. Notably, in the large combustion plant proposal a good deal of attention
was given in the preamble to the distortion of competition:
Whereas there are disparities between the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
concerning the obligations imposed in respect of large combustion plants which are liable to create
unequal conditions of competition and thus have a direct effect on the common market; whereas,
therefore, approximation of the laws in this field is required, as provided for by Article 100 of the
Treaty 9T
As the ECOSOC pointed out, the directive "may influence the cost of energy and of products
with a high energy content, thereby affecting competitiveness on world markets and
employment opportunities"92. However, by the time the final version was elaborated, under
the SEA, mention of competition had disappeared. Given Member State sensitivity towards
issues of sovereignty especially where energy is concerned, such a directive could only
realistically be envisaged using a unanimous vote: it was adopted on the basis of Article 130s.
This can appear somewhat incongruous, since LCP88/609 is one of the Community's most
expensive pieces of environmental legislation93 and certainly could affect competition.
90 In fact, Article 100a EEC has been used very sparingly in environmental legislation to
date, in such directives as those on exhaust from motor vehicles (for instance Directive
88/436, OJ 1988 L214/1 on emissions of pollutants from diesel engines; and Directive 88/77 OJ
1988 L36/1, on gaseous and particulate pollutants from diesel engines) and (after litigation:
Case 300/89 Commission v Council 'Titanium Dioxide' 1991 ECR 2867) the Titanium Dioxide
Directive (Directive 89/428 on the harmonisation of pollution reduction programmes).
91 Com(83)704 final, OJ 1984 C49 /1.
92 Economic and Social Committee opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the
limitation of emissions of pollutants into the air from lare combustion plants, OJ 1985 C25/33,
point 2.2.2.
93 See Chapter 1, point 2.1. at Consideration of costs.
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Adopted after the accession of new Member States, LCP88/609 further illustrates an
approach based on variable geometry, in that different goals are set according to the
capability of each Member State94. Because it affects the energy industry, it can have serious
repercussions for many other industries. Of the two Member States studied here, Spain is
particularly sensitive to this fact.
5. The Choice of Member States:
An in-depth examination of the Fifteen Member States is not feasible here. Two Member
States, France and Spain, have been chosen as case studies, largely because of their
disparities, in the hope that a wider range of problems will thus come to light. An initial
difference regards their membership in the Community: France was one of the original
members, and has therefore participated in all the negotiations for environmental
legislation adopted to date; Spain joined only in 1986, and acceded to a body of environmental
law that had been elaborated without its input (e.g. EIA85/337), although it participated in
the formulation of subsequent rules (e.g. LCP88/609).
Environmental Disposition: A starting point in the selection of these two states was
provided by various sources which point to the differences in the perceived disposition (a
criterion that is admittedly not quantifiable) of Community states regarding implementation
See Chapter 1, point 2.5.2.
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of Community environmental law95. France fell into a group of Member States96 that are
average: that neither cause particular difficulty nor show particular enthusiasm with regard
to their Community environmental obligations. Spain97, on the other hand, fits a more
Mediterranean pattern; traditionally environment pulls up the rear of a long list of national
priorities and implementation of Community environmental directives has suffered as a
result98. Furthermore, Southern states see much of Community environmental policy as a
response to primarily Northern problems, and resent it as such99. (Such criticism has been
levelled at LCP88/609, since acid rain was indeed a problem affecting mostly Northern
Member States, although Southern States have certainly contributed to it.) Spain is the most
frequent objector on these grounds, indicating a fundamental disagreement on environmental
policy goals among the Member States100.
95 Klatte, 1991, pp.45-47; also JOHNSON, S., and CORCELLE, G., The Environmental Policy
of the European Communities, Graham & Trotman, 1989, at p. 8.
No examples were taken from the most progressive group: Denmark, the Netherlands
and Germany (the Scandinavian Member States had yet to join at the time). The Member
States that are regarded as the most recalcitrant before what they appear to regard as the
over-intrusiveness of EC measures in the area (the United Kingdom and Ireland) have also
been avoided.
Furthermore, although the categorisation is taken as a point of departure and of
interest in the initial selection, it is not necessarily a factor in the discussion to follow. The
point is not to attempt to discover which country is "best" in applying Community law; the
classification was simply taken to indicate that the problems experienced are different in
each case.
96 Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy fell into the same category (other authors would tend
to place Italy in the same group as Spain, Portugal and Greece; see generally Cini, M., Porter,
M., and Pridham, G., "Environmental standard setting and the Single European Market:
Southern Europe as a Special Case?" in The Evolution of Rules for a Single European Market,
Part II: Rules, Democracy and the Environment, Proceedings from the COST A7 workshop in
Exeter, U.K. 8-11 September 1994, ed. David Mayes, European Commission D-G Science,
Research and Development 1995, at p.306).
9 7 Joined by Portugal and Greece.
98 Spain consistently has one of the highest figures of presumed infractions of
Community environmental rules: in 1989 Spain had 125 presumed infractions, as compared
with 57 in France and 190 in the United Kingdom; in 1990 the figures were 129 (Spain ), 49
(France) and 126 (UK ); in 1991, 83 (Spain), 50 (France) and 70 (UK); in 1992, 115 (Spain), 49
(France) and 131 (UK); in 1993, 103 (Spain), 31 (France) and 64 (UK); see Eleventh Report
1993, OJ 1994 C154/59.
99 Aguilar, Susana, "Corporatist and Statist Regimes in Environmental Policy: German
and Spain,"2 (1993) Environmental Politics 223, p.232.
100 Cini, Porter, Pridham, 1995, pp.312-13, 315.
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Economic strength: Most environmental problems can be traced to an economic source or
activity!^. The level of economic (industrial, commercial) activity determines, in part, the
nature of the environmental damage caused. More significant in the choice of these two
Member States was that differences in economic power lead to variations also in a Member
State's willingness to commit significant national resources to the environment or to take
environmental decisions that negatively affect economic interests. The latter, in turn, greatly
influences the implementation and enforcement of environmental law. Less-industrialised
than many other Member States, Spain has faced a particular challenge: upon entering the
Community in 1986, an enormous effort was necessary to adapt to EC requirements. Attaining
this goal was made still more difficult because, simultaneously, Spain was continuing its
efforts to adapt to recent internal territorial divisions^02 and was emerging from an
industrial crisis and engaging in the conversion of industry^03.
The variation in economic strength of the two States chosen also gives rise to a difference
in access to European funds. The Community generally has made efforts to help remedy the
problem of insufficient financial resources to meet the costs of implementing environmental
rules by providing access to a variety of Community funds (particularly the Cohesion
Fundl^4). However, as Aguilar points out, referring to a 'widespread rumour' that only 20% of
101 Kerry Turner, R., Pearce, D., Bateman, I., Environmental Economics: An Elementary
Introduction, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994, at chapters 1-6.
I®2 Indeed, the existence of a single Community law has helped harmonise across
autonomous communities.
103 Estevan Bolea, 1991, pp.183,228; Double, M.B., p.5.
104 Partially because Spain insisted on the creation of a specific fund independent of the
Structural Funds; Aguilar, p.232.
Spain shall receive a total of ECU 32,810 million between 1994-99 (at 1994 prices).
The Cohesion Fund has allocated some ECU 15.15 billion to Spain, Greece, Ireland and
Portugal): Spain consistently receives the lion's share, between 52% and 58% of the total;
Eurostat, Europe in Figures, 4th edition, 1995.
In fact the Cohesion Fund covers not only environment projects but also projects of
trans-European transport; the latter have been controversial from an environmental
perspective; (see Chapter 6, point 2.6. Practical illustration — Tunnel du Somport) and more
recent plans to make the longest trans-Alpine tunnel between France and Italy, through the
Mercantour national park, where wolves have recently returned; The Observer, Sunday 25
August 1996, p.16.
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the Cohesion fund money will be used for conservation, "...the arrival of Community money
does not necessarily mean that the state of the environment will improve."1
Internal structure and environmental administration: Variations in their internal
structures also influenced the choice of states. France's structure remains highly centralised
despite significant efforts in the early Eighties to extend power and a measure of
independence to territorial collectivities beyond the centre. Spain's system is quasi-federal in
structure and significant tension exists between the centre and periphery; its seventeen
autonomous communities vary among themselves in degrees of autonomy.
Administrative differences are also significant in the two Member States. While France
has had a ministry of the environment since 1971, Spain's environmental activities, at the
national level, are still mainly overseen by a department within the Ministry of Public
Works, Transport and Environment (MOPTMA), a partnering where interests and priorities
necessarily collide on occasion.
Legislative structures and traditions: These influence the manner in which the law is
applied; here also certain differences are relevant. For example, France possesses a separate
administrative court system; in Spain administrative procedures are heard before regular
courts. Other fundamental differences may be expected to have an effect on the subject of this
research, such as the fact that the Spanish Constitution, adopted two decades after the
French Constitution, includes a reference to the environment. However, although its
Constitution contains a reference to the environment, relatively little national environmental
law exists: environmental legislation is generally a recent import from the Community.
Public involvement: The level of public concern in each of the Member States is crucial to
environmental law, first because to some extent it is mirrored in political and legislative
priorities; also because so much of the effectiveness of environmental legislation depends
105 Aguilar, p.234. Furthermore, Community vigilance that funds will in fact be used to
improve the state of implementation of environmental rules is, as shall be seen, unreliable;
see generally Court of Auditors reports 3/92 and 4/94.
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upon public awareness, participation, and outcry, and on the public's willingness to invest
time and trouble into making a claim. Public involvement affects the number and force of
environmental associations, in turn putting pressure on the government. Again differences are
apparent: along with many other Western European countries, France experienced a surge in
environmental interest in the Seventies106. Spain, more isolated from the rest of Europe at
the time, did not have the activism of the Seventies to apply pressure for the creation of
environmental rules107; public interest and involvement in environmental protection is a
recent phenomenon.
As for public participation in environment associations, France can be considered average.
In Spain on the other hand, the structure of participation in environmental associations
impedes effective empowerment: generally, "...mass attitudes continue to rest very much on
assumptions about the incompatibility of economic growth and environmental protection."108
Although social preoccupation with environmental matters has grown in recent years10^,
membership in environmental organisations (0.4% of the adult population) is lower than the
European average (4%)110; 75% of the environmental organisations have fewer than 200
members. Moreover, lack of resources strangles the activities of these associations: in 1991
only 15.4% of these organisations were able to remunerate personnel111; this in turn, has a
restrictive effect on the judicial actions that can be pursued.
106 Pronier, Raymond et le Seigneur, V.J., Generation Verte: Les ecologistes en
politique, Presses de la Renaissance, 1992.
107 Cini, Porter, Pridham, 1995, p.308.
108 Ibid., p.317.
109 Bano Leon, p.613; Cini, Porter, Pridham, 1995, p.315.
110 Double, Mary Beth, "Spain Confronts Environmental Issues," 113 (1992) Business
America 5, p.5.
111 MartIn mateo, Ramon, Tratado del Derecho Arnbiental, vol.1, Editorial Trivium,
Madrid, 1991, p.159.
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6. 'Upstream' and 'Downstream' Problems:
Finally, problems of implementation and enforcement identified at Community and
Member State levels are divided into two categories. Those problems that can be traced back
to the general context, or to the process of formulation of Community rules and thus flow from
the administrative situation and the quality of the legislation produced are referred to as
'upstream problems'. In a study of implementation and enforcement, it may appear
incongruous to insist upon these issues. However, it is argued here that certain problems of
implementation and enforcement originate prior to the actual application of the rules.
Difficulties of the environmental administration affect its efficiency in using environmental
rules. Moreover, effective implementation and enforcement cannot be divorced from the
quality of formulation of both environmental policy and rules112. As stated in the Fifth EAP,
"[fjor the foreseeable future...the likelihood is that the effectiveness of implementation will
be closely related to the quality of the measures themselves and of the arrangements for their
enforcement."112
Problems that more obviously emerge during the process of properly implementing
Community rules (i.e., national transposition or 'formal implementation'114, and practical
implementation); and that arise during their enforcement are considered 'downstream
problems'.
112 PE 116.085, 1988, at p.39; Chemical Industries Association, cited House of Lords Select
Committee on the European Communities, 1991-92; HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.9.
113 OJ 1993 C138/80.
114 Although national transposition could be considered legislative formulation at
national level and therefore an 'upstream' problem (particularly France's EIA rules, which
were adopted prior to the Community's EIA85/337), from the Community perspective they
constitute formal implementation and are therefore classified for the purposes of this
research among the 'downstream' problems. This is further supported by the fact that, where
adopted to transpose Community rules, some shortcomings flow from inconsistencies in the
Community legislation.
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PART I: COMMUNITY LEVEL
CHAPTER 1: Upstream problems -- Administration, Legislative Formulation and Decision¬
making
1. Community Environmental Administration — an indication of priority
2. Community Legislative Formulation — Actors' Interventions:
Actors' Interventions:
2.1. Commission:




Proposals to receive attention:
Compromise:
Lack of expertise in the matter regulated:
Inertia:




2.4. Court of Justice:
Competence to adopt environmental rides:
Choice of legal basis - Quality of the rules:
2.5. Practical Illustrations — The Evolution of the EIA85/337
and LCP88/609
2.5.1. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive:
Proposed version:
Adopted version:
2.5.2. Large Combustion Plants Directive:
Proposed version:
Adopted version:
3. Decision-making in other areas — Integration of environmental protection into
other Community policies:





1. Community Environmental Administration — an indication of priority:
Prior to examining decision-making and legislative formulation, attention must be drawn
to an initial upstream factor that significantly affects the Commission's ability to carry out its
varied tasks: the Community's environmental administration, which reflects the fundamental
subordination of environmental protection to other concerns. As shall be seen below, the priority
accorded the environmental administration, in terms of resources and authority, have a
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fundamental impact not only on legislative formulation, but also on monitoring compliance^ and
on the manner in which discretion is used in enforcement proceedings2.
Initially a small environment and consumer protection service in DG-III (Internal Market
and Industrial Matters) was entrusted with environmental protection. This became a
Directorate General in 1981, to which civil protection was later transferred from DG-V3. It is
now the Directorate-General for Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear Safety, DG-XI.
It had a difficult time imposing its authority^:
the task force that preceded the formation of DG-XI was originally so weak that it sought the
support of the NGOs and mobilised and supported them in order to defend itself. He (a Commission
official) believed that without NGO support, DG-XImight have died in its early years.3
More than two decades after the Stockholm conference, still
environmental departments are not heavyweight political actors. Though growing in importance in
the 1980s the environmental portfolio of the Commission is still relatively junior, whereas those
directorates-general responsible for the development of the single market programme were at the
traditional centre of the Commission's activities - finance and industry.8
Theoretically the position of DG-XI has been strengthened with relation to the other
Directorates since the adoption of the principle that environmental policy be integrated into
other policies2, although it is still considered to be less influential within the Commission
than other Directorates General8. The Danish Bottles case is frequently cited as a triumph for
Community environmental policy; yet Weale and Williams^ make the important point that
the fact that a case was brought against Denmark at all (regarding its stricter drinks packaging
rules) was the result of a power struggle within the Commission that DG-XI lost to DG-III. Still
in the 1990s DG-XI is subjected to upheaval: until recently DG-XI's largely autonomous Legal
Affairs Unit had considerable independence in its investigations and pursuit of complaints and
3 See Chapter 2.
2 See Chapter 3.
3 Williams, R., p.354.
4 Apparently the same is true of the Council of Environment Ministers; Wurzel, 1996
JEPP, p.274.
5 Mazey and Richardson, 1993, p.121.
6 Weale, Albert and Andrea Williams, "Between Economy and Ecology? The Single
Market and the Integration of Environmental Policy," in A Green Dimension for the EC?, David
Judge editor, 1993, p.58.
7 Article 130r(2)EEC.
8 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., p.223; Aguilar, p.228.
9 Weale and Williams, 1993, p.59.
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infringements. However, in a controversial administrative reorganisation in 1994, proposed
during the absence of the Director General, the Legal Affairs Unit has been moved to DG-XI's
Directorate B111. Now in order to process complaints, the director of Directorate B, who has
political functions as well as legal, must give approval11.
Besides its impact on administrative functioning, with the ideological subordination of
environmental protection comes an unwillingness to encroach on other interests for the
environment's benefit. Administration of the Structural Funds1^ is but one of the examples of
environmental ideology not being deeply enough entrenched to compete with other interests.
Indeed, the problem is not that inadequate integration of environmental protection has gone
unnoticed at the Community level13. Yet even where the problem is acknowledged and possible
solutions have been identified, the Commission (its diverse Directorates General) and Council
appear reluctant to resort to them. For instance, the Commission has the power to suspend
payment on Structural Fund projects that have been found to inadequately integrate
environmental considerations and has threatened to use it. However, "[t]he political pressure
on the Commission is, in such cases extraordinarily high and, until now, no case has arisen
where the Commission did not agree, in the end, to (co)finance the project."14
The fact that DG-XI is one of the youngest administrative sections, and that its many tasks
outstrip its resources is a consideration that must be kept in mind, and will be referred to in more
depth where appropriate.
2. Community Legislative Formulation — Actors' Interventions:
The problems encountered in the development of legislation and the faults of the decision¬
making process have a significant impact on the legislation's quality15. Where the technical
or scientific background of directives is lacking or costs are inadequately foreseen, legislation
10 Water and air protection, nature conservation and civil protection.
11 Williams, R., pp.354-57.
12 Below, point 3.
13 It has been noted in the Task Force on Environment and the Internal Market, by the
Court of Auditors and in several EP Resolutions (Collins: B3-1765; Harrison: A3-0170/92; Von de
Vring: A3-0209/92).
14 Kramer, Casebook, 1993, pp.407,434.
15 Cf: question ecrite 1584/87 "Inintelligibilite du droit communautaire" (OJ 1988
C296/15).
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may be impractical, if not impossible to implement. In the event that legislation contains
ambiguities, problems of implementation may be more due to uncertainty regarding the
obligations than ill-will on the part of Member States. Where too much room for interpretation
exists, harmony across the Union is threatened. A state of uncertainty may persist until (if
ever) the ECJ is called upon to interpret the meaning of the provision that the actors in the
formulation process were unable or unwilling to lay down unequivocally, a situation which, in
the light of legal certainty, cannot be viewed as acceptable.
This section reviews the difficulties encountered, or indeed caused by the European
institutions during the creation of environmental legislation, as illustrated by EIA85/337 and
LCP88/609. Finally, the formulation of legislation and policies in other areas of Community
policy and their effect on implementation and enforcement of environmental rules is examined.
A preliminary point should be noted. General problems of decision-making can arise even
before the Institutions intervene. The decision to regulate an environmental problem — and of
which problem to address -- is often more to do with politics than environmental or even human
well-being, as the development of LCP88/609 illustrates. In the Sixties and Seventies
widespread consensus among European nations emerged that the effects of acid precipitation
needed to be urgently addressed, and limiting emissions to the atmosphere of SO2 and NOx was
considered one method of doing so16. However, Germany and the United Kingdom, the
Community's principal emitters had earlier raised objections serious enough to rob a related
international convention of its force17. Only when Germany had a change of heart inspired by
its own newly discovered problems of forest die-back, did it appear reasonable to attempt to
address the issue at Community level.
16 See Introduction, point 4. at - Large Combustion Plants directive.
17 The Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention of the UN's Economic
Commission for Europe: 1979 signed by the USSR, Eastern Europe, the USA and Canada and
Western European states. The EEC later separately acceeded to the Convention: Decision
81/462, OJ 1981 L171/11. The Scandinavian countries wanted standstill clauses on sulphur
dioxide, which would then be progressively reduced. The USA, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom disagreed, with the result that the convention contains an
agreement for signatories merely to cooperate in reasearch and "endeavour to limit and, as far
as possible, gradually reduce air pollution." (Subsequent protocols containing more stringent
obligations have been adopted.)
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Actors' Interventions: Problems of implementation and enforcement may arise during the
decision-making process as proposed legislation passes from one Community Institution to the
next. These problems are examined as each Community Institution intervenes. While the
Commission's draft may contain shortcomings, it is considered that the most serious difficulties
arise during the legislation's passage through the Council. The role of the European Parliament
is briefly examined, both for its limited past input into the legislation, as well as its enhanced
(through co-decision) future input. Finally, although not widely associated with legislative
formulation, the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is not limited to enforcement and is
also considered.
2.1. Commission:
The EC Commission drafts legislation, thereby exerting an obvious influence on the quality
of environmental law and on the capacity to implement it18.
Flaws stemming from consultation procedures: The Commission has in the past been
frequently criticised for its approach to consultation regarding various aspects of the
legislation it proposes. For instance, some have commented on the dubious scientific quality of
certain environmental directives1^, which apparently varies according to medium20. Part of
the problem is the above-mentioned lack of scientific and technical data: as a consultant to DG-
XI put it, "We know that it is in bad shape. What we don't know, as of yet, is how bad it is."21
Part of the problem, though, is related to the manner in which the Commission approaches
consultation22. The Commission's scientific advisory committees are, reputedly, poorly
organised and furthermore are not accorded sufficient time to review the scientific substance of
18 Article 155 EC: "The Commission shall...have its own power of decision and
participate in the shaping of measures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in
the manner provided for in this Treaty".
DoE Memo, FIL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.15; PE 116.085,1988.
20 Water directives are apparently particularly affected; PE 116.085, 1988, at p.40. See
also Financial Times, 2 August 1993 "High Costs of Going Green."
21 Klatte, p.47.
22 On 2 December 1993, the Council restated the guiding principles for drafting and
implementation of the Community legislation by the Commission and the Member States,
particularly emphasising the need for legislation to be prepared and applied on the basis of
thorough consultation with all interested parties; Bull.EC 12-1993, p.73.
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the questions put to them23. Specifically in the instance of LCP88/609, the Commission's
consultation — allegedly limited to one consultant — was simply inadequate, even judged on the
basis of scientific information available at the time. The UK Minister on the Community
Environment Council who participated in the negotiations, William Waldegrave, commented
that "the Commission's study should have been produced and would have been largely taken
apart by other scientists. The report was produced by one consultant and it was not very
good."24 Likewise the Commission's acceptance of, and insistence on the causes of acid rain was
questioned, for although there was no doubt that SO2 and small doubt that NOx contributed to
acid rain, there were doubts as to the urgency of regulating these two specific substances,
particularly as the scientific community seemed to take a less alarmist view25. In recent years
the scientific content of proposed legislation has possibly improved26; however, earlier
legislation remains in force with such flaws intact.
Other groups with an interest in the Community's environmental legislation are also not
adequately consulted and the consultation process is, apparently, inconsistent and
contradictory27. When consultation of other organisations does take place, environmental
groups are generally not well represented, as compared to representatives of industry and trade,
a factor which may seriously jeopardise the protective elements of a given piece of
23 PE 116.085, 1988, p.40. They in turn have pointed out that the Commission is unwilling
to make efficient use of their capabilities, nor are their conclusions adequately published; also
PE 156.269 Staff Situation at Commission DGXI, rapporteur: Hemmo Muntingh.
24 William Waldegrave, Minister of State DoE, HL Eighth Report Session 1986-87,
"Fourth Environmental Action Programme" with evidence, p.86. (However, the United
Kingdom's fundamental objection to the legislation must be recalled.)
25 The HL Air Pollution Report, 1983-84, cites research that does not support the
hypothesis relating only sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides to the damage, but also a
secondary air pollutant: ozone (point 61). The British Forestry Commission suggested there is
not single cause to the problem and their experiments with acid rain produced few observable
results (points 64 and 69).
26 For example, Simon Ball commented on the scientific sensitivity of the provisions of
the recent Habitat Directive (Council Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats
and of wild fauna and flora, OJ 1992 L206/7); Ball, "Has the United Kingdom Government
Implemented the Habitat Directive?" Conference: The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the
United Kingdom, London, 3 November 1995.
Mazey, S., and Richardson, J., "Environmental Groups and the EC: Challenges and
Opportunities,"pp.111-13; and Collins, K., and Earnshaw, D., "The Implementation and
Enforcement of European Community Environment Legislation," p.223, both in A Green
Dimension for the EC?, David Judge editor, 1993.
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legislation3^. Environmental organisations are hard pressed to compensate for the lack of
consultation. Even those that do have resources and offices in Brussels3^ find it extremely
difficult to follow an issue or a single piece of legislation through each stage of the process;
they are usually unable to compete with industrial actors whose specific interests are
threatened by a certain piece of legislation30.
Ideally the Commission could enter into contact with those in national and regional
administrations who will be called upon to implement legislation. Their practical input prior
to adoption of legislation could perhaps help avert practical problems of implementation that,
to them, would have been obvious at the stage of formulation34. However, at present this
option is politically unlikely, as all contact with Member States is filtered through the State
representation in Brussels.
Another problem with consultation -- of scientific researchers, interest groups,
environmental agencies or Member State representatives — is that usually those consulted and
the substance of their advice are hidden from public scrutiny and criticism33. The
overwhelming consensus among the above groups33 is that the Commission needs to adopt both
a more systematic and a more transparent approach to consultation at the drafting stage. For its
part the Commission has indicated the ambition to regularise and improve its consultation
procedures34. It has adopted new rules on legislative drafting and committed itself to taking
38 KrAmer, Focus..., p.139; Boons, F. "Product-oriented Environmental Policy and
Networks: Ecological Aspects of Economic Internationalisation," in A Green Dimension for the
EC?, David Judge editor, 1993, at p.94. Preparation of Directive 85/339 (waste from liquid
beverage containers) took roughly a decade, and with the influence of groups with vested
interest during the 1970s and early 1980s, the final result is weak; Ludwig KrAmer, European
Environmental Law Casebook, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, at p.103.
29 Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, World Wide Fund and smaller organisations such as
Pesticide Action Network and Climate Action Network
30 Mazey and Richardson, 1993, p.123; kramer, Focus..., p.22; Aguilar, p.224.
3 1 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., p.224; Mr. Plowman, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92.
33 Van der Straaten, "A Sound European Environmental Policy: Challenges, Possibilities
and Barriers," in A Green Dimension for the EC?, David Judge editor, 1993, at p.72; PE 116.085,
1988, p.40;
33 See PE 116.085, 1988, p.39-40; HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.9; KrAmer, Focus...,
p.139.
84 Fifth EAP, p.81; Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Com(96)500, Communication from the
Commission: Implementing Community Environmental Law, point 51, p.17.
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increased care in the pre-proposal and drafting stages. It will consider including review clauses
and the requirement that sanctions be provided in certain legislative proposals33.
Consideration of costs: A sizeable problem during the formulation of legislation concerns the
inadequate consideration of the cost of subsequently applying that legislation. The issue bears a
direct link to legislative efficiency; it can be argued (and has been protested, as with
LCP88/609) that some legislation is too costly to implement36.
A wider vision of the enormous economic consequences of environmental legislation and the
financial implications of enforcing these rules in all Member States is needed3^. Although
frequently used as a pretext to avoid regulation of a particular matter, it is true that the
sometimes stunning costs of implementing legislation, and the effect on industries and companies
(which will pass the burden to consumers), as well as on the insurance and banking sectors, must
be kept in mind. Only after these are accurately calculated can the Commission realistically
weigh the economic feasibility of the proposed legislation against the desirability of the goals
to be attained or the standards set; "priorities must be established between competing
claims."3®
In addition to the issue of general costs of environmental legislation is the issue of 'variable
geometry' and accommodating the particular economic circumstances of certain Member States.
The Treaty requires that
When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Article 8a, the
Commission shall take into account the extent of the effort tnat certain economies showing
differences in development will have to sustain during the period of establishment of the internal
market and it may propose appropriate provisions.
If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a temporary nature and
must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the common market".
35 Commission, "Implementing Community Environmental Law," Communication to the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, 1996, at pp.14-20.
36 In the case of LCP88/609 is has been argued that a similar result could be achieved
through other than regulatory methods; see TURNER, PEARCE, and BATEMAN, 1994, at p.90.
37 A illustration of the price tag that can be attached to environmental legislation was
given by the United States Superfund to clean up contaminated land: the potential cost to the
Environment Protection Agency and the private sector is $300 billion (in 1990 dollars) over the
next 30 years, with the Defence and Energy departments facing liabilities of $200 billion;
Financial Times, 2 August 1993: "High Costs of Going Green", p.13.
Although not a Community example, the fear of a similar experience with other
environmental legislation sent tremors far beyond the United States' borders.
38 Financial Times, 2 August 1993: "High Costs of Going Green", p.13.
3 ^ Article 7c EC as amended by the TEU.
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The impact of the costs imbedded in environmental legislation has been softened, inter alia,
through such 'appropriate provisions' as extending help to the less prosperous Member States
(for example, through the Cohesion Fund411) and through use of directives with differing
requirements according to economic capability.
LCP88/609 illustrates both the broader issue of costs and the effort that has been made to
address the specific difficulties of less prosperous Member States. The original proposal was
unacceptable to Spain because its Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism (MOPU) estimated
the costs to involve 670,000 million pesetas investment in corrective measures, followed by an
additional 67,000 million per year in operation costs entailing an increase of 20-25% in the price
of the kilowatt hour41. The United Kingdom government also viewed the price tag for
LCP88/609 as unacceptably high42; they judged the Commission to have underestimated costs
by a factor of five43. The total cost to the Central Electricity Generating Board, they
calculated, would be £350 million per year with between £16 and £40 million required for
monitoring plant operations after 199544.
40 And through various other funds: Structural Funds (regional, social, EAGGF), and
programmes such as ACE, LIFE. Lack of solidarity of the wealthier Member States with these
is still criticised; Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer
Protection on the implementation of European Community environmental legislation, 6 January
1992 (A3-0001/92); Rapporteur: Jacques Vernier.
41 The costs of the legislation actually adopted have been estimated to require an initial
investment of 220,000 million pesetas, with operation costs of 19,033 million pesetas/year
entailing an increase of 0.307 pesetas per kilowatt hour, according to one estimate; valerio
Martinez de Muniain, E., La Legislacion Europea de Medio Ambiente: Su Aplicacion en
Espafla, Colex, Madrid, 1991, p.99; see also Sanz Sa, op.cit., p.425. Another source suggests that
the operation costs will be closer to 473,000 million pesetas per year; J.A. Azuara, Director of
CIEMAT, cited in martin Mateo, Ramon, Tratado del Derecho Ambiental, vol.11, Editorial
Trivium, Madrid,1992, p.353.
Estevan Bolea, 1991, pp.404-405: of total costs of electricity production, the cost of
limiting atmospheric pollution from solid residues can reach 20% (+/-8%) of annual costs when
purifying SO2 by 90%, NOx by 50%, and dust by 99.5%; if NOx must be reduced by more than
50%, the investment costs go up by 3% and the annual costs by 5%.
Generally, however doubts have been voiced about both original cost estimates and
those used today; estevan Bolea, op.cit., p.407.
42 Boehmer-Christiansen, S., and skea, J., Acid Politics, Belhaven Press, 1991, at p.238.
43 Although obviously not a disinterested party, the CEGB found that installing flue gas
desulphurisation (FGD) technology to the twelve largest emitters would be necessary to meet
the targets in the proposed directive. This would involve not only closing the plant in order to
install the systems, but also, they estimated, a capital outlay of about £1,430 million with an
associated loss of capacity of 663 MW. If this were to be replaced by a new coal-fired plant
with FGD, the additional cost would be £560 million.
44 HL Air Pollution Report, 1983-84, points 74, 78, 79, 81, and 86.
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Regarding the specific difficulties LCP88/609 posed for the economies of the newly joined
Member States, a solution was found by varying the required emissions reductions in view of the
differing problems and capabilities of the Member States45. In addition, several derogations
from emission limits are provided for Spain's large plants as well as "for plants burning
indigenous solid fuel."46
However, legislation such as this opens a debate on whether it is appropriate for a
Community that promotes a level playing field for economic actors to impose varying targets on
each State, or whether economic difficulties should — and do — trigger access to Community
funds while the same goals are maintained. Although less wealthy Member States indeed
have difficulty assuming the costs of implementing environmental legislation, the danger lies
in their reliance on widespread acceptance of the fact that their economies need to grow in
order to avoid taking environmental obligations seriously4''.
Lack of resources: On occasion the quality of legislative drafting suffers from the limited
staff, and legal issues are at times poorly defined or contradictory48. Drafting is largely in the
hands of administrators who may or may not have had any legal training; lawyers make a
tardy entry in the process4^. In 1991 Dr. Kramer reported that the Legal Unit of DG-XI had a
staff of only ten lawyers, four officials and six on secondment8^. In 1994 DG-XI disposed of about
a dozen full-time lawyers51. This is inadequate: they are responsible for legal advice on
45 For example, taking 1980 as a base, the calculated reductions of SO2 emissions from
existing plants for France are 40% for 1993, 60% by 1998 and 70% by 2003. For the same periods,
the United Kingdom must reduce emissions by 20%, 40% and 60%. Spain is allowed to maintain
its 1980 emissions without reduction in 1993; but required to reduce by 24% by 1998 and 37% by
2003; see LCP88/609, Annex I.
46 LCP88/609, Articles 5(2) and 6.
47 Ute Collier refers to a similar possibility with regard to carbon dioxide emissions;
Collier, op. cit., p.134.
Furthermore, certain economic advantages could eventually stem from the less-
industrialised situation: the potential exists to build initial structures using environment
friendly specifications, rather than investing to convert older infrastructure, and the
investment necessary to fund clean-up efforts may well be less than in industrialised Member
States, where economic activities have resulted in greater environmental harm.
48 Van der Straaten, op.cit., p.71.
49 Mr. Plowman, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, at pp.21-22; Collins and Earnshaw,
op.cit., pp.223-24.
50 Dr. Ludwig Kramer, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.2.
51 Interview, Dr. Kramer, 25 July 1994.
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drafting (as well as monitoring implementation52), and must grapple with the variety of legal
traditions and languages that make up the Community53.
2.2. Council:
The eventual deficiencies of the proposals that emerge from the Commission are often
unresolved when passed to the Council; some are aggravated during Council negotiations.
Composed of representatives of the Member States, the Council is where national interests are
expressed, sovereignty is defended, and where environmental interests are appropriately
balanced against other goals. Under the system established by the SEA, and for the most part
even with Maastricht's modifications, ultimate responsibility for the quality of environmental
legislation rests with the Council54.
Proposals to receive attention: An initial manifestation of the influence of the various
Member States lies in the selection of legislative proposals that are to receive the Council's
attention55. The attitude of the Member State currently presiding in the Council is a
determining factor in whether a proposal is examined or politely disregarded56. For instance,
Germany was the champion of LCP88/609 in its early stages57 and the turbulent negotiations
were only successfully concluded when the German Council presidency came up again years after
initial negotiations began. It was felt that only Germany had the authority to counter-balance
British opposition to the proposal5®; furthermore Germany's determination was reinforced by
the knowledge that the Council presidencies coming up after it (Greece and Spain) were highly
unlikely to consider this legislation a priority issue59.
52 Discussed in the following chapter.
53 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., p. 223; Dr. Ludwig Kramer, HL Ninth Report Evidence
1991-92, p.9. See Chapter 2, points 1. Commission's tasks; and 2. Commission limitations.
54 Although co-decision, introduced by the Maastricht amendments to the EC Treaty,
gives new importance to Parliament's intervention.
55 See for instance, Wurzel, K.W., "The Role of the EU Presidency in the environmental
field: does it make a difference which member state runs the Presidency?", 3 (1996) JEPP 272-91.
56 KRAMER, Focus..., p.143; Mazey and Richardson, 1993, pp.111-12; some would even argue
that Council presidency is 'the most important feature of the Council in terms of its agenda
setting; Weale, 1995, p.22.
57 After dropping its earlier objections; above, point 2.
5® The two had previously been allies in opposing legislation to curb acid rain, until
Germany's change of heart in 1982; Weale, 1995, p.20.
59 BOEHMER-CHRISTIANSEN, S., and SKEA, 1991, pp.244-45; Haigh, "New Tools...",
pp.30,32.
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Compromise: The Council is where national interests are articulated and defended; each
Member State tries to emerge from negotiations with legislation that is tailored to their
specific national situation. The process of compromise necessary to obtain consensus on a
proposal — also referred to as "horse-trading"60 and "emasculation of proposals by national
administrations in the Council of Ministers"6* -- is responsible for many of the shortcomings of
quality of environmental legislation. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, this negative national
influence was aggravated by the need to achieve unanimous consensus in environmental
matters62. Years of work and modifications between Commission, ECOSOC and European
Parliament, as well as a majority consensus in the Council could be undone by one Member State's
negative vote. Council representatives have therefore been willing to make large concessions to
avert this possibility and during negotiation, intergovernmental haggling can take place over
issues unrelated to the environment63. The result is that EC environmental legislation is at
times "vague, ambiguous, and sometimes superficial"64, and riddled with general clauses and
vague standards that pave the way, at the national level, for practices that are not
'environment friendly'65.
— Diversity of national interests across the Community: One aspect of the
pressures for compromise is the sum of the interests represented by the Twelve and now Fifteen
Member States in the Council. Trying to accommodate the cumulative national influences exerts
an obvious and powerful influence on the quality of the legislation that is adopted. The final
act must incorporate pro-environment Scandinavian interests; interests of the Mediterranean
states, which still popularly perceive the tensions between environmental and economic issues
60 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, in the House of Lords Ninth Report
"Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Legislation," Vol. I Report, p.9; Collins
and Earnshaw, op.cit., p.226.
61 OJ 1988 C94/155 at C94/156.
62 Between the Single European Act and the Maastricht modification to the EC Treaty,
the main exception to unanimous voting in the Council was for the rare measures adopted on the
basis of Article 100a, after the SEA. For the most part, however, the existing body of
legislation required a unanimous consent in the Council.
63 Committee on the Environment Report on the implementation of European Community
legislation relating to water, rapporteur: Kenneth Collins, PE Doc A2-298/87 (PE 116.085, 1988),
p.42. Klatte, op.cit., p.45; Collins and Earnshaw, op. cit., p.226.
64 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., pp.225, 243. The Commission has recognised that
unanimity was partly the cause of "measures that were difficult to put into practical
operation"; Fifth EAP, OJ 1993 C138/80; see also Van der Straaten, op.cit., p.71.
65 KrAmer, Focus..., 1992, p.19.
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as a zero-sum game, in which any potential environmental gains are necessarily subtracted from
their economic growth66; and all those in between. Moreover, basic national attitudes shift
according to issue and divisions do not always run along North-South lines: for example
Denmark and Greece found themselves allies in supporting higher vehicle emissions standards
although the other Members were prepared to reach agreement67.
- The Hierarchy of interests within individual Member States: Another factor
in achieving compromise is that within any one State ecological concerns may not be foremost
among national priorities68 and a specific environmental issue may be seen to raise particular
problems. Again a legislative proposal may unravel in the Council because it is not feasible
politically. This can entail abandoning a legislative project (as with the Carbon Tax proposal,
to which the United Kingdom and Spain objected69) or modifying its contents for certain
Member States significantly.
Maastricht has changed and complicated the voting rules. The need for unanimity is now
rarer and the influence of each single Member State has diminished. Nonetheless, it is likely
that measures similar to EIA85/337, with a significant impact on town and country planning
and land-use, or to LCP88/609, with its effect on energy policy, will continue to require a
unanimous vote under Article 130s(2)70 as modified by the TEU. And even where the need for
66 Cini, M., Porter, M., and Pridham, G., "Environmental standard setting and the Single
European Market: Southern Europe as a Special Case?" in The Evolution of Rules for a Single
European Market, Part II: Rules, Democracy and the Environment, Proceedings from the COST
A7 workshop in Exeter, U.K. 8-11 September 1994, ed. David Mayes, European Commission DG
Science, Research and Development 1995.
67 Weale, 1995, p.22.
68 pew environmental organisations have the resources necessary to influence national
bargaining positions; Collins, PE Doc A2-298/87, p.42.
69 Collier, Ute, "The European Union's climate change policy: limiting emissions or
limiting powers?" 3 (1996) Journal of European Public Policy 122-38, at pp.132,134.
7® Article 130s(2)EC: "By way of derogation from Aricle 189c, "the Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt:
- provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;
- measures concerning town and country planning, land use with the exception of waste
management and measures of a general nature, and management of water resources;
- measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy
sources and the general structure of its energy supply.
The Council may, under the conditions laid down in the preceding paragraph, define
those matters referred to in this paragraph on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified
majority."
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achieving compromise is not as extensive, with qualified majority vote, compromise continues to
influence the quality of legislation.
Lack of expertise in the matter regulated: Even where national priorities enable them to
put environmental concerns first, Environment Ministers may be expected to take decisions that
imply evaluation of scientific data that is not within their area of expertise71. The British
Minister on the Environment Council remarked:
"[tjhere has never been an occasion — I am sure it would be an offence against all proper
constitutional procedures within the Community — where the Council are addressed by scientists or
have a briefing by a scientist or anything of that kind, which normal Ministers holding
responsibilities in their countries would of course, always do."77
Costs: As with the Commission, the Council must also make a realistic appraisal of costs:
this is the stage at which it is appropriate to decide whether they should be incurred. Surprise
has been registered at the randomness of the Council's assessment of costs. One Environment
Minister believes that generally the Ministers "do not do enough in trying to set an agenda or
priorities which is based on a sensible application of not unlimited resources, not unlimited
patience in terms of the consumer or taxpayer73." Wider consideration of costs and specific
difficulties of individual States are inter-linked: a balanced approach to costs incorporated in
the legislation affects States' willingness and ability to implement and enforce an act, and
seeing that the goals are reasonably postulated will be a factor in the wealthier States'
willingness to contribute, via Community funds, for implementation in the less wealthy States.
Inertia: National representatives have shown reluctance to undertake significant
modifications of national policies and laws74 particularly if these are perceived as superior to
71 Wurzei, JEPP 1996, p.289.
77 Waldegrave, in HL Eighth Report Session 1986-87, p.86.
73 Ibid., p.85.
74 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., pp.224-5; Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.16. As the
Parliament's Committee on the Environment has pointed out, the "Drins" directive illustrates
the "tendency for Member States to seek to legislate only for what is already achievable". PE
116.085, 1988, p.46. During the adoption of a directive on toxic pesticides (aldrin, dieldrin,
endrin, isodrin) the UK sought a standard that would enable it to avoid the introduction of
quality objectives for drins and consequently, new measures to comply with these objectives. The
UK government suggested a 50ng/l limit rather than the 5ng/l proposed, in spite of the fact
that its own authorities considered that no safe level for drins existed and their use should be
discontinued.
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the Community legislation78. Re-aligning existing national measures and a traditional way of
implementing them in a given area in order to accommodate Community legislation may be
more strongly resisted than the introduction of absolutely new legislation7^. This was apparent
during negotiations of the EIA85/337. One source remarked at the time that "[a]s the Directive
fits no single national planning system exactly and would require adaptation on the part of all,
each Member State is interested in a final product which would cause the least amount of
disruption."77
Lack of concern for implementation: It is not the formal duty of the Council to directly
involve itself in the implementation and enforcement of Community rules and historically the
Council has not demonstrated particular concern for the subsequent application of legislation78.
Legal efficiency would perhaps improve if the adoption of an act were not viewed as the end of
the Council's involvement with it. Discussion of the actual progress of specific directives would
force ministers to take notice of practical issues of implementation and might lead them to
pressure one another regarding subsequent implementation79. Perhaps more realistically, it
would at least make them aware of the types of problems that arise when, due to insufficiently
tight phrasing of legal obligations, excessive discretion is left to Member States.
78 See Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.16: "This attitude appears relatively
widespread in Germany, the Netherlands, France and, to a certain extent in Denmark
(although here it is more often justified)."
76 Sheate, W.R. and Macrory, R.B., "Agriculture and the EC Environmental Assessment
Directive: Lessons for Community Policy-Making," 28 (1989) Journal of Common Market Studies
68, at p.78 (Sheate and Macrory, 1989).
77 Kennedy, W., "The Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment," 8 (1982)
Environmental Policy and Law 84-95. p.94. For instance, the Commission found France resisted
separating EIA procedures from elaborate planning authorisation and classified installations
schemes. This separation would have made the Commission's task of examining
implementation easier, but would have disrupted national procedures that had been in place,
in some instances for decades.
78 HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, pll, p.35. However, concern for practical effect has
more recently, received more attention: the Council Presidency meeting of Environment
Ministers at Amsterdam, 11-13 October 1991; European Council of Edinburgh Presidency
Conclusions, Europe no. 5878 Sunday/Monday 13/14 December 1992; Council Resolution of 29 June
1995 (OJ 1995 C188/1), on the effective uniform application of Community law and on the
penalties applicable for breaches of Community law in the internal market.
79 HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, Memorandum by the Institute for European
Environmental Policy, London p. 169. However, the Italian Embassy was lukewarm about the
idea, suggesting that the Council be notified only of major difficulties encountered in practical
application, p.232.
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Transparency: Finally, the extent of the above factors' impact is difficult to calculate since
obtaining information on what actually took place during negotiations of a specific piece of
legislation is difficult to obtain. Council minutes are confidential; this lack of transparency
contributes to concern that the substance of legal acts is being sacrificed in political swaps that
have little to do with the subject at hand80. (In fact, lack of transparency is one of the major
criticisms of the Community's entire legislative process81.)
Furthermore, a subsequent judicial interpretation of a provision sometimes emerges that
does not correspond to what was originally intended. As one minister pointed out: "...Ministers
are often surprised at where the competence appears to exist to do things which had not
occurred to anyone when these negotiations first took place."82 If interpretation of a directive
were at issue in infringement proceedings, one could imagine a situation (such as that of
EIA85 /33783) in which published minutes could be used to support a Member State's case, by
indicating what the representatives in the Council believed they were agreeing to. Although
the ECJ has ruled84 that declarations in Council minutes cannot be used in the interpretation of
Directives, a different view would perhaps be taken were the minutes published and therefore
available for Member States to rely upon in implementation. After a recent Court of First
Instance ruling85, condemning the Council for failing to exert its judgment on the matter of access
80 Collins and Earnshaw, op.cit., pp.225-26.
81 Kramer, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92; Klatte, 1991, p.45; Macrory, R., "The
Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical Issues," 19 (1992) CMLRev 347.
82 Mr. Heseltine, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.186.
83 Concerning Annex II, where agreement was possibly obtained only because the Member
States believed that assessment for the projects in this annex was wholly discretionary. The
Commission, however, subsequently indicated that it believed otherwise; below.
84 Case 429/85 Commission v Italy 1988 ECR 843, at para. 9: "It must be observed in this
regard that an interpretation based on a declaration by the Council cannot give rise to an
interpretation different from that resulting from the actual wording of the fourth indent of
Article 8(1) of the directive."
85 Case T-194/94 John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd, 1995 ECR 11-2765, at para.
73: "Those two letters show that the Council, when responding to the applicants' requests, did
not comply with the obligation of balancing the interests involved, laid down by Article 4(2) of
Decision 93/731; and para.78 "In light of the foregoing, it must be found that, as regards the
requests for access to the documents relating to the Justice and Agriculture Councils, the Council
failed to exercise its discretion in compliance with the relevant provisions as interpreted by
the Court...".
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to documents in conformity with relevant dispositions in effect, the Council was expected to
agree to publish minutes of meetings88. Progress here is still extremely slow8'7.
2.3. Parliament:
Limited role: It is widely felt that another problem of the Community legislative process is
that the most democratic and "greenest" of the EC institutions, the European Parliament, has a
beneficial contribution to make during the formulation of Community rules (as illustrated below
by its comments on the directives) but has had too limited a legislative role88 (as illustrated,
below, by the scant consideration given to its comments).
Parliament assiduously guards the formal role accorded it by the consultation and, later,
the co-operation (after the SEA) and co-decision (after the TEU) procedures. Pressure from
Parliament was a significant force behind the Single European Act generally, and specifically
behind the inclusion of the Environment Title89. Parliament has since promoted, not always
successfully9^, use of Article 100a and thereby its own role, in turn affecting the degree to which
its comments on draft legislation must be taken into account. This is important, for its comments
have at times foreshadowed issues which gave rise to problems in later application9^. Also, its
alert attitude has occasionally ensured that an element of environmental protection is
integrated into other policies during the formulation of legislation, as with the inclusion in the
Broadcasting Directive of the provision that "[television advertising shall not encourage
behaviour prejudicial to the environment"92.
86 Wolf, Julie, "EU code to end secret decisions", The Guardian, 2 October 1995, p.9.
82 Bates, Stephen, "Secretive EU institution forced to go public about not being open," The
Guardian, T7 November 1996; however, see also Commission, "The Week in Europe," 13
February 1997, WE/o6/97.
88 E.g., KrAmer, Focus..., p.214.
89 Judge, David, '"Predestined to Save the Earth': the Environment Committee of the
European Parliament," in A Green Dimension for the EC?, David Judge editor, 1993, at p.189.
90 Case C-155/91 Commission v Council 1993 ECR 1-939.
91 See the EIA and LCP directives, below.
92 Article 12e of the Broadcasting Directive (OJ 1989 L298/23).
It would be misleading to overstate the case however; numerous examples exist where
the Parliament's Environment Committee, in spite of its efforts, has failed to significantly
influence the outcome of the legislative process (Judge, 1993, at pp. 206-7). Furthermore, the
Parliament faces its own restrictions in terms of resources and the efficiency of Parliament's
work is generally perturbed by the constant shuttling between three physical locations (David
Martin, MEP, in a lecture given at the University of Edinburgh, 21 February 1994).
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The Maastricht Treaty has modified the relationships between institutions. Significantly,
Parliament's role has been enhanced: it has been given the power to co-legislate with the
Council through the procedures elaborated in Article 189b. Parliament has been extended the
power to definitively reject, by an absolute majority of its members, any Council proposal93
(under co-operation, a Parliament rejection could be overridden by the Council acting
unanimously). Parliament also has the power, possibly more important9^ to amend an act. This
procedure, referred to as "co-decision", can be hoped to improve the quality of environment
rules. However, as it is complex and potentially time-consuming95, dispute over correct legal
bases may also be encouraged96. Furthermore, this positive step in Parliament's legislative
involvement will not, of course, affect the existing body of legislation.
2.4. Court of Justice:
Competence to adopt environmental rules: Not typically associated with the formulation
of rules, the ECJ has nevertheless played an important role here. Prior to explicit legal
foundation for environmental rules in the Treaty, the ECJ supported Community competence to
formulate environmental rules at all, even where these could restrict competition, and despite
93 Article 189b(2)c EC: "...The European Parliament shall thereafter either confirm, by an
absolute majority of its component members, its rejection of the common position, in which event
the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted, or propose amendments in
accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph;" Article 189b (6): "...In this case, the act
in question shall be finally adopted unless the European Parliament, within six weeks of the
date of confirmation by the Council, rejects the text by an absolute majority of its component
members, in which case the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted."
It is interesting to note that where Parliament wishes to approve a Council text, no
provision is made, which is taken to mean that a mere majority of voting members is sufficient.94 Hartley, T., "Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement,"
42 (1993) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 213-37, p.225.
95 If the Parliament cannot agree to the Council's common position on a second reading of a
proposal, or if the Council cannot accept Parliament's amendments, a Conciliation Committee is
convened in which both institutions are equally represented. If the Conciliation Committee
cannot come to agreement, the act will be deemed not to have been adopted unless the Council
(Article 189b(6), acting by qualified majority, adopts it. In deference to co-decision, Parliament
then has six weeks in which to reject the text by absolute majority. In practice co-decision may
well take steps to address the "democratic deficit" while slowing the Community's gait down
to a plod. Also note here, that where Parliament's power has been heightened, the
Commission's has probably decreased: if the Council wishes to approve a Parliament
amendment that the Commission has rejected, it can simply wait three months and set up a
Conciliation Committee, after which it can adopt the text by a qualified majority even if the
Commission objects; Hartley, 1993, pp.225-6.
96 Below, point 2.4. Choice of legal basis — quality of the rules.
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the SEA, the dividing line between possible legal bases was not distinct, and the ECJ gave
important guidance in Case 45/86 Commission v Council^, in which it indicated that the
criteria for selecting a legal base must be objective and amenable to judicial review.
The adoption of the SEA increased the choices available by adding Articles 100a
(measures having as their object the establishment of the internal market) and 130s (actions
relating to the environment). The ECJ was again called upon to resolve disputes between
institutions as to the correct choice of legal basis. The quality of Community intervention
differed under the two articles: the principles outlined in Article 130r(2)102 and guidelines in
Article 130r(3)103 of the Environment Title were to shape legislation adopted on the basis of
o
101 Case 45/86 Commission v Council 1987 ECR 1493, regarding a choice between Articles
113 and 235, at para.11: "...the choice of legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an
institution's conviction as to the objective pursued, but must be based on objective factors which
are amenable to judicial review". At para. 13 it states further "It follows from the very wording
of Article 235 that its use as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other
provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the
measure in question."
The Court was also called upon to defend Article 100 (which also dictates the
legislative form, "directives"), as a legal basis for legislation with an environmental aspect
that would have an impact upon the undertakings required to adhere to its provisions: Case
91/79 Commission v Italian Rqjublic (Detergents) 1980 ECR 1099 at para 8.
102 Article 130r(2)EEC lays down the principles "that preventive action should be taken,
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter
should pay. Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community's
other policies."
Less forceful interpretations understand the provisions as mere guidelines for
Community environmental action rather than obligations; Vandermeersch, D., "The Single
European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community," 12 (1987)
European Law Review 407-29, at p.420 (Vandermeersch, ELRev 1987).
However, interpreting forcefully, Article 130r(2)'s principles have considerable
potential to protect the environment. For instance, the polluter pays principle is a critical
element in internalising the costs of environmental protection; strongly interpreted it could
entail an evolution towards a concept of strict liability (responsabilite sans faute) such as that
foreseen in the Commission's Green Paper on Remedying Environment Damage (Com(93)47).
From the principle that preventive action should be taken one could, interpreting forcefully,
deduce a legal obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment.
103 Article 130r(3)EEC requires that "In preparing its action relating to the environment,
the Community shall take account of: (i) available scientific and technical data; (ii)
environmental conditions in the various regions of the Community; (iii) the potential benefits
and costs of action or of lack of action; (iv) the economic and social development of the
Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions." The depth of
contemplation this implies during the formulation of legislative proposals is unclear.
Also, a situation could be imagined in which these considerations have consequences at
the enforcement stage: for instance, the cost-benefit provision could, theoretically, be used in
proceedings against a Community measure that is challenged on the basis of proportionality;
see Vivier Hannequin, p.227.
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Article 130s. For example, where Article 130s104 was used as a basis, the subsidiarity
principle405 required that Community action be more effective than that of Member States
acting separately.
On the other hand, Article lOOa40^ raises different types of issues. A positive requirement
is that Article 100a(3) stipulates that in matters regarding, inter alia, environmental
protection, the Commission "take as a base a high level of protection"407 in its proposals (but is
silent as to what happens to the "high level" in the final version). The implications for
implementation are clear: where a high level is embodied in legislation itself it follows that,
if properly implemented and enforced, a similarly high level exists in practice. Where Article
100a is used other important questions arise concerning, for instance, the modalities of the
possibility to derogate (Article 100a(4)408), and the consequence of this on uniform
implementation of the rules across Member States4— a primary concern, after all, of
legislation adopted on this basis.
404 Article 130sEEC: "The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall
decide what action is to be taken by the Community.
The Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph,
define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority."
405 Article 130r(4)EEC: "The Community shall take action relating to the environment to
the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at
Community level than at the level of the individual Member States. Without prejudice to
certain measures of a Community nature, the Member States shall finance and implement the
other measures."
406 Article 100a(l)EEC: "...The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission, in cooperation with the European Parliament and after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market."
407 In Article 100a(3)EEC. As with Article 130tEEC, the phrase was included for the
Member States that worried their superior environmental policies would be dragged to the
level of the least environmentally concerned; Vandermeersch, ELRev 1987, pp.417-19; Kramer,
SEA pp.669-80; Vivier Hannequin, p.229.
408 Article 100a(4)EEC opens the possibility for derogation from harmonization measures
where a Member State "deems it necessary" on grounds referred to in Article 36 or for reasons
pertaining to the protection of the environment or the working environment. The Member State
shall notify the Commission of the derogating national provisions. This article only applies to
measures based on Article 100a and actually adopted by a qualified majority.
4°9 For example, unlike Article 93 EEC (derogations regarding state aids; a Member State is
in breach of Article 93 EEC if it fails to notify of an aid plan, regardless of the decision the
Commission ultimately reaches on the compatibility of the plan with Community legislation),
Article 100a(4)EEC mentions no time limit for notification and therefore provides no incentive
for Member States to notify promptly, leading to legal uncertainty during the period where
national derogating provisions are unconfirmed; see Flynn, J. "How Will Article 100a(4) Work?
A Comparison with Article 93," 24 (1987) CMLRev 689-707, p. 700, who suggests that a
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Procedural requirements also differ between these bases. Unanimity was necessary with
Article 130s1111; a qualified majority sufficed with Article 100a111 and, with the latter,
Member States saw their individual voting power reduced. The articles further differ with
regard to the potentially time-consuming to-and-fro of co-operation with the EP, required only
with Article 100a. The impact of these choices on the quality of the act in question can be
significant.
Again the ECJ's rulings influenced the quality of formulation by providing guidelines on
institutional involvement: it has ruled that the choice of legal basis dictates the procedures to
be followed and is thus "capable of influencing the content of the measure. An incorrect choice of
legal basis, if established, would not therefore constitute a purely formal defect."112
The ECJ gave further guidance in the context of proceedings brought by the. Commission
when the Council attempted, unsuccessfully, to avoid resorting to Article 100a113. Legally,
Community measures must conform both to Community environment and competition policies;
therefore, since environment protection requirements must in any case be a 'component part' of
other Community policies, a Community measure cannot be covered by Article 130s simply
because it also pursues environmental objectives (Titanium Dzoxzde114). Likewise, the simple
"reasonable time" to review the provisions' compatibility is, as with Article 93, about two
months (p.703). Disagreemeent exists as to whether derogations can be sought only for national
measures adopted prior to Community harmonizing legislation: compare Flynn, op.cit., p.696
and Usher, op.cit., p.271; to Kramer, SEA, p.681.
110 Although the possibility existed for the Council to decide unanimously to vote by
qualified majority: Article 130sEEC, second indent.
111 Previously the choice had not existed, except on those rare occasions where use of
Articles 43 and 113 was envisaged, as both provide for qualified majority vote.
112 Case C-62/88 Greece v Council 1990 ECR 1-1527 at para. 12.
113 See also LCP88/609, Introduction, point 4, where Article 100a was avoided as a legal
basis.
114 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) 1991 ECR 1-2867, paras. 22 and
23. Further, judging both the aim and content of challenged Directive 89/428, the Court found
that the measure concerned indissociably both the environment and competition; that to use
both articles, and therefore to require the Council to act unanimously in any event, would divest
the cooperation procedure of its very substance. The Court found the directive closely concerned
production conditions and the elimination of competitive distortions in a given industrial sector
and therefore annulled the directive as incorrectly based on Article 130s.
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fact that a directive concerns the functioning of the internal market is not enough to justify
recourse to Article 100a (Commission v Councifi^5).
The quality of Community legislative intervention under these legal bases has again been
modified with the Treaty on European Union. At a general level the TEU underscores the
Community's commitment to environmental protection116 while echoing the concept of
"sustainable development"1117. More specifically, the principles and guidelines in the
Environment Title have again been somewhat altered118. One example is that the requirement
that environmental protection be a "component" of other Community policies is here more
specific: "environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of other Community policies", a factor that was considered likely to increase
the justiciability of the principle119.
Article 130s now contains five subparagraphs, providing for a variety of procedures and, as
a possible consequence, increased scope for dispute as to choice of legal basis. Article 130s(l), by
116 Case C-155/91 Commission v Council 1993 ECR 1-939. Here the Court ruled that
Directive 91/156 was correctly founded on Article 130s. Dealing with both industrial and
domestic waste, regardless of whether this was to be eliminated or priced, the directive had
only an incidental effect on harmonisation of the internal market and must be considered to
have, as principal objective, the protection of the environment (paras. 19 and 20).
116 Article B of the Common Provisions refers to the objective of promoting "economic and
social progress which is balanced and sustainable" and Article 2 of Part One Principles speaks
more explicitly of promoting "sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the
environment."
117 Made popular by the Brundtland Commission and reiterated in the Fifth Action
Programme.
118 For instance, the TEU amends the Article 130r(l) objectives to include the goal of
"promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environment
problems", again invoking the wider field of action asserted in the Fifth Action Programme.
Article 130r(2) EC has been amended to include a "high level of protection taking into account
the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community", disposing of the earlier
discussion surrounding the absence of a 'high level' in SEA's Environment Title. The additional
mention of the precautionary principle may entail that the burden of proving that
environmental damage will not occur should be shifted to the polluter; Wilkinson, D.
"Maastricht and the Environment: The Implications for the EC's environmental policy of the
TEU," 4 (1992) JEL 221, p.224.
Although Subsidiarity is now applicable to the entire Treaty, Article 3B EC, that part
of the SEA's subsidiarity provision that left the finance of environment policy to Member
States surfaces in the TEU's amendment to Article 130s(4).
Also Article 130t maintains the existing right of Member States to implement stricter
protective measures. It simply adds that these shall be notified to the Commission.
119 Lane, R., "New Community Competences Under the Maastricht Treaty," 30 (1993)
CMLRev 939, p.972; however, see Conclusions, point 3.2. Integration of environmental
considerations into other policies.
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referring to Article 189c (co-operation with the Parliament1211) provides that the Council will
vote by qualified majority and Parliament will have a second reading of proposed legislation.
Article 130s(2), by way of derogation from the above, provides for unanimous voting in the
Council and only consultation with the Parliament in certain areas121. In these areas (which
may be subject to interpretation122) the Council may agree unanimously to vote by qualified
majority. Article 130s(3) provides that "in other areas, general action programmes setting out
priority objectives to be attained" shall be adopted through the joint decision between Council
and Parliament, as described in Article 189b123. Again, which "other areas" are referred to is
not absolutely clear. Tensions may remain between Parliament and the Council as to choice of
legal basis.
The debate that surrounded the Treaty on European Union and its entry into force may
increase the ECJ's influence in the formulation of Community rules. With the added complexity
of the choices — not only between Articles 100a and 130s but also within Article 130s — the ECJ
may again be called upon to consider disputes involving choice of legal basis. And given the new
insistence on the subsidiarity principle124, the ECJ may also be called upon to decide broader
issues of Community competence in environmental (and other) matters.
2.5. Practical Illustrations — The Evolution of the EIA85/337 and LCP88/609:
A deeper look at the evolution of the two directives followed throughout the research
more concretely illustrates the roles of the institutions and the effect on legislation of the
problems discussed above, and provides background for the study to follow.
2.5.1. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive: As noted, EIA85/337 attempts to apply
the Preventive Principle to Member States' development and construction projects125. Coming
12(1 Above, point 2.3.
121 See above, point 2.2 at Compromise.
122 For example, the manner in which "land use with the exception of waste management
and measures of a general nature" will be interpreted in practice, or what measures may be
deemed to "significantly" affect a Member State's choice between energy sources are not
unassailably clear.
123 Above, point 2.3.
124 See Conclusions, point 3.3 at Subsidiarity.
125 Commission proposal for a Council Directive concerning the assessment of the
environmental effects of certain public and private projects, OJ 1980 C169/14, Article 1.
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prior to the inclusion of the integration requirement in the SEA, it constitutes an early effort to
require Member State authorities to consider environmental protection in their land-use and
development plans12^.
Proposed version: The evolution of the EIA proposal highlights the general reluctance of
Member States to adopt provisions that may imply considerable inconvenience to economic and
administrative actors. The proposed EIA directive was stripped of many of its more stringent
obligations: for instance, follow-up of conditions imposed in an authorisation, the cornerstone of
effective intervention, is subtracted from the final version127. Thus, limits to the results that
can be expected of a legal provision are inherent to the legislative text itself, even if correctly
implemented.
The developer was required to assemble and submit with his128 application for
authorisation a good deal of information concerning not only his project but also reasonable
alternatives entailing fewer adverse effects on the environment.
Various types of public and private projects were divided into three categories. Those
listed in Annex I were to be systematically subjected to assessment. From this "exceptional cases
which are unlikely to have any significant effect on the environment," and "below a specified
threshold" could be exempted by the competent authority with the agreement of the
Commission and "where appropriate" made subject to a simplified form of assessment129.
Annex II projects were subject to assessment where their characteristics require, with competent
authorities determining the criteria and thresholds for subjecting these projects to an
assessment, either full or simplified121*. Thirdly, the competent authority was to examine
projects other than those listed in the Annexes which, particularly in light of the sensitivity of
126 Commission proposal, Article 2. The assessment was to take into account the projects'
effects on: water, air, soil, climate, flora, fauna and their interrelationships; and the built-up
environment, including architectural heritage and the landscape (Article 3).
127 Taken out of proposed directive by Council: (proposal, Article 11) the competent
authority shall check periodically whether the conditions attached under Article 10 to a
planning permission are being complied with, whether they are still adequate, whether other
provisions to protect the environment are being obeyed and whether it needs to take further
easures to protect the environment from the effects of the project."
128 In order to simplify matters, throughout this research, 'he' is used where 'he' or 'she' is
meant; 'his' were 'his' or 'her' is meant, et cetera.
129 Commission proposal, Article 4(1)
120 Ibid., Article 4(2)
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their location, were likely to have significant effects, in order to ascertain which should be
made subject to an assessment131.
Further obligations fell upon the competent authorities132: among them, to ensure that the
developer supplied the information required, to publicise the information gathered and
arrange for appropriate consultation of the concerned public133. In taking its decision the
competent authority was not only required to take into account the above information but also to
draw up its own assessment of likely significant effects of proposed project and, except where
permission was denied for reasons not pertaining to the environment, make this publicly
available134. Most significantly, it was required to monitor that imposed conditions and
restrictions were indeed respected133.
Undeniably, the draft contained ambiguities138. When called upon to give opinions, the
Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and Parliament had certain reservations and
suggested additions to the proposal that may have helped eliminate subsequent confusion in
application had they been heeded.
The ECOSOC137 registered general concerns about the potential for administrative
delay138 and the fact that the proposal did not treat the important matter of allocation of
costs, which could lead to divergent practices13^. In several instances ECOSOC pointed out
vague wording140 or imprecise definitions141, or questioned the classification of projects142,
131 Ibid., Article 4(3)
132 Such as sending the above information to and consulting any relevant bodies (Article 7),
including those in another Member State that might be affected (Article 7(2)), and fixing a
suitable time limit for their comments.
133 Commission proposal, Article 8; and in doing so, respect commercial and industrial
secrecy laws, provisions and practices, as well as public interest (Article 9).
134 Its assessment of the likely effects; a synthesis of main comments and opinions; its
reasons for granting or refusing planning permission; and any conditions attached to the
planning permission (Article 10).
135 Commission proposal, Article 11, above.
136 For instance Annex I, for which assessment was mandatory, includes airports and
commercial harbours (point 9); Annex II, for which assessment is not necessarily required, also
nincludes "harbours and airfields"(point 10).
137 OJ 1981 C 185/8.
138 Points 1.14 and 2.2.1.
139 Points 1.12 and 1.13.
140 For instance, the terms 'significant effects' and 'substantial changes' in Article 1,
Commission proposal.
141 For instance, in point 2.4.6 ECOSOC notes that the proposal does not define the
difference between a 'simplified' and a full assessment. In point 2.6.3 it provides its own
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rightly pointing out that such imprecision may give rise to difficulties of interpretation and
result in dispute that could cause harmful delays in the determination of planning
applications143. Although some terms were in any event dropped, others that remained in the
final version did give rise to difficulties (for instance, 'significant effects'144).
Parliament also had suggestions143, most of which had the effect of widening the scope of
the directive and strengthening the obligations required both of the developer and the
competent authorities: for instance, Parliament wished to include Community projects among
those that could be subjected to assessment146. Subsequent practice has revealed that two other
points Parliament brought up would have been of particular importance (from the viewpoint of
environmental protection rather than that of adequate implementation). Parliament wished
the competent authority, in the evaluation required of it, to include "an assessment of the
alternatives including that of not continuing with the project"147. As seen below, in the
national contexts, the fact is that alternatives are rarely considered148 and, as a general rule,
projects are almost never discontinued for environmental reasons. Furthermore, concerning the
public's intervention, Parliament speaks of both consultation and objection^^. In practice, the
public's opinion on a specific project is not accorded much weight: certainly its objections do
nothing to halt important projects.
definition of non-technical summary: "a printed explanation of the findings of the assessment
which can be easily understood by the layman."
147 The Committee wondered if it should be more closely related to the extent of effect on
environment in point 2.4.2.
143 Point 2.1.1.
144 The meaning of this is not clear and Spanish legislation, for instance, does not take
much heed of the phrase; GARCIA URETA, 1994, pp.223,27; arguably neither does the French
system of thresholds; see Chapter 4, point 2.2.1. at Financial thresholds.
145 Parliament Opinion, OJ 1982 C66/78.
146 Prior to the introduction of Article 130r(2) with the SEA or the reform of the Structural
Funds, which subsequently subject certain Community projects to EIA.
It also noted imprecise definitions, suggested that the distinction between Annex I and
II projects be reviewed after a trial period (Parliament Opinion, Points a. and b. Annex I), and
added several projects to both annexes.
147 Parliament Opinion, Article 10.
148 For example, Chapter 5, point 1.2.1. Reluctance to modify project; ibid. Chapter 8, point
1.4.
149 Parliament Opinion, Article 8(3).
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Rather than taking on some of the suggestions of Parliament and ECOSOC, the final
version waters down even the provisions of the original version. Indeed, in view of the initial
opposition to the idea of Community EIA legislation, it was an achievement that the directive
was ever adopted150. Initially no Member State was wholly in favour of the directive, some
because they felt the provisions were too intrusive151 and others because the provisions did not
go far enough152. Several Member States were simply leery of introducing similar legislation in
the Community because early American experience with the NEPA153, which inspired the EIA
proposal, had resulted in massive litigation and delays154.
The United Kingdom (and others) feared EIA's potential to cause delay and complicate the
planning process and did not wish to add to the planning costs of developers155. Nonetheless,
the House of Lords, having conducted an extensive hearing155 came out strongly in favour of the
Directive and may have been instrumental in the Government's eventual agreement to
EIA85/337. Probably as crucial was the Government's firm conviction that assessment for
projects in Annex II was entirely at their discretion1517, a conviction shared by other Member
States; this error of formulation has since haunted implementation of EIA85/337.
The United Kingdom was not the only opponent. Germany objected to the need to seek
Commission agreement for exemptions to Annex I projects158. The Bundestag further sought to
150 For example, early on the UK made it clear that the directive would never be adopted
while agriculture figured on the first Annex of projects for which assessmenf was mandatory; as
a result, even by the time of the first draft agriculture is in Annex II. It also argued that the
system of development control in their town and country planning procedures was more
effective; Sheate and Macrory, 1989, p.72-74; see also Haigh, JPL 1987, p.8.
151 For example, the United Kingdom and West Germany, although for different reasons.
152 For example, the Netherlands; Kennedy, op.cit.; Haigh, N., "Environmental
Assessment — the EC Directive," 1987 JPL 4-20, at p.4.
153 United States' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
154 Kennedy, op.cit., p.86.
155 Kennedy, op.cit., p.90; Haigh, JPL 1987, p.8.
The House of Commons saw no point in adopting a Directive with which they were
unsatisfied when, in their view, "[o]ur present system enables assessment to be made of
environmental impact when required. We remain to be convinced that it is necessary or
desirable to replace that eminently practical system with a rigid mandatory one"; Statement
of Mr. Gordon Oakes in the British House of Commons, 9 June 1981, Hansard, p.11.
156 HL Eleventh Report, Session 1980-1, "Environmental Assessment of Projects," with
minutes of evidence.
157 Sheate and Macrory, 1989, p.74; see Haigh JPL, p.8, which refers to a government
consultation document in which it is stated, regarding Annex II projects, that "In general, the
Government does not foresee that it will be necessary to make the carrying out of formal
assessments mandatory in such cases...."
158 Kennedy, op.cit., pp.90-91.
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avoid adding to bureaucratic procedures. Still it should be noted that although the UK and
Germany had similar misgivings, in Germany, where complex planning procedures already
existed, the fear was not (as in the UK) that a mandatory system would be introduced, but that
their many codified provisions would need to be modified to accord with the provisions of the
directive. A further German reservation was that their high standard of protection might be
reduced159. The Netherlands also had early qualms, mainly because, when compared to their
national legislation, the directive was not extensive enough160.
The principal objections were overcome in 1983 by shortening Annex I and providing the
possibility to make exemptions without having to request the Commission's agreement161.
However, at this point Danish objection emerged concerning the requirement to submit
development projects authorised by an act of their Parliament, the Folketing, to the provisions
of the Directive. The Danish Government was of the opinion that this infringed upon their
sovereignty, and on this issue, the only unresolved point for many months, they would not
cede162. It was finally settled with the inclusion of an exemption for projects authorised by a
"specific Act of national legislation," of political necessity rather than environmental
logic160.
Adopted version: The actors' interventions are evident on the end result: the directive
adopted in 1985164 is less strict than the one proposed in 1980. The great advantage of
EIA85/337, and one that should not be undervalued, is that it puts another criterion in the
balance of "pro-con" factors that competent authorities must consider when authorising a
project. However, the legislation merely requires that environmental costs be considered, not
that the project be stopped if the costs are too high. Theoretically designed to give effect to the
Preventive Principle, in fact, the authorities are simply required to consider prevention: in
159 Ibid., p.91.
160 Ibid., pp.92-93.
161 Haigh, Nigel, Manual of Environmental Policy: the EC and Britain, Longman in
association with the Institute for European Environmental Policy, London (updated yearly), at
p.11.2-5; Haigh, JPL 1987, pp.8-9. Nonetheless, they must notify the Commission of such
exemptions.
162 Haigh, JPL 1987, p.9.
163 If the EIA process is genuinely a tool to make the project evolve towards less
environmental harm, there seems to be no logical reason to assert that projects adopted by
national legislatures should not also undergo the process of evolution.
164 EIA85/337 OJ 1985 L175/40.
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neither version, proposed or adopted, is the competent authority obliged to refuse planning
permission to a project found to have significant harmful effects to the environment. Nor is it
required to attach conditions to authorisation although this is arguably the purpose of the
exercise (and implied in Article 9165). Without genuine ecological concern on the part of the
competent authorities (extremely variable within Member States as well as across), the EIA
becomes merely a complex set of formalities to be fulfilled before allowing the project to
continue as planned. Even if correctly implemented and enforced, the goals set by EIA85/337 are
very low.
More specifically on the issue of implementation and enforcement, it is an example of
Community legislation where at least
some of the difficulties of implementation stem from the imprecise language used in the Directive.
Various opportunities exist for Member States to provide their own interpretations. As a result the
Directive is not consistently applied across the Community. ^66
The fundamental elements of EIA85/337 (which are used throughout this research to
structure the discussion) are: that public and private projects likely to have important
repercussions on the environment be subject to the EIA procedure. Such projects are listed in the
Directive's Annexes I and II. The EIA procedure, in turn, consists of the Environmental Impact
Study (EIS: Article 5.2, EIA85/337) which is submitted to public consultation (Articles 6.2 and
6.3, EIA85/337). The administration must then consider both the EIS and the results of public
consultation prior to granting permission or authorisation (Article 8, EIA85/337)167,
- Projects covered: A positive list of projects caught by EIA85/337 is used.
Notably, the projects always subject to an assessment have been greatly reduced: many projects
have been shifted from Annex I to Annex II^S. More exemptions are available: the directive
EIA85/337, Article 9: "When a decision has been taken the competent authority or
authorities shall inform the public conerned of: — the content of the decision and any conditions
attached thereto,... (emphasis added).
166 Salter, J. "Environmental Assessment: The Challenge from Brussels," 1992 Journal of
Planning and Environment Law 14, at p.16.
167 Other Member States that risk being affected by the project must be notified (Article 7);
by its nature, this obligation arises more rarely, and is referred to more briefly here. The public
must be informed of the decision (Article 9, EIA85/337).
168 por example, projects concerning production and preliminary processing of metals and
those in metal manufacture, with their various sub-categories (Commission proposal, Annex I
points 3 and 6) were systematically subjected to assessment in the proposed version; in the
adopted text only integrated works for the initial melting of cast-iron and steel remain in
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does not apply to national defence projects159; to projects adopted by a specific act of national
legislation170; or to specific projects which Member States in exceptional cases decide to
exempt from the procedure. Furthermore, in the latter event, the Commission is given a smaller
role in implementation: it is no longer called upon to give agreement but is merely informed of
the reasons for the exemption1 71.
The fact that the projects listed in the Annexes are not precisely defined172 and are
susceptible to widely divergent interpretations has affected implementation. The term
"integrated chemical installation" has caused such a flourishing of national definitions that a
working group of national experts was formed to attempt to narrow these down to an acceptable
interpretation173. Indeed, the issue later arose before the ECJ for interpretation174, as have
the terms "modification to development projects"175 and "canalisation and flood-relief
works"175.
The difficulties in categorising and defining specific projects pale in comparison to problems
of implementation which have arisen due to the phrasing of Article 4(2) concerning Annex II
projects: Annex II projects are subject to an assessment only "where Member States consider that
their characteristics so require". Rather than clearly obliging Member States to define methods
Annex I (point 4). Also, the subdivisions of the food industry and rubber processing, as well as
most of the chemical industry, have slipped from Annex I in the proposal to Annex II in the
final draft (Integrated chemical installations remain in Annex I, point 6).
169 EIA85/337, Article 1(4).
170 Ibid., Article 1(5). The provision implies that rules for a legislative process are such as
to enable the assessment procedure to be undertaken, but trie rules of the House of Commons and
the House of Lords had recently to be changed to include (possibly less strict) environmental
impact assessment. See Salter, "The Challenge...," 1992, pp.16-17.
171 EIA85/337, Article 2(3)
172 With the exception of two that refer to definitions in other legislation; Macrory,
Richard, "Environmental Assessment — Critical Legal Issues in Implementation," in EC
Environment and Planning Law, David Vaughan, ed., Butterworth, 1991, at pp.37.
173 Macrory in EC Environment..., 1991, pp.37-8.
174 Case C-133/94 Commission v. Belgium, judgment 6 May 1996, para.24: The Flemish
executive interpreted 'integrated chemical installations' narrowly, excluding installations
that fell below the minimum processing capacity of 100,000 tonnes. The Court found that the
fact that the installation is "integrated" is the crucial criterion since other chemical
installations had been included in the Annex II, and upheld the Commission's complaint on this
matter.
175 Case C431-/92 Commission v Germany 1995 ECR 1-2189, para.35.
176 Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others and Gedeputeerde
Staten van Zuid-Holland, judgment 24 October 1996, paras.21-35.
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for determining such characteristics, it indicates that they "may inter alia specify certain
types of projects as being subject to assessment."177 The wording seems to indicate that Member
States may equally well choose not to specify such types17® and (as seen particularly in the
Spanish context, below), this has been a constant, important source of confusion and dispute
since. Although harmonisation is a Community concern, this article provides fertile ground for
discrepancies17"; the final result is that, across the Community, many Annex II projects
systematically escape the EIA procedure.
Indeed the fact that Member States had the impression that Annex II was wholly optional
was a decisive factor in the directive's adoption1®11 and many were surprised to find that by not
specifying guidelines they had, in the Commission's opinion1®1, fallen foul of the directive.
The Commission holds the view that, at the least, Member State legislation must, provide for
the potential inclusion of Annex II projects1®2. Macrory suggests, convincingly, that it is
assumed that Annex II projects are likely to have a significant effect although this may not be
so in particular cases: therefore Member States are allowed to develop procedures to
distinguish among these. (Furthermore, one such procedure — the use of thresholds1®3 — has
also been criticised for not taking sufficient account of 'significant effects', particularly in
fragile areas1®"1.)
177 EIA85/337, Article 4(2). If it does specify types of projects if must inform the
Commission of any criteria and/or thresholds adopted for projects in question," Article 11(2).
Regarding the use of thresholds the Community legislation can be criticised for failing
to consider that the cumulative effect of many small projects may also cause considerable
environmental destruction. Furthermore, although thresholds may be useful in establishing
legal certainty, care must be taken to respect the fragility of specific areas.
178 Haigh, JPL 1987, p. 10: "admittedly optional wording of the Directive"; Salter, "The
Challenge...," 1992, p.18: "no rules set down on how competent authority decides if Annex II
problems require assesssment".1711 Indeed, as first implemented wide variations existed: Dutch legislation contained
detailed thresholds for the various projects; the United Kingdom's DoE assumed that Annex II
projects were wholly optional; Spain and Italy left Annex II legislation in the hands of the
regions; in Belgium, the Walloon and Flemish regions chose different approaches; and Greece
simply did not adopt any legislation concerning these projects. For a general discussion; Macrory
in EC Environment..., 1991, pp.34-36; Salter, "The Challenge...," 1992, p.17-18; Sheate and
Macrory, 1989, p.72
180 Sheate and Macrory, 1989, p.74; Macrory, 1992 CMLRev 347 at pp.359-60.
181 Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, and Greece, for instance; Macrory in £ C
Environment..., 1991, pp.34-35; Sheate and Macrory, 1989, pp.72-74.
182 Macrory in EC Environment..., 1991, p.34.
183 EIA85/337, Article 11(2).
18^ See Chapter 4, point 2.2.1.
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The Court has been called upon to address certain questions regarding the vagueness of
EIA85/337. This is far from an optimal situation: clear statements on Annex II projects, (despite
the fact that the Commission had made indications of its views) were not available until
1996185 Only jn 1996 Was it stated clearly that "Article 4(2) does not empower the Member
States to exclude generally and definitively from possible assessment one or more classes
mentioned in Annex II."188
- Environmental Impact Study (Article 5.2 EIA85/337): The developer faces less
burdensome tasks in the final version. The substance of the information required in the EIS is
reduced: it comprises at least a description of the project187; the measures foreseen "to avoid,
reduce and, if possible, remedy188 significant adverse effects"; the data required to assess the
effects of the project; and a non-technical summary189. The developer is no longer required to
describe the proposed project in relation to existing land-use plans in the area or explain his
choice of site with regard to less damaging alternatives190.
The developer — the natural or legal person most interested in seeing that the project is
approved — prepares the EIS. This is the root of most of the problems related to the quality of
the EIS. Where earlier French legislation can be criticised for including this of its own
initiative191, the fact that it is reprised in various other national rules specifically adopted to
transpose Community obligations192 can be attributed to the Community's formulation of
EIA85/337, which implies repeatedly that the developer draws up the study193.
185 C-133/94 Commission v Belgium, 1996 ECR 1-2323.
186 Ibid., para 43; see also Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld, judgment 24 October 1996, not yet
reported, paras. 49-53.
187 Referring to site, design and size.
188 Rather than the proposed 'compensate'.
189 EIA85/337, Article 5: where they consider it necessary, the Member States should
supply the developer with relevant infomration they may have.
190 Here note that the information thus gathered will not come in an easily publishable
form, but rather will be a process in several steps: the supply of information by the developer(
Article 5); consultation with other agencies (Article 6 (1) and with the public (Article 6(2) and
(3)), where transboundary effects are likely, consultation of other Member States (Article 7)
and consideration on the part of the competent authority (Article 8); Macrory in E C
Environment..., 1991, p.33; Haigh, JPL 1987, p.5.
191 The legislation is examined in Chapter 4, point 2.2.
192 Including the Spanish texts, Chapter 7.
193 EIA85/337 Article 5(1) "the developer supplies in an appropriate form the
information..." Article 5(2): "The information to be provided by the developer...".
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It has been suggested that the simplicity of allowing the developer to draw up the EIS may
have positive repercussions in enforcement since the responsibility for the EIS clearly rests
with the developer494. However, this fails to justify the mistake: it seems likely that, even if
the EIS were drawn up by an objective team, the responsibility could still be traced back to the
developer, as it was his choice to submit it. It is better to guarantee the quality of the EIS
while there is still a chance that it can serve the directive's preventive purpose in preference
to remedying harm once it has occurred, i.e., prior to the enforcement stage. Practically
speaking, once a project authorisation has advanced to the stage of being contested before the
courts it is extremely unlikely that it will be stopped. Some sort of standard must be attained,
or an administrative qualification must be required of the team responsible for drawing up the
EIS, in the early stages of the procedure. Furthermore, the creation of jobs in a new market such
as this is not to be ignored.
- Public consultation (Articles 6.2 and 6.3 EIA85/337): The public's intervention
is a crucial tool in encouraging the modification of the project towards less damaging options.
The competent authority must make public the gathered information and arrange for
consultation of the public concerned; it may determine which public is concerned, how to consult,
and the time limits49^. Implementing the public consultation provision is problematic at
national level largely because of the margin of discretion left by the Community rule, which
suggests, but does not require a variety of means for publicising the event496. This is ironic,
given the Community's insistence on the importance of public involvement in the
implementation and enforcement of environmental rules. It would have been extremely
straightforward, yet of the utmost importance for practical implementation, for the
Community to make the use of local newspapers, or bill-posting obligatory. Furthermore,
EIA85/337 refers only to the possibility of holding a public meeting. Again practically this
means that usually the public does not benefit from a public meeting and has only the
494 Rosa Moreno, Juan, Regimen juridico de la evaluacidn de impacto ambiental, Estudio
Trivium Administrative, 1993, p.211.
195 EIA85/337, Article 6.
196 Article 6.3 merely indicates that the Member States may inform the public "by bill-
posting within a certain radius, publications in local newspapers, organization of exhibitions
with plans, drawings, tables, graphs, models, — determine the manner in which the public is to
be consulted, for example, by written submissions, by public inquiry...".
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assembled documents to consult, which may compound confusion rather than elucidate the
project's effects.
- Administrative consideration of the EIS and the results of the public
consultation prior to granting permission or authorisation (Article 8, EIA85/337): It is the
States' duty to ensure that the developer supply the information listed in a third Annex, only:
inasmuch as (a) the Member States consider that the information is relevant to £"give stage^of the
consent procedure and to the specific characteristics of a particular project or type of project aind of
the environmental features likely to be affected; and (b) the Member States consider that a developer
may reasonably be required to compile this information having regard inter alia to current
knowledge and methods of assessment.
This is an unfortunate turn of phrase, since the information that is required in the event that
the State considers neither that the information is relevant, nor that the developer can be
reasonably expected to compile it, is unclear. The term competent authority, frequently used in
directives, has here been defined as "that or those which the Member States designate as
responsible for performing the duties arising from this Directive"; the authority in question can
then vary for different obligations in the directive and from project to project197. The competent
authority must notify other Member States concerned19®; and it must of course take the
information thus gathered into account in taking the decision to grant, or withhold, consent199.
Once a decision has been taken the competent authority must inform the public only of the
content of the decision, attached conditions and, where its national legislation requires it, the
reasons and considerations of the decision200.
A crucial omission limiting the effectiveness of the legislation is that the directive does
not require the national administration to monitor compliance with the conditions imposed by
an eventual authorisation. Another omission is that EIA85/337 says nothing about the judicial
review of the administration's decision; moreover there would not appear to be any right for
third parties to appeal against a decision to permit development201. Finally, the competent
197 Haigh, JPL 1987, p.6; see for example, the substantive and environmental authorities in
the Spanish context, in Chapter 7.
19® EIA85/337, Article 7. In doing the above it must respect industrial and commercial
secrecy and the public interest, and where information is transmitted to another Member State
the limitations of the State where the project is proposed apply (Article 10).
199 Ibid., Article 8.
200 Ibid., Article 9.
201 Salter, "The Challenge...," 1992, pp.16-17; Macrory in EC Environment..., 1991, p.36.
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authority is no longer required to provide its own assessment of the likely effects of the project;
a synthesis of the main comments; and, if its own legislation does not require it, it is not obliged
to explain the reasons behind a grant or refusal of planning permission202.
In sum, not only are the goals of the directive moderate generally, but various weaknesses of
the legislation herald difficulties in subsequent implementation and the legislation has given
rise to an inordinate number of infringement proceedings203. It has been suggested that
EIA85/337 may come to have a wider impact if its procedures become usual for developers and
authorities; it may further create public pressure for assessment of projects that are at present
not subject to such procedures204. However, this in no way guarantees that the procedure will be
regarded as more than a mere formal exercise.
2.5.2. Large Combustion Plants Directive:
The original Commission proposal for LCP88/609 underwent similar changes during its long,
complex negotiation period, which included the arrival of two new Member States and the
adoption of the Single European Act. As with the EIA directive, given the initial opposition, a
first success is that LCP88/609 was ever adopted.
Proposed version: The original 1983 document addressed the problem of acid precipitation
by requiring States to draw up detailed programmes for progressive, across-the-board
reductions of emissions so that by 31 December 1995 an overall reduction would be attained of at
2 2 In fact the authority "does not appear to be under any duty to record and publish its
assessment"; Salter, "The Challenge...," 1992, p. 15. Haigh describes the 'assessment' as "a
procedure involving the provision and publication of information on the part of the developer,
the collecting of information from the public and others and culminating in a mental process on
the part of the "competant authority" in arriving at its decision; Haigh, JPL 1987, p.5.
203 Infringement proceedings were commenced, and often later dropped, against almost
every Member State: France, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom were listed for not properly applying; against
Luxembourg for not notifying measures (Eighth Application Report, OJ 1991 C338 at pp.45 and
80-82). Only Denmark was blameless. By the Ninth Report infringement proceedings continued
against all of the above, and Denmark's handling of the bridge Oresund between Denmark and
Sweden had been the subject of complaints(OJ 1992 C250/1 at p.151). The Tenth Report, p.308,
mentions reasoned opinions sent to Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (and
the Commission had issued a press release on the latter in 1992, see Chapter 3, point 1.1. at
Commission discretion); Germany had been referred to the Court. By the Eleventh Report, Italy
and Ireland had joined the above list of those sent a reasoned opinion (OJ 1994 C154/1 at p.110).
204 Haigh, JPL 1987, pp.4,6.
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least 60% for SO2 emissions; 40% dust; and 40% NOx208. The Commission was called upon to
examine a variety of scientific and technical issues206, as well as practical, administrative
and legal questions20'7.
Parliament considered its initial proposal "totally inadequate" but refrained from rejecting
it "so as not to delay swift treatment of the subject in the Council of Environment Ministers"208;
it called principally for drastic shortening of deadlines and sharp reduction of limit values209.
Indeed Parliament may have been justified in finding the original proposal inadequate. The
original LCP draft had been put together in only months when initial consultations often take
years. Consultation was sketchy and "[njational governments, industrial interests and even
sections of the European Commission felt excluded from a hasty and ill-considered drafting
process"210 .
Negotiations got off to a shaky start. Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands were
strongly behind LCP88/609. Since their nuclear programmes were such that the reductions did
not present insurmountable obstacles, France and Belgium were neutral211. However the United
Kingdom was a committed leader of the Member States opposed to the directive, which
included Italy, Greece and Ireland. British challenge centred on the issues of costs, the
scientific background used and the Commission's interpretation of it, and resentment that the
proposal was inspired by, and too closely emulated, German domestic provisions212.
An amended version in 1985213 incorporated some of Parliament's suggestions, clarifying
dispositions of the directive and somewhat strengthening the limit values for SO2 and NOx.
208 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the limitation of emissions of
pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, Com(83)704 , Article 3.
206 Such as composition of liquid and gaseous as opposed to solid fuels, chimney height,
mean values of emission measurements according to time taken.
207 From reporting requirements to the procedures to follow in the event of a break-down in
the purification equipment to the issue of costs
2°8 Parliament resolution closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament
on the proposal from the Commission of the European Community to the Council for a Directive
on the limitation of emissions of polutants into the air from large combustion plants, O] 1984
C337/446, points 2 and 3.
209 OJ 1984 C337/446, point 4.
210 Boehmer-Christiansen, S., and Skea, 1991, p. 235.
211 Haigh, N. "New Tools for European Air Pollution Control", 1 (1989) International
Environmental Affairs 26-37 at p.32.
212 Boehmer-Christiansen, S., and Skea, 1991, p.235; see also p.250.
213 Amended proposal, Com(85)47 final.
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However, Parliament noted that "its main amendments which were agreed on by a large
majority of the European representatives of the 270 million citizens of the Community have not
been incorporated by the Commission of the European Communities."214 Among other things,
Parliament called for a more rapid and extensive reduction of emissions, the elimination of
exceptions in Article 7 of the Commission proposal and reconsideration of earlier proposed
amendments to height of stack and definition of low sulphur fuels218. Parliament also had less
patience with the Council, condemning broadly its "irresponsible and obstructive attitude in its
deliberations"216. Finally Parliament called upon the Council to bring forward the time limits
for the adoption of a directive217.
In this Parliament was not to find satisfaction: the composition of Community membership
and the interests represented in the Council changed with the entry of Spain and Portugal in
January 1986. The proposed legislation posed specific problems for Spain because of its economic
situation: its energy sector, already facing an extremely high level of indebtedness218, needed
(and needs) to meet growing energy needs219. The fact that the least costly way of reducing
emissions would be to reduce electricity supplied, raised fears concerning the consequences for
the rest of the economy. With this added complication, negotiations on the directive
foundered.
The Dutch Council presidency helped to shape the directive by introducing the idea to
divide reductions in two stages and to vary each State's reduction22^. The British position
retreated on the issue of costs somewhat221. Forced to step out from behind British opposition,
214 Parliament's resolution on the amended proposal, OJ 1985 C175/298 (taken from report
PE Doc A2-57/85) at point 2.
215 OJ 1985 C175/298, point 3.
216 Ibid.; it singled out particularly the United Kingdom, "the major source of atmospheric
pollution in the Community, for its delaying tactics and irresponsible attitude" (point 4) and
Italy, which it called upon to "[ajbandon its obstructive attitude" (point 8).
21' Ibid., point 10.
218 VALERIO, 1991, p.106.
219 Spain's energy consumption has increased 20% from 1980 to 1992. Furthermore, the
Spanish energy situation is characterised by an extremely inefficient use of energy resources.
Despite the fact that its own nuclear industry provides some of its energy needs (less than 30%)
reliance on combustion plants for energy is much greater than in other Member States; valerio,
p.106. See also estevan Bolea, 1991, pp.191,395; Sanz Sa, J.M., "Air Pollution: Spain,"
European Environmental Yearbook, 1991, p.424, at p.426.
220 For a discussion of negotiations see generally Boehmer-Christiansen, s., and skea,
1991, pp. 234-250; Haigh, Manual..., p.6.10-3-5.
221 Given the Central Electricity Generating Board's decision to retrofit 6000 MW of plant.
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Spain and Ireland's positions became more defined: they found even a standstill difficult and
limits for new plants and total SO2 limits were unacceptable because of the constraint on
industry of installing expensive abatement equipment. The Belgian presidency suggested three-
stage uniform reductions taking account of changes in emission levels prior to the base-line date
of 1980; notably both the United Kingdom and Spain objected to 1980 as a base-line year222.
Attitudes as well as issues coloured the outcome: as the ideas evolved it emerged that
"[wjhile the more ambitious Member States were concerned that Britain was getting off the
hook...there was no comparable concern about the loosening of emission reduction requirements
for other countries."223 There was resistance to the "inflexibility and insensitivity to the
wider European context" of German negotiators224. Also the United Kingdom made
constant use of standard diplomatic ploys, such as keeping fruitless discussions going until the early
hours of the morning.... Inevitably, this bred frustration and resentment on the part of negotiating
partners who commented unfavourably on the technical grasp of the British team223.
After bilateral meetings with both Britain and Spain, and Commission intervention to help
find a solution, the directive was adopted under the German presidency.
Adopted versiorj226: The purpose of the directive, as stated in the preamble of LCP88/609
is to monitor and gradually reduce the emissions of SO2, NOx and dust from new (for which
clean coal technology and flue gas de-sulphurisation is implied in order to.meet the emissions
limit value) and existing (where either retrofitting or large-scale closure is implied) large
combustion plants, i.e. with a rated thermal input of 50 MW227. To accomplish this, global
222 The year 1980 appears to have been selected because it was the first year that emission
data were available in the Member States; Haigh, "New Tools...", 1989, p.31. The United
Kingdom objected because, although still the largest emitter, it had achieved reductions during
the 1970s. This was due largely to economic circumstances that entailed a drop in demand and
would pick up again as soon as the economy improved; HL Air Pollution Report, 1983-84, p.xii,
point 37.
Regarding objections: HL, Air Pollution Report, 1983-84, p.xxi, point 88; valerio, 1991,
pp.98-99; estevan Bolea, 1991, at p.396.
223 Boehmer-Christiansen, S., and Skea, 1991, p.250.
224 Ibid., p.249.
225 Ibid., 1991, p.250.
226 In 1994 this directive was amended (Directive 94/66 EC 15 December 1994, OJ 1994
L337/83); the amendments are of a technical nature.
227 That do not fall into any of the categories excepted in Article 2(7).
LCP88/609 did not set S02 limits for new plants with a rated thermal input of between
50 and 100 MW using solid fuel; this was provided in the amendment to LCP88/609: Council
Directive 94/66, OJ 1994 L337/83.
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objectives must be set elaborating the progressive reduction in stages of SO2, NOx and dust.
Member States are required to elaborate programmes comprising timetables and
implementation measures to comply with emissions ceilings for reduction in three phases of SO2
(Annex I) and in two phases for Nitrogen oxides (Annex 11)228, (-0 inform the Commission of
these programmes and to send intermediate reports in the middle of each phase, as well as
reports on implementation one year after each phase ends22^; the reports must also provide an
overall view of all plants covered by the directive230.
The general ceilings and reduction targets listed in Annexes I and II differ across the States,
a reflection of^th(^>oth their "specific situations"231 and the compromise necessary to achieve
agreement: Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands face the most stringent cutbacks of
SO2 for existing plants, with those of Denmark nearly as high. More moderate cutbacks are
required from Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom and still more moderate cutbacks for
Spain. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are allowed to increase emissions. The overall EEC
reductions are -23% in 1993, -42% in 1998, -58% in 2003. NOx reductions are to take place in two
phases, 1993 and 1998; again the most severe reductions apply to Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
France, the Netherlands and this time also Luxembourg. More moderate cutbacks are envisaged
for Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, while substantial increases are allowed for Greece,
Ireland, Portugal. In sum the Commission's original proposal of 60% cutbacks for SO2 was
reduced to 58% and delayed by eight years; while the overall NOx reductions are of 13% for
1993 and 30% for 1998232.
Member States must ensure that authorisations for the construction/exploitation of new
mply with the emissions ceilings in Annexes III-VII (SO2, NOx, dust)234. In
228 LCP88/609, Article 3(1)
229 LCP88/609, Article 16(1).
230 And the other information indicated in LCP88/609, Article 16(2).
231 "...whilst making allowance for specific situations of Member States"; LCP88/609,
preamble.
232 Haigh, "New Tools...", 1989, p.33.
233 Those that obtained licences on or after 1 July 1987; LCP88/609, Article 2(9).
234 LCP88/609, Article 4.1.
Annex III, sulphur dioxide emissions limit values in new plants using solid fuels; Annex
IV sulphur dioxide emission in new plants using liquid fuels; Annex V, sulphur dioxide emission
in new plants using gaseous fuels; Annex VI, nitrogen oxides emissions limit values in new
plants; Annex VII, dust emission limit values in new plants.
69
granting licences for new plants, they must also calculate aggregate fuel-weighted limit values
in the manner specified in Article 9 and ensure that this does not lead to an increase in emissions
from existing plants235.
Member States must ensure that measurement of emissions (as provided in Annex IX) takes
place and may require monitoring to take place at the operator's expense236. The measuring
methods and equipment shall conform to "best industrial measurement technology and provide
reproducible and comparable results; information on these methods and equipment shall be
made available (and forwarded to the Commission) by the competent authorities. The
measurements from new plants must be continuous in most cases232. Presumably, the frequency of
measurements for existing plants are included in the timetables and implementing measures of
the programmes specified by the States pursuant to Article 3(1). The States shall ensure that
the operators communicate the results of all measurements to the competent authorities. If
unforeseen circumstances (accidents, difficulties) mean that limit values are not kept, the
competent authorities can require operators to take appropriate primary measures, and must
inform the Commission; the same applies to any exceptions that are authorised23® (although,
given that the Commission is overwhelmed by its obligations23^, whether it can realistically
ensure follow-up with each break-down or exemption is questionable). Information concerning
measurement technology and criteria must also be notified to the Commission24*1.
The Commission, for its part, must generally ensure that the implementation of the Member
States programmes produces the desired results24*: it must assess and regularly compare the
Member States' reports242 and inform the Council of progress243. (Unfortunately such reports, if
they have been drawn up, are not available to the public244.) It may suggest changes in the
targets or dates for the third phase SO2 or the second phase NOx reductions and, in the light of
235 As well as verifying such details as stack height, which must be calculated in such a
way as to safeguard health and environment (LCP88/609, Article 10).
236 Ibid., Article 13(1).
237 Ibid., Annex IX A.l.
238 Ibid., Articles 6, 7, 8.4.
23^ Chapter 2, point 2. Commission limitations.
240 LCP88/609, Article 13.3.
241 Ibid., Article 16(3).
242 Ibid., Article 16(3).
243 Ibid., Article 3(4).
244 Commission Letter 21.3.96/XI/005205.
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both technological and environmental developments, can submit proposals for the revision of
limit values to the Council, which shall decide upon them unanimously248.
A range of derogations and exceptions are possible248; inter alia since it is generally
accepted that Spain's economy needs to grow, a special derogation easing requirements for
Spain until 1999 was agreed242. Article 6, included particularly for the United Kingdom,
provides that States may give derogations for plants burning indigenous high sulphur coal,
where notwithstanding the use of BATNEEC248 major difficulties connected with the nature of
the lignite so require, provided that lignite is an essential source of fuel for the plants249. (In
this case States must inform and consult the Commission on appropriate measures to be taken.)
Besides the above derogations, Annex II provides that within one month of notification of the
Directive Member States were able to delay phase one NOx reductions for two years by
S
notifying Commission for technical reasons (note 3, Annex II). In addition, competent j
authorities may authorise temporary exceptions in the event of breakdown in the abatement
equipment, interruption in supply of low sulphur fuel or where the operator must resort to the
use of other fuels because of a sudden interruption in the supply of gas250.
LCP88/609 has had some impact on the behaviour of the Member States, forcing Member
States to adopt provisions in order to reduce emissions more stringently than foreseen. For
instance, without the directive's requirements it is unlikely that the United Kingdom would
have plans to reduce SO2 emissions to the extent that it has28*. On the wider plane, through
245 LCP88/609, Article 4(2).
246 Those for new plants include derogations for plants not operating more than 2200 hours
per year (LCP88/609, Article 5(1)); for plants burning indigenous solid fuel, where the emission
limit cannot be met without using excessivly expensive technology (Article 5(2)).
Other derogations are possible in case of "unforeseen reasons" (Article 7) and
"malfunction or breakdown of the abatement equipment" (Article 8).
242 Until December 1999 Spain may authorise new power plants, burning imported solid
fuels, to meet a sulphur dioxide emission limit value of 800mg/Nm3 as opposed to the
400mg/Nm3 foreseen in Annex III. New plants burning indigenous solid fuels are authorised to
reach only a 60% rate of desulphurisation rather than 90% (Article 5(3).
248 Best available technology not entailing excessive costs.
249 HAIGH, Manual..., p.6.10-6. However, the privatized electricity generators, Powergen
and National Power, have considered importing lower sulphur coal or burning gas rather than
fitting flue gas desulphurisation: the UK may therefore be the target of criticism since one of
the reasons it was able to secure lower reductions, and the possibility to derogate, was because
of its high sulphur indigenous coal.
250 Article 8 (1),(2), and (3).
251 Haigh,Manual..., p.6.10-5.
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this directive the European Community has secured more far-reaching reductions than
provided in the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP)232. It
accomplishes a more complex task than the 30 Percent Club established by the 1985 Helsinki
Protocol to the LRTAP Convention by assigning different and more appropriate reductions to the
Member States as well as committing them to having only 'low acid' power stations233.
3. Decision-making in other areas — Integration of environmental protection into other
Community policies:
Finally, the importance of decision-making in other policy areas must be noted. One of the
factors that affects the subsequent implementation of Community environmental rules is the
inadequate integration of environmental protection during the formulation and. execution of
other Community and national policies. Environmental rules cannot be elaborated in isolation
from other policies and broadly speaking, 'where environmental problems exist the clues to
their existence and their solution often...lie in the economy"234. For example, air pollution
control generally is inextricably linked to energy and economic policy233; how these are
formulated and carried out has an impact on LCP88/609's implementation and enforcement.
The Community has formally recognised the importance of taking the environment into
consideration during formulation of policies. The SEA amendments required protection of the
environment to be a "component part"236 of Community policies; in 1990 the ECJ reinforced this
by stating that "all Community measures must satisfy the requirements of environmental
protection."232 Later, the TEU linked the integration requirement more specifically to policy
232 boehmer-christiansen, S., and Skea, 1991, p. 230.
233 Haigh, "New Tools...", 1989, p.35.
234 Pearce, "Toward...", 1991, p. 4; turner, pearce, and Bateman, 1994, pp.1-27.
233 weale, A., The New Politics of Pollution, Manchester University Press, 1992, p.21;
Knoepfel and Weidener, "Implementing Air Quality Programs in Europe" 11 (1982) Policy
Studies Journal pp. 103-15.
236 Article 130r(2) SEA.
At which stage of the elaboration of other policies environmental protection must be
integrated is not spelt out, yet the EAPs indicate that the environment should be taken into
account in early stages of decision-making process, and it seems reasonable to understand that
ecological protection must be a conscious decision in the proposing, implementing and enforcing
of all Community policies; see Jacobs, R. "EEC Competition Law and the Protection of the
Environment," (1993) LIEI 37 at p.48.
232 Case C-62/88 Greece v EC Council 1990 ECR 1-1527 at p.20.
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formulation than previously: Article 130r(2)EC states "environmental protection requirements
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies". The
environmental impact of Community agricultural, competition, and other policies should be
envisaged as these policies are made, modifying them to minimise negative environmental
consequences, and at least so as not to run counter to environmental policy and law.
Yet in practice258, integrating an element of environmental concern poses considerable
difficulty starting, ironically, with the process of establishing the internal market. Although
the requirement was introduced by the SEA, the practical impact on the Community
environment of achieving a single market was not seriously entertained at that time. The
Economics of 299225^ ("Cecchini Report), the fundamental starting point for appraisal of the
internal market, when speaking of tunnelling and airport building, fails to mention
environmental impact assessment260 although the directive had been adopted three years
earlier in order to integrate environmental considerations into precisely such projects261. The
physical costs to the environment of achieving the Single Market were not subtracted from the
gains, a lapse not remedied until 1989, "when a task-force was hastily assembled to report on
the matter"262. The Task Force noted262, somewhat tardily, that the single market itself
could be expected to have a considerable negative environmental impact: "to the extent that
barriers are removed or modified, and no alternative policy measures put in place, a number of
additional environmental pressures is to be feared"2^.
258 And quite apart from possible future tension between increased regard for the
subsidiarity principle, which seems at present to imply less Community action in
environmental policies, on the one hand; and on the other, ever more integration of
environmental protection into other policies, which seems to call for greater Community
involvement and verification.
250 European Economy number 35, March 1988.
260 Commission of the European Communities research on The Costs of Non-Europe: Basic
Findings vol.5, The Costs of Non-Europe in the Public Procurement Sector; Weale and Williams,
1993, pp.52-55.
261 It is not surprising, then, that questions about subtler consequences of legislation were at
times overlooked. For example, legislation that limits the pollution at source may well fail to
achieve its purpose: the reduction in emissions from single companies will be outweighed by the
total increase in companies polluting; Kramer, Focus..., p.220.
262 Weale and Williams, 1993, p.49.
262 Task Force, "1992" — the Environmental Dimension, Report on the Environment and the
Internal Market, chairman Gunter Schneider, 1990.
264 Task Force Report, 1990, p.9. For instance, an increase in transfrontier truck traffic
entails a corresponding increase in damage, fiscal harmonisation in some instances may reduce
the tax burden on polluting products; Weale and Williams, 1993, pp.52-54.
73
Still more striking an example of failure to integrate environmental protection is provided
by management of the Structural Funds265. Article 130r(2) applies to policies pursued through
these funds. More specifically Regulation 2052/88 on the functioning of the Structural Funds266
stipulates that measures they finance must be in keeping with principles of environmental
policy. The fact remains that
the Community departments are seldom aware of the exact details of the individual operations
funded by the structural instruments as decisions are essentially taken at national or regional level
and, in many cases, during the execution of the programmes262.
The Commission is unable to devote resources to a systematic check that projects conform
with Community objectives268. As the Court of Auditors understates:
if one compares the large number of programmes and projects submitted with the number of officials
[within the Commission] dealing with them, one may suspect that the ecological aspects are not
adequately examined in every case,26^
The question of Community priorities in practice is raised, for certainly resources are applied to
ensure that other policies are scrutinised for compatibility with internal market
requirements220.
Worse, not only is Article 130r(2) not sufficiently heeded in the administration of the
Structural Funds, at times the Community actually helps fund projects that not only do not
conform to general Community requirements, but are also in violation of specific environmental
directives and international conventions22^. In practice, the Commission.contents itself with
265 The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).
266 Regulation 2052/88 (OJ 1988 L185/9) at L185/13. Article 7(1): "Measures financed by the
Structural Funds or receiving assistance from the EIB or from other existing financial
instruments shall be in keeping with the provisions of the Treaties with the instruments
adopted pursuant thereto and with Community policies, including those concerning the rules on
competition, the award of public contracts and environmental protection."
262 Court of Auditors Report, (OJ 1992 C245/7). Furthermore, the report found that "[a]t the
national level the Court [of Auditors] checks did not establish that the reform of the Funds had
brought about any appreciable progress in procedures designed to give more attention to
environmental problems in the drafting of programmes"; at C245/13; specific examples
C245/15-16.)
268 Kramer, Focus..., p.219.
269 HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.55.
220 Article 30 et seq.
221 Specific examples are numerous: in Northern Greece lagoons designated as wetlands of
importance under the Ramsar Convention as well as a protected area under Directive 79/409,
(and the object of protective measures financed by ACE) was damaged through intensive
exploitation projects funded by fisheries appropriations and the ERDF.
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the recipients of Community funds assurances that the project is in conformity with Community
environmental requirements272. Additionally, Community-financed environmental projects and
pilot studies undertaken precisely with a view to integrating the results in other policies have
subsequently been disregarded273. Furthermore, an environmental label does not mean that
environmental considerations are paramount or even adequately incorporated in Community-
funded projects; qualitative aspects of projects classed as "environmental" must also be
examined more closely to verify that these are not, for instance, infrastructure projects in green
clothing274.
Recently the Commission was brought before the Court of First Instance because of its
decision to continue funding two Spanish power stations after it became aware that the legally
The wetlands of Mikra Prespa and Megali Prespa, again protected under Directive
79/409, were partially drained in the 1980s with the help of Community Structural Funds for
the construction of fish farms, contructed in the most sensitive part of the lake, causing the
maximum disturbance to the bird population.
In Spain the region of Castilla-La Mancha receives Structural Funds for a large number
of afforestation projects for which no EIA was carried out. The region also submitted a plan in
1989 asking for 800,000 million pesetas: 50% to go to land transport and infrastructure, less than
1% to environmental investments. In total, a study by WWF-Spain claims that 27 regional,
national and EC laws are contravened in this region of great natural importance, including
EIA85/337, the wild birds directive, the Berne Convention, and the EC directive on pollution by
dangerous substances dumped in the aquatic environment.
Such violations are not limited to southern States: for instance, a Court of Auditors on-
the-spot visit found that in Saxony-Anhalt a plant for converting railway plant had been built
in a drinking water protection area, with the risk that chemicals poured over sleepers would
seep into the soil.
See de Sadeleer, N. "La directive 92/43 CEE concernant la conservation des habitats
naturels ainsi que de la faune et de la flore sauvages," 364 (1993) RMC, p.25n; HL Ninth Report
Evidence 1991-92, pp.264-70, p.188, question 571; European Trends, first quarter, 1994, p.97-99;
Court of Auditors Report 3/92, C245/6-7, C245/12, C245/16.
272 Kramer, L., "Public Interest Litigation in Environmental Matters Before European
Courts," 8 (1996) JEL 1 at p.7; he notes that neither the European Investment Bank nor the
World Bank rely on their debtors assurances of environmental conformity; p.8.
273 "The files on important research, such as the processing of waste or the protection of
marine algae, are closed without any decision being taken as to the possibility of practical
application or any order of priority established for the destination of future financing and
without there being any possibility of making a check on the proposed measures so that the
work done is not wasted"; Court of Auditors Report 3/92, C245/12.
274 For example, all the aid (ECU 178 million) for the Athens metro was classified under
environmental protection rather than transport because it is hoped that the investment will
limit the increase in road traffic and pollution; OJ 1992 C245/14.
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required EIAs had not been carried out275. For the most part, however, no challenge is made to
Commission decisions to help finance projects278.
There is no shortage of such examples277 most of which indicate several failures at
Community level278. The reform of the Structural Funds27^, it appears, has not helped: more
recent reports by the Court of Auditors280 indicate that, despite awareness of the problem,
there has been no improvement in recent years. The Maastricht Treaty provides for a new
Cohesion Fund281 available to eligible Member States in order to help reduce "the disparities
between the levels of the least-favoured regions, including rural areas."282 Not surprisingly,
the Court of Auditors has registered concern that the environment be more effectively
integrated into the working of this instrument than has been the practice to date282.
Causes of inadequate integration: The causes for inadequate environmental integration are
varied. More superficially, part of the problem is lack of manpower, organisation and sufficient
communication between Directorates-General284. The Commission must urgently devote some
278 The action failed when the applicants failed to establish legal title; T-585/93,
Greenpeace and others v Commission, discussed, Chapter 3, point 2.1.
276 Kramer, 1996 JEL, p.9.
277 The Court of Auditors refers to several such clashes of interest between programmes in
the lagoon and wetland areas along the Mediterranean; Court of Auditors Report 3/92, C245/7.
278 At the stages of decision-making as well as in implementation: failure to integrate
environmental factors, to monitor the requirements of the Structural Funds, to monitor the
implementation of specific directives (such as 79/409, as in many of the wetlands projects cited
above). Of course, the Commission would not need to be so vigilant if Member States were not so
eager to avoid environmental obligations.
279 Regulation 2080/93 (OJ 1993 L193/5), Regulation 2081/93, Regulation 2082/93,
Regulation 2083/93, Regulation 2084 / 93, Regulation 2085/93.
Indeed, references are made to the Fifth EAP and Community environmental policy,
and the preamble (OJ 1993 L193/6) indicates that "Member States should therefore supply, in
the plans submitted under objectives 1,2, and 5b and appraisal of the state of the environment
and the environmental impact of the operations envisaged, in accordance with the provisions of
Community law in force, as well as the steps they have taken to associate their environmental
authorities with the preparation and implementation of the plans".
280 Court of Auditors, Special Report no. 4/94, Observations pursuant to Article 188C(4),
paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union on the Urban Environment, together with the
Commission's replies.
284 Article 130d EC "...The Council, acting in accordance with the same procedure, shall
before 31 December 1993 set up a Cohesion Fund to provide a financial contribution to projects in
the fields of environment and trans-European networks in the area of transport infrastructure."
Cohesion Fund regulation 1164/94, OJ 1994 L130/1.
282 Article 130a EC.
283 oj1992 C245/19.
284 The Court of Auditors points out that although a good deal of documentation on specific
projects exists there is little that would give insight on the overall work of the various
departments and Directorates-General, little documentation that would enable a global
evaluation of the Funds. Although Directorates do communicate with each other regarding
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resources and effort to verifying that conformity with Community environmental requirements
is more than a vague wish where the projects that it helps to fund are concerned.
However, the root of the problem lies deeper. Underlying priorities are possibly the most
intractable of environmental problems — at the Community level as well as at national level.
The development of environmental law and related disciplines are a relatively recent
phenomenon. A veneer of ecology has been glossed ovei many social, economic, and commercial
activities in the past two-and-a-half decades but it must compete with a more deeply
entrenched attitude that regards the environment as belonging to no one, a good without price to
be exploited freely288.
The attitude is evident in the manner in which actors approach larger policy-defining
issues as well as the thousands of small, daily decisions that environmental protection
necessitates. The requirement that environmental protection be a part of all other policies, and
the associated costs, are often seen as a fresh annoyance imposed on decision-makers,
contributing to poor implementation of environmental rules. Notwithstanding "greenspeak"28^,
industrialised economies have made little genuine attempt to attach economic values to the
natural resource base287. Use of the environment continues to be inadequately priced, and
therefore often viewed as without valuers. This inherent distortion in society's approach to
decision-making has widespread repercussions289.
specific projects, the information is usually too vague to be productive, especially since
deadlines are very short (OJ 1992 C245/6); see also Economist Intelligence Unit, European
Trends, first quarter 1994, p.12. Furthermore, the Commission has evidently indicated that
centralisation of all EIAs is both practically impossible and contrary to spirit of Structural
Funds (ibid., p.99).
285 Kramer, "The Open Society, Its Lawyers and Its Environment," 1 (1989) JEL 1, p.7;
WEALE, A., The New Politics..., p.158; Weale and Williams, 1993, p.54; TURNER, PEARCE, and
BATEMAN, 1994, pp.6-7, 26; see generally World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED), Our Common Future, 1987.
286 Kramer, Focus..., p.171.
287 Pearce, D., Markandya, A., Barbier, E., Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan
Publications Ltd, London, 1989; kramer, Focus..., p.218: "The old ideology of the 'freedom to
pollute' is the underlying reason".
288 For example, in France civil jurisdictions often grant only 'symbolic' compensation for
environmental harm.
289 Pearce, "Toward...", 1991, pp.4-6.
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A difficulty with the integration requirement and implementation of Community
environmental rules generally is the gulf between what is recognised as needed and what is
feasible, given the collision with other powerful interests. Incorporating environmental
protection into agricultural policy provides an illustration.
4.1. Practical Illustrations
- Agricultural policy: Agricultural Policy, a bete noire that devours a huge
proportion of Community resources290, is traditionally an area of political tension, providing a
fertile source of litigation in the ECJ and of dispute with Community international trading
partners29!. Attempts to diminish 'butter mountains' and 'wine lakes', to reduce the colossal
costs of price support, or cope with the latest agricultural crisis have spurred heated,
disruptive demonstrations from farmers, and occasionally heated, disruptive responses from
Member State governments292. Agriculture, generally, is an issue which decision-makers
approach cautiously. Attempts to integrate environmental protection reflect this extreme
caution and are inevitably minimal.
In the mid-1980s reforms to the CAP were introduced in an attempt to reduce price
supports292 and to reduce the quantity of goods produced; also included were measures to
encourage eco-friendly agricultural practices. Beginning with Regulation 797/85294 on
improving the efficiency of agricultural structures, Member State aid (subject to Articles 92-94
EEC) was allowed in environmentally sensitive areas292. Soon after, Regulation 1760/87296
290 From 80.6% at the time of the UK's accession to 72.6% in 1985 to 62.6% in 1991; Usher,
J.A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community Clarendon Press Oxford, 1988, p.l;
also, for 1991: Eurostats, p.41 (figures obtained after subtracting Fisheries share of 0.9% of
63.5%, Eurostats, p.51).
291 As illustrated by the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations.
2g- As the recent 'mad cow'-BSE hostilities and the British non-cooperation policy
illustrate.
293 The Common Agricultural Policy's manipulation of economic forces (guaranteed prices)
has resulted in a stunning increase in productivity, accompanied by an unprecedented
destruction of nature; see generally Corcelle, G., "Agriculture et environnement: une liaison
tourmentee, mais tellement naturelle!" 1991 RMC 180.
294 Regulation 797/85 (OJ 1985 L93/1).
295 Regulation 797/85 (OJ 1985 L93/10) concerning national aid in environmentally
sensitive areas, in order to introduce or promote agricultural practices compatible with
requirements of conserving natural habitats, Member States are authorized to introduce special
national schemes in environmentally sensitive areas (Article 19(1)). The farmer undertakes
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introduced Community funding of 25-50% for conversion and extensification297, a system of
premiums for the 'set-aside' of arable land for at least five years and aid to afforestation and
woodland projects. Although attempting to integrate environmental concerns, the primary
purpose of the regulations298 was to help adapt agriculture to market needs. More recently
Regulation 7078/92299 was adopted300 providing higher rates of Community financing for
protective activities30^, a more detailed and broader list of activities which qualify for such
funding302, and funding for courses and traineeships on ecological agricultural practice.
Certainly decision-makers have made a welcome attempt to integrate environmental
considerations, yet it must be noted that participation in the above schemes is voluntary.
Authoritative measures have been avoided, illustrating that where an issue of such overriding
importance as agriculture is concerned environmental protection will only be integrated insofar
as it does not seriously inconvenience the former.
Even when an authoritative approach has been chosen the end result is timid. For example,
Directive 91/676303 was designed to regulate excessive use of fertilisers and prevent pollution
of surface and drinking water as well as run-off into the seas. The proposal contained some
that there will be no further agricultural intensification and that intensity of agricultural
production will be compatible with the environmental needs of the area (Article 19(3)).
296 Regulation 1760/87 (OJ 1987 L167/1) amending regulations 797/85, 270/79, 1360/78,
355/77 on agricultural structures, the adjustment of agriculture to the new market situation and
the preservation of the countryside.
292 To be financed through the EAGGF. Conversion refers to the conversion of surplus to non-
surplus products; extensification refers to the reduction in output of the product concerned by at
least 20% without other production capacity being increased.
298 Adopted on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 of the Agriculture title.
299 Regulation 7078/9 (OJ 1992 L215/85) on agricultural production methods compatible
with the requirement of the protection of the environment the maintenance of the countryside.
300 Still on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 EC but more specifically environmental in
substance.
3°1 From 50% to 75% in regions falling under objective, point 1 of Regulation 2052/88 (OJ
1988 L185/9).
302 Regulation 7078/92 (above), applies to farmers who reduce use of fertilizers; change to
more extensive types of crop; reduce proportion of sheep or cattle per forage area; employ
farming practices compatible with ecology or rear animals of local breed in danger of extinction;
keep up abandoned farmland/woodland; set aside farmland for at least 20 years; manage land
for public access and leisure activities (Article 2).
303 Directive 91/676 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by
nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ 1991 L375/1).
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fairly stringent obligations; by the end of the decision-making process these had been modified
or eliminated304.
Genuine integration of environmental protection into the formulation of policies such as
agriculture apparently depends on a more favourable combination of regulatory and voluntary
initiatives, and the perceived utility of farmers303 as well as of the politicians who must be
willing to risk the displeasure of the agricultural community. Finally, the basic force
encouraging over-production, guaranteed prices, remains in place303. Environmental protection
remains a suggestion, occasionally with incentives, rather than a requirement.
- Transport Policy: Of course, agriculture is not the only policy area where
political will to take strong environmental initiatives is lacking. Transport policy seems to face
a similar dilemma, for instance. The Commission has examined in some detail the many ways
in which transportation contributes to the destruction of the environment307. (One which the
Commission does not insist upon is the destruction caused by the creation of new trans-European
road networks, promoted by the Community, which is examined in a subsequent chapter308.)
304 The Commission's draft directive was inflexible in its provisions relating to
designation of vulnerable zones. The draft also specified maximum stocking densities to limit
the application of livestock manure. Member States were required to establish codes of good
agricultural practice, to set up training programmes, to establish action programmes for
designated vulnerable zones and to monitor the effectiveness of these programmes, providing
for the prohibition of fertilizers during certain periods, and for storage vessels for periods
where application is prohibited. The proposed 50mg/l N limit above which catchments were
to be designated as vulnerable zones was an absolute requirement.
Because of Member State objections (France and the UK), in the final draft, 50mg/l N is
no longer and absolute limit but an average; vulnerable zones are only to be designated where it
can be shown that the area contributes to nitrate pollution; action programmes can apply to only
parts of the zone; Haigh, Manual..., p.4.14-3.
303 Some farmers and agricultural organisations have recognised their interest in
reorienting practices: easing intensive production methods lessens the costs of production and
may make the product more attractive to ecologically aware consumers. But those members of
the agricultural community considering the power of green consumers are as of now, in the
minority; Corcelle, op.cit., p.182.
306 Pearce, "Toward...", 1991, p.4.
307 Operational pollution has long-term and cumulative effects on air, water and soil, and
immediate, transient effects of noise and vibrations; land use and intrusion of transport
infrastructure has a permanent and often irreversible impact; congestion, although a temporary
phenomenon, causes an increase in energy consumption and operational pollution; and finally
there are risks of extremely serious damage inherent to the transport of dangerous goods;
Com(92)46, "Green Paper on the Impact of Transport on the Environment: A Community strategy
for 'sustainable mobility'," at pp.11-35.
308 Chapter 6, point 2.6. Practical illustration — Tunnel du Somport. Also the more recent
European network plans for a trans-Alpine tunnel between France and Italy through the
Mercantour national park have been the subject of controversy.
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The Commission also notes what is needed to establish a framework for 'sustainable
mobility'3^; (nter ana measures laying down strict environmental standards for motor
vehicles, motorcycles, aircraft, barges, ships, trains and fuel quality and environmental
measures laying down strict air and water quality standards and strict limit values for air and
water pollutants. Both these types of measures must be backed by other rules to ensure
implementation and enforcement3111. Use of fiscal and economic instruments is also perceived as
required3^ 1.
As elsewhere, the fact that the Commission here recognises what action is necessary does
not guarantee that this will be taken: the Council has been reluctant to set progressively higher
standards for emissions of pollutants in the area of transport. As for economic and fiscal
instruments, in a subsequent communication the comments of most 'stakeholders' indicated that
such instruments could be used successfully to influence transport demand; the important
exception was industry, which "has warned against the possible negative effects of fiscal
measures on economic growth."312 Thus,
[although the Community has recognised the need for a coherent and global approach to the impact
of transport on the environment there is as yet no framework for a common strategy aimed at
'sustainable mobility1 in the Community.313
Again, the transport example seems to indicate that effective integration of environmental
concerns must wait until the more powerful transportation actors perceive that their utility lies
in such integration — an unlikely event, at present. As Ludwig Kramer has pointed out, even the
green and white books on transport and the environment have not been seriously followed-
up314.
3°9 The purpose of the communication was to initiate debate and comment from those with
a stake in transport; Com(92)46, pp.55-56.
310 Com(92)46, pp.53-55.
311 As well as an overall action plan for transport of dangerous goods; guidelines on
conversion and upgrading of relinquished infrastructure, development of urban 'soft' transport,
research for clean transportation technology and eco-friendly fuels, rational use of private cars;
minimum consumer information requirements on environmental performance of vehicles.
312 Com(92)494, "The Future Development of Common Transport Policy: A global approach
to the construction of a Community framework for sustainable mobility," p.58, point 160.
313 Com(92)46 p.53.
314 Dr. Ludwig Kramer, "Recent Developments in EC Environmental Law," Conference: The
Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom, London, 3 November 1995.
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The integration requirement as phrased in the Maastricht Treaty, it has been suggested,
puts challenge to policies that insufficiently integrate environmental concerns on firmer judicial
ground315. One could hope that the ECJ, if called upon to further define the meaning of the
Article 130r(2) requirement, would energetically interpret, at the later stage of enforcement,
that which the Council and Commission appear unable to sufficiently apply during the
formulation and execution of Community policies. However, a recent ECJ decision takes a weak
view of Article 130r(2) and seems to defer to whatever action the Council chooses316. Stating
that Article 130r is "confined to defining the general objectives of the Community in the matter
of the environment"31'7, it seems to announce a retreat on the strength of the provision. The
priority accorded to other policies, to the extent that these are permitted to have a negative
impact on the environment31^, continues to undermine effective implementation and even
enforcement of the rules designed to shield the environment from exactly such effects.
5. Conclusions:
Although awareness of poor implementation of environmental rules is recent, attempts to
discern its causes have revealed, 'upstream' from actual implementation and enforcement, a
variety of contributing factors. Generally it becomes evident that political considerations,
typically favouring economic over environmental concerns, set the scene that then shapes
implementation and enforcement. Decisions concerning which issues to address are already
subject to political tensions and the decision-making process, among twelve and now fifteen
Member States is, perhaps necessarily, unwieldy. In many ways the quality of legislative
proposals, occasionally inadequately researched in terms of science and costs, then falls victim
315 Lane, R., op.cit., p.972; furthermore, a new commitment exists in Article 130r to
"improve" the environment: Article 130r(l) "Community policy on the environment shall
contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: - preserving, protecting and improving the
quality of the environment;...".
316 Case C-379/92 Criminal Proceedings Against Peralta 1994 ECR 1-3453, para.57:
"Secondly, Article 130r is confined to defining the general objectives of the Community in the
matter of the environment. Responsibility for deciding what action is to be taken is conferred on
the Council by Article 130s."
31 ^ For further discussion of factors that undermine the justiciability of the Article 130r(2)
requirement, see also Scott, J., "Environmental Compatibility and the Community's Structural
Funds: A Legal Analysis," 8 (1996) JEL 99.
31 ® And the fact that economic actors need not include the costs to the environment in their
internal planning.
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to the subordination of environmental concerns during negotiation. Moreover, the environment
administration, a 'late-comer' on the political stage, frequently loses in the push and shove
between other branches of the Community's administration. As a result, even at Community-
level policies can conflict and contradict each other as seen, for instance, with the Structural
Funds. Decision-makers in other policy areas seemingly view integration of environmental
concerns and implementation of environmental protection rules as being of little concern to them,
or as a hindrance.
These problems carry their impact downstream, adding themselves to further difficulties
emerging directly from implementation and enforcement. Against this backdrop
implementation and enforcement of Community environmental rules can be expected to proceed
with some difficulty, both at Community and national levels.
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Complete and correct transposition:
1.2. Practical Implementation:
2. Commission limitations:
2.1. Not accorded priority:
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European Parliament:
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3. Addressing limitations:
3.1. Judicial promotion of adequate implementation:
General duties:
ECJ Decisions regarding formal implementation
Shifting the burden to national courts:
3.2. Creation of information sources:
4. Conclusions:
Implementation of Community environmental directives is largely in the hands of Member
States, which must carry out the various actions implied by Community obligations. The role of
Community institutions is therefore to monitor the Member States' performance and to ensure
that they fulfil these obligations. At Community level, the principal actor involved in monitoring
implementation is the Commission, but the European Court of Justice, European Parliament^ and
individuals play important supporting roles2. Problems encountered at Community level during
the monitoring of implementation are examined here, concentrating first on the Commission's
endeavours to carry out its tasks, and next on efforts made to help the Commission in its tasks,
including those of the ECJ.
1 For instance, Parliament was the first to draw attention to the poor state of
implementation of environmental directives (see Introduction, point 2 at Emerging Awareness of
Problems in the Application of Community Environmental Legislation) and periodically issues reports
on the implementation of selected directives.
2 The role of the Court of Auditors, promoted to the status of Community institution by the
TEU (Articles 188a-188cEC as modified by the TEU), is not specifically discussed. It should be
noted however, that it has made a valuable contribution in monitoring financial aspects of
implementation (see Chapter 1 point 3. Decision-making in other areas — Integration of
environmental protection into other Community policies).
84
1. Commission's tasks:
If the Member States' duty under Article 53 is to shoulder their Community obligations, the
Commission's duty under Article 155 is to "ensure the proper functioning and development of the
common market" and inter alia, to "ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied". The Commission's task can be divided
into two categories: monitoring formal, or black letter implementation; and, still more difficult,
monitoring practical implementation. Both tasks require adequate information.
1.1. Formal implementation:
Formal implementation can, according to the Commission's own description of its duties, be
further divided into monitoring that Member States have notified the measures transposing a
specific directive, and verifying that the transposition is complete and correct4. At this stage the
directives EIA85/337 and LCP88/609 present different types of difficulties: for a vertical directive
such as LCP88/609, affecting mainly one industry, evaluation of implementation is relatively
straightforward. On the contrary, a horizontal directive such as EIA85/337 requires the
development of new administrative procedures -- often spanning distinct administrative levels —
and examination becomes much more complex5.
Notification: Verifying notification to the Commission of national measures transposing
Community rules is not complex. If the Commission has not been notified of the measures in the
required time, it can advance directly into Article 169 proceedings, a move justified by the fact
that Member States have at this stage been twice reminded of their duties6. (They have often been
reminded informally several times.) If the transposition is found to be complete the proceedings
are terminated.
Article 5 EC: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
Community's tasks."
4 The Eighth annual report on Commission monitoring of the application of Community
law, OJ 1991 C338/1 (subsequently Eighth Report 1990).
5 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.212.
6 Reminders are sent to the Member States two months after the directive is adopted and
again six months prior to its entry into force.
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themselves and relate them to the directive in question."15 To examine and understand these texts
the Commission's Legal Affairs Unit tries to assign a lawyer from the French legal system to
examine French measure, a Spanish lawyer examines the Spanish measures, and so on16.
For example, monitoring French provisions implementing EIA85/337 was complicated by the
fact that French EIA legislation preceded the directive and was not designed to implement it
specifically. Several pieces of legislation cover the requirements of the directive. The Commission
found that these were more complex than in most other Member States, and often unnecessarily
confusing1'7. Spain, on the other hand, specifically adopted EIA rules to implement the
Community directive, which made verification of national level legislation simpler, since there
are only two key provisions18. The simplicity was marred, however, by the fact that a host of
provisions adopted by regional authorities with different degrees of autonomy, at different times,
had also to be examined1^.
Macrory, R., "Environmental Citizenship and the Law: Repairing the European Road," 8
(1996) JEL 219 at p.225.
16 Thanks are given to Dr. Ludwig Kramer, for this interview 25 July 1994.
1^ Com(93)28 final, pp.66,75,94.
18 The Real Decreto Legislativo 1302/1986 (equivalent to an Act) on environmental impact
assessment and the Real Decreto 1131/1988 setting the procedure to implement the former. Two
other pieces of legislation are also relevant: Act 25/1988 on highways and Act 4/1988 on
conservation of natural areas and wildlife. See Com(93)28 p.229.
The complete list of legislation declared is:
Asturias: Ley 1/87,30 March, of territorial coordination and management; Decreto 54/90,
17 May of the Consejeria de Agricultura y Pesca, approving the normative regulating changes in
forest cultures as well as new plantations;
Canarias: Ley 11/1990 13 July of Prevention of Ecological Impact;
Madrid: Ley 10/1991 4 April, for Environmental Protection;
Valencia: Ley 2/1989, 3 March, of EIA; Decreto 162/1990 15 October, of the Consell de la
Generalitat Valenciana, approving the Reglament for implementing the Ley 2/ 1989;
Aragon: Decreto 192/1989, 19 September, of the Diputacion General De Aragon,
distributing competences on EIA; decreto 118/1989, 19 September, of the Diputacion General De
Aragon, on EIA procedure; and Decreto 148/1990 9 November, Diputacion General De Aragon,
regulating the procedure for the declaration of environmental impact in the territory of the
Comunidad Autonoma de Aragon;
Baleares: Decreto 4/1986, 23 January, of establishment and regulation of the studies of
EIA;
Cantabria: Decreto 50/1991 29 April, on EIA;
Castilla y Leon: Decreto 269/1989,16 November on EIA;
Cataluna: Decreto 114/1988 7 April on EIA;
Extremadura: Decreto 45/1991 16 April on Measures for Ecosystem protection in the
Comunidad Autonoma de Extremadura;
Galicia: Decreto 442/1990 13 September on EIA;
Navarra: Decreto Foral 245/1988 6 October, assigning determined functions on EIA
matters to the organisms of the Comunidad Foral de Navarra.
Pals Vasco: Decreto 27/1989, 14 February, defining the competent authority for applying
the normative on EIA and toxic and dangerous wastes.
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Correct transposition remains a stumbling block in Community environmental law. For
example, the legislation of most Member States implementing EIA85/337 has long been
considered by the Commission as incomplete regarding Annex II projects (projects for which
assessment is not systematically required in every case)20. The result is that, at national level
many projects are now being authorised without prior EIA24 in violation of Community law.
1.2. Practical Implementation:
The major problem lies not in the transposition of directives, but in their practical
implementation22, the most difficult area to monitor from the Community viewpoint. Concrete
instances of conflicting interests, tensions within the various administrative hierarchies
(Community, Member State, and regional or local authorities), and practical, technical problems
of application manifest themselves here. Often difficulties in practical implementation are linked
to black letter transposition22; for example a breach may involve both a failure in correct
transposition as well as a physical project undertaken in violation of a directive24. Infringements
of practical implementation are much more difficult to discover and then pursue, as illustrated by
Case C-361/8823 on air pollution, which approaches the problem of air pollution from the angle
of legal questions of transposition rather than actual air pollution. Given that the Community has
neither the inspectors nor the powers to inspect26: it is "only in exceptional circumstances that the
Andalucia: orden of 12 July 1988, issuing norms to fulfil the mandatory requirement of
including a study of environmental impact in the projects of the Consejeria de Obras Publicas y
Transportes. (Public Works and Transport);
See Com(93)28 pp. 245-5.
20 Tenth Report 1992 (Environmental Offprint) point 1.3.
24 Tenth Report 1992 (Environmental Offprint), p.8.
22 DoE Memorandum HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.13.
23 Macrory, CMLRev 1992, p.355.
24 For instance, the black letter restriction of the definition of certain types of industry
results in the practical environmental (and competitive) consequences of those industries
escaping the legislative restrictions.
25 C-361 /88 Commission v. Germany 1991 ECR1-2567.
26 Nor even inspectors collaborating with national enforcement officers; Geradin, D., "Trade
and Environmental Protection: Community Harmonization and National Environmental
Standards," 13 (1993) YEL 151, at p.192.
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Commission will have sufficiently strong evidence for a case on actual air pollution to stand in
the European Court."27
If Member States' records on formal implementation are bad, their records regarding practical
implementation are worse. Even where Member States have timeously and correctly transposed
Community environmental obligations they are notoriously lax in observing such obligations in
practice.
Varying interpretations of the black letter rule can have serious repercussions on practical
implementation and harmonisation across Member States28. For instance, differences in
interpretation of EIA85/337, both among Member States and between the Member States and the
Commission, were such that huge divergences in practical implementation resulted. Many
Member States fail to apply the directive in its entirety2^ (largely because of vagueness in
formulation30; a directive amending EIA85/337 and remedying some of its deficiencies has
therefore been proposed31). Actual practice, for instance, regarding Annex II projects has
witnessed both extremes: Annex II projects, which were initially excluded entirely in many
Member States32, are still not fully covered in some States (e.g. Spain), while in others excessive
coverage takes place of minor projects due to thresholds that are too low (e.g. France33). The
content of the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) is also subject to variations in interpretation. The
EIS has been found in most cases to consist of the bare minimum required, disregarding the
outline in Annex III. Although differences in practical implementation of EIA85/337 exist, one
area of uniformity has, unfortunately, emerged: the procedures required by the directive are
frequently carried out in a purely formalistic or cosmetic manner34.
27 Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p. 367.
28 Note here that variations in practical implementation are built into the requirements of
LCP88/609: reductions vary according to Member State.
24 Com(93)575 Proposal for a Council Directive amending directive 85/337 on the
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, p.2.
30 Chapter 1, point 2.
31 Com(93)575 final; see Conclusions, point 2. Lessons learned — Amendments to the EIA
legislation.
2 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.214; Macrory, Richard "The Enforcement of Community
Environmental Laws: Some Critical Issues," 1992 CMLRev 347 at pp.359-60.
33 In the Commission's opinion; national critics disagree.
34 Even Denmark, usually serious in its environmental obligations, has entered into an
agreement with the Swedish government for the construction of a bridge between the two
countries. The Danish Government overcame opposition in the Parliament by ensuring that the
contracts were to go to Danes, and the measure passed within one day, without debate. When the
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In sum, verifying Member State notification, the completeness and accuracy of transposition,
and performance in practice are the monitoring tasks before the Commission. In order to
complete these tasks properly the Commission must possess adequate information. However,
what appears clear is precisely that the Commission does not have the means to obtain necessary
information independently and is in fact almost entirely reliant on external sources of
information. This in turn conditions its efficiency in carrying out its tasks.
2. Commission limitations:
Several factors leave the Commission ill-equipped to carry out the above tasks effectively and
to counter the nonchalance of States regarding implementation: these include the Commission's
own former lack of emphasis on implementation, its limited resources and lack of power, and
Member States' continuing concern for sovereignty.
2.1. Not accorded priority:
An initial problem, since remedied, was that monitoring the application of Community law
was simply not a priority. It has systematically taken place only since 1984, when the first report
on application of Community law was published33. The administrative unit within DG-XI in
charge of monitoring specifically environmental legislation was not created until 198736 and
environmental legislation was first reviewed in detail (and amid considerable upset37) only with
Commission objected to this abuse of the derogation (under Article 1(5) for "projects the details of
which are adopted by a specific act of national legislation"), it was informed by Danish lawyers
that an explanatory memorandum took the place of the debate; Kramer, interview 25 July 1994.
Mr. Marc van der Woude, Conseiller juridique, Service Juridique des Communautes
Europeennes, confirmed the tendency of authorities to make the decision to go ahead with
whatever project and simply to manipulate minor details pursuant to the environmental impact
assessment/public participation process; thanks are given for this interview, 26 July 1994.
35 Com(84)181, "First report on the application of Community law 1983", which failed to
note the poor compliance record of Member States with regard to environmental obligations; see
para. 85.
36 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.201.
37 Prior to the release of the Eighth Report, Commissioner Ripa di Meana released figures
on compliance by Member State, deeply offending the national sensibilities of these (Note de
Presse de la Commission "Le Controle de Tapplication du droit communautaire en matiere
d'environnement," Bruxelles 9 fevrier 1990). The practice of encouraging compliance through
public embarrassment, although it produced positive results, has since decreased; Kramer
interview 25 July 1994.
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the publication of the Eighth Report's Annex C38 in 1991. Until then formulation of environmental
legislation took place largely at the expense of its proper application39. When the Commission
did begin to concern itself more with monitoring the application of Community environmental
law, this was generally limited to formal implementation: verifying notification and transposition.
No infringement proceedings related to practical implementation were commenced before 1983,
and by the end of 1985 only five had been commenced40. As a result, the Member States
apparently drew the conclusion that there was little danger of being pursued for failing to fulfil
practical environmental obligations.
Although deficiencies of practical implementation now increasingly preoccupy the
Commission, it is hampered by the extreme shortage of legal staff and by limits on its ability to
investigate, making it difficult to look beyond the simple evaluation of reports sent to it by
Member States, information and questions put to it by the Parliament, and complaints made by
individuals and associations — all external sources of information.
2.2. Insufficient resources:
One problem, of a technical and institutional nature, could be overcome if the will to devote
considerably increased resources to environmental priorities existed. While lack of resources is a
common complaint in various administrations, it appears that regarding environmental
administration, the degree to which resources are strained is indeed severe. The Commission is
greatly constrained in its duties ~ throughout the stages of formulation, monitoring, and
enforcement — by its limited budget and staff. Financially EC environmental policy is allocated
about 100 Million ECU of the 70 Billion EC budget44, or only about 0.14% of the EC's annual
budget — "a ridiculous misappropriation of a policy."42 In 1994 DG-XI had a staff of about 200,
38 Eighth Report 1990, C338/204.
'
See, for instance J.P. Plowman, Head of Environmental Protection, Europe Division, HL
Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.21; Aguilar, 1993, p.227.
40 Collins and Earnshaw pp.220-1. By 1990, 62 proceedings for poor practical
implementation had been commenced.
41 Kramer, 25 July 1994.
42 Klatte, op.cit., p.46.
As the Commission points out in "The State of the Environment in the European
Community: Overview (Com(92)23 final Vol. Ill), there are "few comparative data available for all
Member States"; p.82. The figures given for environmental expenditure as percentage of GDP in
1988 are for Spain, 0.6%, for France 1.0%, for the UK 1.2% and for the EC (excluding Belgium,
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with an additional 200 on temporary contracts43; (to compare, in 1991 the Dutch Ministry of the
Environment employed some 90044). Moreover DG-XI had only one lawyer for each Member
State and a head of unit, responsible for verifying all the legislation and following hundreds of
cases45. The directorate's ability to perform its duties is torpedoed by its restricted resources, and
although the Parliament, largely in control of the budget, every year attempts to increase DG-XI's
budget and staff46, these continue to remain too limited to enable DG-XI to adequately confront
the tasks before it47.
2.3. Limits to Commission powers:
A further constraint on the Commission is that, in terms of gathering environmental
information and evaluating Member State performance, it must deal with Member States in a
manner similar to an ordinary system of public international law: the Commission is unable to
bypass central authorities48. All communications and inquiries directed from the Commission to
the Member States must pass through the national representation in Brussels, which then
forwards the document — in the fullness of time ~ to the appropriate national ministry or
department. The procedure is further lengthened in those instances where the target of the
Luxumbourg and Greece) 1.2%. A double trend has been noted: to slowly increase environmental
expenditure on one hand, and for a growing proportion of this to be shouldered by the private
sector on the other; p.83.
See also Court of Auditors testimony, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, pp.49-51. To
compare, 3.9% is spent in development co-operation with Latin America, Asia and the
Mediterranean (excluding the financial and technical aid to ACP countries under the Lome
Conventions), 25.9% is spent in structural measures, agriculture, of course takes the largest part of
the budget at 58.4%; see Europe in Figures, third edition, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1992, p.43.
43 Kramer, 25 July 1994; Williams, R., p.366.
44 Klatte, Frontiers of Environmental Law, p.44.
45 Rhiannon Williams states that this is a fair average over the years; furthermore, among
these lawyers there is extremely rapid job turnover; Williams, R., pp.366,372.
46 Thanks are given to Mr. Sjef Coolegem, Senior Administrator, Secretariat of the
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, for this interview on 27
July 1994.
47 For instance, the Commission's resources are too stretched to cope with the increase in
complaints to do with the environment; Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.232.
48 Macrory, CMLRev 1992, p.357; Kramer, GYIL 1991, p.34.
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inquiry is a regional authority4^. For a reply on the issue in question, the Commission must wait,
first, for the Member State to be willing to answer, and then for the reply to filter through the
various local and State levels back to the national representation in Brussels50. At present it
remains
extremely difficult to gain access to the data held by national, regional and local authorities on for
example, the frequency and results of the inspections, the firms inspected, the conditions laid down
in the licences granted, or the pollution levels recorded.5^
Again the effects of the ideological ranking of environment can be discerned, for where in the
area of competition, Regulation 1752 authorises Community inspectors to descend upon firms
suspected of infringements and search offices and seize documents, or in the area of fishing policy
on-the-spot visits are authorised55, no such power exists in the area of environment. As Kramer
points out, where infringements of environmental law are similarly suspected, Community action
is restricted to a polite exchange of letters — "clearly an absurdity"54. This raises the question of
where Community priorities lie and the vision of how the Community is to develop. Since
initially environment protection did not exist at all, having any Community action in this area is
an achievement. Yet more than two decades beyond the introduction of environmental protection
as a Community concern, is the difference in priorities between policies still justified? On the
contrary, it seems desirable and logical to extend the powers necessary to survey correctly the
practical implementation of Community environmental rules in order to bolster their effet utile55.
49 Although direct contact can take place between regional authorities and the Commission,
this can occur only at the regional authority's initiative. In Spain's case such contact has only been
initiated when the problem in question bears financial implications or relates to Community
funding. Concern for the environment alone has, apparently, not yet warranted the trip to
Brussels; Kramer, interview 25 July 1994.
50 Although not referring specifically to the environment, the Commission envisages future
contact that is increasingly decentralised, particularly with inspection and implementation
authorities; Reinforcing the Effectiveness of Community Law, Com(93)256, p.16.
51 Kramer, GYIL 1991, p.31.
52 OJ special ed. no.13,1962 No. 204/62 p.87, Article 14.
53 Regulation 2241/87 (OJ 1987 L207/1 amended by 3483/88 OJ 1988 L306/2) establishing
certain control measures for fishing activities. Article 12(3): "To ensure that Member States
comply with this Regulation, the Commission may verify on the spot the implementation thereof
in liaison with the competent national departments." Article 12(4) outlines the formalities of
inspections at sea, in air, or on land.
54 Kramer, L. "Community Environmental Law — Towards a Systematic Approach," 11
(1991) Yearbook of European Law 151 at p.169.
55 Particularly since the compatibility of the Single Market and environmental protection is
firmly espoused by the Commission in the Fifth EAP and emphasised in Article 2 EC since the
TEU.
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Genuine overall commitment to environmental policy, in spite of various positive statements, is
particularly questionable on the issue of powers, since furthermore no real imagination is
required in the development of powers. The powers that would be useful are known; they exist in
these other areas (competition and fisheries).
The idea of extending the Commission's power is occasionally brought up, although less
frequently in recent years56. That this has yet to be approved by the Council is a symptom of
another obstacle to Commission monitoring: Member States' reluctance to allow the Commission
to encroach further on their sovereignty — a sovereignty that Member States continue to defend in
spite of the long-established fact that the "Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their
sovereign rights."57
As might be expected, concern for national sovereignty resurfaces especially in the area of
practical implementation, which may imply physical inspection of national territory, unlike the
documentary evidence required to ascertain formal implementation. As MEP Ken Collins has
indicated, the idea of a corps of environment inspectors swarming over the national territory
"armed with a measuring jar and pipette", testing the actual state of the environment was
unacceptable to many Member States: "they did not like the idea of their environment being
inspected by 'foreigners'."55 On-site investigations are extremely rare5^, although the right to
such visits can be inferred from Article 5, in fact they take place at the mercy of the Member State
and the Commission has on at least one occasion been denied permission60. Again the
importance of the distinction between practical and formal implementation is underlined, here in
terms of repercussions in enforcement actions: considerations of national sovereignty generally
bar the Commission from obtaining concrete evidence. Without power to investigate the facts of a
case or impose periodic controls on Member States, the Commission is rarely able to prove
successfully a practical infringement61.
56 Macrory, CMLRev 1992, p.362; Kramer, interview 25 July 1994.
57 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL 1964 ECR 585.
55 Ken Collins, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.35.
50 Seventh Report on Commission Monitoring of Community Law 1989, Com (90)288 p.34.
60 Kramer, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92 p.6; Although as Kramer himself points out,
an on-the-spot visit by a lawyer to assess scientific ecological conditions is of "limited efficiency";
Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.405.
61 Tenth Report 1992, p.101. This has been borne out before the Court; see for instance Case
C-337/89 Commission v UK 1992 ECR 1-6013.
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2.4. Dependence on external sources of information:
Flowing from the former limitations on its ability to collect data, the Commission is highly
dependent on three sources of information over which it has little control: data supplied by the
Member States themselves (more useful in providing general information than in helping the
Commission detect infringements, for obvious reasons); reports, petitions and written questions
submitted by Parliament; and complaints from individuals and associations62.
- Member State reports and replies to Commission communications: Reliance on
Member States for the reports required by certain directives and for answers to specific questions
carries the built-in drawback of counting on Member States to supply accurate information that
may be eventually used against them.
Part of the blame for the States' poor performance in forwarding reports stems; again, from
legislative formulation. In early directives the requirement for Member States to submit reports
often was either non-existent or very vague. For instance, an often-used requirement in early
legislation was to report "at intervals" ("what interval? Every hundred years? This
millennium?"63). When reports were required, the requirement to notify the practical measures to
implement was often omitted64, encouraging focus on only black letter transposition.
Accordingly, Member States tend to summarise administrative and technical measures and
provide little information on the performance of concrete programmes and actions65.
Furthermore the Commission was slow to insist on the importance of fulfilling reporting
requirements: the first case against a State for failure to send reports was brought only in 198766.
Member States are more at fault, however. Even where a specific requirement exists, Member
States commonly disregard their obligation: the "utility [of reports] is limited by the infrequency
62 Tenth Report 1992 (Environmental Offprint), p.9.
63 MEP Dr. Caroline Jackson, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.39.
64 Kramer, GYIL 1991 p.30.
65 Moreover, occasionally officials seems to equate formal implementation with carrying out
the concrete actions required: one official from the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy
implied that, by forwarding the required programme to the Commission Spain had fulfilled its
concrete obligations.
66 Case C-162/89 EC Commission v Belgium 1990 ECR1-2391.
These reports are also important in elaborating coherent protection programmes. In Case
C-162/89 for instance, had the reports been forwarded in time it would have helped the Waste
Management Committee set up by the Member States and the EEC, to co-ordinate and rationalise
national waste policies; Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.287.
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of their transmission. The situation has not discernibly improved in recent years67". If the
Commission does not devote enough attention to seeing that reports are forwarded by given
deadlines68, it must be stressed that in some cases it is almost impossible to extract any
information from the Member States. An informal year-long69 survey within DG-XI concerning
requests to ten member States for information revealed that, of 111 letters sent by the
Commission, only two had been answered within the two-month deadline; one third had
received no answer at all; and the average period for a reply was six months70. An extreme
example is Italy which, for more than four years and even during the course of infringement
proceedings71 failed to answer repeated Commission requests for information pertaining to
practical implementation on matters relating to waste and hazardous waste. Despite the
judgment against Italy, some questions remained unanswered in 199472. (This has further
consequences in enforcement, in that the ECJ's reasoning can be limited by inadequate
information73.)
Information is so rarely supplied that often the Commission, in turn, cannot carry out its own
obligations to issue reports on implementation of particular directives74. EIA85/337 and
LCP88/609 illustrate the pattern: the Commission's report on implementation of EIA85/33773,
due in July 1990, was published only on 2 April 1993. The Commission has stated76 that it will
proceed with the comparative analysis of pollution reduction as required by Article 3(4)
67 Com(93)320 p.320; Audretsch, H.A.H. Supervision in Community Law 2nd rev. ed. 1986,
p.431-2.
68 Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.5; HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.18.
69 July 1993-July 1994.
70 Williams, R., p.361.
71 Case C-33/90 Commission v Italy 1991 ECR1-5987.
72 Specifically regarding a US contract to import waste into Campania, confirmed by
Kramer, interview 25 July 1994. Waste management is an area particularly affected by Member
States' unwillingness to supply information, cf: Tenth Report 1992 (Environmental Offprint), p.44.
73 As in Case 57/89R Commission v Germany 1989 ECR 2849 (Chapter 3, point 1.2. Problems
in the judicial phase).
74 Com(90)287 final; HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.20; Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.288.
Such was the case with the Article 12 reports required by the Birds Directive 79/409: between
1981 and 1992 the Commission was unable to produce a single composite report; Kramer,
Casebook, 1993, p.158.
75 Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Directive 85/337/EEC,
Com(93)28 final.
76 Eleventh Report 1993, C154/49.
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contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law, which again may
help promote the correct implementation of Community environmental law. (For instance, the
Ombudsman is investigating the alleged failure of the Commission to make a diligent inquiry
into the potential violation of EIA85/337 regarding the British widening of the M40 motorway89.)
- Individuals and groups or associations: By contrast with traditional systems of
public international law, through the Community's complaints procedure, individuals and
associations become crucial actors, at Community level, in monitoring the implementation of
Community law90. Complaints are by far the Commission's most important source of information
on infringements. In 1982 the Commission received 10 complaints and detected none through
other sources; in 1985 it received 37 and detected 10 cases; in 1988, 216 complaints were received
and 33 cases detected; and in 1990 the figures were 480 and 42 respectively91. Clearly the
procedure is an invaluable resource for the Commission. Moreover, complaints tend to concern
inadequate implemftation in practice92, the Commission's most troublesome area to monitor.
Interested individuals and ecological associations fulfil the critical function of acting as the
Commission's eyes on Member State territory.
The procedure has many advantages. Local remedies need not have been exhausted. All
written complaints are registered, and the complainant notified, and although no particular
format is needed, the Commission has simplified matters by publishing a complaint form93. No
violations of specific legislation need be cited, as long as the complaint is sufficiently precise to
permit inquiry. Indeed, it falls upon the Commission to obtain factual and legal information on
the object of the complaint. The procedure is free of charge.
89 European Union, The European Ombudsman, Annual Report, 1995, Annex b, pp.42-43;
investigating complaints no. 132/21.9.95/AH/UK-EN and 150/29.09.95/DL/UK-EN by two
British citizens.
However, it would perhaps be mistaken to place too much hope in his role. As Dr.
Kramer points out, his function is "rather to control the administrative activities of Community
institutions than to check and eventually to challenge Commission's decisions"; Kramer, L.,
"Public Interest Litigation in Environmental Matters Before European Courts," 8 (1996) JEL 1 at
p.10.
90 And in enforcing it, below 3.1. Shifting the burden to national courts.




However, while the complaint procedure presents these advantages and is a crucial source of
information for the Commission, it does possess several drawbacks. It is, by nature, sporadic. It
cannot reflect the true situation of the environment: relying on the public, the procedure passes
through a cultural filter reflecting national perceptions about which issues are serious and merit
attention. Complaints on environmental issues may be most frequent precisely in states where
environmental awareness is most acute, where crucial public information and education are
highest and where the true situation may in fact be better than elsewhere94. It also implies
awareness of the Community source of obligations being breached. The procedure will be
ineffective where the public is not vigilant or is (kept) unaware of the Community origin of
national measures and does not complain to the Commission about breaches of Community
law98.
The complaints procedure also skews proceedings towards specific problems: it is logical that
public attention be more focused on spectacular events or occurrences than on slow continuous
degradation. For instance, in 1987-88 most of the complaints against Germany, the Netherlands,
Italy, Belgium and France regarded drinking water, wild birds, and environmental impact
assessment96; the last two were still the most frequent sources of complaint in 199297. Yet that
Commission attention is thus focused on wild birds and environmental impact assessments does
not exclude the possibility that quality of shellfish waters, for example, or air pollution caused by
industrial plants are also the subject of gross, if less obvious, breaches of environmental law.
Another difficulty is that the complaints procedure depends upon the ability to obtain
relevant information. However, attempts to obtain information are often unsuccessful:
individuals and pressure groups are often told that data are confidential and cannot be
released98. Efforts to overcome this secrecy have been made, as with the adoption of Directive
94 WWF, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.265.
PE 116.085, 1988 at p.17. Member States tend to play down the Community origin of
national measures, for instance the Department of the Environment Booklet on Pollution Control
Systems discusses air pollution controls and provides graphs for reductions in emissions from
British Large Combusion Plants, yet never mentions the existence of the EC directive (DoE,
Environment in Trust: Pollution Control Systems, pp.5-6.). Citizens must be aware of the
Community source in order to make complaints to the Commission or to rely on Community
provisions in a national court where the measure is capable of direct effect.
96 Com(90)288, p.35
Tenth Report 1992 (Environment Offprint), p.10.
98 Kramer, HL Ninth Report Evidence 1991-92, p.6.
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90/31399 on freedom of access to environmental information held by Member State public
authorities100. However, derogations are built into the directive itself101 and problems exist with
its transposition and practical application, which "require substantial changes in the traditional
administrative procedures of most Member States"10^. And even if its provisions are respected by
administrative agents (and examination of the two national contexts reveals that this is often not
the case10-1), a concerned individual must be informed enough to know what kind of data to
request.
As seen above, with the aid of Parliamentary petitions and questions the number of cases
detected by the Commission independently of the complaints procedure has risen somewhat, but
the figures show that the Commission is still over-reliant on irregular interventions of groups and
individuals, as the Commission itself admits104. Complaints, though certainly of great use, can
hardly substitute for a systematic approach to monitoring implementation.
An enormous drawback of the complaints procedure both for complainants and the
environment is its length. Some 500 complaints a year entail a continuous flow of documents
between Member States and the Commission and long delays while the central State authority
then seeks information from regional or local authorities or companies — delays that national
authorities notoriously prolong unjustifiably105. While environmental problems often require
urgent attention, a complaint to the Commission provides no short-term solution. In Case C-
57/89106 for instance, the first complaints were made in 1985 concerning work to increase an
existing dike on the Leybucht (a designated birds habitat) and the disposal of dredged sludge in
99 Directive 90/313 (OJ 1998 L158/56).
tOO The Commission has announced the elaboration of a text regarding access to
environmental information held by Community authorities as well; see Kramer, Ludwig and
Pascale Kromarek, "Droit Communautaire de l'environnement; ler octobre 1991 - 31 decembre
1993," RJE 2-3/1994, p.218.
101 Article 3(2) of this directive lists grounds on which a Member State may refuse to provide
information, although stipulating that "[information held by public authorities shall be supplied
in part where it is possible to separate out information on items concerning the interests referred
to above."
10^ Tenth Report 1992 (Environment Offprint), p.7
t°3 The implementation of this directive has proceeded poorly, and the Commission has seen
fit to warn that it considers several of the provisions of Directive 90/313 EEC to have direct effect
and therefore to be applicable from 1 January 1993, with or without national implementing
legislation; Tenth Report 1992 (EnvironmentOffprint), point 1.6.
104 Eighth Report 1990, p.272.
105 Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p. 4; Kramer, GYIL 1991, p.34.
106 Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany 1991 ECR 883.
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the area of Rysumer Nacken, which the Commission believed would lead to the disappearance of
birds habitats. By the time interim measures were considered, in August 1989, the ECJ judged
construction to be so far along that there was no urgency in stopping the remaining
construction107. The action, in which the Commission proved unsuccessful, was judged in
February 1991, seven years after the first complaints. The shortcomings for environmental
protection are obvious, and the potential to make Europeans lose confidence in the value of the
complaints procedure are serious. Confidence in the complaints procedure has been affected: the
public perceives that occasionally investigations are discontinued for political reasons108.
Finally, a worrisome development with regard to this source of information is that, regarding
Community law generally, the burgeoning number of complaints and the difficulties experienced
by Commission departments in investigating cases have led to the Commission to advise
complainants to raise the matter with the national authorities in the first instance, particularly
when the complaint refers to "measures taken on the spot."10^ The same advice has been
reiterated with specific reference to environmental complaints110. Where already Member States
tend not to take their environmental obligations seriously, this diminishes an important
Community-level avenue towards enforcement, for in the end the action taken by the
Commission is usually provoked by a complaint. It is serious that this means of gathering
information specifically related to infringements is being played down while no significant
improvement to the Commission's ability to gather this information itself has been made
(resources/competence). Also there is a certain irony in the fact that, on the one hand, the
Community has taken pains to put powers at the disposal of European citizens (through such
107 Case C-57/89R Commission v Germany, Order of the President of the Court, 1989 ECR
2849, at paras. 18,19, 22.
108 Six non-governmental organisations, including WWF-UK, RSPB and Greenpeace
International responding to a questionnaire indicated that
- all were dissatisfied with the reasons for closure of the complaints procedure, and very
dissatisfied with the time it takes the Commisison to process complaints (one even cited its
concern that the Commission used its "slow processing of complaints to avoid taking timely, but
politically controversial decisions");
- all felt external political pressure may have played a part in the processing of their
complaints (most felt, citing actual occasions, that it had indeed played a part);
- three felt internal Commission policy played a part;
- two felt that lack of Commission personnel might have been a factor;
Williams, R., pp.364-65, 372.
10^ Com(93)256, p.14. Williams, R., pp.368-69.
110 Com(96)500, p.10 point 31; Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.232.
102
directives as 90/313^ on access to information) in order that they may help monitor the
implementation of environmental rules; on the other hand, the use of these powers is, to a certain
extent, discouraged.
3. Addressing limitations:
Serious attempts have been made at the Community level to address the Commission's
restrictions. The ECJ has placed useful tools at the Commission's disposal, by outlining general
duties and more precisely, by giving guidance on acceptable methods of implementation. The ECJ
has also developed certain doctrines that are instrumental in alleviating the Commission's burden
of monitoring and enforcing Community law, by promoting the enforcement of Community
rights and obligations at national level. Finally, in an effort to decrease its dependency on the
sources of information outlined above, the Commission has established alternate sources.
3.1. Judicial promotion of adequate implementation:
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given the Commission valuable support in the
Commission's task of monitoring implementation, both through development of general legal
doctrines, most of which find their origins in Article 5 EC, and through specific decisions that
outline the requirements of implementation.
General duties:
- Duty to co-operate: A tool the ECJ has given the Commission and that has been
used in environmental litigation^2 js jts development of the positive duty of "loyal co-operation"
arising from Article 5(1) of the Treaty whereby Member States are required to facilitate the
Commission's task by co-operating fully with it. (The Commission, likewise, must co-operate
111 Above.
112 Case 52/84 Commission v Belgium, above, (para.16).
Case 272/86 Commission v Greece 1988 ECR 4875 "the lack of cooperation was particularly
serious because it persisted before the Court" (para.31).
Case C-33/90 Commission v Italy (Campania) 1991 ECR 1-5987 (paras.18-21).
See also AUDRETSCH, 1986, pp.15-18.
113 Case C-2/88 Zwartveld and Others 1990 ECR 1-3365, para.17 "...relations between the
Member States and the Community institutions are governed, according to Article 5 of the EEC
Treat, by a principle of sincere cooperation. That principle not only requires the Member States to
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relating to more intractable difficulties (social turmoil and strikes, parliamentary difficulties
making adoption within the time limit impossible, and constitutional or administrative division
of competence placing implementation in the hands, not of the Member State, but of a local or
regional authority124), often leaving Member States with a genuine problem. Arguing that a
Member State is not alone in its failure will not shield it from its responsibility12^; nor does the
fact that Community institutions may also have failed to fulfil their obligations justify a Member
State's failure126. Some allowance may be given to cases of force majeure, (although this will not
- that the complex subject matter would entail amendment to the Civil Code; Case 17/85
Commmission v Italy 1986 ECR 1199 (para.5);
- inter alia the "need to take account of European capital market"; Case 390/85 Commission
v Belgium 1987 ECR 761 (para. 6).
124 Social upheaval: Case 128/78 Commission v United Kingdom (Tachographs) 1979 ECR 419,
it was claimed that compulsory measures would meet with "active resistance" from concerned
sectors (para.7);
Parliamentary difficulties: Case 91/79 Commission v Italy (detergents) 1980 ECR 1099
(environment) efforts had been thwarted by the brief existence of the seventh legislature of the
Italian Parliament (para.5); also Case 280/83 Commission v Italy 1984 ECR 2361 the early
dissolution of Parliament prevented the draft directive from completing the Parliamentary
procedure (para.3);
Division of competence: Case 227-230/85 Commission v Belgium 1988 ECR 1
(environment): the Belgian government is not empowered to compel the regions to implement the
directive, nor to substitute itself for the regions (para.8). Rejecting this defence, the Court
explained that although a Member State is free to delegate powers as it sees fit, it is not thereby
released from its obligations to the Community (para.9); also Case 97/81 Commission v Netherlands
1982 ECR 1791 (environment) (paras. 11,12); and Case C-33/90 Commission v Italy (Campanian
Waste) above, (paras.23-24).
Financial difficulties: Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium 1990 ECR 1-2821 (environment,
para.24); (and certainly not if the request for an extension on compliance time comes after the
deadling for transposition of the directive has passed, para.23).
125 Regarding the fact that a Member State cannot rely on possible infringement of Treaty by
another MS to justify its own default, see:
Case 52/75 Commission v Italy, above (para. 7/9);
Case 232/78 Commission v France, above (para.9).
Case 325/82 Commission v Germany 1984 ECR 777 (para. 11).
Reference has been made to the Court in national cases where it was argued that
application of national implementing legislation was prejudicial to nationals, since other Member
States had not implemented, see
Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinlig v Germany 1977 ECR 595 (para.24).
Case C-38/89 Ministere Public c/Blanguernon 1990 ECR 1-83, (paras.4-7).
126 Cases 90 and 91/63 Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium 1964 ECR 625, the defendants
argued that, as the Community had failed to comply with its obligations, the Commission has lost
its right to plead infringement of Treaty. The Court disagreed: the fact that the Council failed to
carry out its own obligations cannot relieve the defendants from carrying out theirs (p.631).
Case 7/71 Commission v France ("Supply Agency" Euratom) 1971 ECR 1003: the French
Government, of the opinion since 1965 that the provisions of Chapter VI Euratom had lapsed
(para.3) argued that it was not open to the Commission to bring action in 1971 for a situation that
it has known about since 1965 (para 4 ). The Court ruled that the Commission only commenced
action after a lengthy period of time cannot have the effect of regularizing a continuing
contravention (para.6) and the fact that the Council has not reached a decision to confirm Chapter
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justify excessive delay)127 and in instances where real doubt as to the legal obligations of the
Member State exists128; it is clear, however that such circumstances will be interpreted very
narrowly.
Securing adequate legal certainty has been the force behind many rulings offering guidance
in correct implementation. The ECJ has given technical assistance to the Commission by clarifying
areas of possibly genuine doubt regarding the acceptable forms and methods of implementation.
The over-riding issue is that persons concerned be made fully aware of their rights and
obligations.
Through successive rulings the ECJ has made abundantly clear that administrative circulars
that are inadequately publicised and can be modified at the whim of the administration,
voluntary agreements, and legislative reference to non-binding technical rules are generally not
enough to correctly transpose a directive129. Thus transposition of directives
does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express
specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the Directive, be
adequate for the purpose provided that it does guarantee the full application of the directive in a
sufficiently clear ana precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to create rights for
'individuals the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where
appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.121'
VI provisions cannot prevent Commission from ensuring respect for provisions it esteems to be
still in force (para.12).
127 Case 101/84 Commission v Italy 1985 ECR 2629. A bomb attack in 1979 on Italy's Ministry
for Transport's data-processing centre hampered Italy's ability to compile the required statistical
returns on carriage of goods by road required by the Commission. The Court found that although
this may have constituted a case of force majeure "its effects could only have lasted a certain time"
(para.16). Italy was found not to have fulfilled its obligations.
See also Case 52/84 Commission v Belgium 1986 ECR 89, (para.16).
128 Case 26/69 Commission v France (Olive Oil) 1970 ECR 565 in view of "the equivocal nature
of the situation thus brought about, the French Republic cannot be accused of any failure to fulfil
its obligations" (paras. 27-32). (This defence is unlikely to work again, cf: Case 7/71 Commission v
France (Euratom); see Dashwood and White, 1989, p.402).
129 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium 1980 ECR 1473 (environment): "...a Member State has
not discharged the obligation imposed upon it by the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty
if, for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements under the directives in question , it simply relies
on existing practices or even just the tolerance which is exercised by the administration (para.10);
"...Mere administrative practices, which by their nature can be changed as and when the
authorities please and which are not publicized widely enough cannot in these circumstances be
regarded as a proper fulfilment of the obligation imposed by Article 189 (para.11)"; see also Case
C-361/88 Cotntnission v Germany 1991 ECR 1-2567 (environment, paras.14-21).
130 Case 363/85 Commission v Italy 1987 ECR 1733 (para.7).
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The fact that a measure is directly applicable or capable of direct effect does not make
transposition redundant131. Furthermore, that a provision is applied in practice but not
transposed is capable of causing confusion132. Although formal implementation does not
necessarily require legislative action, the existing principles and provisions must
guarantee that the national authorities will in fact apply the directive fully and that, where the
directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the legal position arising from those principles
is sufficiently precise and clear and the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and,
where appropriate, afforded the possibility of relying on them before the national courts1.
The maintenance in force of national provisions incompatible with Community legislation,
even if not applied in practice, likewise clouds legal certainty134. The fact that the practice
prohibited by a directive does not exist in a given Member State does not entail that the provision
is not worth transposing and cannot justify the absence of appropriate legal provisions135. Nor
does the expectation of an upcoming change in Community law justify the Member State's failure
to transpose the Community provision that is currently valid; the binding force of a directive may
not be challenged as long as it has not been abrogated or amended136. Prohibitions in a directive
must be expressly set out in national law137.
131 Case 301/81 Commission v Belgium, above. The Court took the opportunity to explain that
even if provisions are directly applicable, the state is not exempted from implementing them
(para.13). See also 102/79 Commission v Belgium (para.12).
132 Case 300/81 Commission v Italy 1983 ECR 449 (para.10).
133 Case 29/84 Commission v Germany 1985 ECR 1661, at para.23.
See also:
Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium 1980 ECR 1473 (paras.10-11);
Case 236/85 Commission v Netherlands 1987 ECR 3989 (paras.18,25);
Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany (above; para.24);
Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands 1990 ECR 1-851 (environment, para.36);
Cases C-13/90, C14/90 and C64/90 Commission v France 1991 ECR 1-4327,1-4331 and I-
4335 respectively (environment).
134 Case 167/73 Commission v France (Code de travail maritime) 1974 ECR 359. Although the
regulation was directly applicable, the maintenance in force of the incompatible wording of the
Code du Travail Maritime gave rise to "an ambiguous state of affairs by maintaining as regards
those subject to the law who are concerned, a state of uncertainty as to the possibilities available
to them of relying on Community law" (para.41). The uncertainty was reinforced by the internal,
verbal character of administrative directions to waive the application of national rules. As
Dashwood and White note, op cit. at p.393: "legislation can produce effects incompatible with
Community obligations independent of its application by national authorities."
135 Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands 1990 ECR 1-851 (environment; paras.22,25,32).
136 C-310/89 Commission v Netherlands 1991 ECR 1-1381 (environment) p.1381.
See also Case 220/83 Commission v France 1986 ECR 3662; Case 252/83 Commission v
Denmark 1986 ECR 3713; Case 205/84 Commission v Germany 1986 ECR 3755; Case 206/84
Commission v Ireland 1986 ECR 3817: four insurance cases, where it was argued unsuccessfully that
the Commission sought to pre-empt procedures in Council, where a proposal for a second
directive on same matter was under discussion.
137 Case 252/85 Commission v France, (environment)(para 19);
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Shifting the burden to national courts: Finally, certain general doctrines developed by the ECJ
have had the effect of alleviating the Commission's burden with regards to investigating, and if
the need arises, commencing infringement proceedings at Community level for alleged
infractions438.
- Direct Effect: The most notorious of the doctrines developed by the ECJ is that of
direct effect. Even if not, or if poorly implemented, a directive is capable of creating rights that are
enforceable in national courts against the State or an emanation of the state (Marshall and
confirmed recently in Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb^9). A provision is capable of direct effect if it is
unconditional, sufficiently precise and "not qualified by any reservation which would make its
implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure enacted under national law" and
if the deadline for its implementation has passed4 40. doctrine has been instrumental in other
areas of Community law, lightening the Commission's burden by making Community legislation
enforceable directly in the Member States.
The difficulty is that the doctrine of direct effect, designed to ensure that individuals can
assert their Community rights in national courts, has only limited application in environmental
law. Environmental law rarely meets the criteria for direct effect: it is an area in which further
Also C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands (above) (para.22); C-131/88 Commission v
Germany 1991 ECR 1-825 (environment) Germany's argument that, if no authorisation was
granted, then discharge of dangerous substances were in effect prohibited (as required by the
directive) did not satisfy the requirement of legal certainty for companies applying for
authorisation (para.37).
438 Alternatively, a more cynical view might take this as 'passing the buck' to the Member
States.
139 Case 154/84 Marshall v Southampton A.H.A. 1986 ECR 723; in Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini
Dori v Recreb Sri, 1994 ECR 1-3325. In the latter, although denying horizontal direct effect, the
Court reminded Member States that the doctrine of sympathetic interpretation required the
national courts, when applying national law, whether adopted prior to or after Community
directive, to interpret that law as far as possible in the light of the wording and the purpose of the
directive so as to achieve the result intended by the directive (para.26). As an added incentive, the
Court (para.27) also reminded Member States of the judgment in Francovich, requiring them to
make good damage caused to individuals through failure to transpose a directive provided that
the Francovich conditions are fulfilled (see below).
440 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Tarief Commissie 1963 ECR 1, p.13). Cf Case
148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti 1979 ECR 1629 at 1651. Case 8/81 Becker 1982 ECR 53 at 71.
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"instructions" are typically given to authorities141. More intractably, it seldom creates individual
rights142 (although this does not diminish the obligation on the State143). This seems to rule out
protection of directives designed to protect the environment as such, rather than the environment
in conjunction with the health of individuals. Case C-236/92144, the first case concerned with the
direct effect of an environmental directive (directive 75/442143, admittedly not a strong candidate
for direct effect14^) suggests a stringency in application of the doctrine to environmental rules.
The argument that, rather than examining whether specific articles of a directive can confer
individual rights, "rights of individuals should follow from the general protective aim of
environmental directives, reflecting the close relationship between human health and
environmental quality,"142 is here strongly supported. Again14®, while the Community
encourages individuals to be vigilant and active in the enforcement of Community environmental
rules (access to information, complaints procedure, public participation), it is ironic that a rigid
interpretation of individual rights could preclude this highly effective path for enforcement at
Member State level. However, the case-law is young, and the effects of this judgment remain to be
verified.
Moreover, enforcement of Community environmental law by individuals directly in national
courts is not ruled out completely: some environmental directives are esjeajned^to have direct
effect such as provisions laying down maximum values for discharges (limit values, emission
values); prohibitions couched in absolute terms149. For example, EIA85/337 arguably creates a
141 KrAmer, Focus..., pp.159.
142 Insistance that rights be 'individual' further plagues would-be protectors of the
environment with regard to legal title before the courts, both at Community level, and in the
national contexts; see Chapter 3, point 1.2, problems of the judicial phase; and enforcement in the
national chapters.
143 In Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany 1995 ECR 1-2192, concerning EIA85/337, the ECJ
marked the distinction between whether a provision was unconditional and sufficiently precise to
impose obligations on the State and whether an individual could rely upon them.
144 Case C-236/92 Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and Others v Regione
Lombardia and Others, 1994 ECR 1-483.
145 Directive 75/442 on waste; OJ 1975 L194/39.
14^ Holder, J., "A Dead End for Direct Effect?: Prospects for Enforcement of European
Community Environmental Law by Individuals," 8 (1996) JEL 313 at p. 332.
147 Holder, 1996, pp.330-31.
148 See above 2.4. at - Individuals and groups or associations.
149 KRAMER, Focus..., pp.160-67. Interesting for this research, it is Kramer's opinion that
Article 3 of EIA85/337 is, at least as far as Annex I projects are concerned, capable of direct effect,
as is Article 6, providing that the public concerned must be consulted. See also Macrory in
Vaughan, pp. 40-41, in which he states that "In my view most of the provisions of the Directive
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right to participation150. The Drinking water directive could be esteemed to create an individual
right to drinking water of a certain quality151. Unfortunately it would require both access to
adequate information and a great deal of courage on the part of the individual to claim these
rights in judicial proceedings152: indeed, the choice between buying bottled water or engaging in
lengthy, costly legal proceedings that are uncertain as to outcome is usually quickly made.
- State Liability: The Francovich ruling, by which Member States may be held liable
if their default results in damage to individuals, makes the consequences of inadequate formal
implementation more costly for the Member States155. Interestingly, Jans argues that a form of
strict liability has been introduced, where the State can be held liable for defaults of the
government, for acts of public authorities (even at local or regional level) or even individuals154.
Conditions sufficient to give rise to a right on the part of individuals to obtain reparation
include155 :
- the result required by the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals;
- it should be possible to identify the content of these rights by reference to the provisions
of the directive;
- a causal link must exist between the state's breach of obligations and damage suffered
by the individual15^.
First, the pervasive difficulty in proving causation in environmental matters generally is
noted, given the state of scientific knowledge, the possible accumulation of damage over many
concerning Annex I are sufficiently clear and precise to have direct effect, being mandatory
requirements with respect to such projects."
150 Furthermore, in Case 431/92 Commission v Germany 1995 ECR 1-2211, paras. 37-40
indicates that Articles 2, 3, and 8 of EIA85/337 are clear and precise enought to lay down
unequivocal obligations, but the ECJ stops short of discussing whether this confers rights on
individuals.
151 Likewise the Court's ruling in C-361/88 Commission v Germany 1991 ECR 1-2567 seems to
set the stage for the argument for a right to clean air: "[Article 2, Directive 80/779] implies,
therefore, that whenever the exceeding of the limit values could endanger human health the
persons concerned must be in a position to rely on mandatory rules in order to be able to assert
their rights" (para.16).
152 Kramer, interview 25 July 1994.
153 Cases C-6, C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Sate 1991 ECR 1-5357; reaffirmed C-46, C-
48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame Ltd and Others (Factortame III) (1996) 1 CMLR 889.
154 JANS, J.H., European Environmental Law, European Monographs, Kluwer, 1995, pp.189-90
(JANS, European Environmental Law).
155 C-6, C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Sate, para.40.
156 These conditions vary somewhat in a later ruling: C-46, C-48/93 Factortame III (1996) 1
CMLR 889, para. 51:"...the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals;
the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of
the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties" (emphasis
added).
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years, multiple authors, et cetera. Secondly, it is again doubtful whether environmental directives
meet the tests concerning 'individual rights' set up by this ruling187 (setting aside the difficulties
of evaluating financial compensation for environmental damage). Jans suggests that 'rights for
individuals' should not be too strictly construed - perhaps they should be interpreted in the sense
of a "person's interests"158 — to widen the possibility of its application in environmental matters.
As desirable as this may be to encourage effective implementation of environmental rules, it
seems likely that "floodgates" considerations may intervene. Still it is not excluded that it could
one day have considerable consequences in the environmental sector.
- Indirect Effect (Von Colson): The doctrine of indirect effect is probably more
useful for the implementation and enforcement of environmental rules, since these often confer
collective, rather than individual rights. The ECJ has developed a doctrine of 'sympathetic
interpretation', whereby national courts are expected to interpret their national law159, anterior or
subsequent, in the light of Community directives (within the limits of principles of Community
law, such as non-retroactivity and legal certainty1611), whether the directive has or not been
implemented. On at least one occasion in the national contexts studied here the requirement to
interpret national law in conformity with Community norms has had a positive influence on the
enforcement of an environmental directive161.
Decisions such as those above simplify the Commission's monitoring task by streamlining it;
by outlining the acceptable modalities of implementation; by giving the Commission Court
rulings on which to rely in eventual contacts with Member States regarding alleged
infringements. In some instances ECJ decisions have also been critical in prompting Member
States to abandon certain practices. To illustrate, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany
157 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.210; Jans, European Environmental Law, pp.187-191; Lane,
op.cit. p.974.
158 Jans, op.cit., p. 188.
159 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 1984 ECR 1891, para.28:
"...It is for the national court to interpret and apply the legislation adopted for the implementation
of the directive in conformity with the requirements of Community law, in so far as it is given
discretion to do so under national law". This was further extended in Case C-106/89 Marleasing
S.A. v La Comercial International de Alimentation S.A. 1990 ECR 1-4135.
160 Case 80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV 1987 ECR 3969.
161 See France, Chapter 6, point 2.6. Tunnel du Somport.
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have indicated their willingness to forego the use of administrative circulars in formal
implementation and use mandatory legislative instruments instead162. The fact remains that even
when obligations and acceptable means of discharging these are clear, at times Member States
choose to be in violation of their obligations, to postpone implementation of an environmental
directive in order to accomplish or to accord priority to other goals163 or simply in blatant
disregard of Community law164. Where a breach is undertaken knowingly, the Commission must
discover and prosecute the infringement, and once again its limited ability to monitor
implementation has unfortunate effects.
3.2. Creation of information sources:
A variety of measures have been undertaken that should multiply the sources of information
available to the Commission and, again, facilitate its task.
- European Environmental Agency (EEA): The political dispute that delayed the
opening of the European Environmental Agency and the European Environment Information and
Observation Network163 has been resolved. The raison d'etre of the Agency, now seated in
Copenhagen, is to collect and distribute reliable, comparable data crucial to coherent
environmental management. It is disappointing that the more active role in monitoring
application of Community environmental rules, such as that originally envisaged by
Parliament166, was not adopted in the final version162.
162 Tenth Report, p. 101; Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.16.
163 E.g.: UK's delay in implementing the Drinking Water Directive in order to create a more
favourable climate for privatisation of the water industry in England and Wales; Collins and
Earnshaw, p.217.
164 C-70/90 Commission v Italy 1990 ECR 1-4817: "Italian legislation provides that the limit
values are to be measured upstream of the point where the waste is discharged into the
surrounding environment..." (para.10, emphasis added).
Likewise it is difficult to see how a Member State can argue in 1989 that a directive is not
binding as to the result, but merely requires that a Member State take all measures reasonably
possible; see C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom 1992 ECR 1-6103 (para.18).165 Regulation 1210/90 OJ 1990 L120/1.
166 See the opinion of the European Parliament, OJ 1990 C68/50 at Article 2(15), suggesting
adding to the EEA's role: "keep a record of the application of Community law in Member States
and to advise the Commission on measures to be taken in this connection" and 2(16): "to monitor
compliance by the Member States with their duty pursuant to Community directives and
regulations, to submit plans and reports and to use them systematically." See also Article 6a.
162 In a subsequent opinion, Parliament did call for the role of the EEA to be revised, inter
alia to include "the granting of powers of inspection with regard to the implementation of
113
The Agency's role in providing the Commission with the information necessary to carry out
its tasks is specifically mentioned168. In order to help the Agency fulfil its role, an informal
network has been set up composed of Member States' national networks of environmental
information169, national focal points for co-ordinating and communicating information to the
Agency1''0 and specific institutions responsible for co-operation and liaison with the Agency on
particular subjects of interest171. Topic centres are created and designated specific tasks,
according to the Agency's multi-annual work programmes172.
- General Consultative Forum: In keeping with the idea that much environmental
protection is in the hands not of 'greens' but of industry, business and other sectors, the
Commission has created a forum173 of dialogue on environmental issues, which may be
consulted by the Commission on any problem relating to the Community's environment
Community environmental legislation in cooperation with the Commission and exisitng
competent bodies in the Member States"; OJ 1990 C96/112, Article 16b.
Parliament succeeded in securing a commitment in the founding Regulation (Article 20)
to review the Agency's role two years after it commences operation, with a view to expanding its
role.
168 Regulation 1210/90, Article 2(ii).
169 Article 4(2); see also Commission, "Implementing Community Environmental Law,"
Communication to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, 1996, points
55 and 56, on the EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law
(IMPEL).
170 Article 4(3).
171 See for instance, the French agency designed specifically to interact with the EEA,
1'Institut fran^ais pour l'environnement: Chapter 4, point 1.3.2, New national agencies.
172 Article 4(5), (6).
In order to ensure "broad dissemination of reliable environmental information" the
Agency shall publish a report on the state of the environment every three years (Article 2(vi)).
Furthermore it will seek the co-operation of a variety of Community-level research and
information bodies (Article 15(1)), such as the Joint Research Centre and the Statistical Office; as
well as international organisations such as the United Nations Environment Programme, World
Meteorological Organisation, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(Article 15(2)). As an aside, the Agency is also open to non-Member States (Article 19).
173 Commission Decision 93/701 on the setting up of a general consultative forum on the
environment, OJ 1993 L328/53.
174 -phg forurri/ mentioned in the Fifth EAP (OJ 1993 C138/80), consists of thirty-two unpaid
(Article 5(4)) representatives from the various sectors of production: the business world (between
seven and twelve representatives), regional and local authorities (three to five), environmental
protection and consumer organisations (four to seven); unions (one to three). It also reserves
between seven and ten seats for figures with particular competence in environmental issues
(Article 3). Deliberations follow the requests for opinions lodged by the Commission (Article
11(1)) and the forum may invite experts to discuss particular matters on the agenda (Article 8).
114
policy17,1. It has given the Commission advisory opinions on a variety of topics, including the
principles of sustainable development, agriculture and transport, and liability issues178.
- Environment Policy Review Group: As announced in the Fifth EAP, the
Commission has taken the decision to create an environmental policy review group to be
modelled on the Committee of the Directors General of Industry. It is designed to promote
dialogue and understanding between the Commission and the directors general of Member States
administrations generally (rather than in the specific circumstances of infringement proceedings).
Meetings are of an informal nature, examining the evolution of national environmental
policies176, and particular issues related to the target sectors of the Fifth EAP177.
- IMPEL: A network of inspectors of industrial installations has evolved into an
informal network of information that has been meeting since 1992 to exchange experiences
regarding practical implementation of environmental legislation. It is especially concerned with
ensuring better enforcement by national, regional and local bodies178. The Commission has been
co-operating with it since late 199317^ and has indicated that this network could be especially
useful in defining minimum criteria for inspections and in determining which competences are
required for carrying out inspection tasks180.
- Environmental Administrative Units: Also in the spirit of integration, a positive
development was that the Commission had reportedly decided to create administrative units
especially to deal with environmental questions in other Directorates General, notably the DGs
for Agriculture, Transport and Energy181.
The above efforts are young (and not particularly aimed at notifying/investigating
infringements). Flow seriously these initiatives are pursued and their effects cannot yet be fairly
assessed. Although they could make a definite contribution to ameliorating implementation,
175 Com(95)642, Progress Report from the Commission on the implementation of the
European Programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable
development: "Towards Sustainability," p.102.
176 O] 1993 C328/80; Kramer and Kromarek, 1993, p.214; Eleventh Report 1993, C154/42.
177Com(95)642, p. 102.
•^78 Com(96)500, Communication from the Commission, "Implementing Community
environmental law," p.19, point 5.
17^ Kramer and Kromarek, 1993, p.214; Eleventh Report 1993, C154/42.
180 Com(96)500, p.9, point 28.
181 Kramer and Kromarek, 1993, pp.213,215.
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frequently after a well-publicised start, interest wanes or the objective shifts. And finally, actual
application of Community rules remains the chore of the Member States, and the Commission
still has no administrative structures in their territories^.
4. Conclusion:
As seen in the previous chapter, during the creation of Community environmental law it is
impossible to keep political considerations, as well as a plethora of technical details, from shaping
the quality of the rules. The same pattern is evident here: while myriad details and malfunctions
also hinder the Community's efforts to monitor implementation, it appears that the underlying
cause of many of these is the absence of political will. This is evident not only in the laxity of
Member States in meeting their obligations, but also in the failure to accord the Commission even
reasonably adequate powers and personnel, in confining the Commission to contacts with
Member State representations rather than directly with the parties implicated by an eventual
complaint, in the Commission's consequent dependence on imperfect sources of information.
Certain efforts have been made to treat the symptoms, to address limitations by creating new
sources of information; by encouraging the protection of Community rights in national courts; by
giving clear indications to Member States of those defences that will be rejected by the ECJ.
Evidently, though, some limitations are, for the present, inevitable. For example, allowing the
Commission wider powers to act, if desirable, would require further amendment to the Treaty, an
unlikely event given the atmosphere surrounding the adoption of Maastricht and its aftermath.
For the present a great deal of the effectiveness of Community environmental law remains at the
mercy of the Member States.
Kramer, YEL 1991, p. 157.
CHAPTER 3: Community Level — Problems of Enforcement:
1. Article 169:
1.1. Problems during the administrative phase:
Information:
Commission discretion:
The decision not to apply to the Court:
1.2. Problems in the judicial phase:
Quality ofdrafting:
Lack of information:
Time and interim measures:
Quality ofjudgments:
1.3. Summary
2. Article 173 and Legal Title:
2.1. Practical Illustration: T-585/93, Greenpeace and others v Commission,
order of the Court of First Instance of 9 August 1995
3. Sanctions and compliance with rulings:
4. Conclusions:
Still in the Nineties "the mandatory character of environment directives is not always
recognised, in practice directives are commonly regarded as mere recommendations.... existing
legislation is deprived of its effect and raises doubts about the status of future programmes."1 As
seen, monitoring performance is essential; so too, is enforcement, for widespread failure to
implement Community environmental legislation, if allowed to continue with impunity, not only
does nothing for the environment but undermines the credibility of the Community legal system.
Enforcement action at the Community level alone is discussed here; enforcement of
Community law in national courts is reserved for subsequent chapters2. At this level two
principal actions are available to control Member States3: the second, Article 170, by which one
Member State can bring an action against another, has not yet been used in an environmental case
1 Tenth Application Report 1992 (Environment Offprint) p.4; see also C-337/89 Commission
v United Kingdom 1992 ECR 1-6103 (para.18), an environmental case in which the United Kingdom
that the directive at issue require Member States only to take all measures reasonably possible.
2 Part II of this work.
Control of Community institutions 174 (by which the Court declares an act found to be
illegal void), 175 (failure of Commission or Council to act), 184 (plea of illegality), 178 (disputes
relating to compensation for damage by Community institutions or servants in the exercise of
duties) and 215 (contractual liability of Community) are outwith the scope of this research.
Also Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee has reportedly researched the possibility of
taking the Council to the ECJ under Article 175 for failure to act because of its extensive delay in
establishing the seat of the European Environment Agency because one Member (France), for
reasons unrelated to the environment (having to do with the location of the European Parliament)
blocked the decision on the location of the Agency and prevented the latter from entering into




and is not discussed here4. This chapter therefore concentrates upon the Article 169 procedure, by
A
which the Commission can commence an infringement procedure against a Member State.
However, the Member States are not the only parties capable of infringing environmental law: at
times the Community institutions themselves fail to carry out their duties. In this regard, attempts
to enforce environmental rules under Article 173 (review of legality) have proven disappointing5,
and mention is made of problems of access to justice. Reference is also made to Article 171, which
enters into play if a Member State disregards an ECJ judgment.
1. Article 169:
An Article 1696 infringement procedure is the principal means by which the Commission can
attempt to bring a Member State to remedy a breach of its Community obligations.
There are two phases to the 169 procedure: the administrative phase, in the hands of the
Commission - meaning here both DG-XI and the Legal Service (Service Juridique) which co¬
operate with each other at each step — and the judicial phase, where the matter is referred to the
ECJ. At each phase obstacles arise.
1.1. Problems during the administrative phase:
If, after what usually amounts to several discrete'' informal contacts with a Member States
regarding a suspected infringement, the Commission remains unsatisfied with the Member State's
reply it initiates the administrative phase of Article 169 proceedings by issuing a letter of formal
4 In fact, its use in any area of Community law is extremely rare and exceptions, such as
Case 141/78 France v United Kingdom 1979 ECR 2923, are few.
5 Mainly where non-privileged applicants brought the action before the ECJ. However,
privileged applicants have also used Article 173 actions in environmental matters or cases with
environmental repercussions, for instance: C-62/88 Greece v Council 1990 ECR 1-1527; C-300/89
Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) 1991 ECR 1-2867; C-70/88 European Parliament v Council
1991 ECR 1-4561.
6 Article 169 EC: "If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice."
"
HARTLEY, T.C., The Foundations of European Community Law, second edition, Clarendon
Law Series, 1988, at p.292.
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notice (mise en demeure). This formally notifies the Member State of the Commission's allegations
against it and invites it to submit its observations within a given time limit®.
If the Commission is unsatisfied with the Member State's response it issues a reasoned
opinion (avis motive), formally noting the suspected violation, defining the details of the dispute,
and informing the State of the measures the Commission considers necessary to end the
infringement. This gives the Member State a last chance to remedy the breach before the judicial
phase. If the Commission receives no answer or continues to be dissatisfied it can refer the matter
to the ECJ for judgment.
The objective of the pre-litigation phase is to permit the Member State to prepare its defence
and to make sure that it is not barred from so doing by the addition of new or subsequently
expanded arguments by the Commission9. One may be justifiably confused as to the exact
relationship between the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion, as to whether the
definitive statement of the Commission's complaints must be contained in the former, the latter,
or in the two taken together^0. While formal details may be somewhat unclear, it seems
8 Usually two months, although in fact the Commission meets to decide which proceedings
to continue only once every six months and the defendant usually disposes of more than two
months in which to regulate its position.
"
Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom 1990
ECR1-6125 at, p.I-6129.
Indeed, the Court has made contradictory statements on this issue. In some rulings it has
appeared clear that the letter of formal notice must contain the definitive exposition of the
allegations against the Member State: certain grounds were declared inadmissible because they
were mentioned in the reasoned opinion yet had not been contained in the original letter of
formal notice, as in:
Case 31/69 Commission v Italy 1970 ECR 25 (para.12);
Case 51/83 Commission v Italy 1984 ECR 2793 (paras.6-8) where even the fact that the
Italian Government subsequently replied to the grounds expanded in the reasoned opinion could
not make up for the Commission's "breach of its duty to give the Italian Government a fair
hearing."
Case 309/84 Commission v Italy 1986 ECR 599, (paras. 14-16).
In some instances even a vague letter of formal notice, when read in conjunction with
previous correspondence, was deemed to have been sufficient: Case 211/81 Commission v
Denmark (Electric Energy Meters) 1982 ECR 4547, (paras. 10-11).
On the other hand, the Court has also stated, in Case 274/83 Commission v Italy 1985 ECR
1077 that, "Although it follows that the reasoned opinion provided for in Article 169 of the EEC
Treaty must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which led the Commission
to conclude that the State in question has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty, the
Court cannot impose such strict requirements as regards the initial letter, which of necessity will contain
only an initial brief summary of the complaints. ...there is nothing therefore to prevent the
Commission from setting out in detail in the reasoned opinion the complaints which it had
already made more generally in its initial letter" (emphasis added). Here the Court ruled that
although the initial letter "was not very explicit" (para.23) the complaint was admissible.
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reasonable to consider that if the objective of allowing a Member State to adequately prepare its
defence is met, the action will be admissible11, for what does emerge consistently from the case-
law is that the EC} considers the pre-contentious phase, because of the opportunity it gives
Member States to submit their observations, to be "an essential guarantee required by the Treaty".
The ECJ is not willing to compromise upon sufficient protection of Member States' interests
during the administrative phase12. The fact that a Member State may choose not to avail itself of
the opportunity to outline its arguments is irrelevant13.
If, after the letter of formal notice and the reasoned opinion, the Commission still holds the
view that the Member State has failed in its obligations, it makes an application (requite) to the
ECJ; its role under Article 155 gives it sufficient legal interest to do this14.
Throughout the stages of the administrative phase various obstacles act as filters, weeding
out many environmental actions before they ever reach the judicial phase. These concern
availability of information, the Commission's use of its discretion and its response to the various
pressures upon it.
Information: The obstacles to obtaining information that plagued the monitoring process
continue to obstruct the enforcement process. The Commission's decision that an infringement
11 See opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-337/89 Commission v United Kingdom
1990 ECR1-6125, at point 23. p.6129.
12 See Case 7/69 Commission v Italy (Wool Imports) 1970 ECR 111, (para.5);
Case 31/69 Commission v Italy, above, (para.13);
Cases 142 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle Finance dello Stato v Essevi SpA and Carlo
Salengo 1981 ECR 1413, (para.15);
Case 211/81 Commission v Denmark, above (paras.8-9);
Case 325/82 Commission v Germany 1984 ECR 777 (para.8);
Case 309/84 Commission v Italy 1986 ECR 599, (paras.15-16);
Case 229/87 Commission v Greece 1988 ECR 6347, (paras.11-12).
13 Case 31/69 Commission v Italy, above (para.13).
Case 211/81 Commission v Denmark, above (para.9).
14 In an early case (Case 26/69 Commission v France 1970 ECR 565) it appeared that the
presumption of legal interest on the part of the Commission was rebuttable, implied by the
Court's statement that "[i]n these circumstances the Court...must consider whether the
Commission still has a sufficient legal interest"(para.l0). The Court found that "there can be no
doubt as to the legal interest in the action brought by the Commission" (para. 13). The possibility
of challenging the Commission's legal interest seems eliminated by Case 167/73 Commission v
France (Code du travail maritime) above: France's challenge to the Commission's legal interest
(para.13) was dismissed by the Court's statement that "The Commission, in the exercise of the
powers which it has under Articles 155 and 169 of the Treaty, does not have to show the existence
of a legal interest, since, in the general interest of the Community, its function is to ensure that the
provisions of the Treaty are applied by the Member States and to note the existence of any failure
to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom, with a view to bringing it to an end" (para.15).
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exists and proceedings should be commenced is utterly dependent on the sources of information
discussed above. The consequences on enforcement regarding infringements of which the
Commission is unaware are obvious.
Commission discretion: Once the Commission becomes aware of a possible infringement, there
may be many reasons for which it decides not, or is simply unable, to pursue it. Of 100
proceedings initiated, only approximately six reach judgment18. Article 169, stating that the
Commission "shall deliver a reasoned opinion" may give the impression that the Commission has
the duty to pursue every suspected infringement, yet this is tempered by "if it considers that a
Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation." It seems reasonable to conclude that a duty to
seriously consider whether an investigation should be undertaken is implied16.
- Lack of evidence: Where enough information exists to discern an infringement,
this may yet be insufficient to prove it before the ECJ. The burden of proof under Article 169 falls
upon the Commission, and it must produce enough information for the ECJ to conclude that the
alleged failure has occurred1'7. This is especially difficult where practical implementation of
environmental directives is concerned18. Insufficient evidence may lead the Commission to
decide that an infringement is best not pursued, that Commission resources are better applied
elsewhere.
- Conciliation and political pressure: The Commission may use its discretion to
attempt to resolve a violation through conciliation rather than enforcement. The advantages to the
environment of an amicable settlement rather than "a fight to the finish in the European Court"151
are widely211 accepted, and such a solution is actively sought by the Commission throughout both
informal contacts with Member States and the formal administrative stages of 169 proceedings.
For example, the Commission, although aware of serious problems of waste disposal in Greece,
15 AUDRETSCH, 1986, pp.361-2, p.395. Note: the proportional relationship between stages of
sending warning letters and final judgments has remained fairly stable over the years. Cf.
Dashwood and White, 1989, p.338-9. The rough proportions were confirmed in 1994; Dr. Kramer,
interview 25 July 1994.
16 HARTLEY, Foundations, p.292.
12 Dashwood and White, 1989, p.405.
18 See Chapter 2, point 2.3. Limits to Commission powers.
151 Martinez Aragon, GJCE 1993, p.246; Dashwood and White, 1989, p. 400.
20 Though not unanimously; some have expressed concern that conciliation may be sought
where enforcement proceedings are more appropriate; PE 116.085, 1988, at p.16; Collins and
Earnshaw, p.233. Indeed such concern is considered justifiable here.
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actively sought "alternatives to infringement proceedings as a means of helping Greece to apply
the relevant directives properly."2*
From an environmental perspective, the advantages of conciliation can be considerable and
must be emphasised. Environmental infringements can linger for many years through informal
contacts and the administrative phase of Article 169, and through the judicial phase until finally a
decision is reached22 — during which time deterioration of the environment is unrelenting,
pollution accumulates unchecked, habitats are destroyed, protected migratory birds are hunted....
Certainly a passage through the ECJ means that, for the environment, a solution is still a long way
off.
There is also an advantage to conciliation from the international relations viewpoint.
Comments23 made by Advocate General Roemer two decades ago are still pertinent:
this procedure naturally puts in issue to a certain extent the prestige of the Member States
concerned, even though it is merely an objective procedure intended to clarify the legal situation
without any moral judgment24.
Indeed — and here the resemblance to any ordinary system of public international law is
apparent -- sovereign pride is bruised with the initiation of formal infringement proceedings and
there is a corresponding tendency for national governments to resent and bring enormous
21 Tenth Application Report 1992 (Environment Offprint) p.23. Certain directives have set
variable goals for different Member States; however one can wonder whether, at least in dealings
with the Commission, variable geometrywill lead to variable enforcement.
22 Random examples of the time length of environmental cases, excluding both the initial
informal administrative phase and the time taken to comply with the judgment:
- five years, measuring between the letter of formal notice and the judgment (6 May 1986,
30 May 1991 respectively) in C-361/88 Commission v Germany 1991 ECR 1-2567 in a matter
regarding air pollution;
- just under four years (11 May 1987-28 February 1991)C-57/89 Commission v Germany
1991 ECR 1-883 regarding habitats;
- four and a half years (30 July 1986-29 November 1990) C-182/89 Commission v France
1990 ECR 1-4337 regarding endangered species covered by CITES;
- four and a half years (29 February 1988-9 July 1992) C-2/90 Commission v Belgium 1992
ECR 1-4431 regarding waste disposal;
- six and a half years (letters of formal notice 27 November 1985, 4 December 1986-
judgment 20 May 1992) C-190/90 Commission v Netherlands 1992 ECR 1-3265 implementation of
major accident hazards directive.
23 The comments were made in the context of evaluating factors that entering into
consideration in the Commission's use of its discretionary power.
24 Advocate General Roemer in Case 7/71 Commission v France 'Supply Agency' 1971 ECR
1003, Opinion p.1023-1037 at p.1026: the discussion referred to Article 141, the enforcement
provision of the Euratom Treaty.
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political pressure to avoid the commencement of Article 169 procedures25. Usually then both
sides are eager to seek out the quicker, less controversial amicable settlement. The Commission
seeks to heighten co-operation and to find consensual solutions to difficulties. Group meetings
(reunions paquets) designed to reconcile differences with regard to infringement proceedings26
have been organised during which Commission representatives meet with the representatives of
a Member State's national ministries to discuss violations of various directives. Results can be
effective27.
However, a very real danger exists that legal enforcement can become hostage to political
pressure. "In this context, political considerations play a considerable role."2®
An example relates to alleged infringements of EIA85/337 by the United Kingdom29.
Enforcement proceedings that were engaged against the United Kingdom concerning the absence
of EIA for the construction of several roads3^ engendered a fabricated 3^ political uproar complete
with alleged violations of national sovereignty, resentment of the European Commission's 'diktat'
(supposedly as to where British roads should be located, although no mention had been made of
the roads' location, but rather whether EIA85/337 had been correctly applied) and general
accusations regarding Community interference. A personal request from the then Commissioner
Mr Ripa di Meana to the then Transport Secretary Mr Rifkind not to proceed with work on these
projects so that the environment would neither be lost nor damaged beyond repair32 was also
met with tremendous resentment33. In the ensuing media frenzy, much was made of the apparent
25 Hartley, Foundations, pp.291-93; Kramer interview 25 July 1994 .
26 KRAMER, Focus..., p.219; Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, p.11; Marc van der Woude,
interview, 26 July 1994; Com(96)500, p.12, point 41.
27 For example where a DG-XI official attempts to discuss an environmental problem with
an environment minister, but accord may be more elusive where an environmental problem also
involves discussion with an agriculture minister, or a transport minister. Depending on the
results of the group meetings, the Commission may drop the proceeding or continue to pursue it.
2® Kramer, 1996 JEL, p.2, also pp.9-10.
29 See generally Williams, R., pp.384-95; The Financial Times, 21 November 1991; The
Economist, 2 November 1991, p.13; The Guardian, 22 October 1991 and 26 October 1991; The
Independent, 22 October 1991.
30 Inter alia, OxleyWood and Winchester Bypass.
31 "public misunderstanding...was created by senior members of the government"; Williams,
R., p.387; for a similar account of the entire incident, see bryant, barbara, Twyford Down: roads,
campaigning and environmental law, E&F SPON of Chapman and Hall, London, 1996, especially
pp.258-81.
32 Williams, R., p.385.
33 Ibid., p.385. It was represented to the press as an 'order' to stop works.
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astonishment of the UK authorities34, although they had received a pre-Article 169 letter35, met
twice with Commission authorities36, and received a memorandum37 and telephone call, prior to
receiving the Article 169 letter38. A personal letter from di Meana to Rifkind was faxed at 17.03
prior to the 17 October 1991 Commission press release at 18.OO3^. Despite the inaccuracy of the
UK's 'surprise', the Commission was accused of 'bad manners' by senior member of the
government: ironically, since in this instance the Commission was merely attempting to enforce
the law to which the Member States, including the UK, had unanimously agreed. Even the prime
minister became involved in applying political pressure on the Commission40 concerning the
commencement of the Article 169 procedures: threats were made regarding the Maastricht Treaty,
due for signature by EC leaders that December. As Williams accurately points out:
[tjhis is overt linkage of the political with the legal processes of the Commission. Here, a
misrepresentation of a matter where the central issue is the interpretation of the law, has the effect
that a Member State announces that it may jeopardise a major political conference. The message is
very clear — that the Commission should think twice about such legal proceedings (or, at the very
least, their publicity) if it wants the United Kingdom to co-operate politically. .. It is outrageous in a
democratic system of government that such manipulation should be allowed to be threatened, carry
any weight, or even seem feasible44.
Subsequently, several of the proceedings were dropped with regard to the projects,
Reasoned opinions were sent with regard to two, one of which was later dropped43, leaving a
variety of questions unanswered43. Also, Commissioner Ripa di Meana resigned from the
Commission, six months prior to the end of his four-year term44, apparently after having received
a nudge from Mr. Delors.
Whether or not this was so, it is an indictment of the system that it should have been perceived and
widely believed to be true that a Commissioner who was committed to law enforcement and
34 Major is reported to have said "We had no previous notice of it... It is on the basis of facts
that were not discussed with the UK," Hansard, 8 Nov 1991, 727; cited byWilliams, p.387.
35 24 January 1990.
36 10 June 1991, and 16 October 1991.
37 30 July 1991.
38 17 October 1991 which was faxed to the UKREP at 12.27 p.m. and to Rifkind at 12.44 p.m.
3^ Williams, p.387; Commission Press Release, IP(91)928; BRYANT, pp.258-64.
40 Salter, "The Challenge...," 1992, pp.19-20; see also The Times 13 November 1991, p.l.
41 Williams, pp .393-94.
43 The Ombudsman is conducting investigations on the alleged failure by the Commission
to carry out a diligent inquiry; European Union, The European Ombudsman, Annual Report, 1995,
p.43.
43 By the Commissioner who replaced Ripa di Meana, see BRYANT, pp.267-281.
44 Along with Vasso Papandreaou, the of the Social Affairs Commission, who had also
generated political dispute with Member States over her 'crusading style'; Williams, p.396; see
also Bryant, pp.265-67.
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openness in that quest should forfeit his job because of the impact of that commitment on political
processes48.
Obviously this is an extreme (but not unique48) illustration4^. However, while the
Commission does not always succumb to Member State pressure, the fact that legal enforcement
might be selective or conditional on politics is especially dangerous for environmental law,
typically low in government hierarchies of political priorities. Furthermore, the perception that in
a politically tense situation the Commission must know when to give up a fight damages the
credibility of Community law. And unfortunately the situation cuts both ways, since to pursue an
infringement where opposition to the issue is such that even a condemnation of the ECJ would be
ignored might also damage the authority of Community law.
- Lack ofaccord within the Commission: As seen, an Article 169 proceeding may be
dropped (or not commenced) through lack of information, conciliation and even political pressure
on the Commission. It may also be dropped because of disagreement among the Commission
directorates, who moreover experience their own political pressures, further eliminating
proceedings prior to the judicial phase48. Although the legal unit of DG-XI tends to pursue most
infringements enthusiastically, the Legal Service of the Commission, which handles various
aspects of the 169 procedure for all the DGs, and ultimately the Commissioner, must agree to each
step of the procedure. The latter has indicated that, given the excessive workload, the "gung ho"4^
attitude of the former is difficult to sustain. Where the number of judicial proceedings is
necessarily limited, an attempt to attach as much value as possible to each decision must be made.
Therefore the Legal Service attempts to pursue infringements that may be meaningful to several
Member States, where the questioned behaviour is more systematic, and is reluctant to pursue
isolated infringements8^.
413 Williams, R., p.396.
48 Similarly, Dr. Ludwig Kramer was apparently transferred from his position as Head of
the Legal Affairs Unit in late 1994 because of "political difficulties and embarrassment caused to
the Commission by his refusal to compromise on issues of legal principle in enforcement
investigations and infringement proceedings" 6 February 1995, European Report, cited in
Williams, R., p.358, note 10.
4^ The United Kingdom is, of course, not the only Member State adept at applying pressure.
48 Marc van der Woude, interview 26 July 1994.
4^ "Tous azimuts," Marc van der Woude, interview 26 July 1994.
50 Both Dr. Kramer of the DG-XI Legal Unit and Marc van der Woude of the Service
Juridique acknowledged this tendancy, although this is not to say that one isolated infringement
will never be pursued; interviews 25 and 26 July 1994.
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DG-XI's Legal Unit initially discerns a possible infringement and composes the letter of
formal notice; to send it, however, not only must the accord of the Legal Service be sought, but
that of the other Commission Directorates-General. Ultimate decisions regarding enforcement
proceedings must be approved by the Commissioner5*, who is also responsible for a plethora of
political decisions.
...given the proximity in the exercise of these two functions one would expect to see safeguards in
the system designed to ensure that infringement cases could never be closed for political as
opposed to legal reasons. However, there are none.52
And as Mr. Ripa di Meana's early resignation might indicate53, even should the
Commissioner actively pursue infringements he may subsequently be tripped up by political
considerations. The dispute between DGs that took place prior to the Danish Bottles case must be
remembered, where the environment DG lost to the Internal Market DG in the initial decision to
pursue Denmark for its high-level environmental policy. Again tensions among the various
Community policies emerge, and in any given instance one of the other DGs may well argue that
the needs of industry, or transport, or agriculture must take precedence over the environment. As
Dr. Kramer points out54, in such a dispute the environment rarely wins. If a letter of formal notice
is indeed sent, DG-XI receives and evaluates the Member State's response. The decision to send a
reasoned opinion again requires the agreement (or must at least override the objections) of the
various Commission departments, although this time the reasoned opinion is composed by the
Legal Service. Co-operation takes place among all the Commission actors in evaluation of the
Member State's reply to the reasoned opinion and in the decision to seize the Court, an action
carried out by the Legal Service55.
Hartley sums up the Commission's use of discretion succinctly:
The true position seems to be that the Commission has a discretion but is also subject to a duty. The
duty is to take the most appropriate action to ensure that Community law is obeyed; the discretion
concerns the determination ofwhat is most appropriate in the circumstances.55
5* Kramer, interview 25 July 1995.
52 Williams, R., p.353.
53 Or Dr., Kramer's transfer, above, footnote 46.
54 Kramer, interview 25 July 1995.
55 The other Member States must also be made aware of such a decision in order to
intervene before the Court should they wish.
56 HARTLEY, Foundations, p.293.
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The decision not to apply to the Court: The discretion to bring a claim, or not, is the
Commission's alone: Article 169 states specifically that proceedings may be brought "if the
Commission considers". If this does not coincide with when a complainant or MEP considers an
infringement to have taken place, they may only register a new complaint or submit another
question. In contrast with the options available under the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty5'', under the EC Treaty the complainant or MEP can neither bring the matter directly to the
ECJ nor bring the Commission before the ECJ for failing to start proceedings under Article 17558.
(As an aside, although from a diplomatic point of view it may be difficult at present for the DG-XI
to clarion out the reasons for dropping an issue, the complainant is under no such pressure and
can make judicious use of national press to publicise the problem. Pressure and publicity are,
after all, two effective tools.)
A sizeable problem when the Commission fails to pursue an infringement is that reasons for
its choice are not transparent. Little official data on alleged or presumed infringements exist59; no
explanations are exacted from the Commission60. For instance, in the Twelfth Application Report,
it is mentioned that only three cases were referred to the ECJ in 1993 and again in 19946*; the
figure seems remarkably low given the state of implementation of environmental directives (it is
recalled that in those two years, environmental infringements accounted for, respectively, 28.5%
5/ If an individual or firm with standing (or another Member State) finds that the
Commission has failed to excercise its discretion properly, he/it may apply to the Court under
Article 35 ECSC for a ruling that the Commission has failed to fulfil a Treaty obligation by not
recording the Member State's violation under Article 88 ECSC. If the Court finds against the
Commission, without directly ordering the Commission to take an Article 88 decision, it may
under Article 34 ECSC require that the Commission take the necessary steps to comply with the
judgment. This action is not available under the EC treaty because a reasoned opinion is not
legally binding and therefore is not a reviewable act; Hartley, Foundations, pp.300-302.
58 "Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this
Treaty fail to act, the Member States and the other insitutions of the Community may bring an
action before the Court of justice to have the infringement established. The action shall be
admissible only if the institution concerned has first been called upon to act." Emphasis added.
59 audretsch, 1986, p.363; these are mentioned statistically in the Eleventh Report 1993,
C154/57-63; and the Twelfth Report 1994 Com(95)500 final, p.59.
60 Collins and Earnshaw p.229; PE A2-298/87, Kramer p.225.
6^ Twelfth Application Report 1994, p.59.
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and 25% of all infringements registered62). Not surprisingly the Commission has been criticised
for its use of discretion63.
Many arguments support increased transparency. Given government hyper-sensitivity to
their public image, increased publicity and increased political pressure might inspire them to be
more circumspect in carrying out Community obligations. Such transparency/publicity would
convince the individual that his complaint was worthwhile, enhancing Community Law's general
credibility as well as public awareness of its presence in States' legal orders. Uniform
interpretation among Member States would also be promoted64. Perhaps even more compelling
is the argument that, with some measure of increased publicity, misrepresentation of issues for
political reasons would become more difficult and public pressure on Member States'
governments and on the Commission itself65 would increase.
1.2. Problems in the judicial phase:
If indeed an application to the ECJ is made, further obstacles must be surmounted. Article 164
EC defines the ECJ's role as being to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of this
Treaty the law is observed". In enforcement proceedings the ECJ is called upon to determine the
position of the defendant State with regard to observance of Community law66. Many difficulties
it confronts in its task flow from the problems previously mentioned; others arise specifically in
the context of judicial enforcement.
Quality ofdrafting: The quality of the drafting67 may itself be a problem of enforcement in that
it leaves unclear what, exactly, are the legal obligations. In such circumstances, the ECJ may be
62 Commission, "Implementing Community Environmental Law," Communication to the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, at p.2.
Given such figures, Member States could reasonably wager against the odds of getting
caught in an environmental infraction.
63 By the European Parliament for its less stringent perception of what constitutes a
violation: for example, regarding Directive 78/319 on toxic and dangerous waste, where
Parliament's Committee of Inquiry found the majority of member states' transpositions lacking,
the Commission apparently felt that only two were worth pursuing formally, bringing
proceedings against Belgium (for failure to properly implement) and Greece (for failure to notify
measures); PE A2-298/87, point 15.
64 Kramer, Focus..., p.226-7.
65 Regarding the decision to pursue infringements.
66 Case 7/68 Commission v Italy 1968 ECR 423, p.431.
67 Chapter 1.
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obliged to interpret a provision68, with the risk that its interpretation may modify in some way
the meaning that was originally intended and yet become the only interpretation that is
applied6^. The Drinking Water Directive (80/778) provides an illustration: in one case the Court,
by contrast with the Commission's interpretation, found that the obligation to comply with the
Maximum Admissible Concentration of 50pg/l of lead did not apply where lead pipes are present
— in these cases the 50pg/l indication is "for guidance only"70 although, with or without the
presence of lead pipes, the risk to health is the same. As Dr. Kramer mentioned74, "one would
have wished an interpretation which tries to ensure the protection of health to a greater extent."
Lack of information: Lack of information has, in earlier stages, led some infringements to pass
unnoticed and led others to be dropped during the pre-litigation phase. Inevitably other
consequences of inadequate information reach the enforcement stage. In one instance7^,
regarding an application for interim relief the Commission had spoken of the protection of
several birds in its application: the white-fronted goose, two species of tern and the avocet73.
Considering the application, the ECJ was able to consider the impact of nearby construction only
upon the avocet breeding grounds, since this was the only species for which data were supplied
to the ECJ74. Germany in effect limited the ECJ's discussion by supplying data for only that
species73. Again the over-reliance on the goodwill of Member States in supplying information is
stressed.
Time and interim measures: The environment is vulnerable to the problem of time length
between the occurrence of an infringement and eventual judgment76 (particularly where, as with
EIA85/337, the issues usually concern the construction of a large new project).
68 A certain element of vagueness in the legislation may be necessary to achieve
compromise in the Council, making a Court interpretation necessary.
60 Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.263.
73 Case C-337/ 89 Commission v UK (above) paras.30-33.
71 Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.263.
77 Order of the President of the Court of August 16, 1989 in Case 57/89R Commission v
Germany 1989 ECR 2849.
73 Ibid. At para. 6.
74 Ibid. At para. 19.
75 Although this raises the issue of whether the Commission could not have directly
consulted national environment associations in order to obtain such information. Certainly the
recent European Environment Agency can be hoped to help remedy this type of situation.
76 See below, footnote 162.
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- Non-availability of interim measures prior to reference to the ECJ: The first problem
with regard to interim measures is that they are not available sooner. Through protracted
negotiations with Member States and possible in-house Commission disputes in the
administrative phase, damage to the environment continues unimpeded. During this period the
Commission cannot oblige member States to take any action; prior to the point at which the
matter is placed before the ECJ — usually several years ~ the Commission is powerless to halt the
damage77.
Article 155 stipulates that the Commission shall (fourth indent) "exercise the powers
conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the latter." There
appears to be no legal obstacle to conferring some sort of injunctive power on the Commission
and certain Commission actors have wished for this possibility78. For alleged environmental
infringements one could also argue that failure to give the Commission such powers in the
administrative phase robs Article 186 EC79 of effet utile, for by the time a matter reaches the Court
its urgency and therefore the usefulness of interim measures has often disappeared. Notably in
the area 'of regulation of public procurement, a 1987 proposal would have given the Commission
power to "act immediately to ensure the precedence of Community public interest."8^ However,
'' The Commission "takes the view that it may order such measures only where secondary
legislation or a ruling of the European Court has specifically empowered it to do so" (Sharpston,
E., Interim and Substantive Relief in Claims under Community Law, Current EC Legal Developments
Series, Butterworth 1993, p.87). This is the case with Regulation 17 in the area of competition, and
the case-law of the ECJ has many times confirmed the availability of interim relief from the
Commission in this area (see for instance Case 792/79R Camera Care Ltd v Commission 1980 ECR
119); the Court has even suggested that the Commission, in the area of competition, may be in the
wrong to fail to order interim measures; see Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1992] 4 CMLR
449.
78 In the area of the environment, see Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.433.
Giving the ECJ the power to order injunctive relief during the judicial phase.
80 Com(87)134 final, proposed Article 2: "It must be possible, in the course of judicial or
administrative procedure instituted by a contractor or supplier if a competent authority for the
Commission to act immediately to ensure the precedence of Community public interest and
proper application of the Community rules on public procurement. These guaranteed powers for
Commission would ensure that the Community rules on public procurement were interpreted
and applied uniformly and that the contracting authorities were better informed of their
obligations under those rules."
One author, Laurence Gormley, has suggested (speaking generally, rather than of
environmental cases) that an alternative be found to the lengthy process of applying for interim
measures and that "thought should be given to establishing mechanism similar to that of Order 14
of the Rules of the Supreme Court which could be used in appropriate cases without the
somewhat long time span inherent in even the quickest proceedings"; Gormley, "European
Communities: The Common Market, Quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent
effect,"14 (1989) ELRev 156 at p. 157.
130
the boldness of enabling the Commission to 'act immediately' in the public procurement directive
proposal had vanished in the adopted version. Given that even in the area of public procurement
the Council saw fit to keep such powers within the Member States' grip8!, given further the
political atmosphere surrounding Maastricht Treaty and subsidiarity debate, the present
likelihood of the Council according emergency powers to the Commission in environmental
matters is nil.
- Criteria: Although action before the Court "shall not have suspensory effect"82,
once a matter is actually before the ECJ it has the power to prescribe "any necessary interim
measures"83. It has come to be accepted that this refers principally to interlocutory injunction84,
the purpose of which is to maintain the situation as is until a decision can be reached in the main
action83. Interim measures may be prescribed on express application by one of the parties to a
case before the ECJ. Without prejudging the substance83, the President of the Court must consider
whether prima facie the main action is well-founded87. The party applying must justify urgency of
the measures88, usually by demonstrating that "serious and irreparable damage" would occur to
his interests if the order is not granted89.
As in most legal systems, a balance of the parties' interests is implied90. In the Leybucht dikes
case, one of the rare environmental situations to date in which a request for interim measures
81 OJ 1989 L395/33 Council Directive 89/665 on the application of review procedures to the
award of public works contracts, Article 3(1) and 3(3)c. Here the Commission may only invoke a
procedure by which Member States may suspend the award of the contract.
82 Article 185EC.
83 Article 186EC.
84 Hartley, Foundations, p.307.
83 Article 86(3) and (4)/Court's rules of procedure.
86 Case 65/87R Pfizer v Commission 1987 ECR1691.
87 E.g., Case 160/88R FESA et al v Council 1988 ECR 4121, at para.30.
88 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ (OJ 1991 L176/7 at p.23, Article 83(2)) require that an
application for interim measures "state the subject-matter of the proceedings, the circumstances
giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim
measures applied for".
89 HARTLEY, Foundations, p.309.
See, for instance cases C-143/88, C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Siiderdithmarschen v Hauptzollamt
Itzehoe et al, 1991 ECR 1-415,1-534, at para.33; Case T-353/94R Postbank NV v Commission 1994 ECR
11-1141, at para.19; Case T-332/94R Union Carbide Corporation v Commission 1994 ECR 11-1159, at
para. 30; see however, Case T-368/94R Pierre Blanchard v Commission 1994 ECR 11-1099, which
refers to "irreversible damage", para. 31.
90 In the context of competition, see for instance Case T-353/94R Postbank NV v Commission,
at paras.34-40; Case T-368/94R Pierre Blanchard v Commission, para. 31 which requires that the
suspension be "not disproportionate to the defendant's interest in having the acts implemented".
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came to a judgment91, the Commission addressed the balance of interest92, yet the president of
the Court did not examine this argument, since the application was rejected on other grounds93.
Nonetheless, more recently in an environmental case94, the balance of interests was expressly
addressed; in another concerning both competition and the environment, the parties also saw fit
to argue the balance of interests95. Although this requirement does not seek to discriminate
against environmental interests, in fact it presents a serious problem in an environmental
situation, since the specific interests of a constructor or commercial enterprise are usually more
individually and concretely identifiable than a collective 'environmental interest'.
Whereas during the administrative phase the difficulty with interim measures was that they
were not available, in the judicial phase the problem is that, although available, they are possibly
no longer useful. The urgency may disappear (to the detriment of the environment) before the
91 A request made by An Taisce and WWF UK for interim measures to suspend Community
funds for the construction of a visitors' centre at Mullaghmore in the delicate Burren region was
registered at the Court on 23 December 1992 under the number C-407/92R. Six months later the
request was dropped and the affair struck from the Court's list (6 July 1993) and so the
opportunity to compare the results in another environmental situation was lost. (See Case T-
461/93 An Taisce and WWF UK v Commission 1994 ECR11-733 para. 11). In fact, the Supreme Court
of Ireland, on 26 May 1993 gave an order to suspend work on the Mullaghmore centre and the
Office of Public Works must recommence the procedure of obtaining a construction permit (ibid.
para.23).
Case 57/89R Commission v Germany 1989 ECR 2849, at para. 12: the Commission argues
that "the sole disadvantage of a temporary suspension of the work would be to delay completion
of the project; it would not have any appreciable financial repercussions."
93 Case 57/89R Commission v Germany, above, specifically paras. 17-22, which discuss the
fact that the Commission submitted its application after the regional government's project was
well under way. The acting president of the Court, T. Koopmans, therefore only considered the
impact of the next stage of the construction on the protection of the avocet. The application was
rejected because (para. 19) its breeding grounds were no closer to the next scheduled stage of
work than to the work that had already been undertaken; although in steady decline, the most
significant fall in avocet breeding there had occurred prior to the commencement of the works
(para.20); and the Commission failed to substantiate fears of disturbance caused by the
development of mass tourism (para.21). "The Commission has thus failed to establish that there is
an urgent need to interrupt the work already started."
94 Case T-219/95R Danielsson a.o. c/Commission 1995 ECR 11-3051 at 11-3068. Admissibility of
the main action; the existence of a prima facie case; and urgency were also considered. The
application was rejected because the applicants were not considered directly and individually
concerned (paras. 70-77).
95 Case T-228/95R S. Lehrfreund Ltd c/ Conseil et Commission 12 February 1996, not yet
reported. S. Lehrfreund Ltd requested the suspension of regulation no. 3254/91 prohibiting
leghold traps and importations from countries using them. (The situation required legal
clarification since the Commission had told the Member States that the prohibition on
importation was as yet impracticable and that therefore the trade in furs should not be disrupted
by customs checks at this time.)
In their application the parties addressed the issues of admissibility, fumus boni juris, the
urgency of the measure and a balance of interests. The application was rejected.
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ECJ is empowered to consider injunctive measures98. The fact that the urgency of the order is
difficult to demonstrate may have significant implications not only for the environment but for
human health. For instance, in relation to the Drinking Water Directive the Commission had
apparently considered applying for interim measures to be applied in a situation where lead was
present in the drinking water, but without a fatality, it was afraid to waste resources where the
urgency of the situation would probably not be recognised97.
- Applications for interim measures before national courts: Although in theory, it is for
each Member State to decide procedural modalities, the ECJ has never considered procedural
autonomy an absolute value98. The ECJ has recently given stronger indications of conditions to be
considered by national judges for granting interim measures99; these are discussed at Member
State level.
Quality ofjudgments: Occasionally problems of implementation and enforcement emerge from
the rulings themselves. It is not the purpose of this research to present a critique of the Court of
Justice's rulings, yet the attitude of the ECJ and the quality of its judgments are undeniably of
great importance in applying environmental law: although not bound by its own rulings, once the
ECJ has ruled, its interpretation will be used as the yardstick by which situations are measured.
This can have serious consequences for subsequent implementation and enforcement where ECJ
decisions are inconsistent, or where it is felt that the interpretation made is inappropriate.
Although some rulings are extremely forward-looking in terms of environmental protection^,
96 As was the case with the Leybucht bay area, where such measures were therefore
rejected: Case 57/89R EC Commission v Germany, above.
97 Dr. Kramer, interview 25 July 1994.
98 Medhi, Rostane, "Le droit communautaire et les pouvoirs du juge national de l'urgence,"
RTDE 32 (1) janvier-mars 1996, p.92.
99 See for instance, Case C-213/89 Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433; cases C-143/88, C-92/89
Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen; C-465/93 Altanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH e.a., 1995 ECR I-
3761. However, the latter concern challenge to a national administrative act where the validity of
Community legislation is in question. (Although national applications for interim measures, in
environmental situations are more likely to concern the validity of the administrative act of a
specific authorisation, than the validity of the national legislation based upon the Community
measure). For instance, the conditions listed in Atlanta para. 51, include the serious doubt of the
validity of Community measure, urgency must be proven, due account of Community interests
must be taken by the national judge, who must also respect the decision of the ECJ on lawfulness
of measure or on similar application for interim measures).
100 por instance, putting environmental protection on a par with other essential objectives
(Case 240/83 A.D.B.H.U. 1985 ECR 531) or widening the choices available for enforcement of
environmental law; for instance, the Court's ruling (Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij GJ Bier v Mines de
Potasse d'Alsace 1976 ECR 1735) that interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention on
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other decisions that appear positive at first glance may be mixed on closer examination101. The
Danish Bottles ruling102 was applauded for expressly expanding the Cassis de Dijon list of
"mandatory requirements"103 (concerns that may limit the application of Article 30 of the Treaty)
to include environmental protection. Indeed, it was certainly an advance for Community
environmental policy and law to be considered a mandatory requirement, despite the lack of
express Treaty foundation at the time. On the other hand, from this point forward, environmental
protection must meet the Cassis de Dijon criteria in that, in the absence of Community
harmonisation measures, environmental measures that constitute an obstacle to movement of
goods within the Community, may be justifiable but must be indistinctly applicable, necessary
and proportionate101. Furthermore in this case the ECJ also found the restrictive effect on imports
of Denmark's requirement to use non-approved containers in only limited quantities capable of
protecting the environment (para.16) but disproportionate to the objective pursued (para.21). In
effect Denmark's higher level of protection was esteemed too high for the rest of the Community
and Denmark was forced to accept the ECJ's interpretation of which level of protection was high
enough. The reasons for which one level of protection is deemed proportionate (the deposit and
return scheme, to require re-use of containers, which impeded importation yet was found in itself
to be proportionate) and the other is not (limited quantities of non-approved containers or the
requirement to use only approved containers) are not clearly explained103.
Comparison between rulings may reveal inconsistencies. In this event the message sent to the
Member States on the correct interpretation of their obligations is unclear. Several rulings
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters "must acknowledge
that the plaintiff has an option to commence proceedings either at the place where the damage
occurred or the place of the event giving rise to it" has a direct impact on enforcement by
facilitating the decision to bring an environmental action; see Sands, P. "European Community
Environmental Law: Legislation, the European court of Justice and Common Interest Groups,"
1990 Modern Law Review 685, p.695.
101 Generally the caselaw of ECJ has been harshly criticized by some authors: Crosby, "The
Single Market and the Rule of Law," 16 (1991) ELRev 451; Geradin, 1993, pp.175-76.
102 Example: Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark 1988 ECR 4607; see para.9.
103 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Brauntwein (Cassis de Dijon)
1979 ECR 649; at para.8: which lists, non-exhaustively, "the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the
consumer."
101 Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (German Beer) 1987 ECR 1227.
105 See commentary, Kramer, Casebook, 1993, pp.94-105; Geradin, 1993,156-58.
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concerning the Birds directive106 provide an illustration. For example Case 252/85107, specifically
states that the importance of "complete and effective protection of wild birds throughout the
Community, irrespective of the areas they stay in or pass through, [is such that it] causes any
national legislation which delimits the protection ofwild birds by reference to the concept of national
heritage to be incompatible with the Directive (emphasis added)." In Gourmetterie van den Burg,
however, the Sixth Chamber of the Court introduces a national delimitation, between species of
wild birds which do and those which do not occur naturally in the legislating Member State1 08
Moreover, the ECJ found here that migratory and endangered birds are afforded specific
protection and that Article 14 of Directive 79/409 (allowing Member States to introduce stricter
measures than those provided) applies only to migratory and endangered birds100. However,
Article 14 of the directive110 mentions no distinction between migratory and endangered birds
and other birds; Article 1 states clearly that the directive "relates to the conservation of all species
of naturally occurring birds in the wild state in the European territory of the Member States to
which the Treaty applies."111
Furthermore, in another Birds case, the ECJ states clearly that one of the directive's intentions
is precisely to restrict commercial pressures on bird populations112. Yet in Gourmetterie it is
clearly stated that the Netherlands' ban on imported grouse, although aiming to protect birds in
another Member State by easing commercial pressure to kill them, is unlawful112.
106 OJ 1979 L103/1.
107 Case 252/85 Commission v France 1988 ECR 2243, (para.15).
108 Case C-169/89 Gourmetterie van den Burg 1990 ECR 1-2143 para.16.
109 Case C-169/89 Gourmetterie van den Burg, (above) para.12. Here, such species are
protected "even more effectively" and "[w]ith regard to the other bird species covered by 79/409,
the Member States are required to bring into force the laws regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with the directive but are not authorised to adopt stricter
protective measures than those provided for under the directive, except as regards species
occurring within their territory." As Minor points out (op.cit., p.274) "...there is little textual
support in Article 14 for this restrictive interpretation."
110 Directive 79/409 OJ 1979 L103/1, Article 14: "Member States may introduce stricter
protective measures than those provided for under this directive."
111 See also 262/85 Commission v Italy 1987 ECR 3073, (para.6).
112 Case 262/85 Commission v Italy (above) para.18: "...it is clear from the protection to be
afforded under the directive that it is intended to avoid a situation in which all the species that
may be hunted may also be marketed because of the pressure which marketing may exert on hunting
and consequently on the population level of the species in question (emphasis added)."
112 Case C-169/89 Gourmetterie van den Burg, (above) para.16: "A prohibition on importation
and marketing cannot be justified in respect of a species of bird which does not occur in the
territory of the legislating Member State but is found in another Member State where it may
lawfully be hunted.
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In this example conflict exists not only between ECJ rulings but also between an ECJ
interpretation and other Community legislative acts: for instance the very purpose of Regulation
3254/91444 is to ease commercial pressure on animal populations (and prevent cruelty) by
prohibiting importation of furs from countries where use of leghold traps is permitted. Thus its
goal is similar to that declared unlawful in Gourmetterie: to protect nature outside the territory of
the legislating body — in this case the Community. The same type of action has also been accepted
between Member States445. The decisions sow confusion as to which species exactly are
protected, and fail to explain why certain actions (e.g. importation bans) are acceptable in some
situations while not in others.
Where rulings are inconsistent this may be due to the fact that the Court, also, is not immune
to political developments. During periods when Community authority is challenged politically
(as in the aftermath of the 1992 Edinburgh Summit) the ECJ may tread lightly where Member
States' commercial or traditional446 sensibilities are affected. Furthermore, the ECJ may simply
choose not to address certain issues because they carry complex legal and practical implications,
which again may politically inconvenience Member States. An example involving EIA85/337 is
Case C-396/92447, concerning authorisation requests made after the directive's entry into force (3
July 1988) but prior to entry into force of national transposing rules. In response to the German
request for a preliminary ruling the ECJ answered that the relevant article did not permit a
Member State to waive the EIA obligations of the directive for these projects. However, the ECJ
avoided answering the question that would have resolved important implementation issues
regarding authorisation requests initiated prior to the 3 July 1988 directive's deadline but not
actually accorded before the deadline. Certainly the issue was pertinent: the German court
expressly asked whether Member States were obliged "from the expiry of the deadline for
transposition to make all non-approved projects subject to an EIA..."448. A variety of parties
444 OJ1991 L308/1.
445 Furthermore the Commission has accepted as legal a German ban on importation of
corallium rubriim, a Mediterranean coral, although lawfully captured in another Member State,
that was aimed at protection of the environment in that State (Italy). The issue was therefore
settled before it came to the ECJ; Kramer and Kromarek, RJE 2-3/1994, p.244.
446 Dr. Kramer cites Case 252/85 Commission v France 1988 ECR 2243, and its over-sensitivity
to traditional hunting as an example of a political judgment; Kramer, Casebook, 1993, p.176.
447 Case C-396/92 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern v Freistaat Bayern 1994 ECR 1-3717
448 Case C-396/92, p. 1-3725, see also p. 1-3751.
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considered the issue important enough to intervene: the Commission and the Netherlands
claimed that EIA had to be undertaken for all projects not yet approved by 3 July 1988; the United
Kingdom and Germany disagreed119. Advocate General Gulman identified the issue as being of
"considerable significance."12® Unfortunately, the Court preferred to leave the issue dangling,
limiting its response to those projects for which "the consent procedure was already initiated
before the entry into force of the national law transposing the directive, but after 3 July 1988..."121.
1.3. Summary:
As seen, a series of obstacles hinder the progress of Article 169 enforcement proceedings
during the administrative phase; of the procedures that make it to the judicial phase, progress is
not necessarily much smoother. Even if arriving at an ECJ decision is in itself a small victory, this
does not translate directly into an advance for future implementation: ECJ decisions may yet
leave uncertainties, or create new difficulties.
2. Article 173 and Legal Title:
Community institutions also bear practical responsibilities for correct implementation of
environmental law; as seen earlier, at times122 they fail in their duties. To begin, the
Commission's role as guardian of the Treaty is untenable where a Commission decision is
challenged123. The limited experience with Article 173 challenges to environmental decisions
taken by Community institutions indicates that problems — seemingly insurmountable ~ have
arisen in judicial actions. These have concerned the existence of an administrative act124, and
119 As well as Friestaat Bayem, and the municipality of Vilsbiburg.
120 And subsequently found that EIA was not necessary, based on an argument of
development convenience rather than environmental logic, illustrating how reluctant many
officials are to 'inconvenience' economic forces: Case C-396/92, p. 1-3730, point 34: "Such an
interpretation would lead to arbitrary results, in particular to results which could considerably
delay the execution of projects beneficial to the community and result in major inconveniences for
developers and the community."
121 Case C-396/92, para.20.
122 See discussion of Structural Funds, Chapter 1, point 3.
123 Kramer, 1996 JEL, pp.9-10.
124 Case T-461/93 An Taisce 1994 ECR 11-733 was brought by WWF UK and later joined by
An Taisce, the National Trust for Ireland. At issue was the Community funding of the
construction of a visitors centre in a protected national park, requiring a new access road and a
waste water treatment plant. EIA85/337 had not been implemented in Ireland, and although an
EIA had been carried out (February 1992) it, had been Highly criticised (together with a later
137
particularly seriously, access to justice, when individuals or groups attempt to review the legality
of a decision of one of the European Institutions. To do this, associations or individuals must rely
upon Article 173^5; this action is both much rarer and more difficult to pursue than Article 169
procedures.
Significantly, the Fifth EAP insists on access to justice for individuals126. Since obtaining
information is a necessary preliminary step to enforcement, Directive 90/313 requires that
report) particularly regarding the treatment of the waste water plant (para.7). The Director
General of DGXI wrote the Irish Permanent Representative to inform him that he was
recommending the Commission to commence Article 169 proceedings. The Commission later
decided not to initiate the procedure. The applicants challenged the decision not to suspend or
withdraw the allocation of IRL £2.7 million; alleging that the decision had been taken on 7
October 1992 (the date of a Commission press release stating that it had decided not to initiate
Article 169 proceedings).
Without it being necessary to examine locus standi, the application was dismissed as
inadmissible, for lack of an administrative decision (para.38): "Nothing however, can justify the
conclusion that the Commission also decided at that time not to make use of the possibility given
it by Regulation 4253/88 to suspend or reduce the use by the Irish authorities of Community
funds for the construction of Mullaghmore centre." Or as Dr. Kramer puts it: "The Court of First
Instance held that the Commission had not taken a decision, but had simply decided not to open
proceedings against Ireland under Article 169": Kramer, 1996 JEL, p.5. An appeal has been
lodged: C-325/94P.
Notably, the ECJ has in the past accepted that negative decisions can constitute 'acts';
Case C-313/90 CIRFS and others v Commission 1993 ECR1-1125 (in the context of state aids).
(The same issue, lack of an administrative decision, has thwarted administrative actions
aat national level; see Chapter 9, point 3.3. Need for an Administrative act.)
125 Article 173 (fourth indent): "Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions,
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to the former."
126 "Individuals and public interest groups should have practicable access to the courts in
order to ensure that their legitimate interests are protected and that prescribed environmental
measures are effectively enforced and illegal practices stopped"; OJ 1993 C138/82.
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information be given to a natural or legal person "without his having to prove an interest."*33 The
proposed directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste*28 specifically provides that
environmental associations shall have the right to seek remedy or join proceedings that are
underway. Despite these urgings, legal interest is often the first hurdle at which environmental
associations fall, including at the Community level.
2.1. Practical Illustration: T-585/93, Greenpeace and others v Commission, order of the
Court of First Instance of 9 August 1995*29;
The case involves the Commission decision*30, taken under the Regional Funds, to accord
Spain a maximum of Ecu 108,578,419 for the construction of two electric power stations in the
Canary Islands. Soon after the funds were authorised the Commission received complaints: that
the works on Grand Canary had commenced illegally*3*, without the EIA required by
EIA85/337; and*33 that Unelco had undertaken the construction without the Environmental
Declaration required by national legislation implementing the Community directive*33. At
Community level, the Article 173 action brought by Greenpeace and eighteen others sought to
annul the Commission decision allocating a further Ecu 12,000,000, on top of the initial 28,953,000,
*22 Article 3(1), Directive 90/313 on the freedom of access to information on the
environment; OJ 1990 L158/56 at 57; furthermore, judicial or administrative review must be
available should the public authority refuse to give the information (Article 4).
*28 Article 4(3), OJ 1991 C192/6 at 13.
*29 For a more complete analysis see Gerard, N., "Access to Justice on Environmental Matter
- A Case of Double Standards? Greenpeace and Others v Commission of the European Communities," 8
(1996) JEL 139.
130 C(91)440 7 March 1991.
*3* Letter of 23 December 1991, from Mrs. Aurora Gonzalez Gonzalez and Mr. Pedro Melian
Castro (5th and 6th applicants).
1 3 Letter of 23 November 1992, from M. Domingo Viera Gonzalez, second applicant.
*33 The relevant national organ (Comision de Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente de Canarias)
issued the declarations in question on 26 February and 3 March 1993, more than a year after the
Commission received the first complaint that the works had been commenced. Theoretically the
project should have been suspended at this point: Real Decreto Legislative 1302/1986 (the basic
legislation transposing the Community directive), Article 9, stipulates that, if a project requiring
Environmental Impact Assessment is commenced without having completed the procedure it
"shall be suspended" ("sera suspendido"); however, the automatic nature of this is possibly
mitigated by the addition of "at the request of the environmental organ."
Various national level actions were commenced (apparently without benefit of interim
relief): by Tagoror Ecologista Altemativo on 26 March 1993; by the Comision Canaria contra la
Contaminacion, on 2 April 1993; and by Greenpeace Spain on 18 December 1993. They are, as yet,
unresolved.
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to reimburse Spain for the construction of the two power stations134. The applicants argued135
that the Commission was under the double obligation to ensure that Spain respected Community
environmental policy, specifically EIA85/337; and, in the case of violation of the policy, to refuse
to allocate funding. The applicants further requested that the CFI order the Commission to release
the documents relating to the funding.
Several aspects of the Commission's conduct are worthy of note, besides its failure adequately
to verify the conformity of the Spanish project with Article 130r(2) EC or the Structural Funds
regulations. The Commission not only did not suspend aid of its own accord once it had been
notified of the alleged violations of Community law136, it chose to allocate a further Ecu 12
million. Despite Commission calls for greater transparency137, when Greenpeace requested
information relating to the measures the Commission had taken regarding the conformity of the
Spanish construction with Structural Funds requirements, the Commission responded that the
requested information concerned the internal decision-making procedures of the Commission
and could not be provided138. Furthermore, in this instance the Commission's actions fell short of
its assufances that its "decision was taken only after a full consultation between the various
services of the concerned"13^, since it has spent Ecu 40 million on a project that violates
Community environmental law14(1.
The matter centred on the plea of inadmissibility (locus sfanrfi)141 raised by the Commission
and whether the applicants were directly and individually concerned by the challenged decision,
134 The Commission implied that it had taken this decision between 7 March 1991 (the date
on which C(91)440 was adopted) and 29 October 1993, the date of the meeting during which the
Commission confirmed that Ecu 40 million had been allocated in application of decision C(91)440.
135 Paragraph 25.
136 Which it is empowered to do by Article 5 of decision C(91)440.
137 See, for example, Communication 93/C 166/04, OJ 1993 C166/4.
138 Paragraph 11. Perhaps this tendency to guard its own secrets will be affected by the
decision adopted pursuant to Case T-194/94 John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v Council,
judgment of 19 October 1995, in which the Council was condemned for having a similar attitude
towards revealing internal information.
13^ Paragraph 11.
140 It is presumed here that the projects fall within the scope of EIA85/337; the mere absence
of an EIA for such a project (Annex I) constitutes a breach. The directive does allow derogations
"in exceptional cases" for a specific project (Article 2(3)). In this case the competent authorities
must still consider whether another form of assessment is appropriate, they must make the
information relating to the exemption publicly available, and inform the Commission. This
apparently did not take place.
141 Apparently the Court of First Instance considers the case to be so "manifestly
inadmissible" (Cf: Article 111, Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European
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as required by Article 173. The CFI began by invoking the Plaumann442 formula, developed three
decades ago in the context of the common market. It dismissed the applicants' invitation to
distance itself from the earlier case-law, and disregarded the fact that Article 173 case-law had
indeed evolved greatly in other areas443. Instead it set itself the task of determining whether the
applicants could be 'individually concerned' because the decision at issue "affects them by reason
of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are
differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them
individually just as in the case of the person addressed."444 Against this test, the local residents,
fishermen, farmers, ornithologists, the individuals with health problems (and admittedly, one
wind-surfer) of this claim were found to be indistinguishable from any other local resident,
fisherman, farmer. They therefore lacked legal interest to make a claim443. Nor was the fact that
certain applicants had previously forwarded complaints to the Commission sufficient to consider
them individually concerned446. The standing of individual applicants was thus ruled out.
Next, examining the legal title and interest of the associations, the CFI recalled that, again
according to case-law, associations defending collective interests cannot be accepted as having
interest in light of Article 173 of the Treaty. They cannot be considered to be more individually
Communities of 2 May 1991, OJ L136/1 at 20) that it issues a reasoned order, rather than a
judgment.
The question of reviewable act -- whether the Commission decision to continue funding
was in fact a decision in the sense of Article 173 and therefore susceptible to judicial review — was
left unanswered. The grounds for review — the violations of Directive 85/337 on the part of Spain
and the Commission's failure to suspend funding in accordance with Article 130r(2) — are also
unresolved.
442 Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co. v Commission 1963 ECR 95.
443 Below.
444 Case 25/62 Plaumann 1963 ECR 95 at p.107.
443 Paragraphs 54 and 55.
446 Paragraphs 56 and 57.
Nonetheless, as early as 1986, in Cofaz (Case 169/84 Cofaz v. Commission 1986 ECR 391),
the ECJ accepted individual concern of the third parties because they had played a role in the
procedure investigating a possible violation of Community rules, and because "their position on
the market is significantly affected by the State aid which is the subject of the contested decision"
(para.25). This is further supported by other rulings: Case 323/82 SA Intermills v Commission 1984
ECR 3809, paragraphs 5 and 16; Case C-225/91 Matrav Commission 1993 ECR 1-3203, see
particularly the opinion of Advocate General van Gerven at 1-3221-26.
In fact, the Court of First Instance has itself accepted a relaxation of the Plaumann test in
T-2/93 Air France v Commission 1994 ECR 11-323, paragraphs 44 through 48; and Case T-435/93
ASPEC, 1995 ECR 11-1281, paras.63-64.
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affected than the individuals of which they are composed. Since in this instance the individuals
had been ruled out, so were the three associations 147
Finally the CFI examined whether the correspondence between Greenpeace and the
Commission regarding the financing of the projects could "constitute special circumstances such
as to give it locus standi to bring an action as an association."148 Since the association entered into
dialogue with the Commission only after the challenged decisions were taken (i.e., once
Greenpeace discovered the alleged breach of Community law, rather than before such a
discovery) it could not be considered to have an interest.
As a result, the action was dismissed and the applicants were ordered to pay the costs.
The CFI's decision is especially disappointing since it defines the approach to similar
situations in future. The Community seems to endorse the paradoxical situation by which the
more people149 adversely affected by Community decisions and breaches of Community law by
Community institutions, the less chance they have of being heard. This for the simple reason that
they are too numerous to be considered 'individually' concerned.
The underlying problem, both here and as shall be seen repeatedly at Member State level, is
exactly illustrated by this: concepts of individual interest are fundamentally antithetical to the
environment. Procedural rules requiring "individual" concern are simply ill-suited to
environmental issues. Environmental interests, by nature, are collective, concerning the many
rather than the few. The CFI here says, in essence, that environmental interests of a natural or
legal person cannot ever usefully be invoked against a Community decision because they will not
meet the test for admissibility. Field up against this, the Community's own emphasis on access to
justice for environmental associations in the Fifth EAP seems untenable.
An element of political priority seems also to influence the outcome: In fact the problem is not
so much the test as embodied in Article 173 as the CFI's interpretation of it. Environmental
interests, being collective, cannot ever distinguish the claimant from "all other persons". The CFI
stubbornly adheres to the language of Plaumann, despite the fact that the Treaty has since evolved
147 Paragraph 60.
148 Paragraph 61.
149 For example, the 1266 resident members of Greenpeace, the 154 members of the Tenerife-
based TEA, not to mention the European taxpayer who has put Ecu 40 million towards an
allegedly illegal project.
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to include environmental obligations, despite its own recognition that the circumstances under
which this test was developed do not apply here150, and finally, despite the fact that the case-law
surrounding Article 173 has been an area where the ECJ has shown itself particularly inclined to
take an active role in interpretation151.
Even the Plaumann decision, in a portion that is rarely cited, suggests that the test could be
relaxed:
The provisions of the Treaty regarding the right of action of interested parties must not be
interpreted restrictively; where the Treaty is silent a limitation in this respect may not be presumed.
Could it not then also be argued, that aid given through the European Regional Development
Fund is not so different in effect from aid given by the State152, where the test has been allowed to
evolve? The applicants are not affected in the sense of economic competition, but they are
adversely affected in terms of competition for limited natural resources. To borrow the words of
Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat in Cofaz, it could be argued that the disadvantages for
the environmental associations and the individuals bringing this action are the counterpart of the
advantages conferred, in the form of a grant made under the Regional Funds, upon Unelco153.
Furthermore, the case-law developed in the wider context of Community law is applicable
here. In application of Article 5 EC154, the ECJ has consistently held that
150 Paragraph 50.
151 The considerable evolution has concerned the areas of which type of act can be
challenged (Case 22/70 Commission v Council 1971 ECR 263; Case C-39/93P Syndicat Frangais de
I'Express International (SFEI) v Commission 1994 ECR 1-2681); against which institution the action
can be directed (Case 294/83 Parti Ecologist 'Les Verts' v European Parliament (1987) 2 CMLR 343);
standing for semi-privileged applicants (Case 302/87 European Parliament v Council ('Comitology')
1988 ECR 5615; C-70/88 European Parliament v Council ('Chernobyl') 1990 ECR I-2041Case 302/87
European Parliament v Council ('Comitology') 1988 ECR 5615; C-70/88 European Parliament v Council
('Chernobyl') 1990 ECR 1-2041); standing for non-privileged applicants in the areas of anti¬
dumping (Case 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corporation v Commission 1984 ECR 1005; Case 262/82
Timex Corporation v Council and Commission 1985 ECR 840), competition (Case 26/76 Metro-SB-
Grojlmdrkte GmbH and Co.KG v Commission 1977 ECR 1875), and (as invoked by the applicants)
state aids.
152 The applicants pointed out that in matters of state aids (citing case C-198/91 Cook r>
Commission 1993 ECR 1-2487) the legal interest of the competitors of recipients of state aids has been
recognised; (paragraph 24) those with interest are defined as those "affected in their interests" by
the aid, "notably the competing undertakings and professional organisations."
153 Even if, as VerLoren van Themaat suggests (Case 169/84 Cofaz v. Commission 1986 ECR
391, p.405), admissibility were limited to those who had earlier submitted complaints to the
Commission, the present case could have proceeded to discuss the grounds for review, since three
applicants had formulated complaints.
154 Article 5 EC; for text, see Chapter 2, footnote 3.
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any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice
which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court
having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its
application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily,
Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements,
which are the very essence of Community law1®®.
Unfortunately for the outcome of the present case, the CFI failed to apply to itself the obligation to
set aside rules that would obstruct the application of Community law. Generally, this case seems
to indicate that the CFI stops interpreting actively where environmental interests are involved.
On the present occasion the rigidity of the CFI concerning the arbitrary and inappropriate
barrier of 'individual concern' and its failure to set aside obstructive technical rules resulted in a
sizeable two-fold violation of Community law156 being tolerated. The judicial control of the use
of European funds that is so urgently required was denied. This is especially ironic when one
recalls the dynamic pro-environment stance adopted by the ECJ at a time when no Treaty
foundation for such a position existed. One can detect the effects of a change in the Community's
political.atmosphere, evident in a general retreat on environmental issues since the Edinburgh
Summit in 19921®7, although it can be hoped that the environment fares better during the appeal
of this case1®®.
This illustration and various other cases1 ®9, indicate that individuals cannot expect, at
Community level, to benefit from the transparency, access to information and access to justice
that the Community actively urges the Member States to grant them at national level.
155 C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Tactortame and others (No.2) 1990 ECR
1-2433, at paragraph 20; see also 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA
1978 ECR 629 at paragraphs 22 and 23.
156 Spain's violation of the EIA directive 85/337 (unless a derogation under Article 2(3) were
accorded; apparently not the case); and the Commission's failure to ensure that the integration
requirement in Article 130r(2) EC and the requirement in the Structural Funds in regulation
2052/88 were respected.
157 Cf: Council of Edinburgh Presidency Conclusions, Europe no. 5878 Sunday/Monday
13/14 December 1992 at p.l. Since this time, a variety of environmental obligations have been
reviewed and amended, and the Community has become markedly more hesitant in proposing
and adopting environmental legislation. When it has adopted new environmental rules, it has
opted for broader, less specific and arguably less enforceable standards; Cf: "The Impact of EC
Environmental Law in the United Kingdom," conference held in London, 3 November 1995,
particularly comments made by Dr. Ludwig Kramer, "Recent Developments in EC Environmental
Law," and David Freestone, "The Impact of Subsidiarity."
158 Which has been registered as Case C-321/95P.
159 See for instance, T-219/95R Danielsson and others v Commission, 1995 ECR 11-3051, para.70-
77, regarding French nuclear tests on Mururoa. The applicants sought to annul the Commission
act which stated that, even in the worst hypothesis, scientific assessment demonstrated that basic
safety standards concerning exposure to ionizing radiation would be met; therefore Article 34 of
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3. Sanctions and compliance with rulings:
Especially frustrating is that the phase after an ECJ decision also presents difficulty.
Presenting the limitations of a traditional system of public international law, the ECJ was until
recently limited to a strictly declaratory finding that a Member State, by its act or omission, had
failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty. Article 171 EC requires a Member State to take the
measures necessary to comply with the Court of Justice's decisions; it makes no mention of time
limit, although the Court insists that "it is beyond dispute that the action required to give effect to
a judgment must be set in motion immediately and be completed in the shortest possible
period."160
Member States frequently do not comply, however161. Examples exist regarding
environmental legislation where infringements -- detected, pursued and then judged — have
continued for a decade or more, despite Community efforts to enforce appropriate provisions16^.
the Treaty (Euratom) did not apply. The action was dismissed as 'manifestly inadmissible': again,
the applicants could not show that they decision was of direct and individual concern.
See further, Case C-131 Arnaud and others v Council 1993 ECR 1-2573;
Case T-475 Buralux and others v Council, decision of 17 May 1994 (appeal rejected);
Case T-117/94 Rovigo v Commission 1995 ECR 11-455 (appeal C-142/95).
160 Case 69/86 Commission v Italy 1987 ECR 773 (para.8); also Case 131/84 Commission v Italy
1985 ECR 3531 (para.7).
161 Tesauro, "La sanction des infractions au droit communautaire," 32 (1992) Rivista di
Diritto Europeo 477 at p.481. AUDRETSCH, 1986, pp.395-°6; HARTLEY, Foundations, p.314n: in at
least half the cases the judgment was not implemented within a year.
16^
- More than a decade: An infringement regarding waste directives continued in one
Member State from the entry into force of the directives in questions (July 1977 for directives
75/439 and 75/442 and February 1979 for directive 78/176) through initial judgments (68/81,
69/81 and 70/81, 1982 ECR, pages 153,163 and 169 respectively), through a second judgment on
14 January 1988 for failure to implement the earlier judgments (cases 227 to 230/85 Commission v
Belgium ECR 1).
- eleven years: Regarding the birds directive:, in Case 75/91 Commission v Netherlands
1992 ECR 1-549 the Netherlands was condemned for failure to implement the judgment in Case
236/85 Commission v Netherlands 1987 ECR 3989. The lapse spanned the entry into force in 1981 of
directive 79/409 to the judgment of February 6,1992.
- eleven years: Case C-337/89 Commission v UK 1992 ECR 1-6103, the UK was condemned
for failures of both formal (failure to transpose in Norther Ireland and Scotland) and practical
implementation (quality of drinking water). The directive entered into force in 1982, two years
after its adoption, with an additional three years for quality of water to comply. The UK is still
cited in the Eleventh Application Report in 1993 for not implementing the earlier judgment, and
the situation is still not remedied in 1996. The infringement has lasted at least eleven years.
- twelve years: the Commission commenced proceedings against France for failure to
implement the judgment in Case 252/85 Commission v France 1988 ECR 2243 regarding the birds
directive, proceedings which are following the Article 169 stages still in 1993 (see Eleventh Report
1993, C154/169) — at least twelve years from the entry into force of the directive.
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Tesauro notes that the significance of failure to comply must not be exaggerated: often this is
to do with the complexity of practical considerations rather than defiance163. However,
particularly with environmental rules, on occasion failure to implement an EC) ruling can be a
political choice164. Even where the failure stems from practical difficulties, the result is the same
from an environmental perspective: Community environmental legislation fails just as surely to
attain its goals. Member States' failure to heed a judgment can be especially serious to the
environment in that it compounds problems of time during which dangerous or harmful
situations may continue unresolved166. At the very least, disrespect for an ECJ ruling, whatever
the reasons, implies a waste of the already scant resources of DG-XI: the pursuit of an
infringement that survived all the obstacles outlined above still amounts to very little (although a
useful precedent is set). It is difficult to deny that failure to implement judgments does indeed
damage the Community's authority.
In the event that a decision is not implemented, the Community's formal options are limited.
Until recently the only action possible against a State that failed to implement a judgment was the
initiation of new infringement proceedings. The absence of effective sanctions, once widely
deplored166, has been modified by the Maastricht Treaty. Article 171(2)167 as amended by the
TEU gives the Court the power to impose a lump sum or penalty payment on Member States that
have not complied with its judgment.
While this may provide valuable inspiration to comply, it has been pointed out that
imposition of a fine may be an "unsubtle remedy"16®. It raises questions regarding which sum can
be considered dissuasive. It presents difficulties in that the dutiful taxpayer rather than the
166 Tesauro, 1992, pp.482-83.
164 For instance, in order to create give priority to other national concerns; see comments on
the UK's delay in implementing the drinking water directive; Collins and Earnshaw, p.217.
165 As for instance, in the Campania case (above) where situation that is frankly dangerous
for public health lingered on.
166 Vernier Report, EP A3-0001/92, Point J, p.5; WWF and FoE, HL Ninth Report Evidence
1991-92, pp.267, 277.
167 After the Commission has proceeded once again through the stage of reasoned opinion,
the Commission (Article 171(2)):"...may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In so doing it
shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State
concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its
judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it."
168 Lane, op.cit., p.974.
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polluter pays; and where one might hope that the taxpayer might then exert "grass-roots"
pressure on defaulting Member States, it must be remembered that, at least in some Member
States, the media coverage of any imposed fine may well distort the issues and be portrayed as an
'attack' from Brussels. However, at least from an environmental perspective (if not the taxpayers'),
having this sanction available represents a considerable advance and may eventually encourage a
Member State to avoid being singled out in this manner.
Commission discretion, a point on which it has insisted16^ may present problems similar to
those discussed in the administrative phase (above). Nonetheless, amid a variety of references to
those issues that the Commission would consider sufficiently serious to warrant use of Article 171
(economic freedoms^, marketing, and functioning of the Community), the Commission has
specifically referred to "particularly damaging effects of pollution arising from an action in breach
of Community law."*'*
A remaining, important, shortcoming is that even the power to impose a fine for non¬
compliance with an ECJ decision adds nothing to the Community's arsenal prior to the disregard
of the judgment. One can only agree with Tesauro when he points out that it would have been
more useful to impose a sanction after the first condemnation — without which "the Court's first
decision may be 'banalised' and Member States may be incited to wait until the introduction of a
second infringement procedure before satisfying their obligations"1^.
4. Conclusion:
The previous chapters have highlighted a variety of problems, some legal and procedural,
others political, that on the one hand, can lead to the creation of environmental rules that are at
times difficult to implement or enforce, and that on the other, obstruct the Commission in its
attempts to monitor Member States performance with regard to those rules. Given the obstacles
examined in this chapter, it seems that political pressures both from Member States and among
the various Community departments, appear also to intrude on enforcement proceedings.
169 Memorandum on applying Article 171 of the EC Treaty, OJ1996 C242/6 at point 3.
"...attacks on fundamental rights and on the four fundamental freedoms should be
regarded as serious"; ibid., point 6.1.
1^1 Ibid., point 6.2.
^ Tesauro, 1992, p. 489.
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Despite the earnestness with which certain players attempt to enforce environmental rules, it
seems that their efforts are occasionally^3 undone by more powerful actors. This too is a
reflection of political priorities and the ranking of environmental protection as a goal. It is difficult
to imagine the situation in reverse: other policies being sacrificed in favour of environmental law.
However, it is not argued here that all the ills of the Community-level monitoring and
enforcement are a result of Member State machinations. Indeed, the Community fails to apply to
itself the requirements — of transparency, of access to justice, of co-ordination between policies —
that it demands of the Member States.
Certainly, to some extent, various difficulties noted in this discussion can be problematic in
any policy area and cannot be attributed only to lack of priority of environmental rules (for
instance, the stage at which applications for interim measures can be made). However, in many
cases it seems that their degree of obstructiveness is greater in environmental matters: it appears
that arguments accepted in, for instance, state aids, (negative decisions constituting acts, direct
and individual concern) are not accepted in environmental matters. Although surface
improvefnents can be made, more deeply, and more so where environmental rules are concerned,
it is difficult to separate politics from law in order to rigorously apply the latter.
In sum, efforts to enforce environmental rules at Community level are progressively
restricted by cumulative obstacles, with the result that proportionally few cases reach a decision
at Community level. The responsibility of the Member States in ensuring the effectiveness of these
rules by securing adequate implementation and enforcement is, therefore, greater.
Lack of transparency makes it difficult to judge how frequently.
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1. Upstream issues — the French Context
Upstream issues surrounding France's environmental administration give insight to the
backdrop onto which Community environmental law is grafted. The administrative context
influences the efficiency of government actors in charge of formal and practical
implementation. Subsequently, formal implementation of the two Community directives is
examined.
1.1. France's Environmental Administration:
Prior to the early Seventies, the few existing environmental attributions were fragmented
across several ministries1. By the late-Sixties/early-Seventies popular pressure was sufficient
to spur the government to develop a more coherent approach*1. The Ministry of Protection of
Nature and Environment was created, without fanfare, in January 19713 and announced during a
minor government reshuffling4. Its unobtrusive entry in the political arena heralded
difficulties in imposing its authority as an equal among the other ministries. Certainly the fact
that its basic attributions and the central administrative services allocated to carry out these
attributions were subtracted from other ministries5 (in a process that the first environment
minister termed the "strip-tease administratif'6) elicited resentment and inertia from other
governmental actors^, necessarily restraining the ministry's activities and weakening its
1 Mainly, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public
Health.
1 After a consultation among some five hundred associations, the Programme des Cent
Mesures was adopted: already efficient application of existing law was stressed as preferable
to the creation of new law.
3 Ministere de la Protection de la Nature et de I'Environnement, Decree of 27 January
1971.
4 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.152.
5 Notably the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture, Cultural Affairs, Transport.
6 Robert Poujade, le Ministere de VImpossible, Calmann-Levy 1975, p.31.
Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise noted, the French has been translated by the
author and should not be taken as authoritative. Where legislation is cited, the relevant
portion of the original French text is provided in an appendix.
Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p. 153.
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powers.8 The Environment Ministry had few administrative resources of its own in the field
(,services exterieurs)9 and, in order to carry out inspections and enforce legislation it was forced
to borrow the regional administrative services of other ministries10. The potential for a
conflict in priorities and loyalties is evident11. Necessarily aimed towards action in the field,
and yet without autonomous resources at this level, the Ministry of the Environment was
appropriately nicknamed the Ministere de I'Impossible by its first minister12. His efforts to
assert the Ministry's legitimacy were poorly received by other political actors, as illustrated
by his abrupt dismissal in 197413.
In fact, the problems experienced in these early days set the pattern for the Ministry's (or
the administrative organ serving that function) development. There followed a period of
experimentation and upheaval during which, although the competences and external services
remained more or less the same, ministers and secretaries of state in charge of the environment
were substituted for each other in rapid succession and the administrative body lost its status as
The initial decree (Decree 71-94, 2 February 1971) intentionally shared certain powers
between ministries and deliberately left ambiguities for fear of "indisposing" the other
concerned ministries. See Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p. 162.
Early experience with the Regional Environment Delegates (Delegues regionaux a
Venvironnement, Decree 73-355, 27 March 1973) who had been given some general inspection
duties and yielded poor results.
10 The latter were to be called upon "insofar as necessary" but clearly, this could not take
place without the prior consent of the minister in charge of the services at issue. (Decree 71-94,
attributing powers, Article 3, states that the Minister of the Environment "can in so far as
necessary, call upon the services and organs under the authorities to carry out the inspections he
esteems necessary". Subsequent decrees echo this formula (decree 75-406, 26 May 1975; decree 76-
1085, 29 November 1976).
Competent decentralised services included: Regional Directorates of Industry and
Research (Directions Regionales de l'Industrie et de la Recherche, answering to the Ministry of
Industry; the Departmental Agricultural and Forest Delegations (Delegations
Departementales a VAgriculture et de la Forit, under the authority of the Ministry of
Agriculture; and one of the most powerful state exterior services, the Departmental Public
Works Delegation (Delegations Departementales a I'Equipement, of the Ministry of Public
Works); see Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.215.
11 Romi, RDP 1990, p.1124; Billaudot, Framboise, "Les Mutations administratives de
l'environnement: Aspects de l'application du plan national pour l'environnement," 1991 RJE 333
at p.337.
12 Robert Poujade, whom Michel Prieur has referred to as "the bad conscience of the other
ministries", Dalloz 1991, p. 155.
13 A more recent parallel can be drawn to the unexpected transfer of former DG-XI Head of
Legal Affairs Unit, Dr. Ludwig Kramer; see Chapter 3, footnote 46.
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an autonomous ministry1'1. For example, in 1978 the Ministry of the Environment and Quality of
Life18 Was created by merging the ministries of Public Works and the Environment — a thin
polish over the fact that the environment had been tucked into a corner of the Ministry of
Public Works16. A serious practical consequence of such a tandem is that, where previously
differences between the two ministries (and creation of infrastructure is obviously often in
conflict with environmental protection) could be arbitrated by the prime minister, conflicts now
took place within one ministry1'7. Also at this time the most profound upheaval in the French
administrative system generally since l'An VIII18 took place: the movement to decentralise
transformed all areas of administration, including the environment19. Although this created
new opportunities for environmental administration it also created new possibilities for
confusion.
1.2. Problems of implementation and enforcement stemming from environmental
administration:
Whereas the fact that France was among the earliest Member States to establish
environmental ministries might give cause for optimism, it soon becomes apparent that
application of Community rules has been negatively affected by the administrative situation.
14 It was attached to other ministerial structures and for a time became the Ministry of
the Quality of Life (1974-77) encompassing competing concerns such as sports, leisure, tourism
and the environment.
15 Cadre de Vie.
16 The absorption becomes particularly noticeable when examining the disproportion in
resources of each. See Prieur, Dalloz 1991, pp.153,167-8.
17 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.168.
From 1981 to 1986, (with a gap from March 1983 - July 1984 when the Minister of
Environment became a Secretary of State) the environment was entrusted to an autonomous
ministry. Competences were juggled both in favour of the newly autonomous ministry and back
to other ministries (Decrees 78-533, 79-460).
18 L'An VIII marked the setting up of Napoleon's centralised administrative organisation
of the territory and the creation of the administrative institutions and justice system; Dalloz
administratif, 1992, pp.19-20, p.278.
19 Which continued to undergo change. Socialist victory in 1988, brought an improvement
in status and some extension of powers; environmental attributions were attached directly to
the Prime Minister rather than the Ministry of Public Works (Decree 89-235, 17 April 1989); see
Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.176.
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Just as DG-XI would later have difficulty imposing its authority at Community level2®, the
French environmental administration had trouble asserting its authority; this had an
unsettling effect on implementation and enforcement of environmental rules from any source,
Community or national.
1.2.1. Legitimacy: The many administrative advances and retreats cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the environmental administration and on the Government's commitment to
environmental goals. Early upheavals show the wariness with which the new competitor in
the political arena was regarded. Tensions between ministries and resentments over gained or
lost influence were kept alive as attributions and manpower continued to be subtracted from one
ministry and added to another. The Environment Ministry was subjected to metamorphoses that
would have been unthinkable for a Ministry of the Interior or of Foreign Affairs. It was unable
to develop the authority that comes of stability and seniority, and this detracted from the
seriousness with which the Government's approach to environmental matters was perceived
(and acted upon) by the other branches of the administration and private actors.
An illustration of the fact that the environment administration carried little real weight
was given by a Conseil d'Etat24 ruling in 198222 which effectively dismissed the Environment
Minister's opinion within the context of the EIA procedure23. The litigation, involving a quarry
linked to the construction of a nuclear power station, concerned the fact that authorisation was
given prior to receiving the Environment Minister's opinion. The commissaire du
gouvernement24 granted that only in very exceptional cases could the soliciting of a minister's
opinion be interpreted as not having a substantial character25. Clearly favouring economic
20 See Chapter 1, points 1 and 3.
24 See appendix.
22 CE 5 February 1982 Association de defense de la qualite de la vie du Val de Loire, AJDA
1982, p.471.
Arguably violating the intention of the Nature Protection Act, Article 2; Note J.C.,
AJDA 1985, p.239; nevertheless, EIA85/337 does not indicate the value of an environmental
authority's opinion.
24 See appendix.
25 Fie acknowledged that the solution is proposed on the grounds of bureaucratic
convenience. At the same time as the commissaire dismissed the opinion, he notes that the
interpretation of the environment minister's opinion as part of a true procedure of consultation is
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priorities, however, he found that acknowledging the substantial nature of the opinion here
"could...result in great disturbance to the progress of the diverse regulatory procedures onto
which this saisine^6 is grafted."27 Because the provision is inconvenient, it was to be
considered not obligatory2®. The Conseil d'Etat summarily ruled that the environment
minister's opinion was devoid of legal effect2^ and dismissed the application. Legally,
administrative actors need not even await the Environment Minister's opinion.
1.2.2. Lack of Resources and Power: Political priority is reflected in the scant resources
devoted to environmental policy: still in 1990 only some 550 agents worked at the central level,
with between 413 and 43030 in the DRAE34, the closest thing to environmental agents at the
regional level. In 1990 the Nature Protection Directorate had only 85 agents, 3 of whom were
assigned to natural reserves32. Environmental protection acquired some measure of authority
and agents only with difficulty. The legitimacy of environmental administrators was
questioned, "viewed as a concession to a hesitant policy"33 — a Government policy that
commands no more than 0.06% of the annual budget34 could hardly expect to be taken
supported by the terms of the statute, by common sense and by the parliamentary debates (cf: JO
deb. A.N. 11 June 1976, p.4060); AJDA 1982 p.473.
28 The fact of being seized for an opinion.
27 AJDA, p.473:"elle pourrait, nous semble-t-il, se traduire par d'importantes
perturbations dans le deroulement des diverses procedures reglementaires sur lesquelles cette
saisine doit se greffer."
28 He justifies this by pointing out that, in the event that a project does not require a
public inquiry, the public would be neither be notified of the impact study nor able to seize the
environment minister until after authorisation anyway; AJDA 1982, p.474. The commissaire du
gouvernement fails to consider that this is perhaps precisely the reason that the environment
minister is empowered to give an opinion of his own initiative.
- J And that the contents of the challenged EIS responded to the requirements of Article 2
of the Nature Protection Act.
30 Depending upon the estimate, see Romi 1990, p.1123.
33 Water resource management: Direction regionale d'amenagement des eaux.
32 While 30 proposals for nature reserves awaited approval; Romi, Droit et
Administration, 1994, pp.125-26.
33 Billaudot, 1991, p.338.
34 In 1980 environment was 0.111% of state budget; 1985 it was 0.077% of state budget; in
1990 : 0.063% (source: Rapport B. Hugo, Senat no.61, 21 November 1989, Projet de loi de finances
pour 1990). In 1981 culture had a budget 4 times superior to that of the environment, in 1982 it
was 8 times superior; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, (p.33-35).
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seriously35. Furthermore, in an effort to make the collectivities provide for their own needs
(creating new financial worries for these), the central state took the opportunity given by
decentralisation to unload some of its financial and resource burdens36.
2.2.3. Conflict of Commitment: As noted, the Environment Ministry, or body serving that
function, was assisted by a host of regional and departmental services answering to other
ministries. Practically, this stew of interests meant environmental protection could lose to the
'host' policies in the event of conflict, particularly where economic stakes were high, or that
environmentally harmful situations would be approached with a more conciliatory attitude37.
For example, despite the fact that the environmental administration relied upon these services
to help protect flora and fauna, to police fishing and hunting, to inspect classified installations
(installations classees), and to control pollution and waste3®, the DRIR39 were also in charge of
promoting large industry; the DDE40 also promoted large infrastructure projects; the DDAF44
answered to the ministry of agriculture. With so much of practical implementation dependent
on decentralised agents answering to other than environmental authorities, effective
implementation depended greatly upon the goodwill of local officials and their awareness and
concern for environmental problems, with extreme variations from region to region47.
2.2.4. Confusion and overlap: Community rules were introduced into a situation where
constant shifting of administrative competences maintained a certain level of confusion
regarding who was in charge of what43. Since the decrees outlining the attributions of
35 Plan National de l'Environnement, June 1990, p.41; Romi, Raphael, "La reforme de
l'administration de l'Environnement en 1990: des 'grands mots' aux 'petits remedes'?" 107 (1991)
RDP 1089 at p.1091.
36 Albertini, P., "Les collectivites locales et l'environnement," 1993 AJDA 835 at p.837: "si
le contrat a conserve a I'Etat un rdle d'impulsion, il lui a permis aussi de soulager, rapidement,
la masse de ses investissements publics". See also Dalloz administratis 1992, p.265; Colson, RJE
1993, p.225.
37 Romi 1990, p.1123, p.1138 note 36.
3® Billaudot, 1991, p.338, pp.343-44.
39 Regional Directorates of Industry and Research.
40 Departmental Directorates of Public Works (Equipement).
41 Departmental Directorates of Agriculture and Forests.
47 Lavoux, 1991, p.72.
43 Billaudot, 1991.
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environmental authorities often referred to a maze of earlier decrees, shedding light on the
exact limits of competence was no easy matter44. And if authorities themselves were at times
disoriented by the dispersion of services, then the public, even if committed, could hardly be
expected to untie the administrative knot. The mechanism of public participation as a buttress
of implementation and enforcement could not function properly. Also from the point of view of
the outsider, notably the Community institutions, the administrative rearrangements can be
puzzling. The Commission complaint that environmental administration is particularly
fragmented is justified.
1.2.5. Decentralisation: Particularly since decentralisation4^ the environment is an area
claimed by a multitude of administrative actors, compounding the confusion mentioned above.
The landmark event of decentralisation was a 1982 statute46 establishing the principles of
equality and co-responsibility between the administrative partners (descending by size): the
State, the now officially created region, the department, and the commune47. In the area of the
environment, as elsewhere, decentralisation in the Eighties has created possibilities but has
also added to existing problems and created new ones. In fact, decentralisation has been a lost
opportunity in terms of clarity of roles, co-ordination between administrative levels and
regional involvement.
In keeping with the renewed importance of local levels, all levels have been given
environmental competences, yet an element of clarity has been sacrificed. The duties of each
official actor are not precisely defined in the legislation, perhaps because the legislator chose
44 Billaudot, 1991, p.336-7; Albertini, 1993, pp.835-39.
45 Subsidiarity-type arguments in favour of bringing people closer to the centre of decision
were supported by: a basis for decentralisation existed in the Fifth Republic's Constitution of
1958 (Article 72); and dissatisfaction with the centralising trend among the approximately
37,000 traditionally individualistic French communes; Lorrain, "The French Model of Urban
Services" 15 (1992) Western European Politics 77 at p.79.
46 Loi du 2 March 1982 relative aux droits et libertes des communes, des departements et
des regions.
47 Two subsequent laws (Loi du 7 January 1983 and loi du 22 July 1983 relatives a la
repartition des competences entre les collectivites locales et I'Etat) attempted to disentangle
the divisions of competence and were supported by later rules regarding matters of
decentralisation.
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an element of vagueness as the most neutral solution to the issue48. Many legal commentators49
agree that decentralisation has complicated rather than simplified an already complex
area50 and efficiency may have diminished since no single entity holds the key to an entire
sectoral policy54, leaving certain issues unresolved55. The latest statute concerning
decentralisation has not clarified matters:
...the law of 1992 proceeds to sprinkle competences, perhaps to conserve better a directing role for
the State...the occasion for clarification has once again been lost!55
Co-ordination between administrative levels has also suffered. As Albertini has remarked,
harmonisation between levels is desired but the means for achieving this have not been clearly
furnished54 and no mechanism for arbitration is provided in case of disagreement55.
Decentralisation has eliminated la tutelle^ and thus the problem of coherence between levels
is accentuated55. Where legal texts are silent, the State's role as co-ordinator of the various
interventions is favoured58 (and here the Government's commitment to genuine decentralisation
48 Albertini, 1993, p.835-36. Apparently some local authorities have siezed the
opportunity to occupy domains left undefined.
49 Albertini, 1993, p.840; Moreau, "Droit administratif: France," 5 (1993) Revue
Europeenne de Droit Public 397, at p.402; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, pp.220-25; Romi, Droit et
Administration, 1994, pp.154-55 .
50 The environment is a domain which touches on almost every area of public intervention;
to hope for a truly stream-lined and simple administration is perhaps unrealistic.
54 Gremion, C., "Quelle methodes pour evaluer la decentralisation?" AJDA numero special
1992, p.116.
55 Such as the division of responsibility between state and collectivity; Morand-Deviller,
Jacqueline, "Le Partage de responsabilite entre les communes et l'Etat dans l'instruction des
autorisations de construire," LPA, 23 June 1993 p.24. See also Romi, RDP 1992 pp.1774-75, p.1779.
See also, Loi du 7 janvier 1983, Article 35.
53 Albertini, 1993, p.839.
54 With the exception of controls of the legality of the measure and of financial
advantages.
55 Albertini, 1993, p.837.
56 Administrative supervision by a higher authority established compulsorily over a
public body in case of mismanagement.
It is suggested (Loi du 7 January 1983, Article 6) that coherence be fostered by the
conclusion of conventions between local authorities (concerning mainly urban services, for
example water, sewage, waste treatment and urban transportation) yet the details are left
vague and harmonisation of interventions seems to depend upon the willingness of local
authorities to form links on common projects and on the financial support of these; see Lorrain,
p.81.58 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.220; Albertini, 1993, p.837.
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and the sharing of power can also be questioned. Ironically, Member States subdue at national
level the same subsidiarity arguments they promote at the European level).
Decentralisation can further be considered a lost opportunity in that regional competences
are restricted. Several sources have postulated that the newly created region is an
administrative echelon well-adapted to environmental management5^. Regional authorities
are sufficiently close to local issues, priorities and cultural characteristics to take decisions
well-suited to local problems, and yet not so close as to be easily swayed by political
friendships and patronage relationships60. From the Community viewpoint, extending regional
competence would fit well with European funding schemes and their new emphasis on regional
identity. Regional authorities could appropriately carry out the task of implementing national
and Community policies concerning economic and social development61. (However, despite the
Community's intention to emphasise the role of regions in the framework regulation for
Structural Funds programmes of 1994-99, regions are as yet "more objects than subject of new
Community policies, notably in the attribution of funds under FEDER for regional
development"62.) Increased emphasis on this administrative level would bolster political
statements prioritising regions and would be beneficial from the standpoint of environmental
awareness and local political pressures. Nonetheless,
to avoid confusing roles, the State regularly reminds local authorities of the limits of the direct
relations with Community institutions. A distinction is made between contacts for information,
5y Albertini, 1993; Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.268.
60 As Romi and Muscatelli comment, although communes and departements may be closer
to the level of citizens, "[ljike it or not, local pressures and the search for resources lead
municipalities to choose the short term over the long term"; Romi and Muscatelli, "Protection
de l'environnement et contentieux de l'urbanisme; sur les aspects frustrants des decisions
d'annulation de mesures d'urbanisme," LPA, 14 April 1989, p. 11. See also, e.g., T.A. Bastia, 24
November 1988, Chapter 5, footnote 101; Romi, Raphael, "L'administration de
l'environnement: entre decentralisation et deconcentration," 108 (1992) RDP 1771 at p.1779;
Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.8.
61 Oberdorff, Henri, "Des incidences de l'Union europeennes et des Communautes
europeennes sur le systeme administratif frangais" 111 (1995) RDP 25 at p.32. Cf: Loi
d'orientation, no.92-125, 6 February 1992 relative a l'administration territoriale de la
Republique (JO 8 February 1992).
62 Bodson, Nicolas, "Communaute europeenne: vers une reconnaissance institutionnelle des
regions?", LPA 10 avril 1993, p.16
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regarded as useful to the local authorities, and decision-making procedures, to do only with
competence of the Stated
1.3. Reform:
In 1989 the French Government64 conceded that the environmental balance sheet had, thus
far, been negative. Both the public and government became increasingly conscious that deeper
change needed to be investigated. The previous notion that the Ministry of the Environment
had to be "lightweight and flexible" (justifying the fact that it was given no personnel in the
field), ceded to the idea that a greater stability was required for it to impose itself as a
political actor of equal weight with others6^.
A report that influenced reform, the National Environment Plan66 ("Plan Vert"), gave a
harsh assessment of France's administrative treatment of the environment in comparison with
other Community Member States. Two of the main problems it discussed are mentioned above:
lack of real autonomy of 'environmental' agents and insufficient resources. Practically, it
proposed a doubling of the budget allocated to environment and suggested that new taxes be
voted to finance this; a regrouping of competences under the Environment Minister's authority
was also proposed. The report also stressed that environmental choices do not necessarily run
Oberdorff, 1995, p.33.
64 In the person of the Garde des Sceaux: he Monde 17-18 December 1989, p.9; Romi,
Raphael, "Le droit public de l'environnement: vers la maturite?" 106 (1990) RDP 1121, at p.1122
(Romi, RDP 1990).
65 Three reports helped to shape the debate in the Assemblee Nationale, and
subsequently the direction of reform: realistic if somewhat timid, the Rapport Lorit (sur la
modernisation de l'administration territoriale de l'environnement, December 1989) stressed the
need for increased number of agents in the field (pointing out that, for instance, the number of
DRIR inspecting classified installations was so few that they were forced to unload a portion of
their tasks onto other services, further fragmenting administration); (see Romi, RDP 1990
p.1127). The Rapport Barnier (sur la politique de l'environnement AN no.1227, 11 April 1990)
demanded a doubling of the environmental budget and a regrouping of services with competence
in environmental matters under a new, larger Ministry of the Environment. Between these two
reports fell the National Plan for the environment' or the "Plan Vert" — the most influential of
the three.
66 L. Chabason, J. Theys, Plan National pour I'Environnement, June 1990, Secretariat
d'Etat aupres du Premier Ministre charge de l'environnement et de la Prevention des risques
technologiques et naturels majeurs.
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counter to economic objectives and notes that the former are obligatory in any case because of
France's membership in the European Community67.
A new seriousness about environmental issues and an increase in apparent political
importance followed from the debate and the reform took several shapes. To begin, the
environment's budget was raised from 857 million francs in 1990 to 1270 million in 1991 — yet
still remained only 0.09% of the State budget68. The environment budget 1995 showed an
increase of 6.7% on the previous year, and an addition of 2351 agents for the Environment
Ministry.
1.3.1. Modification of existing agencies:
- DIREN: Most notably, and as recommended in the debated reports, many of
the environmental attributions dispersed amongst various ministries were regrouped into one
external service under the authority of the Ministry of Environment: 25 Regional environment
directorates (DIREN)69 were created in 1991. A reversal of fortune, these are now at the
disposition of the other concerned ministries70. Political tensions were, obviously, not erased
with this move7''.
- DRIRE: The Regional Directorates of Industry and Research (DRIR) continue
to exercise many environmental attributions for other ministries. (However, the inspection of
classified installations was later transferred from the Ministry of Industry to the Ministry of
the Environment77). The structure of the DRIR, however, has been modified to emphasise the
environmental aspects of their role as well as an element of co-management of the DRIR
b/ Romi, RDP 1991, p.1089-91; see also Romi, RDP 1990 p.1123, note 3.
68 "L'Environnement est victime du verdissement artificiel des deputes" he Monde 26
October 1990, p.10. Romi, RDP 1991 p.1096.
69 Directions Regionales de I'Environnement, Decree 91-343, 9 April 1991.
70 Ministries of Agriculture (water competences), Public Works (architecture, urbanism,
protection of sites and landscapes), Transport (navigable routes) and Culture (protection of
historical monuments). For descriptions of their duties, see Romi, RDP 1992, p.1777; Billaudot,
1991, pp.341-43.
71 The relationship of the DIREN with department level bodies is not always well-
defined, progress is not always smooth; Billaudot, 1991 p.343.
Decree 92-434 of 12 May 1992. See Deruy, Laurent, "France," in Environmental
Liabilities and Regulation in Europe, edited by Mark Brealey, International Business
Publishing Limited, The Hague, 1993, p.160.
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between the ministries of Industry and Environment. Re-baptised the Regional Directorates of
Industry, Research and the Environment (DRIRE7^) they have been put unequivocally at the
disposal of the Ministry of Environment. In keeping with Article 130r(2)EC the idea that it is
better to have a greener industry than to add only to the Environment Ministry's resources, a
"Regional Service of Industrial Environment" unit has been created within each of the
DRIRE , and the environment representatives are co-appointed by the ministers of Industry
and Environment.
2.3.2. New National Agencies: Another object of reform was the inadequate collection of
data, on which the formulation of coherent policy and legislation, and effective
implementation rely. Three agencies have been established in an effort to co-ordinate at the
national level the efforts dispersed throughout France: ADEME, an agency of environment and
energy7^; INERIS, the National Institute of Environment and Risk7^; and IFEN, the French
Environment Institute77, the latter specifically designed to provide a link with the European
J Directions Regionales de I'lndustrie, de la Recherche et de I'Environnement.
7 4 Billaudot, 1991 p.344.
"
Agence de lenvironnement et de la maitrise de Venergie. The Agency was created (Loi
90-1130, 19 December 1990 ) by regrouping three existing institutes: two small ones with a more
environmental focus (Agence Nationale pour la Recuperation et I'Elimination des Dechets,
ANRED and Agence pour la Qualite de I'Air, AQA); and one large (Agence Frangaise pour la
Maitrise de VEnergie).
Environmental priorities have been questioned in the creation of this Agency: the
agencies are statutorily equivalent, but ADEME has already been criticised as an absorption of
the environment-oriented ANRED and AQA by the industry-oriented AFME ("La Nouvelle
Super-Agence de I'Environnement est-elle credible?" Liberation, 9 October 1990, p.5). The
agency got off to a bad start politically, since even the directors of the agencies involved were
unaware of the merger until it was announced; Romi, RDP 1991, p.1094-99; Billaudot, 1991, pp.
346-7; Deruy, 1993, p. 172.
76 Institut National de I'Environnement et des Risques, created by Decree 90-1089, 7
December 1990. It is composed of two pre-existing scientific bodies (Centre d'Etudes et de
Recherches de Charbonnages de France and l'lnstitute de Recherches Appliquees). Its purpose is
to conduct and promote research and experimentation in the limited area of industrial pollution
and the prevention of risk to persons and the environment stemming from economic activities;
Billaudot, 1991, pp.350-4; Romi, RDP 1991, pp.1094-95).
77 Institute Frangais pour I'Environnement (Decree 18 November 1991), the counterpart of
the European Environmental Agency, is designed to collect systematically its own statistical
and scientific data concerning natural resources and the environment, or verify the validity of
existing data without the involvement of political and commercial interests; Billaudot, 1991,
pp.347-349. Perhaps environmental commitment runs deeper here than with the other agencies,
for example: although nine ministries are represented in the administrative council, the
Environment Minister has the final word; Romi, RDP 1992, pp.1774-76.
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Environment Agency. With these agencies, emphasis has been placed both on gathering
necessary information and on monitoring and surveillance of the actual environmental situation.
Indeed, although some overlap and consequently some confusion remains, the reform has
laid groundwork that should help promote correct implementation and enforcement of
Community, and of course national environmental rules.
1.4. Summary:
Government departments in any policy area undergo a certain amount of rearrangement and
shuffling as political majorities come and go. However, the juggling to which France's
environmental administration was subjected, and its lack of autonomy, exceeded the norm,
indicating profound doubts concerning the legitimacy of its mission and wariness of the
potential intrusion of environmental preoccupations into other policy areas. For two decades
the environmental administration was placed in the untenable situation of having to 'borrow'
the personnel of competing ministries in order to carry out its most basic duties. Implementation
of environmental rules was compromised as a result.
Although clarity of roles between administrative levels has not been fully achieved, the
recent improvements (resources, autonomy and data collection) should improve the efficiency of
administrative actors, or at least make viable their role in implementing environmental rules.
2. Problems of Formal Implementation/ Transposition
Against an administrative backdrop that has recently been made more coherent,
administrative actors must ensure, first, that texts fulfilling Community obligations exist,
whether pre-existing or adopted specifically for that purpose (formal implementation). As
with formulation of the original Community legislation, the characteristics and flaws of these
national texts influence the results of their practical implementation and judicial enforcement.
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2.1. Types of legislation:
An act adopted by the parliament (loi) may be examined by the Conseil Constitutionnel78
prior to its promulgation; afterwards, however, a statute cannot be contested. Reglements
(regulations7^), generally80 adopted by the executive authority81, are to apply the law in
detail, without modifying or contradicting it. A judge may verify the conformity of the
regulation with a statute, and censure the illegality of the regulation82.
Regarding formal implementation of EIA85/337, separate pieces of legislation preceded
the European directive and therefore went through the normal national legislative processes.
The legislation transposing the obligations of LCP88/609 was adopted after the European
directive, by simple ministerial order (arrete ministeriel).
2.2. Formal Implementation — EIA85/337:
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) touches almost every area of public intervention83
and forms part of a large planning framework. Several pre-existing legislative texts were
notified to the Commission as fulfilling the obligations of EIA85/337. The principal texts
78 See appendix.
79 Which include, inter alia, decrets, issued by the president or Prime Minister, and
arrites, issued by government ministers, prefects and mayors.
80 Although exceptions exist, such as reglements autonomes; see Dalloz administratif,
1992, pp.50-51.
81 The president and government, subordinate to parliament.
82 The loi du 27 August 1948 introduced the idea of a domaine reserve for the reglementary
power: freedom of the legislator to act in all areas has been limited to the areas of Article 34 of
the 1958 Constitution - those in which Assemblee Nationale fixes the rules and those where it
merely determines the fundamental principles. Matters other than those in the domain of the
law (ie: included in Art. 34) are considered to possess a reglementary character; in these areas
the government has competence unlimited by the legislator; Article 37, Constitution 1958.
However, both the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d'Etat have lessened this
distinction: for the most part therefore, issues which challenge previous rules are reserved for
the Assemblee Nationale; issues which put previous rules into operation are for the
reglementary power. The environment is not specifically attributed to Parliament, but the
Assemblee Nationale is required to consider any act touching the fundamental principles or
rights and freedoms of citizens: environmental law falls into this area; see Dalloz
administratif, 1992 p.41, pp.50-56; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.20.
83 Example: 11 ministers and five Secretaries of State are charged with carrying out the
obligations of one of the principal EIA legislative acts, decree 77-1141; the decree entails
modifications to, among other things, the Code de I'Urbanisme, le Code Forestier, le Code de
1'Expropriation, and a variety of existing decrees (Chapter II, articles 8-18.).
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include the 1976 Nature Protection Act84: Article l88 lays down a general interest in the
natural environment and the obligation to protect it; EIA is outlined at some length in Article 2
(the rest of the Act concerns protection of nature and animals). EIA Decree 77-114l86 was
adopted to elaborate the procedure in Article 2 of the Nature Protection Act. Additionally
France has a specific regime for certain undertakings classified for the protection of the
environment: these are subject both to the Nature Protection Act and EIA Decree 77-1141 and to
the 1976 Classified Installations Act87 and its regulation88 (Classified Installations Decree).
The classified installations regime is generally more rigorous than the provisions of
EIA85/33789. (Large combustion plants fall into the classified installations legal
framework90.) Public consultation procedures are contained in the 1983 Public Inquiries Act91
84 Loi 76-629, du 10 juillet 1976 relative a la protection de la nature.
88 Loi 76-629, Article 1: "Protection of natural spaces and countryside, preservation of
flora and fauna, maintenance of biological equilibirum in which these participate and the
protection of natural resources against all the causes of degradation that menace these are of
general interest.
It is the duty of each to watch over the the protection of the natural heritage in which
he lives. Public or private activities of planning, infrastructure and production must conform to
the same requirements...".
86 Decret 77-1141 du 12 octobre 1977.
87 Loi 76-663, du 19 juillet 1976 relative aux installations classees pour la protection de
I'environnement, modified by loi 76-1285, 31 December 1976; loi 85-661 of 3 July 1985, loi 86-2 of
3 January 1986, loi 86-1317 of 30 December 1986.
88' Decret 77-1133 du 21 septembre 1977.
8 9 For instance, once exploitation stops, the clean-up of the site of a classified installation
requires that the prefect be notified and the site be restored to such a state that none of the
dangers requiring the original authorisation or declaration are present (Decree 77-1133, Article
34), going beyond the EIA85/337. A statute passed in 1992 (Loi 92-646, 13 July 1992) has
amended the Classified Installations Act (Article 8.1): an individual selling land that may be
contaminated must provide the purchaser with a document registering the condition of the soil
and notifying of any major risks or adverse effects.
90 Other decrees regarding classified installations also exist, as for example decree 79-
1108 of 20 December 1979 on quarries: its article 10 requires more specifications than in the usual
impact study; this is very specific and will not be used to illustrate problems in this research.
Another legal act covers projects concerning both national defense and private or public
companies: loi d'instruction mixte 29.11.52 and its decree of application no. 55-1964 of 4 August
1955, modified by 78-1045 of 18 October 1978 and 83-997 of 17 November 1983; since decree 77-
1141 many of these are submitted to EIA and the environment minister or DIREN are necessarily
involved on an advisory basis; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, pp.206-207; Com(93)28, pp.75-75, p.80.
91 Loi 83-630, 12 juillet 1983 relative a la democratisation des enquetes publiques et a la
protection de l'environnement.
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and its principal regulation (Public Inquiries Decree9^). Finally, problems of the EIA system set
up by these rules, particularly regarding compliance w {. ' J- j ) f '"
v' i^-\ hii ^hi..v




To maintain coherence with the other chapters, I w}/ , „7,., .
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elements of the Community obligations, despite the fad , ( v ^ ((.>
influenced) EIA85/337. The Commission's views on the f
response are then examined.
Fragmentation: From the Community point of view
obligations are dispersed across three principal ac
Identifying which portions of the national provisions
other issues of nature protection, for instance) and then, which Community obligation each
relevant provision is meant to cover is not always easy, as mentioned above94.
2.2.1. Projects Covered93:
The European legislation requires that projects likely to have significant effects on the
environment be subjected to assessment, either systematically (Annex I EIA85/337) or where
Member States consider necessary (Annex II, EIA85/337).
EIA Decree 77-1141 provides a list of public and private projects to be exempted from EIA; if
not on the list, it is to be assumed that an EIA is required96. The subsequent Classified
Installations legislation widens the scope of projects subjected to EIA. Projects can fall in either
of two categories: those requiring an authorisation and those, less risky, requiring a mere
92 Decret 85-453 du 23 avril 1985.
93 Decret 93-245 du 25 fevrier relatif aux etudes d'impact.
94 Chapter 2, point 1.1.
93 The French provisions covering this are EIA Decree 77-1141, Article 3 (exempting, with
exceptions projects listed in annexes I and II); annexe III (projects always subject to EIA); article
4, annexe IV on environmental impact notice; Classified Installations Act, Article 1; Classified
Installations Decree, Article 1; Public Inquiry Act, Article 1; Public Inquiry Decree, Articles 1
and 2).
96 Article 3B, Referring to Annexes 1 and 2, (unless the project in question costs less than six
million francs; Article 3C).
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declaration92. Installations presenting grave dangers or inconveniences to the interests of public
health, security, or sanitation; of agriculture; nature and environmental protection; or the
conservation of sites and monuments must apply for prefectoral authorisation98. This can be
accorded only if the dangers or inconveniences can be prevented through measures specified in
the arrite prefectoral"; any request for an authorisation must include inter alia the
environmental impact study (EIS, one element of the EIA procedure) required by Nature
Protection Act, Article 2100. Under the classified installations regime the authorisation or
declaration must be renewed in the event either of a transfer, extension or transformation of the
installation, or of a change in fabrication processes101; this is stricter than in the EC
legislation102. The public inquiry statute and regulations further broaden the application of
the earlier legislation, subjecting projects to public inquiry that avoided it before108. Therefore
the projects of EIA85/337 are generally104 covered in the national rules.
Financial thresholds: EIA Decree 77-1141 establishes a system of exemptions from EIA
based on financial thresholds105. The French statute, however, required that projects that "by
Installations presenting lesser risks, instead of the authorisation procedure, must be
declared and must respect the general prescriptions protecting the interests listed in Article 1;
additionally, the prefect may impose specific prescriptions at the request of a third party (Loi
76-663, Article 11).
98 Articles 1 and 3, loi 76-663.
'
Loi 76-663, article 3; further prescriptions can be included in complementary arretes
prefectoraux on a proposal from the inspection of classed installations and after an opinion of
the Departmental Council of Hygiene (Decree no. 77-1133, Article 18).
100 Loi 76-663, Article 3.4.
101 Loi 76-663, Article 4.
102 In EIA85/337, modifications to Annex I projects figure in Annex II, and are thus subjected
to EIA "where Member States consider that their characteristics so require."
103 For example, construction permits, camping and caravan sties, railroad works...;
Hostiou, Rene, "Democratisation des enquetes publiques et protection de l'environnement,
analyse des decrets du 23 April 1985," 1986 RJE 5 at p.6; ROMI, Droit et Administration, 1994,
p.63.
104 See below, exemptions for constructions in communes with certain land planning
documents (POS and ZAC).
Also discrepancies appear to exist between the annexes of the French legislation
regarding projects allowed to dispense with an EIS, and Annexes I and II of the EEC directive
yet in fact, the only projects allowed to dispense with EIS in the French legislation are the
classified installations requiring only a declaration rather than authorisation; Com(93)28,
p.68.
105 Annexes I and II of the decree (not to be confused with the European directive's
annexes), applied separately, exempt certain projects under specified conditions. Article 3C
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their dimensions or their effect on nature may harm the latter"106 be subjected to an impact
study, foreseeing that a very small project with extremely harmful consequences could be
included. More in keeping with the directive's concept of "projects likely to have significant
effects," it mentioned the need to develop criteria, but never spoke of a financial threshold.
Prieur107 has argued, convincingly, that the appreciation of weak repercussions on the
environment can in no way be based upon financial criteria10®, which apparently do not meet
the European requirement that assessment be undertaken where projects could have "significant
effects"109 and yet the European legislation itself seemingly endorses the use of such
thresholds110. EIA legislation is necessarily somewhat illogical by putting the conclusion
(weak repercussions) before the test (EIS); however such criteria respond principally to a
bureaucratic need to limit the number of studies undertaken. This need is real111, yet more
consideration of actual effects, particularly on fragile areas, could have been envisaged in
developing criteria for weeding out projects.
At the least, the French legislation attempts to address a problem of practical
implementation that had emerged in the first years of application of EIA procedures. By
provides that projects costing less than six million francs are not subjected to study (unless listed
in Annex III — projects that must always have an impact study, regardless of cost).
The Public Inquiries rules use the same technique. Public Inquiry Act (Article 1) leaves
to the decree the elaboration of technical thresholds and criteria, adding that special criteria
can be added to take account of sensitive areas; once again the regulatory power's interpretation
of this is disappointing. It was content to borrow the thresholds approach of the EIA Decree 77-
1141 and use straightforward financial criteria. The special consideration given to fragile
areas "figures in the annex only in homeopathic doses" (Hostiou, RJE 1986, p.7), and consists
merely of lowering the financial thresholds from twelve million francs to six million in fragile
areas. (Notably, the financial thresholds of the EIA and Public Inquiries regimes fail to accord
between them.)
106 "...par I'importance de leurs dimensions ou leurs incidences sur le milieu naturel,
peuvent porter atteinte a ce dernier..."
107 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, pp. 70-73. Most environmental associations would also like to see
thresholds more closely linked (as indeed they are in other legislative acts) with the receptor
environment; see Com(93)28, p.90.
10® And even within the purely national context, the manner in which the decree
elaborates this is contrary to both the logic and the spirit of the French Act.
109 EIA85/337, Article 2(1).
110 Chapter 1, point 2.5.1.
111 Some 5000-6000 EIAs are carried out in France annually. Obviously implementation is
not advanced if the administration is too overwhelmed with studies to effectively control
them.
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insisting that the financial threshold to be considered is that of the entire project, the
legislation attempts to forestall the artificial division of projects into smaller units* *^
(saucissonnage**3) that would then fall under the threshold and escape the necessity of an
EIA**4 or public inquiry.
Specific projects exempted: More problematic is the compatibility of exempting
constructions that require authorisation in communes equipped with certain land planning
documents**5. In theory, French urbanism legislation requires the planning documents to
'respect environmental preoccupations'**5. However, some planning documents were not
themselves subjected to environmental requirements until this decree was passed, yet the extent
of the exemption refers to "all projects", including those that were adopted prior to the
requirement to respect environmental preoccupations**^. Also, from the Community
perspective, a further problem arose in that the "respect" for environmental preoccupations
required by these land-planning frameworks did not always amount to an EIA**8.
**2 Decree 85-453, article 1 .II.: "If the realisation of a single operation is fragmented, the
evaluation of the thresholds and criteria mentioned in this table takes account of the entire
project."
"Making sausage links," Commissaire du gouvernement Jean-Louis Rey, T.A. Pau, 2
December 1992, Association France-Nature-Environnement et autres, RFDA, 9 (2) March-April
1993, p. 277, at p. 280; see Chapter 6, point 2.6.
* *4 See also Decree 77/1141, Article 3C.
**5 Plan d'occupation des sols (POS: the principal land-use planning document), or a zone
d'amenagement concerne (ZAC: zone of concentrated construction), as well as allotments in
communes with an approved POS.
**5 Loi 76-629, Article 2: "...urbanism documents must respect environmental
preoccupations". Decree 77-1141, Article 1 adds that "...Environmental preoccupations are
taken into account by the urbanism documents within the framework of procedures relevant to
them."
Several articles in the Code de VUrbanisme require some element of environmental
concern: Article L.121-10; Article R.311-10-2; Article R.123-7; see also (regarding the POS) CE 4
March 1983, Association S.O.S. Paris, Leb p.94.
**^ Decret 77-1141, Annex II points 1 and 5; see CE 30 January 1985 Association 'les Amis de
la terre' AJDA 1985, p.238, note J.C. at p.239. See also comments Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.72.
Furthermore, only after the public inquiry statute of 1983 were any such documents
subjected to public inquiry (although still well before the entry into force of the European
directive).
118 Com(93)28, p.65.
For instance the POS is required to provide an analysis, with regard to the sensitivity
of the area, of the initial site and its environment and the effects on these of the POS and the
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2.2.2. Environmental Impact Study
EIS contents: As foreseen at Community level120, a significant problem concerning the EIS is
that the project developer or applicant prepares it121, at times sabotaging the idea of carrying
out the EIA at all. Still, this is in conformity with the European legislation and cannot
therefore be regarded as a problem of formal implementation; in this instance, the seeds of
ineffectiveness were in the European legislation itself.
Reviewing formal implementation, the Commission later found that the French legislation
did not comply with EIA85/337 with regard to specific elements of the EIS contents. The French
texts failed to include the non-technical summary, notification of potentially affected Member
States, indication of difficulties encountered by the developer, indirect effects of the project,
and effects on cultural heritage. The absence of the non-technical summary is particularly
serious in that it impedes the exercise of the procedural right to participate that the European
legislation extends to individuals.
2.2.3. Public consultation122:
The underlying problem of public consultation is that the purpose of the provisions conflicts
with a general (rather than simply where environmental issues are concerned) tradition of
measures of conservation and mise en valeur taken (Article R. 123-17 Code de l'urbanisme).
Technically this does not cover all the contents required of an impact study.
110 jhg French provisions related to this are: Nature Protection Act, Article 2; EIA Decree
77-1141, Articles 1,2, and 4; Classified Installations decree, Article 3.4.
120 See Chapter 1, point 2.5.1. at - Environmental Impact Study (Article 5.2 E1A85/337).
121 Decree 77-1141, Article 1.
Not surprisingly, complaints have been made about the quality of the studies carried
out; Com(93)28, p.89-90, p.94: "An increasingly widespread view is that the limitations and
difficulties of implementing EIA as it stands derive from the status of the EIS and from the fact
that the developer is responsible for undertaking it."
Regarding France, the European Commission points out that "[sjome developers, thanks
to the new generation of young and 'greener' engineers and to the influence of dedicated 'greens',
produce more accurate and more detailed information" and that the quality of the study was
higher; Com(93)28, p.86.
It seems unreasonable, however, to gamble the EIS quality on the uncertainty of a
"green" developer.
122 The French provisions concerned are: EIA Decree 77-1141, Article 5 and 6; Classified
Installations Act, Article 5, Classified Installations Decree, Articles 5,6,6bis, and 7; and the
Public Inquiries Act and Decree.
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administrative secrecy123. The consequent reluctance to define a truly participative procedure
is evident in many aspects of its formulation124. The Public Inquiries Act and its regulation
modified earlier provisions and constitute the basic French legislation covering the public
participation elements of EIA85/337125; they stipulate that inquiries, where required, must
inform the public and take note of its observations and suggestions.
On the positive side, the drafter did attempt to make the public inquiry procedure more
meaningful, to foresee and forestall potential conflicts of interests and loopholes: the
commissioners leading the inquiries (commissaire enqueteurs)126 are paid by the state127 and
cannot have an interest in the completion of the project128. An effort was also made to improve
the coherence of public consultation, for where under earlier legislation a variety of inquiries
and studies could be required for a very large single project129, Public Inquiries Decree provides
two procedures for regrouping the inquiries130. This may make the procedure less likely to wear
123 Bouchardeau, Huguette, Rapport a Monsieur Michel Barnier, Ministre de
I'Environnement, December 1993, p.5.
124 This was obvious in the early legislation: in certain cases, the EIS was made public
after the administrative decision concerning the project was taken — once the danger of the
public's active involvement had passed.
An extreme example of this official reluctance regards nuclear policy. Prieur notes that,
although France began working with nuclear power in 1956, the French public has had to wait
until 1991 for the intervention of Parliament, the expression of the people's will, for a law on
nuclear energy; Prieur, Michel, "Les Dechets radioactifs, une loi de circonstance pour un
probleme de societe," RJE 1992, pp.19-47. This takes on renewed significance in light of Chirac's
1995 decision to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific — a decision on which, it appears, no one
was consulted.
123 The Public Inquiry Act is accompanied by a variety of decrees in different fields,
however, decree 85-453, containing the common provisions, modifications to the forest, rural,
expropriation, civil aviation codes and regulations including that of classified installations, is
most relevant to this research.
126 And members of inquiry commissions (commission d'enquete).
127 Loi 83-630, article 8; Decree 85-453, article 10.
128 Decree 85-453, article 9.
Cf: T.A. Dijon 26 July 1994 M. Andre Morin, req. no.923995; in which the deliberations of
a Departmental Commission were annulled because of it irregular composition; namely the
Commissioner of the inquiry's impartiality and independence were contested.
129 Usually projects where no hope exists of passing beneath the threshold and avoiding
EIA altogether.
Given the simultaneous application of both the Nature Protection and Classified
Installations Acts, several impact assessments could be required by the various provisions
applicable, rather than one global procedure. For instance, a nuclear power station may require
ten impact studies.
130 Decree 85-453, Article 4.1 and II.
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out public interest than a succession of inquiries (sig -1 K / j
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inquiry procedure less painful for the developer131). 1 %
The black letter has been respected with regard v v/
whether this Member State used the most appropriate
obligations.
Non-technical summary: As noted above, the absen
violation of Community provisions. This summary is
meaningful to the layman; without it, the public is effectively distanced from the procedure.
The issue was addressed only in 1993 (below).
Consultation period: In indecisive terms, it is stipulated that public access to the EIS be
taken into account: "the opening hours are fixed in such a way as to allow the largest part of the
population to participate, taking account of normal working hours."132 However "it may
furthermore include several half-days chosen among Saturdays, Sundays and holidays"133: if
administrative reluctance combines with respect for days of rest, the working public will
almost certainly have difficulty consulting the EIS.
The duration of the inquiry likewise responds to a restrictive logic. The Classified
Installations decree134 adopts the minimum requirement imposed by the statute: Article 3 of
the statute requires that the inquiry last not less than one month, not more than two months133.
The Public Inquiries Decree, Article 40, provides that for classified installations the length of
the procedure is one month136. Illogically, the more likely the installation is to cause harm
(the reason for its classification), the shorter the time of public consultation.
131 With regrouping possible, dissimulation of the real interests and stakes behind a
project may also become easier; Hostiou, RJE 1986, p.8.
132 Decree 85/453, Article 14.
133 Decree 85-453, Article 14 (emphasis added).
134 Article 40 Decree 85-453 modifying article 5 of Classified Installations Decree 77-1133.
133 Unless extended by the commissioner for fifteen days.
136 Unless prolonged by the commissioner.
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Filtering the public's opinion: During the inquiry, much more depends on the inquiry
commissioner13'7 than upon the public. The commissioner is given a large margin of discretion:
he can extend the period of the inquiry138, he is consulted on the days and hours that the public
is able to consult the inquiry file139, he decides whether to hold a public meeting14(1, he
includes in the file for public consultation only those documents that he "esteems useful to the
public"141. Although the public's propositions must be noted in a final report, when deciding
the authorisation the Administration considers the commissioner's conclusions rather than the
public's143. With so much dependent upon him it is commendable that care has been taken to
prohibit his personal interest in the project. But in fact, he need not be personally interested to
strip the procedure of substance; he need only be uninspired. Furthermore, since he wields
considerable power in the award of an injunction143, the commissioner's attitude here affects
both practical implementation and judicial enforcement of EIA provisions.
Lenience: The provisions lack stringency concerning the inquiry commissioner's on-site
investigations, again in a manner favourable to the developer. The Public Inquiry rules provide
that, should the proprietor or occupant oppose the visit, or if the administration has not been
able to contact them, the commissioner merely notes this in the inquiry file. Likewise, if the
developer refuses to communicate a document "his reasoned response is included in the file."144
Apparently nothing else occurs, even in the case of classified installations143. Certainly, the
formulation of these provisions could have been more compliance-inspiring; as provided here,
133 In order to simplify, subsequently 'commissioner' is used to designate either the
commissaire enqueteur or the commission d'enquete.
138 Decree 85-453, Article 11.1.
139 Decree 85-453, Article 11.2.
140 Decree 85-453, Article 18.
141 Loi 83-630 article 4: "juge utiles a la bonne information du public."
143 Loi 83-630 article 4.
143 Loi 83-630, Article 6: In eventual proceedings, if he has drawn unfavourable conclusions
on a project at the inquiry stage, and if one of the arguments advanced seems serious and of such
a nature as to warrant the annulment of the decision, then administrative courts seized with a
request for interim measures must 'automatically' grant it.
144 "...sa response motivee est versee au dossier de I'enquete" Loi 83-630, article 4; also
Decree 85-453 article 17.
145 Article 42 Decree adding Article 6 bis to Decree 77-1133.
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one cannot see what concrete disincentive the developer encounters in refusing to co-operate. By
contrast, the Classified Installations Act states firmly that classified installations inspectors
(as opposed to public inquiry commissioners) can visit, at all times, the installations under
their surveillance146, backing this with criminal sanctions147. The French regulatory power is
more forceful on issues of actual health and safety (access by inspectors) than it is on public
participation in the decision-making process (access by inquiry commissions).
Validity of public consultation: It is extremely unfortunate that the inquiry is valid for
five years14**. Prior to the inquiry's expiration, if the project has not yet been commenced, the
inquiry's validity may be extended for another five years149. Although not strictly in breach of
the Community legislation, rules such as this erode its effectiveness: even if the project has not
changed during these five or ten years, the public's attitude, the state of scientific and
technical information or the environment itself may have significantly evolved.
In sum, aside from the absence of the non-technical summary, technically the public
participation obligation of EIA85/337 is fulfilled. However, wherever possible the public's
intervention is diminished. Reluctance to involve the public in decision-making has serious
implications for implementation of legislation such as EIA and generally, for putting into
practice the notion of shared responsibility put forth in the European Commission's Fifth EAP.
2.2.4. Administrative consideration! of EIS and results of public consultation prior to
granting permission or authorisation: ^
EIA85/337's obligation that "[dnformation gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6, and 7 must be
taken into consideration in the development consent procedure," was explicitly included only in
the classified installations legislation. However, the implicit purpose of the other legal
146 Loi 76-663, Article 13.
147 Loi 76-663, Article 21.
148 Bouchardeau, p.21; Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.68.
149 Loi 83-630, article 7. The decree simply adds that the competent authority for
extending the validity of the inquiry is the one competent for taking the decision for which the
inquiry is organised (article 5).
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provisions is to do exactly that. It appears difficult to challenge an administrative decision
where the EIS and public inquiry have been duly carried out, since neither the national nor
Community provisions require that environmental concerns be given precedence over other
priorities during the 'administrative consideration'150.
A potentially important aspect of administrative consideration, EIA Decree 77-1141
enables the minister in charge of the environment to give an opinion on an EIS either of his own
initiative or at the initiative of another151. However, clearly care was taken not to give the
minister in charge of the environment the power to obstruct a project. Neither a specific
deadline for the opinion nor the value of the opinion in the authorisation process is mentioned.
The potential was further undermined by the Conseil d'Etat's ruling that the opinion had no
legal value153. Since Community legislation only requires that environment authorities be
"given an opportunity to express an opinion" without specifying its weight or when it shall
intervene, such an interpretation may be inappropriate but is not in clear violation of
EIA85/337.
Usually the authority competent for granting authorisation is the prefect, and therefore
the quality of the consideration given environmental concerns varies according to the prefect's
'green' sensibilities153. In certain cases154 the quality of the environmental consideration is
likely to be influenced by the fact that the competent authority is the authority interested in
advancing the project155, a clear disadvantage for the usefulness of the procedure156, yet again
150 The directive does not give a precise definition of this, stating simply (Article 8) that
"Information gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 must be taken into consideration in the
development consent procedure."
151 EIA Decree 77-1141, Article 7: "The minister in charge of environment can be seized of
his own initiative or at the request of any natural or legal person regarding impact studies. In
this eent, he shall give his opinion to the minister among whose attributions figures the
authorisation, the approval, or the execution of the foreseen works or land planning."
153 Above, point 1.2.1. Legitimacy.
153 Should the risks concern several departements, authorisation is granted by the minister
in charge of Classified Installations, after an opinion from the Superior Council of Classified
Installations; Loi 76-663, Article 5.
154 E.g. the case of oil industry establishments (Decree 77-1133, Article 14), and of
installations dependant upon the services and organs of the State (Loi 76-663, Article 27).
155 As seen below, in Spain this is the rule rather than the exception.
156 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.416; ROMI, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.350.
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the Community directive is silent on such matters. Initial authorisations aside, the legislation
lays a similar trap concerning the monitoring of the conditions imposed in the authorisation^?
Yet since the Community rules impose no monitoring obligations, this problem is not relevant to
formal implementation.
2.2.5. Other EIA requirements:
Other requirements fulfilled by the national legislation include the public's notification of
the decision (EIA85/337 Article 9; EIA Decree 77-1141, Article 6); and safeguarding industrial
and commercial secrecy (EIA85/337 Article 10; Classified Installations Act, Article 2.4). As
mentioned the pre-existing French legal norms did not fulfil the obligations of EIA85/337
regarding notification of other Member States (EIA85/337 Article 7).
The Ninth Application Report indicates that France was sent an Article 169 letter for
incorrect transposition of EIA85/337158.
2.2.6. Underlying causes and general problems of transposition:
Besides problems arising from the specific obligations to be transposed, other difficulties
have arisen, some of which explain the particular shortcomings of the legislation noted above.
Most of these are reflections of political ranking of interests, the most pervasive and inevitable
problem.
Decree 80-813 of 15 October 1980 relatif aux installations classees pour la protection de
I'environnement relevant du ministre de la defense ou soumises a des regies de protection du
secret de la defense nationale: Article 1 requires that the Minister of Defense exercise the
powers usually attributed to the prefect.
However, as most of these projects concern national defense it is difficult to see how the
government could proceed otherwise.
The inspectors of classified installations are engineers or technicians designated by the
prefect on the proposal of the head of the interdepartmental service of industry and mines or,
where an agricultural establishment is concerned, on the proposal of the departmental director
of agriculture (Article 33, Decree 77-1133). Some expertise is necessary to understand the
establishment being inspected, but the departments that propose the inspectors are closely
linked to the establishment in question and the inspector may not be genuinely critical of
projects' effects on the environment.
*58 OJ 1992 C250/154. The action was subsequently dropped.
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Hierarchy of political priorities: As in the European Council, a variety of interests must be
balanced and frequently environmental interests lose in the exchange. As the Fifth EAP159
notes, it would require a revolution in thinking on the part of society as a whole to integrate
environmental protection in the decision-making processes of other disciplines and prevent this
type of occurrence. Nonetheless, despite the occasional clash of interests^, Parliament's
ranking of priorities was not problematic during the adoption of EIA provisions. In fact, at least
in the area of EIA, parliamentary debate added to the force of the Act161.
However, the ranking of priorities emerges elsewhere, such as in the government's
unnecessary delay in adopting regulations, differences between the Act and the regulation. A
directive that is not capable of direct effect cannot be relied upon in the national courts until it
has been transposed. Similarly, delays in the elaboration of a national regulation often mean
that the statute, during this time, remains in limbo, unapplied. The administration has
considerable discretion concerning the moment at which to issue the decree, unfettered by a
precise deadline162 (the mechanism used in Community directives). Therefore it is indicative
159 OJ 1993 C138/17 point 35, C138/22, C138/95.
160 por instance the final version, despite discussion in the Assemblee Nationale, did not
burden the developer with the need to present alternatives to the original project (Prieur,
Dalloz 1991, p.76). The same issue was later included in the proposal for Directive EIA85/337
(OJ 1980 C169/14 at p.16, Article 6(1) sixth indent, debated in the European Council, but failed
to make it into the final version there as well. The effect of the same pressures is evident.
161 The government's original project of the Nature Protection Act did not expressly refer to
EIS at all; it required simply that public works and planning projects 'respect environmental
preoccupations'. During the debate in the Assemblee Nationale a much more detailed text
requiring EIS for private as well as public projects was adopted. Several years later one of the
more biting elements of the Public Inquiries Act was similarly defended by the Assemblee
Nationale, regarding the 'automatic' injunction in Article 6; see Pacteau, Bernard, Note: CE 30
April 1990 Association Lindenkuppel, M. Meier et Mme Brunner, LPA 20 February 1991, at p.10;
Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.61.
162 Most authors agree that the administration has the discretion to choose which moment
to publish the decree (although it must also exercise diligence, an absence of which will be
sanctioned. See Jean-Marie Breton, "L'obligation pour I'administration d'exercer son pouvoir
reglementaire d'execution des lois," 1993 RDP 1749-73 at, p.1755: Vadministration qui n'est pas
totalement maitresse de I'exercice de son pouvoir reglementaire, conserverait toutefois en
principe le droit de determiner le moment ou doivent intervenir les mesures d'application de la
loi." See also Hanicotte, R, "Le Juge face aux retards des textes d'application," 1986 RDP 1667
at p.1668, p.1670.
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of underlying priorities that regulatory delays are especially common with environmental
rules163 (and affected all three EIA-related regulations164).
Most revealing, however, is the delay in the adoption of the Nature Protection Act's decree
and the practical consequences of this; voted in July 1976, the applying regulation was not
elaborated until fifteen months later and entered into force only three months after that. The
Assemblee Nationale had tried to forestall the situation in which the EIA procedure would
remain unapplied by making Article 2 (elaborating the EIA procedure)163 sufficiently precise
163 The Loi Littoral (Coastal Act), 86-2 was voted on 3 January 1986; the decree (of 20
September 1989, modifying article L.146-6 Code de 1'Urbanisme) became applicable only three
years later. During the gap the T.A. Nice, going against the conclusions of its commissaire dn
gouvernment, decided that in the absence of a published decree, the provision could not be
applied (T.A. Nice, 7 April 1988, RJE April 1988, pp.485-86). (And Romi comments that, once
adopted,' the provision looked suspiciously like the one elaborated by the Assemblee
Nationale; Romi, RDP 1990 p.1131).
More extreme, the criminal prosecutions foreseen in a statute on waste emissions into
waters, passed on 16 December 1964, could not be applied until its arrete was adopted —
nineteen years later, on 7 July 1983 (Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.714).
164 TTie Classified Installations Decree was somewhat delayed: elaboration of the decree
took more than a year (19 July 1976 to 21 September 1977). Application of the Public Inquiry Act
was also hampered; the principal decree trailed it by almost two years (From 12 July 1983 to 23
April 1985) and entered into force only on 1 October 1985 (Decree 85-453, art.43 I), later than the
usual entry into force three months after publication.
Although a law on access to administrative documents existed at this time, it did not
provide a mechanism for public participation: Loi 78-753, 17 July 1978 sur la liberte d'acces aux
documents administratifs.
163 Loi 76-629, Article 2: "Works and planning projects undertaken by a public collectivity
or that need an authorisation or a decision of approval as well as urbanism documents must
repect environmental concerns.
The studies preliminary to the realisation of planning works or projects that, by the
size of their dimensions of the impact on the natural milieu, can harm the latter, must include
an impact study that permits the appreciation of the consequences.
A decree of the Conseil d'Etat shall determine the modalities of application of the
present article.
It shall note:
On one hand, the conditions under which environmental concerns are tkane into account
in the existing regulatory procedures.
On the other, the content of the impact study which shall include, at minimum, an
analysis of the initial state of the site and its surroundings, a study of the modifications that
the project would engender there and the measures envisaged to eliminate, reduce and if
possible, compensate the consequences that are harmful to the environment.
The conditions under which the impact study shall be made public.
An exhaustive list of projects which, by reason of their weak repercussions on the
environment, are not subjected to the procedure of impact study.
It shall also determine the conditions under which the Minister in charge of the
environment can give his opinion or be called upon to give his opinion on any impact study.
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to be directly applicable, both in the opinion of many legal commentators and in light of the
general acceptance of the principle of immediate application of laws166. Contrary to
expectation, it was decided that the statute was not immediately applicable167. During the
interim, described as "providential" for developers168 because of the nature of the projects, the
Conseil d'Etat accepted as lawful without EIS contested projects169, among which were three
nuclear stations17®, four superhighways, one very high tension corridor, and one quarry. Indeed,
it is difficult to perceive such delays as other than deferential to other interests171. Such
lapses contrast sharply with the rapidity with which a rule can be adopted that circumvents
protective measures and caters to better defined and more powerful interests177.
At times political priorities manifest themselves in subtle but meaningful differences
between the statute and its applying regulation. National legislation cannot modify the goals
If a challenge commenced before an administrative jurisdiction against an
authorisation or a decision of approval of a project caught by the first indent of this article is
based on the absence of an impact study, the jurisdiction seized must accord the interlocutory
injunction against the attacked decision as soon as this absence is noted through an urgent
procedure."166 Hanicotte, 1986 RDP 1667 at pp.1672-73; CE 14 March 1980, Ministere de I'Agriculture,
Rec. p.145.
167 CE 18 May 1977, Association pour la sauvegarde et lavenir de la vallee de la Dordogne
Rec. T p.899 or RJE no.4-1977 p.325, p.387; see Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.61. A variety of other
environmental cases exist where the Conseil d'Etat refused to apply the law in the absence of
the decree; see Caballero, p.37 note 259.
168 Caballero, p.38; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, pp.60-62.
169 Cited in Caballero, p.38, note 263:
Highways: CE 4 February 1981 Commune de Nozay; CE 24 July 1981 Federation
departementale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles des Vosges; CE 9 June 1982 Comite de
Defense de la Basse Vallee de VAdour; CE 13 October 1982 Chipuot et Comite Stop a VAIO.
High tension line: CE 4 August 1982 Bagard;
Quarry: CE 1 July 1982 Societe Carriere Chalumeau;
Others: CE 23 March 1979 Canu et Comite intercommunal contre I'implantation d'un
aerodrome a Boos; CE 24 July 1981 Association pour la defense des interets du Sud.
170 Creys-Malville; of Graveline and Flammanville, respectively, Deecrees of 2 and 12
May 1977; 24 October 1977, and 22 December 1977; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.61; Romi, Droit et
Administration, 1994, p.50, note 80.
171 In fact Conseil d'Etat rulings tended to excuse the administration for its tardiness;
Hanicotte, pp. 1668-70; examples of cases in which the CE excused the Ministry in charge of
environment for its slowness in preparing the decree include: CE 13 October 1978 FFSPN, Rec. T.
p.693; CE 26 January 1979 FFSPN, Lexis; CE 9 October 1981 Comite de Liaison des associations de
defense opposees au TGV, Lexis; see p.37.177 Romi cites in particular the speed with which the arretes applying legislative
exceptions legalising traditional hunting were adopted and published; Romi, RDP 1990 p.1138.
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of Community directives. Likewise, it is unlawful for the national decree to modify the goals of
the statute. Yet while the European Commission systematically examines that notified
legislation is complete and correct, in France it is up to individuals and associations to
challenge a decree that deviates from the goals set by the statute. EIA Decree 77-1141
(nicknamed "un decret d'inapplication"473j was challenged by a well-respected environmental
organisation, Friends of the Earth (les Amis de la Terre ), before the Conseil d'Etat474. It was
argued, inter alia475, that the imposition of purely financial thresholds for exempting projects
misconstrued the intention of the law, which was to subject harmful — and not just harmful and
expensive — projects to impact study. As noted, this is relevant to the European directive's
requirement that projects likely to have "significant effects" be subject to the EIA procedure. By
ruling the regulation lawful in its entirety, the Conseil d'Etat preserved the decree's
shortcomings.
/> '
Admittedly, these are purely national problems since they occurred before EIA85/337 was
adopted; however, they give insight into governmental priorities that have continued after
the European directive entered into force.
Ambiguity: More technically, ambiguity can present problems in any legislative text.
Ambiguous provisions, perhaps unwittingly, leave other interests room for manoeuvre and
litigation may arise that might otherwise have been avoided, simply to arrive at an
understanding of the text in question.
Difficulties arose on a point the Community has also seen fit to address47^ involving project
'alternatives'. Where EIA Decree 77-1141 stipulates that the EIS include the reasons for
1/3 Editorial of Brice Lalonde, Le Monde, 16-17 October 1977, p.19.
474 CE 30 January 1985 Association 'les Amis de la terre' AJDA 1985, p.238, note J.C. at
p.239; Caballero, p.40. The application took seven years to be decided.475 Other arguments were raised, not relevant to the European legislation, including: that
the publication in some cases of the EIS only at the same time as the authorising decision; the
decree's fabrication of the impact notice (notice d'impact).
4 76 In the proposed amendments to EIA85/337, Com(93)575, at p.13; see Conclusions, point 2.
Lessons learned — Amendments to the EIA legislation.
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which, among the "choices"177 considered, the particular project was selected178, the concept
of 'choice' is ambiguous17^ and is typically not addressed in practice180. Finally, the same sort
of vagueness surrounds the inclusion in the EIS of the
measures envisaged by the developer or applicant to eradicate, reduce and if possible compensate the
harmful consequences of the project on the environment, and the estimation of the corresponding
expenses181.
As formulated, the legal value these have is unclear. In fact only if such measures are
reproduced in the administrative decision — a construction permit or industrial authorisation —
are they enforceable and genuinely constrain the developer187.
No specific sanction foreseen: The failure to foresee specific sanctions encourages the judge
to exert only a minimal control183. In the case of EIA Decree 77-1141, the failure to include
specific sanctions184 encourcged the Conseil d'Etat to avoid controlling the substance of the
procedure and to exert only a control of erreur manifeste d'appreciation^85. The European
177 Partis.
178 Decree 77-1141, Article 2(3).
; ■ CE 17 June 1983 Commune de Montfort AJDA 1983, p.436; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.76-77.
180 Chapter 5, point 1.2.1. at Reluctance to modify project.
181 Decree 77-1141, Article 2(4); EIA85/337 replaces "compensate" with "remedy".
182 Other examples of ambiguity include, for instance, the term projets d'amenagement
(planning projects) has no precise legal meaning; the legislator has taken the opportunity to
avoid systematically subjecting planning documents to EIS; Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.63,72;
Com(93)28, p.65; Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, pp.63-66.
183 Romi, RDP 1994, p.1210. Although even where sanctions are available they often
remain unused or under-used, see Chapter 6.
184 The Nature Protection Act did foresee penalties for other matters covered in the
legislation.
188 CE 23 April 1982 Societe pour I'etude et la protection de la nature en Bretagne Rec.
p.684, conclusion Dutheillet de Lamothe RJE 1983, 3. p263; see also romi, Droit et
Administration, 1994, p.59.
In Caballero's view, the Conseil d'Etat's refusal to examine the substance of the impact
study "torpedoed the meagre existing control" of the procedure; Caballero, p.38-39. See also
Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.63; Com(93)28/vol.l3 pp.90-91. Two of the most striking examples
concerned the nuclear station of Flammanville, where the Conseil d'Etat overruled the
administrative court of Caen for the Iatter's close examination of the substance of EISs and its
finding that these did not fulfil the decree's requirements; CE 9 July 1982 Ministre de I'lndustrie
c. Comite regional d'information et de lutte antinucleaire de Basse-Normandie, Lexis; CE 9 July
1982 Ministre de I'lndustrie c. Comite departementale de defense contre des lignes a tres haute
tension d'E.D.F.
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legislation did not address the issue of sanctions; however this offers an illustration of why
greater preoccupation with sanctions at Community level might be of use.
The Classified Installations Act did not make the mistake of failing to define penalties; it
provides fairly stiff administrative and penal sanctions186. The latter were made still stricter
in 1985. Furthermore, some care has been taken to foresee other problems of enforcement187. Its
great shortcoming, however, is that where other penalties may be adequate, the failure of a
classified installation to respect the prescriptions imposed in its authorisation — the most
common violation, and one which may have serious physical consequences -- is only a minor
offence188.
2.2.7. Intervention of European Community:
EIA85/337 entered into force three years after its adoption — three years during which
France could have addressed the specific deficiencies mentioned above. France did not,
illustrating the reluctance common among Member States to modify existing rules189.
Subsequently, the Commission's comments on the state of implementation, by Member State,
became available1911.
In the French case the Commission found that examination of the pre-existing legislation
was difficult but that, in many aspects, the French legislation is stricter, being integrated into a
wider planning framework191. Although the projects exempted from public inquiry gave rise to
concern and criticism within France, the Commission found that "[i]n practice there are
virtually no projects subject to EIA in the European legislation that do not require a public
186 Criminal sanctions: Titre VI (articles 18 to 22-3 modified by loi no. 85-661 of 3 July
1985); administrative sanctions articles 23-25.
187 For instance, third party rights are expressly reserved (Article 8, Classified
Installations Act), and both judicial and administrative judges have confirmed the principle
that an installation working according to the prescriptions is not thereby discharged of civil
responsibility. See Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.356.
188 Article 19, Classified Installations Act; also Decree 77-1133, Article 43.
189 See Chapter 1, point 2.2 at Inertia.
19(1 Implementation of Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain
public and private projects on the environment; Com(93)28 Vol 13.
191 Ibid., p.82.
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inquiry once the threshold is reached"192. Still, the Commission agreed with other critics that
in some instances the public was informed too late in the decision-making process193 (although
it found that this was not at odds with the directive's requirements)194. in other cases
apparent discrepancies between EIA85/337 and the French texts exist because of French
"resistance to separate the concept of EIA from other planning tools and other environmental
protection laws."193
The Commission did single out several issues on which it found French legislation wanting.
As mentioned above, the evaluation required for land-use plans did not amount to EIA196 nor
did the exemption of "projects for use of uncultivated land or semi-natural areas for intensive
agricultural purposes" in French legislation197 comply with the directive. France was also
found at fault regarding Article 5 EIA85/337, referring to the contents of the EIS listed in
EIA85/337 Annex III198. At the least, Article 5(2) requires the study to include inter alia a non¬
technical summary (item 6, Annex III); indisputably, French legislation did not cover this. The
Commission also complained199 that it did not include item 7 of Annex III200. As mentioned
previously2111, the clarity of the European directive on this point is relevant, for arguably since
this is not listed in the minimum requirements of Article 5(2), it comes under Article 5(1) where
Member States apparently have some discretion as to the information supplied202. The French









200 Annex III, 7. An indication of any difficulties (technical deficiencies or lack of know-
how) encountered by the developer in compling the required information.
201 See Chapter 1, at point 2.5.1. EIA85/337 - Administrative consideration of the EIS.
202 They must see to it that the information is supplied "inasmuch as a) the Member States
consider the information relevant and b) they consider that the developer can reasonably be
required to provide the information."
203 Singled out by the Commission at Com(93)28, p.92.
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but these might again be said to come under Article 5(1). The Commission also criticised French
legislation204 because provisions transposing EIA85/337 obligations on administrative
consideration were inadequate, and those on notification of neighbouring Member States were
non-existent208.
Response to European criticism: After several years France did modify its legislation to
conform with Community requirements. The European directive is cited in the first indent of the
preamble to a 1993 regulation on EIS and public inquiries, EIA Decree 1993208, modifying the
earlier rules. Many amendments are straightforward responses to Community criticism. Direct
and indirect effects, cultural and material assets are explicitly mentioned in a much more
detailed description of the EIS contents, covering the requirements of EIA85/337, Annex III,
item 3202. The non-technical summary208 and difficulties encountered by the developer in
compiling the information209 are also included. If the project is likely to have significant
effects on another Member State, or if another Member State likely to be affected so requests,
the file must be forwarded to its foreign minister210.
Response to national criticism: In other cases, changes were made answering national
critics. The Commission had found that, although the Environment Minister had no power to
obstruct a project authorisation, in the event of a his being seized, his "dissuasive effect is not
negligible"211; by contrast, French internal criticism of the vagueness of this procedure, and of
its treatment in the Conseil d'Etat212 was vociferous. Deadlines have been included detailing
Although these are referred to in EIA85/337 Article 3, this article, in turn refers to
Articles 4 through 11 (therefore 5); again, then, the fact that these are not listed in the
minimal requirements of article 5(2) appears to leave this to the Member States' discretion.
204 Com(93)28, p.81.
208 Above, EIS contents.
206 Decree 93-245, 25 February relatif aux etudes d'impact et au champ d'application des
enquites publiques.
207 Decree 93-245, Article 2-1.
208 EIA85/337 annex III, no.6; Decree 93-245, Article 2-II.
209 EIA85/337 annex III, no.7; Decree 93-245, Article 2-II
210 Decree 93-245, article 4, modifying decree 77-1141, article 5.
211 Com(93)28, p.73.
212 Above, 1.2.1. Legitimacy.
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the eventual intervention of the Environment Minister213. Now explicitly the competent
authority may not give a decision on the project prior to the expiration of a 30-day period
accorded for the opinion of the Minister of the environment. This still does not amount to the
power to obstruct a harmful project, but it can be hoped that the administration will more
seriously consider an eventual negative opinion or one with conditions attached, or that a court
seized with a related issue will consider the environment minister's opinion214.
Although the Community exerted an overall positive influence, by saying that the
financial thresholds appeared to be too low215 (and that EIAs were too numerous), it may have
encouraged an aspect of the legislation much criticised within France. The Commission not only
implicitly endorsed financial thresholds but may have encouraged the French to raise
them216. In the eyes of some, this reduces the value of both the EIA procedure and its
reform217, and as argued above, financial thresholds do not guarantee that "projects likely to
have significant effects," will be assessed.
Improved precision: Generally the decree reflects a renewed concern for precision218 that
might positively influence practical implementation. It also reflects lessons learned from
experience, as when Article 5 instructs the competent authority to respond without delay to
requests for information on how to consult the impact study. Greater precision is furthermore
used to attack saucissonnage: projects divided into different types of works or into time phases
213 Decree 93-245, article 6, modifying decree 77-1141, article 7.
214 Romi, Raphael, "Vers une coherence dans la definition normative des politiques
d'environnement? Chronique d'une fin de legislature," 109 (1993) RDP 1079 at p.1090.
215 Com(93)28, p.84.
216 The new decree doubles the previous thresholds to 12 million francs for both the EIA
and the public inquiries decrees; Decree 93-245, article 3.1, modifying decree 77-1141, article 3C
and Decree 93-245, article 3. II, modifying decree 85-453 article 1 III.
Only one project is added to those exempted from study but requiring notice d'impact to
counterbalance the raised threshold: Decree 93-245, Article 11 adds no. 11 to annex IV of decree
77-1141: "Travaux d'hydraulique agricole dont le cofit total est compris entre 6 et 12 millions de
francs." (Another project is added to Annex 1 of decree 77-1141, no.22: "Travaux et ouvrages de
defense contre la mer d'une emprise totale inferieure a 2000 metres carres").
217 Romi, RDP 1993, p.1091.
218 For instance it notes that "neighbourhood convenience" (commodite du voisinage: of
importance in civil jurisdictions; Chapter 8) is affected by "noise, vibrations, odours, light
emissions"; Decree 93-245, Article 5.
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must include an EIS that covers the totality of the programme2^9. The exemptions from EIA are
also generally made more specific. Another advance is that some technical thresholds are
lowered22^.
A flaw criticised both internally and by the Commission has been remedied: the exemption
for all lots in communes with an approved or published planning document now applies only to
lots in communes having, at the date of the deposit of the application, a planning document
that has been the object of a public inquiry22^. The new decree takes specific care to modify the
extent of one of the Annex II exemptions expressly to exclude certain projects222. These are now
also added to Annex III (projects always subject to EIA, whatever the cost of their realisation),
which has also been clarified and tightened in many respects223. Perhaps most noteworthy is
that, in adding five new projects to Annex III, and in the clarification mentioned above in Annex
II, the administration did not buckle to the considerable pressure applied by the interests
concerned: in particular motorised sports enthusiasts were incensed about the related clause's
inclusion among projects always requiring EIA224 to the extent of holding a series of
demonstrations.
219 Decree 93-245, Article 2, III: "When the totality of the works foreseen in the
programme is undertaken in a simultaneous manner, the study must cover the entire programme.
When the realisation is staggered in time, the impact study of each phase of the operation
must include an appreciation of the impacts of the entire programme."
220 For example: (Annex I, no. 5) the threshold for transportation and distribution of
electricity is lowered from 225kV to 63kV.
224 Decree 93-245, Article 9, modifying decree 77-1141, annexe II.
222 "with the exception of - golf areas targetted in Annex III, - open air leisure spaces of 12
million francs and more, - areas conditioned for the practice of sports or motor sports targetted
in Annex III...".
223 Decree 93-245, article 10, modifying decree 77-1141, annexe III. For instance the earlier
version of no.l reads: "Operations de remembrement rural." This becomes "Operations de
remembrement rural, y compris les travaux connexes." (Compare also, no. 2.)
224 Decree 93-245, article 1, adding decree 77-1141, annex III, no.20: "areas conditioned for
the practice of sports or motor sports of a total suface greater than 4 hectares."
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2.2.8. Summary:
The new decree, which was elaborated "not without resistance"225, generally makes
positive modifications to the formal implementation of EIA. The European Community is
certainly the principal impulse behind it, for where the French administration had listened
without response to national criticism for over a decade, it appears that only once the threat of
Article 169 actions were added from Brussels was the necessary impetus given. The Commission,
commenting on the envisaged changes to the French system, indicated that they would "bring
French legal provisions in line with the minimum requirements of the directive. In many
aspects however, legal provisions go well beyond the minimum requirements, at least in
theory."226
Not everything has been remedied by the new decree. For instance, the public participation
provisions remain much the same, and it can be questioned whether this Member State chose
the "most appropriate forms and methods to ensure the effective functioning of the
directives"227. Generally, however, since the new decree's adoption, the formal
implementation in France is adequate, if dispersed across legislative acts.
2.3. Formal Implementation — LCP:
Where France employed a cut-and-paste approach to make pre-existing legal texts fit the
requirements of EIA85/337, the large combustion plants legislation was adopted specifically to
implement LCP88/609, making examination of compliance with European measures much more
simple (and brief228). Earlier legislation had implemented general European industrial air
pollution legislation and the LCF arr&te (arrete du 27 juin 1990 relatif a la limitation des rejets
225 Romi, RDP 1993, p.1085.
For completeness it should be noted that a new statute on installations classees, Loi 92-
646 du 13 July 1992, reforming the act of 19 July 1976, has been passed, which attempts to
simplify the complexity of the classified installations regime, but not of much concern for
impact assessment.
22^ Com(93)28, pp.93-94.
227 Case 48/75 Royer 1976 ECR 497,para. 73.
228 The fact that LCP88/609 is much more limited in scope, and involves fewer to-and-fros
between involved parties than EIA85/337 makes examination much straightforward.
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atmospheriqu.es des grandes installations de combustion), issued directly by the prime minister,
transposing LCP88/609, built upon this framework.
As seen22^, the purpose of the directive, as stated in the preamble of LCP88/609 is to
monitor and gradually reduce the emissions from new and existing large combustion plants; all
new power stations are to be 'low acid'230.
2.3.1. Problems of Transposition:
Timely transposition: A question that was not applicable to the transposition of the EIA but
is relevant here is the timeliness of the transposition: French legislation arrived just under the
wire, adopted three days before LCP88/609's deadline expired23^. Apparently, however, it
failed to communicate this to the Commission, for France is cited in the Eighth Application
Report as having failed to notify measures232. Nonetheless, fundamentally France appears to
have met with the Commission's approval, for it has not received particular mention in the
Commission application reports following the directive's entry into force for matters of
transposition.
Elaboration on the basis of LCP88/609: Many portions of the LCP arrete are simply copied
from the directive, using similar, and in some places the actual wording of the Community text.
For instance Article 1, outlining the scope of the directive, repeats word for word most of the
definitions contained in LCP88/609, Article 2, adding details relevant to the French context
such as the number of the concerned installations in the nomenclature of classified
installations233.
One of the Community's justifications for using a directive as a legislative tool — allowing
the Member State to fill in the details in a manner appropriate to its context — is illustrated in
other aspects of the French arrSte. Where the European version sketches only general goals
229 Chapter 1, point 2.5.2. Large Combustion Plants Directive, Adopted version.
230 In other words, low emitters of the factors that contribute to acid rain.
231 Article 17, LCP88/609 sets the deadline for adopting national provisions at 30 June 1990.
232 OJ 1991 C338/166. France was sent an Article 169 letter.
233 Other Article 2, LCP88/609 definitions can be found in Article 3 of the French arrete.
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regarding the height of the chimney, for instance, the French version is positive in that it
tackles achieving these goals with considerable precision. It includes a detailed definition of
what is meant by 'chimney height', provisions regarding required studies of dispersion of
fumes, the shape of conduits for fumes, et cetera234.
Differences between European and national provisions: France also used its margin of
discretion to develop limit values for emissions. LCP88/609, Annex III, displays limit values on
a graphic curve where a 400MW new plant burning solid fuel should emit only 800mg/m3
sulphur dioxide. On the other hand, French legislation expresses these limits in equations235.
The relevant provision of LCP88/609 is Article 10: "Waste gases from combustion plants
shall be discharged in controlled fashion by means of a stack.
The licence referred to in Article 4(1) shall lay down the discharge conditions. The
competent authority shall in particular ensure that the stack height is calculated in such a
way as to safeguard health and the environment."
The relevant French provisions, Articles 29-32 of the arrete, are
Article 29: Emission to the atmosphere of combustion gases is carried out in a controlled
manner through a chimney. The chimney has as object to permit a good diffusion of combustion
gases in such manner as to limit the concentration in the air of polluting substances resulting
from combustion.
The shape of the fume conduits, notably in the portion closest to the outlet to the
atmosphere, is formed in such manner as to favour the maximum ascension of combustion gases to
the atmosphere. The contours of the conduit do not present, notably, any angular point and the
variation of the section of the conduit nearing the point of outlet is extremely continuous and
slow. The end portion of the chimney can include a convergence realised following the rules of
art when the speed of emission is higher than the speed chosen for the gases in the chimney."
Article 30: "The height of the chimney (difference between the altitude of the outlet to
free air and the average altitude of the ground at the point considered, expressed in metres) is
determined, on the one hand, in function with the thermal power of the installation and the
level of emissions of pollutants to atmosphere, and on the other, in function with the existence
of obstacles likely to impede the dispersion of combustion gases.
It is defined in articles 31 and 32."
Article 31: "A study of the conditions of dispersion of fumes adapted to the site may be
carried out by the operator in order to determine the height of the chimney, in conformity with
articles 29 and 30.
This study is obligatory for installations with thermal power equal or greater to
100MW.
It is also carried out, whatever the thermal power, in those cases where one of the
obstacles defined in Article 36 is a tall building in the sense of Article R.122-2 of the Code of
Construction of Habitation (in other words when the lowest floor of the last level is situated at
more than 28 metres from the ground)."
Article 32: "In the absence of a study of conditions of dispersion of fumes, the height of
the chimney is fixed by Articles 33 to 35 (omitted here)."
235 por example, for a new plant of 400 MW (ie: 300MW < P < 500MW, where P = thermal
power), burning solid fuels, the equation is 2400 - 4 P. This translates, in the case of a 400MW
plant, to 2400-1600 = 800.
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The same result is attained but it can be noted that a Commission lawyer attempting to examine
this, might be taken aback to find that each country has developed its own equation in order to
produce the same results. Furthermore, another example reveals that the national results are
not always exactly identical to the European limits. On the curve for SO2 concerning new
installations burning liquid combustibles, there is a 50mg/m3 difference between the
Commission and the French approaches236. The Commission must then consider the true effect
of a 50mg/m3 sulphur dioxide difference on the atmosphere, and whether this a big enough
difference to constitute an infringement; fortunately the Commission has experts which it can
consult to help assess the technical implications of discrepancies such as these237. ,
A more obvious discrepancy to the non-technically minded is, for example, that Article 8(3)
LCP88/609 allows the competent authority in some circumstances23^ to suspend the obligation
to respect limit values for a maximum of six months. The French LCP arrete (Article 11) also
provides for a six-month suspension, but makes this renewable for another six months, which is
not in conformity with the directive.
Another significant discrepancy is that in LCP88/609 "new plant" (Article 2(9)) is uefined
as those for which the original operating licence was granted on or after 1 July 1987. In the
French arrite (Article 3, third indent) new installations are those for which "initial
authorisation is later than the date of publication in the Official Journal of the present
arrete", that is, 19 August 1990 — almost three years later than required by LCP88/609.
Theoretically then, France has classified fewer installations as "new" than the Commission
intended. Flere, however, given the principle of non-retroactivity, it is uncertain whether the
French authorities could have changed the status, and thereby the obligations (e.g.,
236 As noted in Annex IV LCP88/609, a 400 MW plant is allowed 1000 mg/m3. Here the
relevant French equation is 3650 - 6.5P (where P is thermal power), in other words, 3650 - 2600 =
1050 mg/m3.
237 Commission Letter 21.3.96/XI/005205.
233 If a plant which normally uses low sulphur fuel faces an interruption in supply.
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construction requirements239), of a French plant two years prior to the date of publication of the
relevant legislation. Perhaps Community legislation was not entirely realistic in this
provision.
Despite the discrepancies in the national transposition mentioned above, the Commission
appears not to have taken action; when asked specifically, unfortunately, the Commission
declined to comment24®.
2.3.2. Summary:
With the exceptions mentioned above, France appears generally to have correctly
transposed its obligations and to have taken the opportunity given by the use of a directive in
order to develop technical specifications and to ensure that these are legally required.
Political pressure from industry has been present241, but apparently from the government's
perspective, because of France's reliance on nuclear power, the goals set were not viewed as
threatening. Formal implementation can be considered adequate.
2.4. Conclusion:
Major infringements of the two European directives no longer exist in the French formal
implementation of the two European rules. Flowever, as seen with the formal implementation
of EIA85/337, on occasion the purpose of the rules is subtly undermined and methods less than
those "most appropriate" have been selected in the transposition, perhaps not in breach of the
formal obligations, but certainly damaging to the "effective functioning of the directives,
account being taken of their aims"242. In subsequent practical use of the rules, much will depend
on the attitude of the individuals involved — the prefect, inquiry commissioner, 'green'
239 LCP88/609, Articles 4 (which refers to conditions of construction), 7 (design
specifications for new plant), and 10 (ensure stack height is calculated to safeguard health and
environment).
240 Commission Letter 21.3.96/XI/005205.
241 See Chapter 5, point 2.2.3.
242 Case 48/75 Royer 1976 ECR 497 para. 73; see also Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld, judgment of
24 October 1996, not yet reported, para.55.
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developer — arid the tenacity of the public in given instances. The implementation of the LCP
rules can be hoped to proceed more smoothly in many ways, in that requirements are less
dependent on administrative and public intervention. Much more depends upon the industrial
operator and the cost of implementing the legislation, and here, competitors have a marked
interest in keeping an eye on each other.
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CHAPTER 5: France — Problems of Practical Implementation
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An administrative context that is neither particularly helpful nor excessively obstructive and
an adequate formal implementation of the two legislative texts under consideration provide
the backdrop for examining the 'messier' issue of practical implementation. Actions taken to
give effect to the national rules transposing Community obligations are investigated, again
following first EIA and then LCP.
1. Practical Implementation EIA:
EIA procedures are inserted into larger authorisation procedure concerning, mainly, land
planning or classified installations. Experience with EIA procedures in France spans roughly
two decades; therefore obtaining information on practical aspects of the procedure is not as
problematic as in the case of Spain. No one problem predominates: implementation of the rules
unravels through a build-up of malfunctions and opportunities to use discretion. Generally
problems appear to surround: the quality of the EIS and the filtering of the public's voice
through the inquiry commissioner (as foreseen upstream); and resistance to making the project
evolve towards less environmental harm. Also the structure of the administration may have
improved but its attitude, frequently, has not. Administrative problems are aggravated by the
fact that resources earmarked for the environment are stretched.
1.1. Administrative Guidance:
Regarding implementation, one of the roles of Community institutions is to guide Member
States; similarly the State administration's principal role in practical implementation is to
guide the agents at the local level responsible for concrete action. Substantive action largely
depends on the diligence and commitment of the local authority. There has been a considerable
effort on the part of the central administration to clarify aspects of the EIA rules in order to
make implementation as effective as possible, to distribute methodological, technical and
training materials, to organise seminars and conferences1, to make cartography resources
1 Particularly in early phase of the procedure, efforts were made by the Ecole des Ponts et
Chaussees and the Genie Rural des Eaux et Forits.
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available in preparation of EISs2 (an issue that the Commission later addressed by adding
scoping requirements to proposed EIA amendments3).
Furthermore, in France administrative circulars, internal administrative documents used to
interpret legal provisions, are extremely important tools of the central environment
administration to enhance implementation4. Circular 93-733 is relevant here, clarifying for
local prefects and mayors6 the new elements added to the EIA procedure by Decree 93-2457 and
insisting on the importance of previously existing obligations. Through this circular, the
Environment Minister attempts to make the most efficient use of the existing black letter law.
His recommendations provide insight into problems of practical implementation that have
emerged in the past, one of the most important of which is that local authorities perceive the
EIA procedure as an administrative irritation8.
Enhancing implementation by widening interpretations: The circular attempts to expand
interpretations of the legal provisions wherever possible. For example, regarding the newly
amended EIS contents (now including indirect and direct, temporary and permanent effects on
the environment), it cautions that these must not be interpreted in a restrictive sense and
provides a lengthy, encompassing discussion of the types of effects that should be analysed in
the study^. The circular further stresses meticulousness on the part of local officials in verifying
2 Part of the mission of the DIREN is to make available cartography and databases
useful in the elaboration of an EIS. Even the Public Works Ministry has been helpful in
extending Departmental services to small communities who do not themselves have the
technical capacity for matters of technical expertise.
3 See Conclusions, point 2.
4 Although the EC} has repeatedly ruled that administrative circulars are inadequate
for transposition of legal obligations, here they are used to supplement the legal measures.
Furthermore, the Conseil d'Etat sees circulars as documents which can be judicially reviewed,
at least to the extent that they add something of substance to the original legal provision; see
Dickson, 1994, p.72. However, the ECJ's stance on circulars is well-founded, both in terms of
legal certainty for those later expected to abide by these rules, and because circulars may not be
reviewable acts within the systems of all fifteen Member States.
3 Circular 93-73, 27 September 1993.
6 Most of the decisional power lies with the prefect: see Decree 77-1141, Article 6:
Classified Installations Act 76-663, Article 5; Public Inquiry Decree 85-453, Articles 12,18.
7 Chapter 4, point 2.2.7.
8 "lis la vivent comme une tracasserie administrative."
9 Circular 93-73, Point 2.2.2. For instance, discussing the contents: "These ideas... are,
rather, a means of making explicit and this elaboration should lead authors of EISs to treat in
an exhaustive manner, the nature, intensity, span and duration of all impacts of a project."
194
the EIS and singles out monitoring and follow-up for attention (here going beyond the
directive's requirements)111; officials are reminded11 of the various details that are their
responsibility in the procedure1"1.
Greater clarity: The circular also enhances implementation by discussing the new decree's
innovations in order to help thwart attempts on the part of the developer to avoid obligations:
for instance, it is made clear that the non-technical summary must not be tucked into the middle
of a great stack of technical documents but must be easily identifiable, must synthesise the
essential elements of the study, and must be clearly written and comprehensible to the
layman13. Similarly, the "author's denomination"14 is clarified15: this must include all the
participants in the preparatory study that support the final document, and those of the
consultants or experts that may have been called upon as well as the drafters of the final
document, helping the public to note the authors' interest in the project. Previous problems of
implementation are also addressed; for instance, the practice of artificially dividing projects is
tackled in detail16.
Addressing formidation: Formulation, implementation, and enforcement are not separate,
chronological phases but rather dynamic phases reacting to and influencing each other. Many
elements of circular 93-73 constitute a clear attempt to enhance implementation by attenuating
the negative effects of flaws in the legislation itself. Again, instructions here shed light on
existing practical problems and hint at the attitude of the authorities in charge of applying
the procedure. For instance, regarding the quality of the EIS, it is recommended that, given the
The discussion of each of the points of the contents includes general indications such as "the
environment must not be interpreted in a restrictive sense."
Where modifications of thresholds and criteria in the new decree are broached, again
the proposed interpretations are wide; Circular 93-73, point 1.2.3.
1(1 For example, Circular 93-73, point 1.1.3.; ibid., point 2.1.3.
11 Ibid., Points 4.1. through 4.2.3.
13 Ibid., Points 3.1. through 3.3.3.
13 Ibid., Point 2.2.4.
14 Article 1, EIA Decree 93-245.
15 Circular 93-73, point 2.2.1. (misprinted in the Recueil de Textes Reglementaires: Etude
d'Impact sur l'Environnement as 2.1.2.).
16 Ibid., point 1.1.3.
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technical nature of an EIS, the developer call upon specialists for all or part of it17. (And in
creating a new professional market — specialists in EIS — lies an occasion to develop
Commission hopes for combining environmental protection with employment opportunities18.)
Also, the circular elaborates the exact contents of the EIS (which have presented practical
difficulties) one by one1^, adding specifications20.
Addressing enforcement: With an eye to possible later enforcement actions the minister asks
the prefects especially to reiterate in the authorisation the measures foreseen in the study to
attenuate the impact of the project on the environment. This is essential: only then are such
measures enforceable. Also crucial to a genuinely protective procedure, the local
administrations are asked to carry out follow-up verifications on the project's respect of the
measures21.
The Environment Minister has done what he could to limit the impact of enforcement in the
courts where this has proved unfavourable to the environment. One element of the EIS contents,
the estimation of the costs of measures envisaged to suppress, reduce and if possible compensate
the harmful consequences of the project22, had remained a dead letter simply because,
traditionally, it was rarely insisted on by the administration or enforced before the courts23. In
conformity with the authorities' lenience, developers ceased to include it in the EIS. Also
17 Ibid., point 2.1.1. In addition, clarifications regarding the author's identity are
required.
18 job creation in the environment sector was stressed, without further detail, in the
Fourth EAP, OJ 1987, C328/1.
19 Circular 93-73, point 2.1.3.
20 For instance, the analysis of the initial site must present and justify the choice of locale
based on actual investigations of the area and site measures rather than mere documented and
bibliographical data. Furthermore the state of initial site must take the factors and "rank
them, accentuate their dynamic, and bring out the environmental components most vulnerable to
the envisaged works. "
21 Circular 93-73, point 1.1.3.: "I ask you to watch that, where regulations in force permit,
the accompanying actions of a project foreseen in the EIS under measures of suppression,
reduction and compensation, are repeated in the decision of approval or authorisation of the
project, and to have your services carry out controls of the respect of the engagements
undertaken. It is also up to you, when necessary, to foresee a follow-up of the realisation or
functioning of the installation."
22 Required by Article 2, decree 77-1141.
23 Only after a decade of the procedure's existence did the Conseil d'Etat send a clear
message on the issue, when it sanctioned an impact study for absence of evaluation of costs of
repairing environmental harm, CE 27 July 1988 Ministre Delegue charge de I'environnement et
Alberdi, RJE 1989 p.79.
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included in the European legislation24, it is extremely serious that national authorities, during
implementation, are willing simply to ignore a legal requirement. Despite the Conseil d'Etat's
lenience on the matter of the EIS contents28, the circular insists that these contents treat
"extensively the nature, intensity, scope and duration of all impacts"26, and further, that
administrative authorities, long accustomed to letting the absence of costs evaluation pass
unnoticed, ensure that this is included27.
Where case-law has left matters unresolved, again the opportunity to make the most of the
margin for interpretation is seized. Regarding fragmentation of a project the circular insists
that, lacking a clear case-law, it is wise to adhere to an extensive interpretation of what
constitutes fragmented realisation, both in order to respect the spirit of the rules and (taking up
a theme dear to local administrations) to avoid annulment of administrative measures in the
event of judicial review28.
In sum, the circular gives local authorities a push in the right direction; after this the
effectiveness of the procedure is in the hands of the local players involved in the procedure.
These are examined as they intervene.
24 EIA85/337, Article 5(2): "The information to be provided by the developer in
accordance with paragraph 1 shall include at least:...
... a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible,
remedy significant adverse effects...".
25 Instances in which the CE accepted incomplete studies: CE 5 June 1981 Association
federative regionale de protection de la nature et autres, req. no. 21.346 et 21.585; CE 9 July 1982
Ministre de I'Industrie c/ Comite departemental de defense contre les couloirs de ligne a tres
haute tension. A Conseil d'Etat commentator approved the rulings at the time as a sign of
common sense: "le juge doit aussi faire preuve de bon sens et ne pas rechercher une perfection
illusoire"; Doctrine, p.591.
26 Point 2.2.2., above.
Also, the Environment Minister attempted to extend the Conseil d'Etat's definitions of
grosse reparation, which is exempted from EIS, and modernisation, not exempted, by offering a
more inclusive definition of modernisation; Point 1.1.7.:"...sont ainsi consideres comme de la
modernisation et non de la grosse reparation les travaux qui modifient les caracteristiques des
ouvrages existants ou qui augmentent leurs capacites d'exploitation."
27 See Bouchardeau Report, p.8.
28 Point 1.1.3. "In the absence of a clear jurisprudential trend, it appears wise, both to
respect the spirit of the rules and to avoid litigious annulments, to retain an extensive
interpretation of the notion of fragmented realisation and to apply this each time that
different phases or categories of works, undertaken by the same developer or not, constitute a
functional unity and that the main programme has been decided in a certain manner."
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1.2. How the procedure unfolds:
Perhaps inevitably, the procedure is complex, passing back and forth among various actors.
Generally, the developer draws up the EIS and gives the dossier containing all the legal
documents to the prefect29 who verifies that it is complete and passes it to the president of the
administrative court. The latter designates an inquiry commissioner or president of the inquiry
commission. After consulting the inquiry commissioner, the prefect30 sets the date, length and
object of the inquiry; the location, days and hours for public consultation; and the times during
which the public can consult the inquiry commissioner34. In theory the inquiry commissioner is
given the dossier prior to the opening of the inquiry to enable him to prepare, to plan visits to
the site, to request documents and to consider the possibility of lengthening the inquiry. If the
commissioner deems necessary, a public meeting is arranged. At the close of the inquiry, the
commissioner issues a report describing the inquiry's progress and the public's observations. In a
separate document, the reasoned conclusions of the commissioner are presented and made
public32. The prefect forwards a copy of these to the president of the administrative court, and
in those cases where the deciding authority is not the prefect himself33, to the authority
competent for granting or denying authorisation.
On receiving the file from the inquiry commissioner, the prefect has three months in which
to take a decision34. Where classified installations are concerned, the initial arrete of
authorisation includes the conditions for exploiting the installation, the methods of analysis
and measurement to be used, and the methods of intervention in the event of an accident33. The
29 Officially: commissaire de la Republique.
30 Decree 85-453, Article 11.
34 Under some circumstances (for instance in matters of urbanism, Article R 123-11 Code de
l'Urbanisme) the mayor sets the above times.
32 Authorisation cannot precede the closure of the public inquiry.
33 As is the case with some classified installations, cf: Article 5, Loi 76-663.
34 After which time his decision is no longer valid: T.A. Nancy, 21 December 1982. There
is a possibility that the prefect can lengthen this period with a sufficiently motivated arrSte,
CE 26 July 1982 Societe Spada; CE 1 July 1988 Societe Monegasque de Location, D.A. 88 no. 477,
cited in Lepage-Jessua, "Les pouvoirs du prefet au regard des installations classees et les droits
de l'exploitant apres la loi du 13 juillet 1992," LPA 5 February 1993, p.11. He must also receive
the opinions of the municipal council and the Departmental Council of Hygiene.
33 For installations requiring only a declaration, the prefect issues a receipt for the
declaration and encloses the general prescriptions applicable. At the request of third parties,
additional prescriptions can be included.
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prefect must respect other applicable rules and procedures36, and for installations subject to
other rules, such as large combustion plants, the initial authorisation contains these
prescriptions3''.
1.2.1. Developer:
The procedure commences with the developer, who must carry out the EIS and present it
with the other documents needed in the authorisation application. When a public authority is
the force behind a given project it seems to take preparation of the study seriously. Large, public
project EISs are more detailed, undertaken by independent consultants and generally of
satisfactory quality. Nonetheless, it is indicative of the attitude of developers and public
officials alike, that circular 93-73 saw fit to insist that the EIS is neither an 'administrative
formality' nor the project's "justification a posteriori", but a tool to help the project evolve
towards less environmental harm38. (Here national opinion contrasts to some extent with the
Commission39.)
Quality of the EIS: On the other hand, private developers' EISs habitually contain the
minimal information required by law and are usually undertaken in-house because of a limited
budget (although generally the procedure is not costly40). Developers appear to regard this as
a corner that can be cut in their search for profitability, rather than a legal sine qua non of the
project41. Unfortunately roughly 70% of projects are undertaken by small, private developers,
and for these, the quality of the EIS is often unsatisfactory. For instance, despite a circular of 27
36 For instance, the new Water Act, 3 January 1992, requires a separate authorisation for
water use and emissions to water.
37 As an aside, even installations not listed in nomenclature can be subject to prescriptions
by reason of proximity or connexity with a classified installation.
38 Circular 93-73, point. 2.1.2.
39 Which had the impression that "[i]n general the developers and their consultants tend
to comply with the legal requirements. In some cases, this is done very formally, in others,
these provisions give the opportunity to work out better projects in terms of environmental
protections"; Com(93)28, pp.93-94.
40 Introduction, point 4. at Environmental Impact Assessment directive and footnote 81.
41 50% of those surveyed considered the EIS as an information tool. 90% considered it as
information for the public, and 45% as information for the administration. Only 35% consider it
a legal obligation. Com(93)28, p.88, referring to a study regional study of the Nord-Pas de
Calais.
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September 198542 addressing the practice of saucissonnage, and rulings condemning it43,
artificial divisions continue to pose problems of implementation44. Most French environmental
associations consulted by the European Commission felt that smaller private EIS were of an
unacceptable standard and responsibility should be transferred to an independent body45. Even
if not produced in-house, the emerging market of undertakings carrying out EIS does not always
produce studies of consistently high quality46.
Lenience in Conseil d'Etat's rulings has not spurred developers to greater meticulousness in
preparation of the EIS. Prieur's suggestion that large nature protection federations and
university laboratories be called upon to draw up portions of these studies seems reasonable.
Reluctance to modify project: For the developer, completing the project the way it was
initially envisaged is obviously the easiest solution. At times the motivation, to build the
project, free of imposed modifications, inspires devious solutions. Circular 93-73 is revealing
when it alerts local authorities to common practices that undermine the procedure: developers
have inter alia circumvented financial thresholds by fragmenting the phases of a project, by
presenting outdated or incorrect monetary figures, or by excluding taxes or the cost of the real
estate in the costs of the project47.
Given that most developers have little intention of modifying the project, interest in the
results of public consultation is non-existent. Indeed, developers have been denounced by
associations for presenting at public inquiries only the 'solution' with, on rare occasions, pre-
discarded alternatives43. Frequently developers prefer to speak with elected officials, or
42 Le Moniteur, n.41, 11 octobre 1985 textes officiels, cited in Hostiou, RJE 1986, p.7.
43 CE 18 December 1981, Prefet du Puy-de-Ddme, D.A. 1982, no.20. CE 21 January Bayle
et autres, Fabregues et autres.
44 Chapter 6, point 2.6. Practical Illustration, Tunnel de Somport.
45 Com(93)28, pp.89-90.
46 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.74.
47 Point 1.1.2. on use of financial thresholds: "I ask you to take particular care to ensure
that estimates given by the petitioner or developer are neither flawed nor obsolete and that
they take into account the totatlity of expenses foreseen for the planning, all taxes included. In
calculating the cost of planning, on one hand, one should group the costs of land aquisitions...
and on the other, take into account all the phases or parts of the programme, when realisation
of the works is fragmented."
43 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, pp.6-9.
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discuss matters with technical services rather than the public49; when they must approach the
public they do so with the attitude of "expert[s] strong in [their] convictions before the ignorant
public"541. Such a situation encourages neither the public's belief in the objectivity of the local
officials nor confidence that its opinions are taken seriously. Where public opinion on a specific
project may already be negative, high-handedness on the part of the developer can cause
irremediable damage. For instance, regarding the tunnel through the Somport54, it was known
in advance the project would lead to conflict, yet the developer made no effort to consider or
negotiate with the public. The consequent outcry was enormous. In sum, it appears that the last
thing the developer wants is for the EIA to be used as a tool to promote prevention of
environmental harm.
1.2.2. Public:
Stripping the procedure down to its basic elements, the public and inquiry commissioner are
next to intervene52. Barring the existence of a particularly green or altruistic prefect, willing to
refuse authorisation for projects that may provide considerable short-term benefits, the factor
on which defence of the environment truly relies is the public (both associations and
individuals).
Sense of powerlessness: In France the public has reason to be dissatisfied with the level of
participation53. To begin, obtaining information can be difficult, in spite of the existing laws on
the public right to information (both Community54, where the Commission has noted problems
of conformity55, and national56) and EIA provisions on public consultation. Requests by the
public for such things as photocopies, theoretically available at the cost of one franc per
49 Ibid., p.9.
50 Ibid., p.6.
51 Chapter 6, point 2.6. Practical Illustration, Tunnel de Somport.
52 The public is discussed first in part to facilitate comparison with the Spanish chapter.
53 Prieur, RJE 1988, p.403.
54 Directive 90/313 on the freedom of access to information on the environment, OJ 1990
L158/57.
55 Thirteenth Application Report, Com(96)600, p.82.
56 Loi 78-753 on freedom of access to administrative dommonk
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page37, often encounter a wall of administrative reluctance38. Dissatisfaction also stems from
the well-founded impression that all the important choices have been taken by the time the
public is included in the discussion3^ — even some developers agree6**. Since alternatives to the
project are not truly considered®*, usually the best that can be hoped for is a environmentally
friendly modification of the initial project. Furthermore, meaningful participation might
include a right for the public to veto a project; this has not even been considered62 (and
EIA85/337 does not mention the value of the public's input). It is not the public's conclusions, but
the commissioner's interpretation of these that are recorded after an inquiry. And even if these
are negative, they do not generally impede authorisation.
Extreme reactions: Consequently, public attitudes swing between the extremes of total
resignation and outrage. Some inquiries have attracted the interest of not one member of the
public. When indifferent, this comes from a conviction that the public could not influence
decision-making, an attitude which a former environment minister refers to as 'lucid'; however,
"when the stakes of the project are high, this same lucidity provokes revolt and obstruction"6®.
The public moves for projects it considers important, and then, explosively. Such action can
ha^e results: the occupation of a site for a projected chemical plant in Marckolsheim, Alsace;
demonstrations in Roscoff against a nuclear power station; and peaceful protests against the
construction of a military terrain on the plateau of Larzac led to the abandonment of these
projects in the early Eighties. Recently the imposition of the high-speed train (TGV-
Mediterranee64) was the target of demonstrations and protests of a scale reminiscent of the
57 One can 'consult' (read on site) administrative documents or take a photocopy, generally
at a cost of one franc per page; Roy, "Je coupe, tu defriches...nous enquetons," 110 (1995) Combat
Nature 22.
58 Bouchardeau Report, pp.5-9; Com(93)28, p.87.
Com(93)28, p.88; Colson, RJE 1993, p.228; Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.9, p.12.
60 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.9.
61 Com(93)28, p.86.
62 Hopes were raised during decentralisation by the possibility of having local
consultative referenda; Loi du 2 March 1982, Article 1, relative to the rights and liberties of
Communes, Departments and Regions. Obstacles have arisen regarding the constitutionality of
such referenda, yet the desire to participate meaningfully is illustrated by the fact that
unofficial referenda have burgeoned in communes and smaller localities; Prieur, RJE 1988, p.401,
p.410, p.414.
63 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.9.
64 The matter was the subject of a Parliamentary question (no. E-1880/94): OJ 1995 C36/12.
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Seventies nuclear protests65; this pushed the Ministry of Public Works to experiment with
involving the public in a more general concertation prior to large infrastructure projects66
involving the public before all the choices are taken67. The willingness to experiment is an
indication that at least in some areas the reluctance, or wariness with which public
involvement in decision-making is now changing — slowly.
Rise of 'participation sauvage'68: The perception may be growing that active protest is
more effective in preventing environmental harm than participating in EIA consultation, and
quicker than commencing an expensive legal action. In Pau, 1992, regarding the tunnel through
the Somport in the Pyrenees, the president of the administrative court's69 rejection of the
application for interim relief provoked popular opposition — occupation of the site — that
postponed works (at least momentarily). The effort cost the militants some sixty criminal
citations and several months in prison70, but the court later annulled the prefect's declaration
of public utility. Protesters could see in this a justification of acting_outwitfvthe procedure.
However, if the public acts confrontationally — instead of participating in consultations,
prosecuting illegalities in national courts, or sending complaints to the Commission in Brussels —
the implementation of environmental law collapses (particularly in the many 'lower-stake'
projects where public energy wanes). Where the public is an essential ingredient of black letter
65 Colson, RJE 1993, p.223, see also p.228: the College de la Prevention des risques
Technologiques is cited as referring to the manner in which the TGV Mediterranee decisions
were handled as "un cas d'ecole de ce qu'il ne faut pas faire"; also Bouchardeau Report, 1993,
p.9. On the subject of the Seventies nuclear protests; see Pronier et le seigneur, Generation
Verte..., chapter 2. Various autoroutes have also been the subject of protests {inter alia, the
A85, the A 83, the A14), as well as the construction of TGV Nord station (the subject of a second
recours before the administrative judge after the first DUP was annulled for insufficience of the
EIS).
66 Circular 15 December 1992 known as "circulaire Bianco".
67 The transparency of this concertation is to be assured by a follow-up commission that
does not take part in the debate but guarantees that the public's questions receive answers.
Experiments with the process carried out for the TGV-Rhin-Rhone, and the TGV-Lyon-
Montmelian have not yielded brilliant results (for example, again no documents were handed
out beforehand) but it is felt that the original idea deserves to be worked on further.
Colson has proposed an early inquiry once while the project is still being elaborated and
another once the choices are more firmly established; a solution which seems ideal, but highly
unlikely; Colson, RJE 1993, p.228.
68 Michel Prieur's term for demonstrations, marches, protests, petitions, and occupation of
the locality; see Prieur, RJE 1988, p.404.
69 22 October 1991.
70 T.A. Pau, 2 December 1992, note Marie-Laure Lambert, RJE 1993, p. 91 at, p.95.
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law, provisions will become meaningless and the procedural rights insisted on at Community
level will become irrelevant. It is crucial that efforts be made to retain the interest of the
public and restore its faith in the value of legal and administrative procedures.
1.2.3. Commissaire enqueteur/Commission d'enquete:
The go-between for the public and the authorities who must ultimately decide the
authorisation is the inquiry commissioner. Often he encounters difficulties; at times he is
himself the problem.
Lack of expertise and inflexibility: Typically the commissioner is male, older, a retired
administrator''1 and not particularly qualified regarding the subject matter of the project72 _ in
fact he often accepts the appointment over the phone without knowing what type of project is
concerned. As a result, he frequently lacks expertise in the substantive area. Having often been
in the administration himself, the commissioner is generally not inclined to challenge it. When
not from the administration, the commissioner is usually a retired engineer either from the
Bridges and Pavements (Fonts et Chaussees) or Public Works and risks being overly sympathetic
to the developer73.
In 1987 a National Company of Inquiry Commissioners (CNCE: concerned with training
issues74) was formed, and remuneration has improved75; these have had positive effects on the
expertise of inquiry commissioners.
Ambiguous conclusions: Often commissioners, experienced in the administrative safety of
avoiding confrontation, couched their conclusions in terms so vague that it was unclear whether
these were favourable or not75. This problem affected the possibility of obtaining interim
71 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.16.
72 Com(93)28,p.86
73 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.10.
74 Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires Enquiteurs which after aslow start (being
elderly and often having had a prestigious administrative career, commissioners typically
failed to see the need to educate themselves in a new field) has had some success.
75 Payment was poor, and it is perhaps understandable that they did not hurl body and
soul into the endeavour. The fee is now paid by the developer, at a rate fixed by the president
of the administrative court (Loi 83/630, article 8, as modified by Loi 95/101, 2 fevrier 1995
relative au renforcement de la protection de l'environnement, "loi Barnier").
76 Colson, RJE 1993 p.224.
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measures77 and has been improved by provisions in the Loi Bouchardeau requiring them to note
clearly whether they are in favour or not7®. A sizeable problem remains: the opinions noted at
the end of an inquiry remain the commissioner's rather than the public's. As long as he respects
transparency, he is entirely free in devising his conclusions79, a fact which occasionally gives
the public the impression that its comments are unheeded. (This impression is not always
unfounded: one inquiry commissioner stated that the 7000 signed copies of an environmental
association's protest letter he had received were of little interest®0). The public is thus
distanced from the procedure -- arguably not the purpose of the Community or national rules.
Obstructed by the administration: When the commissioner carries out his tasks diligently,
the administration on occasion obstructs his involvement. Commonly the prefectoral services
refuse to give him the dossier before the beginning of the actual inquiry, and he is consequently
unable to familiarise himself with the subject matter®1. He is frequently asked, or required, to
be present for only the last three days of the inquiry, at which point it is too late to suggest a
public meeting or to prolong the inquiry. Further obstructions arise if he insists upon holding a
public meeting: one inquiry commission president related that most of his requests were met
with administrative objections concerning "risk of litigation"®7. The practical difficulties of
holding a public meeting can reach the absurd. Examples exist of prefects who refuse to assist
the inquiry commissioner and who deny use of administrative locales for public meetings.
During a public meeting organised by the commissioner one Parisian official felt, after one hour,
that the exercise had gone on long enough and turned off the lights to 'encourage' the public to
leave; one commissioner was obliged to hold the public meeting in a corridor where a timer
system forced them to keep turning the lights back on®3.
77 An automatic injunction; see below.
78 Colson, RJE 1993, p.224.
79 Ibid., p.229.
80 Ibid., p.229.
81 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.6. A sectoral improvement (Loi Paysages) is that, for some
projects concerning expropriation, the commissioner/commission must be designated from the
outset of the project's elaboration, permitting him/them to decide which investigations to carry
out, which documents to request, which individuals to interview.
82 "...risque de contentieux".
83 A variety of negative examples exist. However, examples can be cited in both extremes,
for instance, another mayor organises expositions and meetings to help the public understand
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Recent improvements: In 1995 the Public Inquiries Act was again84 modified85. The major
innovation addresses the lack of expertise of the commissioners: a public list of commissaires
enqueteurs is created in each departement, by aptitude86. Negative conclusions by the
commissioner are viewed more gravely: a project of a local authority that has received
unfavourable conclusions must now be the object of a discussion by the deliberating body of the
collectivity87. While technical issues such as these can be addressed legislatively, the prior
problem remains: political resistance to these advances was "tenacious and powerful"88.
The recent amendments accord more with the purpose of the Community provisions and
evidence of improvement is that negative conclusions from the commissioner are becoming less
rare89. Nevertheless, the public's views continue to pass through an intermediary, whose input
varies from case to case and whose disposition cannot be affected by legislative mecms.
details, and on receipt of an angry letter regarding a project, makes an appointment with the
author to discuss it; Bouchardeau Report, 1993, pp.5-15; Com(93)28, pp.86-87 also refers to the
effects of differences in attitude of the public authorities.
84 The 1993 Loi Paysages had previously modified provisions: commissioners are
designated by a commission that includes two experts on environmental protection and a
representative of the external services of the Ministry of the Environment; Colson, RJE 1993,
p.225; Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.17.
85 Loi 95-101 of 2 February 1995 (loi Barnier)
86 The head of the commission composing the list is the president of the administrative
court rather than the prefect, and the choice of the commissioner is not limited to the list in the
court's own departement (Article 2 of loi 83-630, as amended by loi 95-101) and where
advisable, the president of the administrative court can designate an expert to help
commissioners, at the expense of the developer.
87 Article 8 of Loi 83-630, as amended by 95-101.
88 "...resistances...tenaces et puissantes"; CNCE, pp.3-4; see also Daniel Ruez, "Assemblee
Generate du ler April 1995: Rapport moral du president, CNCE, p.5."
89 Colson, RJE 1993, p.230; Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.7.
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1.2.4. Competent authority:
For the most part, authorisation is given at the local level by the prefect; in some ways this
is the weakest link in the chain of command that begins in Brussels. A variety of problems can
arise (although they do not necessarily arise systematically and are therefore difficult to
present in order of gravity or frequency) and great variation exists across the regions.
The substance of the exercise is not taken seriously: Between 5000 and 6000 EIAs were
undertaken per year prior to the 1993 legislation; these amendments widen further the scope for
assessment. Roughly 10,000 public inquiries are carried out each year in France9®. Rather than
become more adept at handling the procedures efficiently, familiarity appears to have bred
contempt for the procedure among many local administrators. Certain administrators, upon
whom practical implementation of national and Community law hinges, have learned to
respect the black letter of the law whilst emptying the procedure of its substance. Local
administrations often resent the public's intrusion into a realm that was previously less exposed
to scrutiny. "It all takes place as though three of the actors: the administration, developer,
inquiry commissioner, preferred that the fourth actor, the public, manifest itself as little as
possible"91.
That competent authorities have at times given the contents of EIS only cursory
examination is borne out by the fact that much EIA litigation concerns EISs that do not contain
all the required information ~ something that could easily be remedied at the local level
during administrative consideration of the EIS. Circular 93-73 is indicative when it reminds
local officials that control of the procedure is not merely formal; they must also consider the
qualitative aspects of the study, the exactness of the facts, the analyses and the conclusions92.
90 The discrepancy is explained by the numerous planning documents which required
inquiries, but until 1993, no EIS; 50% regard urbanism planning documents (such as the POS,
which although it did not require an impact study, required an environment study and an
inquiry); 25% relate to classified installations; 25% miscellaneous projects, including large state
projects such as roads, railroads. Bouchardeau Report, 1993, pp.2-3:
91 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.7.
92 Point 4.1.1.
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Furthermore, their bete noire, the responsibility of the state in the event that the decision is
annulled, is treated at some length93.
Lack of resources: Even without a certain element of inertia on the part of the prefects and
mayors, monitoring by authorities ~ that developers are indeed incorporating the prescriptions
into their plans, that those exploiting classified installations are doing so in accordance with
the conditions in their permits — is inadequate. Although not required by the European rules,
without follow-up, the useful effect of the entire exercise is allowed to come to nothing. The
principal cause is that, as at the Community level, the personnel available for practical
controls is extremely limited94. Oberdorff notes (generally, not just with relation to EIA) that
verifications must be carried out concerning both national and Community obligations, requiring
a corresponding increase in the personnel of the prefecture. Such an increase has not occurred;
specifically high quality jurists are in short supply within the local administration95. Visibly
a similar tendency exists in Community and national contexts: to over-extend legal commitments
without giving the actual tools to carry out the tasks effectively96.
Administrative presumption in favour of authorisation: Many local authorities are eager to
assume in favour of a project, particularly where large public projects are concerned. Indeed, a
contributing factor to the lack of rigour in examining EISs is that, where questions of highways
or large infrastructure such as a TGV arise, "[n]o elected official demonstrates a critical
attitude. It matters little the damages caused to the environment, as long as the infrastructure
serves their territory."97 Obtaining a large project in one's departement is a way in which to
widen the tax base; it is also perceived by the politically ambitious as a personal victory, and
y3 Point 4.1.2.
94 Where classified installations are concerned, staff shortages are still more extreme;
below, point 2.2.2. at lack of personnel and resources.
95 Oberdorff, RDP 1995, pp.39-40.
96 Recent improvements have been made on a sectoral basis, regarding EIA and waste
management (Loi du 13 juillet 1992 dechets); see Romi, RDP 1993, p.1088.
97 Bouchardeau Report, 1993, p.8. See also Romi, RDP 1992, p.1779; and Simon
Charbonneau note sous T.A. Bordeaux 22 October 1987 Association pour la defense du cadre de
vie de Genissac c/ Commissaire de la Republique de la Gironde RJE 2-1988, p. 166: "II est vrai que
les prefectures ont toujours menage nos elus locaux alors mime que ceux-ci en prennent souvent a
leur aise avec la loi et cela ne date pas de la decentralisation."
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problem that is difficult to address by adjusting lej
one which can warrant bending the rules. In rec
administrative authorities from assuming an impl
inquiry99 and circular 93-73 reminds that projec
submission of the report by the inquiry commiss
In fact, examples of local authorities' disrespect for the law are not rare where
environmental rules are concerned, from the Mountain Act1®!, to the Coastal Act10^ an(j
Loi du 6 February 1992 relative a l'administration territoriale de la Republique.
99 Colson, RJE 1993, p.224.
100 Point 4.1.3.
101 Somewhat lengthy examples are given to illustrate how deep the resentment of
environmental rules runs when the latter seem to threaten economic objectives.
T.A. Bastia 24 November 1988, Association 'U Levante' c/ Mairie de Corte: Even prior to
the 1993 reform of the EIA rules, the POS planning documents were required to respect
environmental preoccupations. In 1985 one mayor decided to circumvent provisions in the Loi
Montagne in order to build a parking area and welcome centre and carry out landscaping in a
fragile area in the upper valley of Restonica, a registered site since 1966. Initially stopped by a
negative opinion from the Commission Departementale des Sites (a huissier had noted that
trying to pass the project off as a 'rehabilitation' where no building had ever existed before was
irregular, and that plans included locating the 'welcome' centre in an area at danger of rock
falls) in 1987 the Mayor urged the fabrication of a POS that would accommodate his plans. In
1988, a public inquiry was ordered, not for the POS, but for the modification of the as-yet
unapproved POS, in violation of L. 123-4 of the Code de l'Urbanisme (L. 123-4, second indent
allows an approved POS to be modified under certain conditions). Furthermore Article 78 of the
Loi Montagne of 9 January 1985 requires that in mountainous areas planning documents take into
account the natural risks specific to these zones an array of health- and even potentially life-
threatening (e.g., landslides) effects were not considered; see commentary by Romi and
Muscatelli, pp.8-10.
Among the accumulation of infringements of various rules, the administrative court of
Bastia simply ruled that the changes envisaged could not be considered modifications to a POS,
since the area had never been part of a POS, and that the graphic documents presented were
irregular. It annulled the administrative deliberation by which the Municipal Council of Corte
had approved the modification of the POS.
An illustration of the disrespect for environmental rules — the Coastal Act (Loi
Littoral), in particular — is provided by the Mayor of Toulon, who was prevented by this Act
from constructing a large sewage station on Cap Side, a small outcropping on the coast of the
Mediterranean. During a colloquium on the Coastal Act he complained that the statute was
poorly adapted to the coast because it does not permit public officials to do what was asked of
them: "...to develop tourism, absorb unemployment, face the largest population growth of the
country"; (Romi, RDP 1994, p.1201, pp.1205-06; Combat Nature August 1993; CE 19 May 1993, Les
Verts Var). In his opinion, the law did not perform properly precisely because it protected the
environment from the ambitions of local officials. Apparently he did not consider as viable the
possibility of locating the sewage station in a less picturesque setting.
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Eia103 vVhen not seeking themselves to divert the application of environmental law104, such
a predisposition encourages prefects and mayors to be lax in requiring developers to fulfil their
obligations, thus lax in their own obligations. Not surprisingly, developers co-operate smoothly
with both national and local administrators. Although a good working relationship between
developer and authorities (praised by the European Commission1 °5) is commendable, this can
influence the outcome of the authorisation procedure.
Inertia and abstractiveness: This significant problem of the EIA procedure affects mainly
matters of public consultation, and is perhaps more symptomatic of general resentment towards
sharing decisional power than directed against environmental interests. Generally public
inquiries have been criticised for the limited resources accorded them106. In spite of the rules
providing for public consultation of the EIS the European Commission finds, correctly, that the
EIS "does not appear to be as accessible as it should be in practice."107 Again, regional
discrepancies are significant.
Obstructiveness of local authorities can be such that the recent Loi Paysages108 has
subtracted powers concerning public inquiries from the prefect10^ and transferred them to the
president of the administrative court110. Furthermore circular 93-73 is peppered with
reminders to local officials of their duties111. Reluctance can exist even between
administrations: where several different administrative services are involved112, authorities
are also reminded that each stage of the process must be accompanied by a complete file
102 See lie de Re cases in which three annulments of administrative authorisations before
administrative judges were ignored by public authorities; Chapter 6, point 2.6, and footnotes 89
and 324.
104 See examples, Bastia and Toulon, in above footnotes.
105 Com(93)28, pp. 85, 87.
106 Ibid., p.86.
107 Ibid., p.95.
108 Loi Paysages, 8 January 1993, Article 21.
1011 Previously the prefect authorised meetings at the request of the commissioner of the
inquiry. These requests were already very modest, making a refusal all the more grating.
110 Colson, RJE 1993, p.227.
111 On this issue it insists that officials must respond "with all required diligence to any
request to consult the study" (invoking as well the statute on free access to administrative
documents of 17 July 1978); Circular 93-73, Point 4.1.4.
112 For example DRIRE for electrical lines; DDE for the construction permit.
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including the EIS or notice**3. It seems that even other Member States may have been affected
by this secretiveness of local authorities**4.
1.3. EIA Summary:
In sum, although the European Commission appears to feel that public authorities are
generally serious regarding EIA**3, the opinion is not widely shared among national sources**6.
The Commission admits that very few projects are actually cancelled because of harmful effects
on the environment**7. (Indeed, EIA rules do not require this.) However, one of the aims of the
Community legislation is ostensibly that the projects be modified to be less environmentally
harmful. The major problem of practical implementation is that, in most cases, even
modification of the project is not seriously considered by the developer, not insisted upon by
local authorities, and it is not within the power of the public to demand**8.
Recent legislation has taken steps to improve practical implementation**9. As in any area,
however, circulars and legislative amendments can address the symptoms but cannot affect the
underlying attitude. Much remains at the discretion of local authorities and the picture is
highly variable across the country. A great deal hangs upon the environmental consciousness
and tenacity of the actors: the developer, public, commissioner and prefect. In sum, although
the EIA procedure is not systematically emptied of value in France, frequently its effectiveness
is chipped away by details, varying with the players' strength of commitment to their diverse
interests.
**3 Circular 93-73, Point 4.2.1.
**4 Ibid., point 4.2.2.
**5 Com(93)28, pp.86-87: "public authorities generally see to it that developers take study
seriously."
* *6 Although perhaps from the Commission viewpoint, by comparison with other Member
States, France has not encountered as many problems.
**7 Com(93)28, p.88, points out that, of some 5000-6000 projects per year, only about 10 are
abandoned because of a poor EIS.
**8 And for most smaller private projects EIS comes too late in the process for much
modification of the project to take place; Com(93)28, p.88.
**9 Mentioned above, that takes out of the hands of local authorities some of the decisions.
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2. Practical Implementation: LCP:
The fundamental reason both that France's were among the most stringent of the variable
obligations set by LCP88/609, and that France has apparently had fewer problems meeting
them is that France provides 70% of its energy needs through nuclear sources. Indeed, France
finds itself in the fairly unusual position among Community Member States of being a net
exporter of energy.
2.1. Approach:
Information is not as readily available concerning large combustion plants as EIA
procedures. However, examination of various sources indicates that practical compliance*20
r d ncg
with the European directive has not presented serious difficulty in the case o^this Member
Stat<). Although some problems of practical implementation are purely national, other
potentially serious problems stem from vagueness in Community legislation*21. The largest
problem appears to be that the influence of industry bars action that could be still more
effective in reducing emissions.
Commission: Establishing an exact Commission opinion on the practical compliance with
LCP88/609 is ruled out. In response to specific questions concerning the various obligations
imposed by LCP88/609*22, the Commission responded*23 that
Under Commission rules of procedure, the monitoring by the Commission of Member States'
implementation of Community directives is subject to rules on confidentiality. The Commission is
unable to give information, other than that which is reported in the monthly Bulletin and summarised
annually in the General Report, or is made public by way of a Parliamentary question, of
infringement cases against the Member States.... Article 16 of Directive 88/609 requires the Member
States to report to the Commission, but contains no provisions regarding the publication of those
reports or the production of Commission reports.
* 20 As opposed to notification of the Commission of compliance, which remains poor.
*2* E.g., approaches to classifying plant. As CITEPA indicates, given the permissible
manners of classifying plant, the emission limits could apparently be attained by simply
juggling plant classification and without any effect on actual emissions; below.
*22 Including the Commission's opinion on the dates for defining new plant in the different
national measures, the performance of the Member States in the first phase reductions, the
second suspension of six months implied by the French legislation, Spanish repatriation of the




Strictly speaking, indeed Article 16 LCP88/609124 does not require that the Commission
make public its information, and frustratingly, Directive 90/313 on access to information
applies to the Member States but not to the Commission125. The Bulletins and application
reports give almost no detail, indicating simply that in 1990 a letter of formal notice was sent to
France125; in 1991 the proceedings were terminated122. It is disappointing that no more
information is forthcoming and that the Commission dismisses the useful pressure for
compliance that publicity could exert (if not in this specific case then generally), particularly
where other means of enforcement are limited1211.
National Sources: Technical commentary from other sources is relied upon here, such as the
two studies carried out by an inter-professional technical centre that mediates between industry
and government authorities responsible for controlling air pollution, CITEPA12^.
n
124 Article 16.1 requires that Member States inform the Commission of reduction
programmes, one year at most after each phase; send synthesis report on implementation of
programmes; and forward intermediate reports in mid-phase. Article 16.2 indicates the points
concerning which these reports are intended to provide an overall view. Article 16.3 indicates
that "the Commission shall organize regular comparisons of the programmes referred to in
Article 3(1) with the Member States in order to ensure harmonized implementation of the
programmes at Community level. The Commission shall take particular care to ensure that the
implementation of the programmes produces the expected results in terms of the overall
reduction in emissions and shall, if necessary, make appropriate proposals." It shall not,
however, make these public.
125 Directive 90/313, Article 2(b): '"public authorities' shall mean any, public
administration at national, regional or local level...".
This, despite a variety of Community declarations on transparency, e.g., the
Commission's communication on "Openness in the Community," OJ 1993 C166/4. Annex II point 4,
Accessibility of documents, states that a request for a document should be refused where it is
necessary to safeguard, inter alia, commercial, industrial and financial confidentiality,
including intellectual property.
See also Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission documents.
Listed under 'exceptions', ie, reasons to refuse access to information, are inter alia "the
institution's interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings." This is, apparently, wide enough
to include requests for information on the implementation of directives.
126 Bull.EC 9-1990, p.119.
127 Bull. EC 6-1991.
128 See for instance Lopez Ramon in Pardo, p.287: "where other coercive means are lacking,
publication of the data concerning emissions is an effective compulsive mechanism for
accomplishing international obligations."
12^ Centre Interprofessionnel Technique d'Etude de la Pollution Atmospherique; CITEPA:
Inventaire des Emissions de S02 et de NOx des Grandes Installations de Combustion en France.
Jean-Pierre Fontelle, November 1993; study partly financed by the Service de l'Environnement
Industriel of the Ministere de l'Environnement, pp.6-7.
The director of CITEPA has also been extremely helpful in answering specific questions.
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Actual situation: The situation that emerges is fairly positive. The programme of annual
emissions reductions required by LCP88/609, Article 3 has been sent to the European
A
Commission130. Complying with the limits set by LCP88/609 has not been difficult; indeed it
appears that in the case of NOx, emissions are below those set in the directive131. The 1991
reductions in emissions comply with the ceiling imposed by the directive132. The figures
indicate a 69% reduction in SO2 and a 56% reduction in NOx as compared to 1980133, despite the
fact that 1991 emissions were higher than average134.
From the European point of view, extremely simple issues remain problematic. Typical of
Member State nonchalance towards reporting requirements, the Ninth Application Report
pointed out that by 1992 not a single report had been received under Article 16 LCP88/609133. At
this point reduction programmes and first phase intermediate reports were due.
2.2. LCP Requirements:
Being of a vertical nature, instead of structuring the discussion by procedural interventions,
the practical implementation of LCP rules is examined by the requirements the rules entail.
2.2.1. Authorisation:
In order to authorise emissions, the Administration must be able to co-ordinate the local
level authorisation with a unified vision of total national emissions. CITEPA carries out
inventories of SO2, NOx and dust emissions that are then used at national level, where many
actors are implicated in order to co-ordinate air pollution policies, and inter alia, to apply
LCP88/609. The principal national actors at the central level are the Environment Ministry,
specifically the Service of Industrial Environment of the Directorate of the Prevention of
Pollution and Risks, and within this, the Office of the Atmosphere, Control of Energy and
Transport13^. The Environment Ministry, responsible for developing air quality* policy, is
130 Cf: Remy Bouscaren, Directeur CITEPA, answer to a letter of 6 May 1995.
131 Circular 90/54; CITEPA Inventaire.
132 CITEPA Inventaire, p.28.
133 Ibid., CITEPA notes that the bases for these years are not strictly comparable.
134 Because of poor climatic conditions and the rise in urban heating.
135 OJ 1992 C250/160, not to be confused with the initial reduction programmes.
136 Ministere de l'Environnement, Organigramme, February 1995.
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competent to co-ordinate the actions of other ministries likely to have an impact upon air
pollution, as well as all actions concerning prevention of major technological or natural
hazards132, such as defining 'special protection zones' within which various sources of
pollution can be regulated133.
At the regional level, authorisations are then accorded pragmatically, in concertation with
the industry, using BATNEEC guidelines, and in fact these negotiations are often arduous13^. In
negotiations with industrialists, the prefects have a large margin of discretion, which could
give rise to considerable variation in authorised emissions across regions and could leave room
for other interests to be satisfied140. However, to the dissatisfaction of the energy industry,
prefects can and often do justify stricter emissions on environmental grounds, and also because of
the proximity of other emitters141. Industrialists who feel they could attack the justification
for stricter limits are prevented by doing so since the limits are the result of group
negotiations143.
Unified vision/data collection: Accurate scientific data on the state of air quality are
essential to implement LCP obligations correctly. In addition to the inventories established by
CITEPA, ADEME143 monitors air quality standards, providing information on air quality,
technical information to industries and access to financial assistance144. It also supervises
research undertakings and manages the tax on air pollution (receiving for this a large
percentage of the para-fiscal tax143). It shares its task of technical assistance linked to air
133 Decree 16 April 1992; see also ROMI, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.369; Bennett, 1991,
p.23; Deruy, 1993, pp.167-68.
138 By joint arrete with the Ministry of Health, signed, if necessary, by the Minister of
Transport or Energy; ROMI, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.369.
Also, the Conseil d'Etat can, by decree, order the suppression of any installation,
classified or not, that gives rise to risks or dangers that the measures listed in the Classified
Installations Act have not rectified (Loi 76-663, Article 15); this power is rarely used; Lepage-
Jessua, LPA 1993, p.13.
13^ Letter Remy Bouscaren, Director CITEPA, 29 July 1996, N/Ref CT 20365-BR/MG.
140 Furthermore, when asked if the prefects have a clear vision of total emissions, the
Director of CITEPA replied that "the prefects have a vision of nothing at all!"
141 Letter Bouscaren, 29 July 1996.
142 Ibid.
143 Agency of Environment and Energy Control; see Chapter 4, point 1.3.2. New National
Agencies.
144 Bennett, 1991, p.23.
145 Below, Incentive — lack of political resolve.
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quality surveillance with two other organisms: the Bureau of atmosphere, energy control and
transport146, of the Environment Ministry; and the Central Laboratory of Air Quality
Surveillance (LCSQA)14^.
Furthermore, local associations of surveillance and management of the monitoring network
exist, accredited by the Environment Ministry and the central laboratories of LCSQA. In 1994,
30 such organisations existed, by 1995, 3214^. The network that they manage included, in 1993,
797 analysing and 178 collecting stations: of these 294 measured SO2 (36 more stations were
added during the year); 144 measured NOx (plus 28 during the year), and 71 measured dust (plus
six)149. The stations are located in industrialised, highly populous areas. Also, the Ministry of
Environment, through the DRIRE, co-ordinates a nineteen-station network for monitoring acid
precipitation; the costs of maintaining the network are borne jointly by state and local
authorities and industry1611. In short, accurate, representative data are available in this
national context, and co-ordination between administrative levels as well as with data
collection appears efficient.
2.2.2. Monitoring compliance:
LCP88/609 sets goals to be attained over several years: local officials must therefore police
installations and ensure that levels set in the authorisations are respected (and that accidents
interruptions in supply are reported to the Commission).
Official Guidance: A circular addressed to the local authorities161 takes considerable steps
to encourage efficient practical implementation of LCP rules. It clarifies various issues, starting
146 Richert, P., Rapport sur les evolutions souhaitables pour le dispositif national de
surveillance de la qualite de I'air, Le Bureau de 1'atmosphere, de la maitrise de Tenergie et du
transport, 3 mai 1995, at p.81.
14^ Laboratoire central de la surveillance de la qualite de l'air.
14® ADEME et le Ministere de l'environnement, La Qualite de I'air en France en 1993-94:
donnees et references, pp.24-25 .
149 ADEME, La Qualite de l'air..., p.26.
160 Bennett, p.25-6.
161 Circular 90-54 du 27 June 1990 relative aux installations classees pour la protection de
I'environnement: Installations de combustion.
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with the scope of the directive and transposing arreted, and the meaning of several terms. In
addition to many technical specifications153, advice is issued: for instance, the circular twice
reminds prefects of their competence to set stricter limits, particularly where justified by
climatic conditions. As with EIA procedures, the practice of artificially dividing a project in
order to fall below regulation thresholds (in MW) pose difficulties that merit attention:
In particular, I absolutely wish to avoid seeing built, by sections of less than 50MW, in space or in
time, combustion installations of more than 50MW, the pollutants of which would be insufficiently
regulated. 15<1
Prefects are cautioned particularly to monitor extensions of plant; plants less than 50MW; and
(going beyond Community obligations) those between 50 and 100MW, for which the directive in
some cases fixes no SO2 limit155.
Regarding surveillance, the circular alerts officials to other sources of difficulty. Prefects
are encouraged to avoid the "perverse effect"155 of the 50MW threshold established by the
directive, and consider going beyond existing requirements by taking measures to include
medium-size installations in their prescriptions (and compliance with the recent Community
amendment to LCP88/609157 should be facilitated). In an effort to encourage precision in
application, such points as the differences between 'evaluating' dust emissions (visual) and
'measuring' (gravimetric methods) are highlighted. The circular insists specifically that the
prefects can require laboratories158 to carry out controls, measures, or series of measures if they
judge necessary in view of effects on the environment. Finally, the circular for large combustion
plants demonstrates a willingness to adjust future implementation by requesting that the
152 Installations that use combustion for the production of energy, whatever the
combustible employed, except for those that re-use the product of combustion directly in their
fabrication process. CITEPA also had trouble determining the precise scope of the directive,
below.
153 For instance, regarding the types of combustibles and their desulphurisation properties,
chimney calculations and dispersion studies.
15^ Circular 90-54.
155 Regarding new plant burning solid fuel. This has been modified by Directive 94/66, 15
December 1994 (OJ 1994 L337/83) amending Directive 88/609, affecting new plant with a rated
thermal input of between 50 and 100 MW which use solid fuel for which no SO2 limit was set by
LCP88/609.
156 Circular 90-54.
157 Directive 94/66, above.
158 Chosen in accordance with the inspection of classified installations.
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prefects forward observations of practical difficulties they encounter to the Secretary of State
for the Environment.
Monitoring poiuers: The inspectors of classified installations, under the authority of the
Ministry of the Environment since 1992^9, are competent to monitor the functioning of large
combustion plants. The Regional Directorates of Industry, Research and the Environment
(DRIRE), monitor control of emissions to air, monitor areas of special protection and keep
records of emergency networks16®.
At local level, mayors and prefects also have policing powers. Mayors possess in their
communes general policing powers linked with, among other things, public health161. Where
the risk of grave and imminent danger requires, the mayor is competent to tighten prefectoral
prescriptions162 and, in an emergency, can take all measures of aid and security and can call for
the intervention of state services. The principal problem here is that generally mayors are
reluctant to use these powers, preferring either to leave it to the state authorities or to prefects
and inspectors of classified installations163.
The widest powers at the local level belong to the prefect; they are responsible for
instituting procedures of alert164. Specific legislation gives them extraordinary policing
powers, exercised on behalf of the State rather than in place of the local authority: these
powers exist in the case of classified installations. Discretion exists in using these powers.
15 ® Transferred from the Ministry of Industry to the Ministry of the Environment by decree
92-434,12 May 1992.
160 The ADEME also has a delegation in each region and it has been suggested that they
play a greater role; Fontaine, Didier, "Les resposabilites locales dans la lutte contre la
pollution de l'air," LPA 14 June 1991, p.6. .
161 Article L.131-1 et s. Code des Communes.
162 CE 14 December 1981, Rec Tables, p.639, cited in Colson, Jean Philippe, "La
Responsabilite du fait des dechets en droit public fran^ais," RIDC 1992, p.124.
163 Fontaine, LPA 1991, p.4.
164 Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.370.
Under certain conditions the prefect also has a power of general police that applies in
the communes: by arrete motive he can substitute himself for the mayor when the public order is
threatened. This must take place only after a letter of formal notice addressed to the municipal
authority receives no response. Such substitution is illegal in the absence of a failure to act
(carence ) on the part of the mayor and/or in the absence of a threat to public health. T.A.
Montpellier, 15 June 1990 Mairie de Lattes c/ Prefet de Region Languedoc-Rousillon.
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Lack of personnel and resources: This concern goes beyond the domain of air pollution to
affect all classified installations. Just as monitoring of practical implementation received
attention at Community level fairly recently, only lately*65 has new priority been accorded to
inspection of classified installations in France*66. The inspectors are highly trained engineers
and technicians*6'7 and an initial concern is that, having similar interests, they may in
individual cases be pre-disposed towards the interests they are controlling.
However, the worst deficiency here, as at Community level, is the "chronic insufficiency of
means of control and numbers of inspectors"*68. In 1991 there were 553 inspectors of classified
installations — some not even full-time — which worked out to one inspector for 904
installations*65. It was suggested that prefects impose methods of 'self-surveillance' on
industrials*70; a similar approach is taken in both the LCP directive*7* and arrSte*72. Once
again tasks are heaped onto the local level that, even with diligence, they cannot accomplish
effectively. To remedy the situation the political will must be found to increase resources.
2.2.3. Co-operation of Industry:
Cost: In the opinion of industrials this directive poses a problem in terms of cost*73.
Practically speaking, although discontent, they appear generally to have complied with the
reductions required*74.
*65 Circular of 11 March 1987, Official Journal 2 May,
*66 Although a body of inspectors has existed since 1917, the task was given to part-time
agents recruited for the purpose. See PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.426.*67 Or, for matters of agricultural undertakings, veterinarians; Article 33 Decree 77-1133.
168 Colson, RIDC 1992, p.128.
169 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p427.
* 70 Circular no.2740,28 March 1988
*7* Articles 14 and 15.
172 Articles 17-28.
*73 See also CITEPA Inventaire, p.28; Letter, Director CITEPA Remy Bouscaren, 15 May
1995.
*74 CITEPA Letter, 15 May 1995: "the application of this arrete, in the opinion of
industrials, poses a problem in terms of cost. In reality, the application does not appear to pose
many problems; the industrials pass either to gas or to fuel-oil BTS and use low NOx burners.
However, the new directive will be probably much more forceful"; see also CITEPA Inventaire,
p.28.
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Guidance: In the matter of helping plant operators adjust to the requirements of the LCP
legislatior^ClTEPA^has issued a technical report specifically about SO2, NOx and dust, aimed
at combustion plant operators: it examines, in some 200 detailed pages, issues such as techniques
of purification, restraints on emission reductions, economic comparisons of emission reduction
methods and cost calculations175.
Incentive — Lack of political resolve: Industrials were supposedly given 'incentive' to
comply through a para-fiscal tax on air pollution176 imposed on sulphurous oxides, nitrous
oxides, chlorhydric acids, non-methane hydrocarburants, solvants and other volatile organic
compounds, and dust. Benefiting the Air Quality Agency of ADEME177 the tax was recently
renewed until 31 December 1999178; it applies to combustion plants with thermal power equal or
greater than 20MW, easily covering LCP88/609 and its later modification. The negotiation of
the tax illustrates both the influence of large economic players and the lack of political resolve
to impose restraints on industrialists179. The tax was to be proportionate to environmental risks
at issue180. However, to work as an incentive it must be high enough to discourage emissions. In
175 CITEPA, Possibility Technico-Economicpies de Reduction des Emissions de S02, NOx et
Poussieres dans les Gaz de Combustion des Chaudieres au Fuel-Oil Lourd, Convention no.
89.2.18.00.48, 15.1.1990.
176 Taxe parafiscale sur la pollution atmospherique.
177 At least 60% of the tax is used for the prevention reduction and measurement of
accidental or permanent pollution. Other uses include development of new. technology, finance
of monitoring the quality of air, aid to studies and technical and economic projects. A maximum
of 6% goes to the technical and financial management of the system; see UIC Lettre du
Departement Technique, no.17, May 1995.
178 Extended for another five years (until 31 December 1999) by a decree and an arrete of 3
May 1995 (JO 4 May 1995).
It had been originally imposed by decree, 13 May 1981, article 18, and implemented by
decree 85-582 and an arrSte du 7 juin 1985 pour les rejets dans Vatmosphere d'oxydes de soufre et
d'oxydes d'azote et prelevee jusqu'au 31 decembre 1989. Then decree 90-389 and arrete 11 May
1990 (JO 13 mai) renewed the tax until 31 December 1994 and widened its application to include
other pollutants.
179 The influence of industrial actors in fixing the rate of the tax was evident. Already
complaining about the costs of the directive, they balked at rates to be fixed in latest tax,
which had been fixed first at 230F and 215F/tonne emitted for SO2 and NOx respectively.
Consequently the rates were lowered to 180F/tonne emitted of both SO2 and NOx (more
strikingly still, rates for volatile organic compounds were reduced from 765F to 180F). Among
other things industrialists managed to increase their representation in the committee of
management of this tax, to the detriment of the representatives of builders of materials for
prevention, reduction and measurement of atmospheric pollution (no longer represented); UIC
Lettre du Departement Technique, no.17, May 1995. In future as well, therefore, the tax is not
likely to have incentive value.
180 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.126.
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the opinion of Remy Bouscaren, Director of CITEPA, the tax would have to be ten or fifteen
times higher to discourage emissions, although it has been useful in resolving the problem of
"black spots"181. In effect, the industrialists find it less burdensome to pay the tax than to
reduce emissions further. Nonetheless, although this might enhance practical implementation
further, it appears Community obligations have been met.
2.23. Communication to Commission:
Finally, should serious difficulties arise and derogations from the rules be required, these
must be communicated to the Commission. Requests to the EnvironmentMinistry for information
on whether this has been necessary have gone unanswered182.
23. Problems encountered:
Vagueness of Community legislation: That compliance was not overwhelmingly difficult is
not to imply that no problems arose. The CITEPA Inventaire encountered a significant difficulty
stemming directly from vagueness in the formulation of the Community legislation183.
Specifically, the term "large combustion plant" leaves too much room for subjective
appreciation184, even considering the definitions/exemptions indicated in LCP88/609, Article
2(7). The obligations in the European directive could be satisfied by juggling classifications,
without any real effect on emissions. The report illustrates that, according to the approach used
to classify plants — by 'establishment', by chimney185, by boiler (chaudiere) — and keeping
within the 50MW criterion set by the directive, vastly different results can be obtained, with
variations of 5 or 10% more or less of installations being enclosed in the definition. Defined by
'establishment' there are 286 existing French installations concerned by the directive (taken as
the basis for comparison, therefore 100%); defined by 'chimney', there are 205 (71.7%); by boiler
only 128 are covered (44.8%). To illustrate the importance of this, in 1991, taking an
181 Intensely polluted areas; Bouscaren, answer to a letter of 6 May 1995.
182 Faxes sent to the Ministry of Environment on 23 September 1996, 31 October 1996.
183 CITEPA Inventaire.
184 Circular 90-54 also addressed this definition.
185 Several may share a chimney or boiler.
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'establishment' approach, emissions of SO2 (in kt) were 587.7; for a 'chimney approach 546.4186
(93%); and for the boiler approach, 509.3 (86.7%). In other words, simply by choosing a
different classification approach, emissions can be significantly reduced (respectively by 7%
and 13.3% in the above example).
Another vagueness in the original directive that posed problems for the national
authorities in implementation is that LCP88/609 was not explicit regarding certain equipment,
such as the incinerators of the petrochemical and oil industry187. The CITEPA report suggests
that greater clarity in the definition of installations is desirable and that the Commission take
care to systematically analyse inventories given by Member States, with a view to ensure that
homogenous results are established despite diverse practices in classifying installations188.
Such issues were not addressed in the amendment to LCP88/609.
National difficulties: Other difficulties that arose were related to technical capabilities
at national level and have since been resolved: for instance, many installations could not obtain
figures for the entire year of 1990 and CITEPA was forced to make estimates of their
emissions189. To help with collection of data on specific technical issues, CITEPA
recommends190 that the official form to be completed for the para-fiscal tax be used as an
opportunity to collect technical details.
2.4. LCP Summary:
From the picture that can be pieced together, there appears to be little worry in this
national context concerning the adequacy of data collection and the capacity to attain emission
reductions. The discretion of prefects in according authorisation, which could lead to variation
across regions, particularly given the influence of industry, does not appear to pose a problem at
present. Regarding the monitoring of ongoing obligations, the situation is far
186 Margin of error: + or - 4.2.
187 CITEPA Inventaire, p. 11.
188 Ibid., p.26.
189 Consequently it notes that the figures are slightly inaccurate for that year.
190 CITEPA Inventaire, p.26; The types of questions that could be usefully added to it are
suggested.
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from optimal. Duties are passed among responsible parties: the mayors leave tasks to the
prefects, the police leave tasks to classified installation inspectors who are unreasonably few
in number. It appears that administrative co-operation between levels and willingness to apply
the rules is not undermined by opposition to the obligations imposed.
3. Conclusion:
Given France's positive energy situation and the fact that it affects a limited section of
administrative actors, the obligations of LCP88/609 have seemingly not been perceived as
overly onerous (although the affected industry has complained of costs). Although room for
discretion remains, prefects appear to negotiate limits fairly strictly. Practical compliance
seems to have been achieved without excessive difficulty, although certainly problems remain
concerning, for instance, insufficiency of inspectors. By contrast the rules on EIA, having wider
effects, are at times perceived by local officials as threatening projects that are economically
beneficial in the short term, as well as being generally much more troublesome to oversee. This
perception plays a significant role in the fact that practical implementation proceeds much less
smoothly (recalling that practical implementation is highly variable). The developer is not
required by the administration to improve his performance, the public's input is distanced
where possible, the inquiry commissioner is occasionally hindered in his duties. Finally the
number of cases brought before administrative courts for annulment of the authorisation based
upon EIA suggest that the verification of the procedure exerted by local authorities is
inadequate. The two examples of legislation suggest that laxity and negative use of discretion
are linked to the play of interests involved and the bureaucratic inconvenience caused.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the conditions in the jurisdictions
(administrative, civil, criminal) in which Community (and obviously national) obligations can
be enforced and to investigate the types of difficulties that can hinder attempts to do so. The
most intractable problem to emerge is that, at the stage of enforcement, another layer of
discretion is added. Frequently those in charge of enforcing obligations do not make use of all
the tools at their disposal: an important general note is that, concerning the environment,
authorities are much more inclined to persuade than enforce^.
In France a separate administrative jurisdiction exists and is examined first, using examples
predominantly from EIA, while signalling important differences in procedures concerning
classified installations (and therefore large combustion plants). Notably here, as opposed to
the Spanish context, in the nearly two decades of the EIA procedure's existence a.great deal of
litigation has arisen -- an indication of the problems that emerge in implementation.
Subsequently, civil and penal jurisdictions are investigated, again giving illustrations relevant
to the legislation examined wherever possible. Since a LEXIS search revealed no litigation
surrounding the French transposition of LCP88/609, it is necessary to discuss hypothetically
problems that could arise in attempting to challenge administrative authorisations, to claim
for damages caused by the pollution proceeding from a large combustion plant, or to criminally
prosecute the operators (legal or physical) of such an installation.
1. Administrative Sanctions:
Before proceeding to a court action, administrative sanctions are available through the
prefect for violations of regulations; extremely positive use has been made of these, mostly in
the area of pollution from classified installations2. A third party may request that the prefect
issue a formal notice (tnise en demeure) to a plant operator. In this manner, far-reaching and
immediately applicable measures, similar to those available through the courts can be
PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.695.
Ibid., p.723; Loi 76-663, Title VII on Administrative Sanctions.
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imposed. Inter alia3, the administration can require the operator to deposit a sum equivalent to
the works required, to be reimbursed as these are carried out, an efficient method that is more
and more frequently used4. The sanctions themselves are of course subject to judicial review.
The advantage of administrative sanctions is that they short-circuit lengthy, costly and
uncertain court proceedings as well as the possibility that prosecution will be discontinued.
Besides the fact that certain sanctions are not much used, the main concern is the possible
inertia of the prefect; however, state responsibility can be engaged for failure to act^. Finally,
if the prefect is unable thus to make the operator respect the applicable rules, one must turn to
the courts.
2. Administrative disputes (contentieux administratif):
Occasionally lower courts are quite forward-looking in taking account of European
obligations or the particular requirements of environmental protection. More frequently,
however, where a positive stance is crucial to give real meaning to enforcing environmental
obligations — regarding interim measures, or using fully the powers conferred upon the judge —
the results are disappointing.
What can be challenged: Concerning EIA, judicial review (recours pour exces de pouvoir6)
seeks not to annul the EIS itself but, by finding an illegality that affects the EIS or the public
3 Regarding the inobservation of imposed conditions, Loi 76-663, Article 23: "...the
prefect can undertake the measures at the expense of the exploitant; or require him to deposit in
a public account a sum corresponding to the total of works to be done, which shall be restituted
to the exploitant as the measures are carried out; or suspend the functioning of the installation,
after opinion from the Departmental Council of Hygiene, until the imposed conditions have
been carried out.
Regarding exploitation without authorisation, the prefect can, Loi 76-663, Article 24:
"suspend the exploitation of the installation until the declaration has been deposited or the
authorisation granted...order the closure or the suppression of the installation...apply the
procedures foreseen in Article 23... with an agent of the public force, place seals upon the
installation maintained in functioning in infraction of a measure of suppression, closure or
suspension, or in spite of an arrSte refusing authorisation.
4 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.428.
5 CE 22 mars 1978 Brelivet, RJE 1980, p.45; TA de Caen, 17 octobre 1972 Syndicat de
defense contre la pollution atmospherique JCP 1973 II 17351; Colson, RIDC 1992, p.127.
6 Translation: Dickson, 1994, p.72; exces de pouvoir is also translated as ultra vires,
Dictionnaire Economique et Juridique, Navarre, L.G.D.J., third edition 1992.
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inquiry and constitutes a formal irregularity^, to annul the administrative authorisation based
upon the EIA. Judgment can neither substitute a legal decision for the illegal one nor order the
administration to take a certain decision or adopt a specific attitude.
Concerning large combustion plants, the types of acts that can be challenged are listed in
the Classified Installations Act8 and include the initial authorisation or declaration or the
decision not to authorise, as well as the arretes fixing prescriptions and conditions of
authorisation. In this event the powers of the judge are more extensive (below). Furthermore, if
the administration ignores requests for administrative sanctions, a third party may commence
proceedings for inaction (carence)9. Litigation in administrative courts may also involve
judicial review of other relevant administrative decisions (e.g., imposition of administration
sanctions) or an action for compensation^0 for damage caused by a publicly owned classified
installation.
2.1. Judicial challenge:
An important difference between administrative enforcement proceedings that affect
legislation such as EIA85/337 and legislation such as LCP88/609 is that, since the latter falls
under the Classified Installations regime, the judge possesses powers of 'full dispute' (plein
' Vice de forme on de procedure: (formal irregularity; translation, Dickson, 1994, p.73).
An action for exces de pouvoir unites the elements of elaboration of the act, its form, its physical
presentation. A formal irregularity results from the misunderstanding of the rules fixing the
form and procedures of each act. However, a hierarchy of these rules exists and not all
violations constitute an illegality. For a discussion of other types of illegality (incompetence,
detournement de pouvoir-, violation de la loi) see Dalloz administratif, 1992, chapter 7, Title
IV.
8 Loi 76-663, Article 14 : i.e.: decisions taken in applications of articles 3, 6, 11, 12, 16, 23,
24, and 26 (regarding for instance, authorisation, conditions of installation and exploitation,
special prescriptions, a prefectural mise en demeure).
9 CE, 22 mars 1978 Brelivet; see PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.433.
10 Recours en indemnite. Generally, this can appear before an administrative court only
after a request for compensation addressed directly to the administrative body concerned has
received a negative or inadequate response (in which event the court must be instructed within
two months) or has received no response (implicit rejection; the court must be instructed within
four months); Deruy, Laurent, "France," in Environmental Liabilities and Regulation in Europe,
edited by Mark Brealey, International Business Publishing Limited, The Hague, 1993, pp.197-
98.
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contentieux^). Whereas for EIA proceedings the judge is able only to annul the decision, here
he can substitute himself for the administration, modify or introduce technical prescriptions12,
or give an authorisation refused by the prefect13. He can ask for an expertise14, visit the site13,
consult administrative organisations, or ask for an opinion of the Superior Council of Classified
Installations18. He can appreciate the legality of administrative sanctions, aggravate these
where he sees fit, apply a variety of sanctions himself17, and issue a formal notice to the
Administration to elaborate and impose special prescriptions18.
Another peculiarity is that, where the operation of classified installations is at issue, the
legality of the issue is appreciated, not in light of the provisions in force on the date on which
the administrative decision was taken, but in light of the provisions in force on the date of the
judgment19; the plant operator is expected to keep up to date regarding applicable legislation.
However, when the authorisation procedure is attacked, legality is appreciated by the rules
applicable on the date the challenged decision was taken-111.
Generally a two-month time-bar from the notification or publication of the regulatory act
exists, or from the notification of the individual if an individual decision is at issue71. Third
11 In the same manner as Electoral disputes or disputes involving buildings 'menacing ruin'
(edifices menagant ruine) are subject to plein contentieux. For Classified Installations, the
distinct contentious regime is traditional, and was elaborated by the Conseil d'Etat in
application of the decree of 15 October 1810 relating to insalubrious, incommodating or
dangerous workshops, modified by the loi du 19 decembre 1917.
12 CE 27 novembre 1957, Ville de Meudon, Rec,. p.924; CE 3 fevrier 1967 Societe des forges
de Chelles, Rec., p.825; CE 9 octobre 1981 Association de defense des sites de Sainte-Radegonde,
req. no.4006. See Encyclopedie Dalloz, Contentieux administratif, p.6: as far as actual closure of
the installation is concerned the jurisprudence is not definitive.
13 If EIS and public inquiry are regular. See CE 16 octobre 1957, Ministre de Vlndustrie et
commerce c/ Soc. Les Tanneries de la Seine, Rec., p.532; CE 11 mai 1988, Comite de Defense du
site de Kervoazou, req 66.490; 66.575. Even for installations requiring only a declaration T.A.
Toulouse 18 juin 1986 Association pour la Sauvegarde de VEnvironnement de Bourret, req. 84 246.
14 CE 14 mai 1948 Courtial Rec., p.210.
15 CE 27 janv. 1978 Cadoux et autres.
16 (Conseil Superieur des Installations Classees) CE 7 nov. 1984 SICA du Val de Gennes.
17 See, for instance, Lepage Jessua, LPA 5 fevrier 1993, p. 14.
18 -pA Toulouse 21 fevrier 1986 Marty.
19 CE 6 fevrier 1981 Dugenest D. 1982.308, note Prieur. See commentary Prieur, Dalloz
1991, p.741; Colson, RIDC 1992, p.126; Encyclopedie Dalloz, Contentieux administratif, p.5: it is
noted, however, that this solution has not been clearly supported by the Conseil d'Etat.
20 CE 27 fevrier 1981 Ets Maurice David (Rec.p.114).
21 Dalloz administratif, 1992, pp.186, 208. If, during the two-month period, the applicant
has formed a recours hierarchique or gracieux, then in case of rejection, a new two-month period
begins to run from this rejection; see also Article 14, loi 76-663.
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parties22 are treated generously: because of the types of dangers posed, they are given four
years from the publication or billing (affichage) of the decision in which to take legal action23.
Finally, it is not obligatory to first make an administrative appeal (recours
administratis^) before commencing judicial proceedings. In spite of the theoretical advantages
administrative appeal offers, the administration is likely to confirm its earlier decision and
the odds of success are slim23.
2.2. Disposition of the Administrative Courts:
Whereas procedural rules often present the toughest obstacles to judicial protection of the
environment, in France, the attitude of the highest administrative court was itself an
important obstacle and particularly affected the enforcement of EIA rules. The discipline of
environmental law is "...a new area in which recent juridical rules, as much at the international
level as at the national level, are shaking up the hierarchy of society's traditional values."26
Particularly during early years the Conseil d'Etat resisted this 'shake-up'. Although this pre¬
dates the European directive, the case-law has left a negative legacy that affects European
rules as well.
Position of Community law in national system: First, a brief reminder of the Conseil d'Etat's
stance towards Community law is useful. It had long been a cause of Community concern22 and
indeed, only with Nicolo2® was the primacy of the EC Treaty over national law, even
22 Described as "physical or legal persons, associations, communes and associations of
communities".
23 An important limitation is that third parties who have acquired, leased or constructed
in the area of the installation after the billing or publication of the arrite of authorisation or
prescription cannot bring a case: Article 14, loi 76-663. There are also subtleties to be considered,
for instance prefectural arrgtes prolonging the time period for treating an authorisation request
can aggrieve the applicant but not third parties; however, the latter can use any irregularity in
the prolongation to attack the final decision.
24 The recours administratif includes both the recours gracieux (asking an administrator to
reconsider his decision) or the recours hierarchique (asking the administrator's superior to
reconsider the administrator's decision).
25 Dalloz administratif, 1992, p. 177.
26 Prieur, "Pas de caribous au Palais Royal" RJE 2-1985 p.137 at pp.140-41.
22 This issue arises in the second practical illustration given, below.
2^ CE Ass. 20 octobre 1989 Nicolo.
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subsequent, accepted. Later this primacy was recognised for Community regulations2^.
Applicants cannot usefully rely on a Community directive against an individual decision30.
Specifically regarding directives, the compatibility of a French regulatory act with a
Community directive can be questioned and an interested party can ask the government to
transpose a Community directive or to abrogate or modify a text incompatible with a
directive34.'^Furthermore, a directive can be indirectly invoked by raising an exception
d'illegality against the regulatory text on which the individual decision that is challenged is
based32.
Early case-law — presumption in favour of project: The Conseil d'Etat's attitude was
initially a significant problem of enforcement that continues to bear consequences because of the
rulings' demonstrative value. Early jurisprudence indicates a prejudice in favour of economic and
governmental interests. Between 1977 and 1982, of 58 cases concerning EIA, two were resolved in
a manner favourable to the environment33. Le Monde was provoked to write34 "[t]he CE
systematically finds against those who complain of the inadequacy of impact studies," and the
CE appeared to consider the EIA procedure as a "nest of contention"35
The CE initially refused to examine seriously the contents of an EIS36. When it did examine
the EIS, its approach was lax, failing to insist that a document be clearly labelled an
environmental impact study, failing to require the separate treatment of the points listed in
2 9 CE 24 septembre 1990 Boisdet.
30 CE 22 decembre 1978 Cohn Bendit Rec, p.524, a claimant "can never usefully rely upon a
Community directive to support a challenge directed against an individual decision." However,
the requirement to interpret in the light of Community directives is accepted: CE ass. 28 fevrier
1992 SA Rothmans International France et SA Philip Morris France, Rec. p.80; RFDA, 1992.425.
34 CE ass. 3 fevrier 1989 Alitalia, Rec. p.44.
32 CE 8 juillet 1991 Palazzi, Rec. p.276, AJDA 1991.827.
33 Caballero, p.37.
34 Le Monde 2 September 1982, p.27.
35 Caballero, "Le Conseil d'Etat, ennemi de l'environnement?," RJE 1-1984 p.3, at p.37.
36 Caballero, p.38.
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EIA decree 77-114137, or even that they be separated from the explanatory note on the
project33. The public's participation was thus made more difficult.
The developer was rarely required to remedy his poor performance. Although an EIS was
required to present a 'serious analysis' (proportional in depth to the importance of the
project3^) of the four elements listed in the decree, the CE accepted EISs that contained
significant omissions43. Further, it censured an administrative court for finding an incomplete
EIS insufficient41 on the basis that the omissions were not "determining". The necessity of a new
inquiry, in the event of changes in the project, was kept to a strict minimum42.
The bias of the CE, both judge and government counsel, was most blatant in its support of
nuclear projects43 at a time when the general atmosphere surrounding nuclear issues was
3' CE 9 juillet 1982 Ministre de I'Industrie.
Article 2, decree 77-1141: An analysis of the initial state of the site; an analysis of the
effects on the environment; the reasons for which the project was chosen; and the measures to
attenuate the negative effects as well as the costs of doing so.
38 CE 5 juin 1981 Association federative regionale de protection de la nature, Req. nos
21.346 and 21.585; Cf: even the commentary in the Doctrine section of AJDA was mildly critical,
p.590.
Doctrine, pp.590-91; on proportionality, see CE 14 octobre 1988 Commune de Saint-
Vrain, CJEG 1989, p.189 conclusions Stirn.
40 E.g., CE 5 juin 1981 Association federative regionale de protection de la nature, req.
no.21.346: the EIS for a road deviation that omitted any reference to the impact on fauna was
considered sufficient.
41 CE 9 juillet 1982 Ministre de I'Industrie c/ Comite departemental defense contre les
couloirs de lignes a tres haute tension, Rec., p.277. The description of the initial site did not
mention the classified sites, historical monuments or leisure areas; and the costs of the measures
to lessen the impact on environment were missing. See also CE Doctrine, p.590.
42 For instance, in the event of project modifications a new inquiry was not needed unless
they modified "the general economy of the initial project" ("portent atteinte a I'economie
generate du projet initial", Sect. CE 20 mai 1966 Dame Veuve Pouvillon, Leb. p.355); affected
the importance and the intention of the project (CE 4 mai 1979 Departement Savoie Leb. p.185);
or were substantial or important (CE 25 mai 1978 Mme Bayret, Leb, p.239; CE 23 avril 1982
Association des proprietaires et exploitants sarthois et autres, req. no. 24.011. An idea about
what was considered 'important' was given by a much-criticised decision: CE 14 decembre 1981
Association des amis des sites du Vexin fran^ais et autres, req. 24.922, 25.146; 27.123; see
comments Doctrine, AJDA, p.588-89).
43 CE 9 novembre 1979 Association pour la defense du littoral Flandre-Artois, Rec. T. p.759;
CE 11 janvier 1980 Comite regional d'information et de lutte antinuclaeaire de Basse-
Normandie, Rec. T. p.926; CE 11 janvier 1980 Societe civile groupement agricole des falaises de
Flamanville, Rec. p.7; CE 8 janvier 1982 Comite d'action socialiste de la moyenne Vallee du
Rhdne, Rec.T. p.684: cited Caballero, p.38.
Romi, RDP 1990, p.1140; also see Prieur's comment (Prieur, "Pas de caribous au Palais
Royal, 1985 RJE 137 at 142): "The vice president of the Conseil d'Etat has clearly admitted
this: nuclear policy was not paralysed because the judge imposed guarantees for the construction
of nuclear power stations thanks to his role of counsel."
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strained. In sum, before the CE "the odds of the environment [were] inversely proportional to
the interests in question"44.
More recent case-law: The Conseil d'Etat's attitude is evolving45, and EIA85/337 may
receive more effective treatment than was previously the case for national EIA rules. An EIS
that is contradictory or contains uncertainties is now considered 'not serious'46. The
responsibility of the State has been acknowledged in the matter of a mere impact 'notice'
(required of certain projects falling below the full EIA threshold)4''. Moreover, the CE has been
more open to challenge in nuclear matters; it even sought the opinion of the ECJ before annulling
several administrative orders authorising the disposal of radioactive waste that were not in
accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom treaty48. Nevertheless, the effects of the earlier
negative case-law are still perceptible in some ways.
Lower Administrative Courts: Lower administrative courts have consistently taken a more
daring stance in defence of the environment. Before the CE had annulled any administrative act
for an illegality involving the EIS the administrative courts had annulled several49 (some of
which the CE overturned). At times these annulments were on grounds not recognised by the CE:
for example, an EIS that treated some, but not all of the four elements listed in Article 2, EIA
decree 77-1141 was found insufficient50, and it was ruled that an EIS dating from six years prior
to the authorisation no longer took account of changes of circumstances in fact or in law54. After
44 Caballero, pp.41-42: during the first years of enforcement of EIA rules, the rare victories
for environmentalists involved relatively minor projects.
45 It annulled an authorisation for insufficiency of the EIS for the first time in 1983; CE 10
juin 1983 Andre Decroix, Rec., p.255. Such annulments have become more frequent since: CE 7
mars 1986 Ministre de I'industrie c/ FLEPNA, Rec., p.66 RJE, 1986, p.281; CE 9 dec. 1988
Entreprise de dragage et de travaux publics, RJE 1989, p.187; CE 13 avr. 1988 OPHLM du Var,
Rec., p.909.
46 CE 4 mai 1988 Sauveur Cardoso, Quot. Jur. 31 December 1988, note R. Romi.
47 CE 31 mars 1989 Madame Coutras, above.
48 See J.P. Colson, "Gravelines, Cattenom, Tchernobyl et les autres," RJE 1986 p.161; cited
in Romi, RDP 1990, p.1141.
49 T.A. Montpellier, 19 mai 1981 Association des pScheurs et conchyliculteurs du quartier
de Port Vendres, RJE 1981.4, p.326; T.A. Rouen, 26 juin 1981 Renaudeau d Arc, Rec., p.534; T.A.
Caen 12 janvier 1982 Comite departemental de defense contre les couloirs de lignes a tres haute
tension, RJE 1982.3, p.313; T.A. Limoges, 1 fevrier 1983 FLEPNA RJE 1984, p.150.
50 T.A. Poitiers, 21 oct. 1981 Caillaud, Rec., p.828.
51 T.A. Bordeaux, 22 octobre 1987 Association pour la defense de Genissac, RJE 1988, p.163;
see note Charbonneau, p.166.
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the adoption of the European directive, some lower courts, interpreting in the light of
EIA85/337, ruled that the EIS must also include those elements contained in the European
directive but not yet mentioned in the French texts32. The attitudes of lower administrative
judges have been positive enough to warrant political challenge to limit their power33.
Although lower courts have been fairly meticulous in annulling an administrative
authorisation where the EIS is inadequate or the procedure flawed, this is not the case
regarding classified installations. As seen, the judge has extensive powers (plein contentieux).
However, in practice these powers are unused. The major problem in administrative litigation
involving classified installations is simply that the judge very rarely uses these powers34.
2.3. Interim measures — Sursis (Interlocutory injunction):
One of the first hurdles faced by those who attempt to enforce environmental rules is to
obtain interim protection. Although procedural matters concerning the award of interim
measures are in theory governed by national rules, the ECJ has issued decisions that imply an
element of Community supervision: it is a Community goal that Member States impose
"conditions which are uniform so far as the granting of such relief is concerned."33 Among the
Community criteria for granting interim relief are the existence of a prima facie case (fumus ?
boni juris); that the main application not be pre-judged, and that the applicant be able to
demonstrate urgency, usually by showing that he will suffer serious and irreparable harm. A
balance of the interests at stake is also implied36. As per Factortame^, national courts are
32 Prior to their amendment. For instance: T.A. Strasbourg, 2 aout 1989 Province de
Hollande septentionale et autres c/Etat RJE 1-1990, p.125 at p.127: without specifically citing
the European directive, the judgment mentions transboundary effects, an element only included
in the European legislation: "que le contenu de letude d'impact ... ne peut se limiter aux seuls
effets sur I'environnement a I'interieur du territoire frangais des travaux et amenagements
projetes...". See also T.A. Pau, 2 decembre 1992, below which refers expressly to the European
directive.
53 Romi, RDP 1994, p.1204; see conclusions of this chapter.
34 Encyclopedie Dalloz, Contentieux administratif, p.6; Caballero, p.31.
55 Case C-143/88, C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Siiderdithmarschen v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe et
al, 1991 ECR 1-415,1-534, para. 26.
56 For Community criteria, Chapter 3 at 2.1. Time and interim measures.
57 Case C-213/89 Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433 at para.23: "...Community law must be
interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in a case before it concerning Community
law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of
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obliged to grant interim measures in order to protect rights claimed by the parties under directly
effective provisions of Community law, even if they must set aside national legislative
provisions to do so. Various types of interim measure (mainly in the form of injunction) are
available in France, at times more easily than at Community level.
Customary law injunction (sursis de droit commun): The interlocutory injunction (sursis d
execution58) available under customary law^ is generally the principal form of interim relief
available (the one which would be applied for in a case involving classified installations, if
the challenge involved neither the EIS nor the public inquiry) and the most difficult to obtain.
Here conditions are very similar to Community criteria. First, the existence of a serious
argument for the annulment of the decision is required, and secondly, the risk of damage that is
difficult to repair6®. However, given the non-suspensive effect of an action before an
administrative court61, the conditions for the award of interim relief are narrowly construed
and have been progressively restricted62. The Conseil d'Etat, furthermore, added what seemed
to be a third criterion for the common law injunction: the discretionary power of the
administrative judge. Even when the first two conditions were present, the judge was not obliged
to pronounce in favour of the injunction63 — arguably this should no longer be the case, since
Factortame requires national judges to set aside such obstacles where they affect Community
rights. Practically, the customary law injunction is rarely obtained, particularly where a
classified installation is involved, since the harm caused by the execution of an administrative
national law must set aside that rule"; more generally, see Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 1978 ECR 629, para. 24.
5 ^ As translated by Dickson, 1994, p.81.
'
The nearest translation available for droit commun. It is now accepted that customary
law can be used to supplement statutory provisions; Dickson, 1994, p.12.
60 "Un moyen serieux d'annulation et le risque d'un prejudice difficilement reparable." See
Prieur, RJE 1991, p.27; Doctrine, p.591; "irreparable" damage is sometimes seen, and Article L.10
nouveau du Code des tribunaux administratifs et des cours admiriistratifs d'appel mentions the
concept of "consequences irreversibles".
61 Stemming from the presumption of legality attached to an administrative decision.
62 Cf: J-J. Gleizal, "Le Sursis a execution des decisions administratives, Theorie et
politique jurisprudentielle," AJDA 1975, p.382.
63 CE 13 fevrier 1976 Association de sauvegarde du Quartier Notre Dame a Versailles. See
comments by Babadji, Ramdane, "Le Sursis a Execution pour absence d'etude d'impact, RJE 3-
1992, p.313.
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decision in matters of classified installations is rarely considered 'difficult to remedy'64:
environmental costs appear to be underestimated in favour of more immediate industrial and
economic gains65.
However, French rules regarding EIA and public inquiry offer possibilities of interim relief
not foreseen at Community level66.
Nature Protection Act injunction: In recognition of the importance of prevention specifically
where the environment is concerned, an "atypical injunction"67 was introduced as early as 1976
in the EIA legislation. Dispensing with the conditions for a customary injunction, an 'automatic
injunction', independent of the administrative judge's discretion68, is available against an
administrative authorisation as soon as it is noted that an EIS is absent from the file on which
the administration's decision was based6^. With time, the inclusion of an EIS, however poor,
has become habitual, and accordingly the 'automatic' nature of this injunction has diminished.
In spite of contrary recommendations7^, in order to maintain the usefulness of this provision
64 Encyclopedic Dalloz, Contentieux administrate, p.3.
65 See cost/advantage discussion in CE 28 mai 1971 Vilie Nouvelle Est; CE 25 juillet 1975
Syndicat CFDT des marins pecheurs de la rade de Brest 1976 RJE 63.
However, recently lower administrative courts have been more willing to grant interim
relief; Hanicotte, "Les sursis...," p.1587.
66 Besides the two injunctions discussed below, a law on decentralisation, Loi 82-213 2 mars
1982, gives local officials the opportunity to request urgency measures, dispensing with the need
to prove irreparable damage, and the court must decide within 48 hours. The usefulness of this
for environmental purposes is limited, since the Conseil d'Etat (Ordonnance 15 decembre 1982
Commune de Garches) requires a 'liberty' to be at risk, and the environment is not considered a
Constitutionally protected liberty.
67 Babadji, 1992, p.315.
68 "II ne pent done faire usage du pouvoir de libre appreciation qu'il s'est reconnue meme
lorsque les conditions d'octroi sont reunies (He cannot therefore make use of the power to freely
appreciate that he has recognised for himself even when the conditions for obtaining (interim
relief) have been united)" Doctrine, p.591. CE Ass. 13 fevrier 1976 Association de sauvegarde du
quartier Notre Dame, Lebrun, p.100; AJDA 1976, p.302; CE Ass. 2 juillet 1982 M. Christian Huglo
et Mme Corinne Lepage-Jessua AJDA 1982, p.657.
6^ Nature Protection Act, Article 2\ "If a challenge ... is founded on the absence of an
environmental impact study, the court fciezect^with the request grants the application for a
sursis as soon as the absence is noted with an urgent procedure."
This injunction represents a shift in emphasis in what is perceived as the 'general
interest': from protecting the general interest by allowing the administration to carry out its
decision (the premise for the customary law injunction); to protecting the general interest, in
this case the environment, by preventing the administrative decision from being carried out
hastily; for further comments, see Babadji, 1992, p.320.
7® "...the absence of an impact study invoked by the law must be regarded as a material
absence and not a juridical absence ('/'absence d'etude d'impact' evoquee par la loi doit Stre
regardee comme une absence materielle et non comme une absence juridique)"; Doctrine, p.592.
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many lower courts71 have interpreted the concept of 'absence' to include not only physical but
legal absence. Where the document does not treat the elements listed in Decree 77-114177, it is
deemed to be absent. The CE has remained evasive in the event that the EIS covers some but not
all of the listed elements73.
Public Inquiries Act injunction: Again derogating from customary conditions for injunction,
the Public Inquiries Act, Article 674, introduces a third type of injunction. Negative conclusions
of the inquiry commissioner are considered to foreshadow doubt as to the value of the works
undertaken73. Therefore, if the conclusions are negative, and if one of the arguments raised is
serious and of such a nature as to justify the annulment of the decision the injunction is, again,
'automatic'.
Debate here centres on the circumstances under which the commissioner's conclusion can be
considered unfavourable. In a 1989 ruling the Conseil d'Etat upheld on appeal76 an
administrative court which had found that favourable conclusions assorted with conditions
that were subsequently unfulfilled were to be looked upon as unfavourable. Once the conclusions
Hanicotte argues that a judge of interim measures can only note the material absence of
an EIS; to note the judicial absence would be to prejudge the substance of the case; Hanicotte,
"Les sursis...," p.1590.
71 T.A. Besan^on 29 March 1990, Commission pertnanente d'etudes et de protection des eaux
du sous-sol et de cavernes de Franche-Comte c/ Prefet du Territoire de Belfort RJE 1991, p.207;
where the sursis was accorded because the inadequacies of the initial analysis of the site were
deemed "suffisamment criante" (sufficiently glaring) as to justify the acknowledgement of the
'absence' of the EIS; and T.A. Rennes, 25 aout 1989 Henri Moreaux et Denis Jouon des Longrais,
RJE 1990, p.113, where the sursis was granted on the basis of the EIS's summary and imprecise
nature; T.A. Pau, Association agreee de piche de la Gaule Paloise, req. no.3136-89.
77 Article 2, i.e.: an analysis of the initial site; an analysis of the effects on the
environment; the reasons for which, among the alternatives, the project has been chosen; the
measures considered to diminish the effects on the environment and an estimation of the
corresponding costs.
73 Cf: CE 28 septembre 1984 Rondeau et Chemouny, RJE 1984, p.330; CE 12 fevrier 1990
Federation departementale des associations agreees de pSche et de pisciculture des Hautes-
Alpes; see comments in Babadji, p.329.
74 Article 6: Administrative jurisdictions seized with a request for interlocutory injunction
of a decision taken after the unfavourable conclusions of the inquiry commissioner or commission
of inquiry shall allow this request if one of the arguments invoked in the application appears,
at the stage of instruction, serious and of a nature to justify the annulment."
75 Pacteau, p. 10.
76 CE 13 March 1989, Commune de Roussillon req. 92-144.
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are deemed unfavourable, the application must be granted without further appreciation on the
part of the judge77.
Although the legislative framework for obtaining interim relief is favourable (at least
where EIA is required), cautionary comments must be made. Although Article 186EC refers to
"any necessary interim measures", the interim relief contemplated in France is generally only
the suspension of the administrative decision. And because of the presumption of legality
attached to an administrative decision, even if an association has obtained injunctive relief,
the president of the Contentious Division (Section du contentieux) can use the power conferred on
him78 to suspend the administrative judgment according the injunction7^. An 'injunction of the
injunction' (sursis au sursis) has been accorded in cases regarding EIA80. (Notably, a similar
provision exists at the European level8!.)
Slowness: The worst problem concerning interim relief is the slowness with which the
decision to grant it or not is made, which as Hanicotte points out, contrasts suspiciously with
the speed of construction. As with the Leybucht Dikes case at Community level, often an
application for interim relief becomes without object by the time it is considered82. In this
national context the situation is worsened by the fact that no real time limit exists for the court
'' In this regard, the Conseil d'Etat (CE 30 avril 1990 Association Lindenkuppel LPA 20
fevrier 1991, note Pacteau) notes that reference to "the circumstances of the case" is superfluous.
The Loi Barnier has further amended this to state more clearly that an injunction is also
available automatically where a decision was taken without the public inquiry being held;
Article 6 of loi 83-630, as amended by 95-101.
78 By Article 23, decree 28 november 1953, (decree 12 mai 1980 confers on adjunct president
of the section du contentieux). See conclusions de M. Jacques Biancarelli, CE ass. 2 juillet 1982
Huglo et autres 1982 AJDA p.658.
' ' The decree conferring this power was challenged — unsuccessfully — in 1982; CE 2 juillet
1982 Huglo et autres, conclusions Biancarelli: suspension of a sursis is not even considered a true
jurisdictional action (veritable fonction juridictionnelle), but "merely taking a provisional
action that makes live again, for a time, the effects of an administrative decision that has
itself been temporarily suspended."
80 For example the effects of a judgment T.A. Bordeaux were suspended that had given a
sursis a execution against a prefectoral arrtte authorising the extension of a quarry on the basis
of the last line of Article 2, Loi 10 juillet 1976 (ordonnance du 30 aout 1978 Societe Sud-Ouest
Materiaux et autres, req. no.13.784 et 13.889); more recently one was accorded in a case concerning
a sand quarry and wetlands; CE 6eme and 2eme Sous-sec., 30 juin 1995 Sabliere de Millieres, req.
no.157848, suspending the injunction given on 31 March 1994.
81 Rules of Procedure of the ECJ, Article 87.
82 CE 10 octobre 1980, Syndicat d'initiative de Criel-sur-Mer. See comments, below,
regarding the slowness of decisions on injunctive remedies.
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to decide83. Therefore the lenience of conditions for award of interim relief can easily be
thwarted in practice. Furthermore, the CE has also rejected applications for refere and constat
d'urgence procedures84 to counter this slowness.
Theoretically, then, there is no discrimination either against Community rules or
environmental rules and in fact the legislative framework favours environmental interests.
However, the use made of discretion means that in practice the results of applications for
interim relief in environmental situations are usually disappointing85.
2.4. Locus standi:
The Community has been consistent in urging national governments to provide the most
generous approach to establishing standing as possible (while not opening the floodgates
itself86). In the French context an individual applicant must have an interest in obtaining the
annulment of the challenged decision; it must have an effect on his personal situation, which
will improve if the decision disappears. This can be a material or moral interest8'7, a personal
interest88, or a public interest. Interest must be sufficiently important ("suffisamment
important"). Notably, the attempt to have the right to the environment recognised as a
fundamental freedom that would then warrant the same protection as other fundamental
83 Although Urbanism Code Article L.421-9 (second indent) mentions one month, no
penalty is attached to letting this delay lapse and it is, in fact, rarely respected; Hanicotte,
"Les sursis...," p.1585. Moreover, the Conseil d'Etat estimates that it would be harmful to
attach sanctions to passing the one month deadline; Conseil d'Etat, "L'Urbanisme: pour un droit
plus efficace," p.110.
84 Refere: the president of the administrative court can order measures to facilitate the
instruction, notably expertises. Constat d'urgence: the president of the administrative court is
empowered to obtain, not an expertise, but the acknowledgement that the facts risk
disappearing before the action opens. For the former, CE 18 juin 1980, Comite departemental de
protection de la nature de Sadne-et-Loire, Rec. T. p.802; for the latter, CE 1 juin 1979, Commune
de Lattes, Rec. T. p.803.
85 Hanicotte, "Les sursis...," p.1591.
86 See Chapter 3, at point 2. Article 173 and Legal Title.
87 For ex: the faithful have an interest in the celebration of their cult, CE 8 fevrier 1930,
abbe Dehard.
88 Though not necessarily exclusively personal.
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freedoms (including access to justice for anyone whose environmental rights were affected) has
failed^9.
Where collective interests are concerned, one problem is that the Conseil d'Etat has not
taken a firm stance: the CE often rejects9^ or accepts91 the application on the merits, without
pronouncing on the issue of standing.
As for the lower courts, on the whole, rules of standing in administrative proceedings have
been interpreted very tolerantly92. Legally constituted associations can defend their own
interests or the collective interests listed among the organisation's goals in their founding
statute92. Some legislation requires that the organisation exist for a specific (and occasionally
s ' Regarding the famous lie de Re project. In a fourth case concerning this bridge, the
Fondation Cousteau and nine other associations raised the argument of a voie de fait, an
extremely serious sanction of the administration on the grounds of a grave irregularity and
harm to a fundamental liberty, which brings the administration before a judicial judge. In the
event, the Tribunal des Conflits, 25 janvier 1988, found that "the pursuit of the works despite
the annulment of the declaration of public utility, although this would harm the environment,
has not infringed a fundamental liberty."
Similarly in Spain, debate surrounds the establishment of a subjective right to
environment; this, too, has failed.
90 CE 26 juillet 1985 Affaire Union Regionale pour la defense de I'environnement, de la
nature, de la vie et de la qualite de vie en Franche Comte (URDEN) Req. no.35024. Commissaire
du gouvernement Marc Dandelot, AJDA 20 December 1985, p.741. The lower courts have on
occasion used the same strategy, for example: T.A. Paris, 12 decembre 1984 Association
Greenpeace c/ Secretaire d'Etat aupres du Premier ministre charge de VEnvironnement et de la
Qualite de la vie et S.A. Moulin rouge, where the application is rejected "sans qu'il soit besoin
de statuer sur la recevabilite de la requite".
91 Recently, more applications have succeeded, also "without there being a need to
pronounce on standing; e.g. CE 29 juin 1990 Federation departementale des chasseurs de la
Dordogne et de I'Union nationale des federations departementales des chasseurs, RJE 1991, p.49.
Ex: The first article of the judgment itself states that the Federation and the Union's
applications are admissible, without going into details.
92 Dalloz administratif, 1992, p.206.
BONELLO, Y-H, and FfiDlDA, J-M, Le Contentieux de I'environnement, P.U.F., Que sais-
je?, Paris, 1994, at p.61; even an undeclared association's standing has been accepted, and more
surprising still, a dissolved association, since the case had commenced prior to its dissolution.
The court is usually more strict in allowing standing where construction permits are
concerned than for other regulatory decisions; Dandelot, AJDA 20 dec 1985 p.741. This is borne
out by the Loi Bosson, an attempt to limit litigation in the area of challenges to construction
permits.
Nonetheless, the application of an association (Truites, Ombres, Saumons) explicitly
listing protection of rivers and aquatic habitats in its founding statute was inexplicably
declared inadmissible to challenge a prefectoral authorisation for changing the course of a
river that would affect a Ramsar-protected wetland; TA Caen, 6 decembre 1994; see Romi, R.
"Politiques publiques d'environnement: nouveaux developpements legislatifs," 1995 Revue de
Droit Public 765 at 771, note 12.
92 For example in the case T.A. Bordeaux 22 octobre 1987 Association pour la defense du
cadre de vie de Genissac c/ Commissaire de la Republique de la Gironde (RJE 1 1988, p.163)
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excessive) period of time prior to the date of the events being challenged94. Geographical
proximity can also be a determining criterion95; having a geographic range too broadly defined
can be detrimental to establishing an interest96. In the area classified installations, the
standing of associations can also be estimated in light of the importance of the inconveniences
caused by the installation97.
Generally, title to act in administrative proceedings for approved associations is not
particularly problematic98 in this Member State.
2.5. Administrative responsibility:
Another issue relevant to the effectiveness of enforcing Community obligations in the
national context surrounds the circumstances under which the State can be held liable for its
actions.
State responsibility can be linked to a flawed authorisation procedure for a project or
classified installation: the prefect must respect rules of competence, must oversee
administrative procedures, and must check that the proposed installation is compatible with
planning documents99 and other rules that may apply4".
concerning an insufficient EIS, the judge was obliged to examine the issue in depth: the goals of
the association in question are defined very specifically to include a variety of domains:
quality of life, urbanism and public works projects, the environment and all types of pollution.
The association was registered and had existed for at least six years before the date of the
event challenged. Geographical proximity was considered.
94 E.g., Classified Installations Act, Article 22-2 requires that associations have existed
for five years prior to the occurrence of the events.
95 See also CE 8 fevrier 1957 Angier, Rec., p.96; CE 26 juillet 1985 Ministre de
I'Environnement, req. 61242.
96 CE 26 mai 1976 SOS Paris, Lebon, p.280.
Also a federation of associations cannot act where the attacked decision concerns only
one of the represented associations; CE 15 janvier 1986, req. 48271. It can intervene or join the
action of one of its members, however.
97 CE sect. 4 decembre 1964, Ministre de I'Industrie c/ Syndicat de defense des interets des
quartiers des Arciveaux et autres, Rec., p.614.
98 Guillaume, "Le contentieux des installations classees," Encyclopedic Dalloz,
Contentieux administratis p.3.
99 Art.R.123-31 Code de l'Urbanisme. This is measured not by the law applicable on the
date the permit was delivered but by the legislation in force on the day of judgment: Colson,
RIDC 1992, p.126; PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.597.
490 E.g., the authorisation for installations that risk contributing to air pollution must
respect special protection zones.
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A procedural mistake is sanctioned only where the procedure is essential (as are EIS, public
inquiry, and even an impact 'notice'). For instance, by depriving the public of the chance to voice
its concerns, the failure to conduct a public inquiry constitutes an administrative transgression
(faute administrative) that can activate state responsibility101. If the authorisation is
annulled for a formal irregularity it remains unresolved doctrinally whether compensation is
accorded102. Concerning substance of the EIS, both excessive leniency or severity in the initial
authorisation can be sanctioned. Article 8, EIA85/337103 is here given substance: the State can
be held responsible for issuing a project authorisation based on poor verification of the EIS104 if
direct damage to the petitioner or a third party has occurred. The fault of the victim which led
the Administration to make a mistake may relieve the Administration entirely or partially of
responsibility. In practice the responsibility of the State has been engaged in the matter of a
mere impact 'notice': the CE found that the State, by authorising a hydro-electric work on the
basis of an insufficient impact notice, had engaged its responsibility, which in the event was
divided between the negligent operator and the State105.
More relevant to LCP88/609106, State liability can be engaged by failure to carry out
supervisory and inspection obligations107. Generally the persistence of nuisances attributable to
the failure of the authorities to ensure the respect of applicable legislation or their failure to
prescribe the necessary precautions108 can constitute simple negligence (faute simple109), or in
the case of "imminent and grave danger", gross negligence (faute Zourde110). Numerous powers
101 CE 20 janvier 1989 Ministre Delegue charge de Venvironnement c/ Arbet Req. no. 83.623.
102 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.87.
103 Requiring the information gathered to "be taken into consideration in the development
consent procedure."
104 T.A. Grenoble, 8 juin 1984, Michallon, RJE 1984, p.240; CE 31 March 1989 Madame
Coutras RJE 4-1989, p.455.
105 The state was condemned to pay 75,000F with interest as its part of the shared
responsibility: CE 31 March 1989 Madame Coutras RJE 4-1989, p.455; see comments, Colson,
RIDC 1992, p.127.
106 Since EIA85 /337 does not requiremonitoring.
107 CE, 22 mars 1978 Brelivet, RJE 1-1981 p.45; see PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.433.
108 T.A. Caen 17 octobre 1972, Syndicat de defense contre la pollution atmospherique. See
Colson, RIDC 1992, p.127; Deruy, 1993 p.196.
100 Translation Deruy, 1993, p.196; CE 29 novembre 1963, Sieur Ecarot, Rec. p.597.
110 Peril grave et imminent, CE 23 octobre 1959 Doublet, Rec. 540, RDP 1959, p.802 note
Waline; p.1235 conclusions A Bernard.
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are accorded the prefect111, and the administration can be held responsible should he fail to
use them to make nuisances disappear112. It is positive that the inaction of inspection
services113, or action taken too slowly11*1, can also constitute a simple negligence that engages
the responsibility of the State. Where an omission of the administration is alleged, liability
^ .v'Liwvt. -i
is, logically, fault-based. " , ^
The State may be held liable for damage proceeding from public projects and installations,
if damage is abnormal and unusual. Here liability is without fault115: rather than proving
fault, the abnormality of the damage in view of the features of the area (troubles anormaux de
voisinage, below)116 must be demonstrated.
Judicial discretion: A difficulty encountered in attempting to establish State liability is
that the case-law leaves unclear the period after which the authorities' inaction becomes
sufficiently blame-worthy112 to engage state responsibility11^. As Colson says, "[n]ot all
illegalities in this area constitute fault, and every fault does not necessarily entail the
responsibility of its author"119. Furthermore, in the area of classified installations, judges are
111 See, for instance, Articles 23 and 24, Classified Installations Act.
112 CAA de Paris 29 decembre 1989, M. et Mme. Chavasse, no.89 P.A.O. 1811 CPEN p.8507,
"if the prefect retains the choice of means to use in order to ensure the execution of the law, he is
required, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to take those measures sufficient to put an
end to an irregular situation. Thus, the fact for the prefect to have failed to take all the
measures at his disposal to eliminate the disturbance provoked by a workshop of
photoengraving is of such a nature as to engage the responsibility of the State"; see Deruy, 1993,
p.198.
The judge who acts in place of the administration must respect the same formalities as
the prefect; CE Sect. 15 decembre 1989, Ministre de VEnvironnement c/ Soc. Sechinor, RJE 1990,
p.243. In the event of damageable consequences, however, his decisions do not generally engage
the responsibility of the State; Colson, RIDC 1992, p.129.
113 Besides positive fautes the Conseil d'Etat has accepted adminsitrative omissions
(faute d'omission) as fautes de service; CE 27 janvier 1988, AJDA 1988, p.352, note J. Moreau. See
Dalloz administratif, 1992, pp.236-37.
114 Dalloz administratif, 1992, pp.237; Colson, RIDC 1992, pp.122-24.
115 Under a regime established by Loi 28 pluviose An VIII. Regarding air pollution, for
example the state has been held strictly liable in the laying of tarmac, CE 11 octobre 1972
Ministere de I'Equipement c/ Judeaux; in the operation of garbage incineration, CE 22 juillet 1977
Association de communes de la conurbation de Caen; and for odours from a garbage dump, CE 3
juillet 1970, Commune de Dourgne.
116 Deruy, 1993, p. 196.
117 "Fautive" translated by Deruy (Brealey, 1993) as "fault-based".
113 Encyclopedie Dalloz, Contentieux administratif, pp.2-3; Colson, RIDC 1992, p.128;
Deruy, 1993, p.198.
119 Colson, RIDC 1992, p.127.
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not overly eager to condemn the administration1211. Finding the State liable is even more
problematic when the administration has acted, but inappropriately, since the issue becomes
one of appreciating the quality of the administration's intervention.
Again, on paper the situation favours effective enforcement of environmental rules; again,
the use of discretion, particularly regarding available powers, is often disappointing.
2.6. Practical illustration — Tunnel du Somport:
An important ruling!21 illustrates many problems of practical implementation and
enforcement discussed separately above, and the influence of EC environmental law — as well as
of EC transport projects — in France. It also illustrates the reality and the limits of using the
EIA procedure to defend environmental interests.
■)
The project concerns an access road to a tunnel to be dug under a Pyreneen mountain (the
Somport), and the construction of a highway in Spain as part of a European project linking Pau,
France, to Saragossa, Spain. The towns are already linked by the RN134 in France and the N330
in Spain. Furthermore a railway tunnel122, unused for two decades, already exists through the
Somport pass: at 470 million francs, its rehabilitation was estimated to cost twelve times less
than the super-highway123. Artificial division of the project was a problem: although the
publicity materials vaunted the Pau - Saragossa link, the EIS covered, essentially, only 1300
metres of the access road to the tunnel124.
An application for interim measures was rejected12^, despite what appeared to be flaws
serious enough (in light of the administrative court's subsequent ruling) to qualify as a legal
absence of the EIS and therefore obtain an 'automatic' injunction12^.
120 Ibid.; See also Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.441 for instance: "...it is not the
judge's habit to easily recognise that the administration's transgressions constitute fault...Most
frequently, gross negligence (faute lourde) is required, whether the judge says so or not...".
121 T.A. Pau 2 decembre 1992 France-Nature-Environnement, Jean Pierre Berges et autres c/
Prefet de Pyrenees Atlantiques.
122 The Oloron-Canfranc tunnel.
123 Rodes, pp.52, 53. The powerful road lobby forestalled this option; it had fabricated a
study to discourage reopening of the existing rail tunnel before launching the project.
124 Although it mentions four kilometres of the project in general terms.
125 See Chapter 5, point 1.2.2. Rise of 'participation sauvage'.
126 Above, point 2.3. Nature Protection Act injunction.
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The Declaration of Public Utility necessary for the project was challenged by several
associations127. One of the associations' arguments raised the issue of artificial division of the
project. Even accepting the EIS's limitation to the tunnel's access road, the associations further
invoked the violation of the Community directive: the project's indirect effects (required by the
European directive125 but absent from the French rules until the 1993 amendment) were
neglected in the EIS. The associations also argued that the EIS did not take into account the
international effects of the project in Spain129.
Noting that the case-law of the CE is unclear1311, the Commissaire du Gouvernement^31
found the 'saucissonnage' alone sufficient to "taint with illegality" the administrative
authorisation. However, more importantly, the Commissaire referred directly to Article 7 of
the European directive, explaining that the French rules were silent on the matter of
transboundary effects132. Because the requirement exists in EIA85/337, the Commissaire found
that, at the least, a link between Spanish and French EISs was required133. Furthermore, the
Commissaire agreed that at least one important indirect effect, again required by the European
legislation, is missing from the EIS contents: no mention was made of the ten-fold134 increase in
traffic the project would entail in the classified Aspe valley135 and the consequences of this on
the safety and well-being of the local population, the pollution in the area and the effects on
127 One association, Mon Terroir, was eliminated because its objectives ("the defense of
interests and the quality of life of its members") were too general to have a link to the decision
being challenged.
125 EIA85/337, Article 3, point 4 of annex III.
129 Arguments concerning the an internal transport law and two other vices de procedure
invoked by the applicants are not discussed here.
130 Rey (p.282) refers to judgments both allowing and sanctioning project divisions. He then
refers to a T.A. judgment (Strasbourg) sanctioning such divisions, illustrating once again that
the courts of first instance are more adventurous on environmental issues.
131 Jean-Louis Rey.
132 He notes that, since an earlier CE decision, rejecting the need for a transfrontier study,
preceded the European directive it was unlikely that this jurisprudence could be maintained,
RFDA 9(2) March-April 1993, p.279.
133 Article 7, EIA85/337 requires a Member State, if it is "aware that a project is likely to
have significant effects on the environment in another Member State" to forward the
information gathered pursuant to Article 5 to the other State to serve as a basis for any
necessary bilateral consultation.
134 It was estimated that lorry traffic over twenty years is expected to go from 100 per day
to more than 1000 per day; The external services of the Ministry of Public Works put this figure
at 800 per day.
135 Classified as a ZNIEFF (zone naturel d'interSt ecologique floristique et faunistique).
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local fauna, such as the Pyrenees bear136. Noting the discrepancy between the European and
French legislation, the Commissaire proposed two solutions to the court. After discussing the
jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat on the direct effect of Community law137, as well as the
potential direct effect of the provision in question, he suggested a direct application of
EIA85/337. Alternatively, in keeping with the von Colson doctrine he proposed that the court
interpret the French legal text in the light of the European rules.
Choosing the latter option, the Court found that after 3 July 1988 (EIA85/337's entry into
force) there was cause to interpret French provisions in the light of the Community text. The
Declaration of Public Utility for the construction of the Somport tunnel and access road was
annulled.
At one point Madrid, Paris and Brussels were reportedly considering the rehabilitation of
the railway tunnel133, a move which would have been in keeping with the Commission's
sustainable transport strategy1351. However, applying a typical "fait-accompli" strategy14®,
works on the new tunnel began anyway in June 1993141, although a new Declaration of Public
Utility was accorded only in October 1993142 ~ and this, despite tens of thousands of letters of
protest143. As Saule says, "it is a sumptuous gift that the State is getting ready to make to the
road lobby, although the Aspois and the majority of Bearnais wish for the reopening of the
136 Reynes, Alain, "Reconcilier l'ours et les bergers," 110 (1995) Combat Nature 17.
137 See above, point 2.2, Disposition of the Administrative Courts: Position of Community
law in national system. Since an applicant cannot rely on a Community directive against an
individual decision (cf: CE 22 decembre 1978 Cohn Bendit) the Commissaire du Gouvernement
notes that the DUP is not an individual act but rather an act "d'espece" cf: CE Ass. 14 fevrier
1975 Epoux Merlin, or Commune de St Egreve, RDP 1988, p.564.
133 The Spanish part of the railway is still in use, see Michel Rodes, "Vallee d'Aspe: Le
chemin de fer de Canfran: les chances d'une reouverture," Combat Nature, no.108, February 1995,
p.551, at p.53.
1351 Com (92)46: Green Paper on the Impact of Transport on the Environment: A Community
strategy for 'sustainable mobility'.
140 Point 5, below.
141 Mentioned in "Howl for wolves as Alpine tunnel threatens valley," The Observer, 25
August 1996, p.16: about another situation in which "the national authorities "seem touched by
motorway madness under pressure from carmakers and public works lobbies."








Repeatedly it is seen that where the legal framework is generally positive, other pressures
work against giving full effect to environmental rules during enforcement. Nonetheless, lower
courts have at times been seen to interpret the rules in the manner most favourable in an
environmental situation: regarding interim measures, for instance14^, or interpreting in light of
the European directive. Yet where associations have been tenacious and administrative judges
of the first degree have been supportive, their victories are often of little practical effect
(which may discourage future applicants): once the procedure is regularised, and. occasionally
even when this has yet to be done146, the project is undertaken as planned. Indeed, Community
EIA rules require only that procedures be respected.
3. Civil Jurisdiction:
Community environmental obligations can also be enforced in civil courts — a difficult route
that nevertheless holds considerable potential. The threat of civil liability could be a useful
mechanism for encouraging the auto-enforcement of legal obligations: the polluter who may be
called upon to pay later is more likely, of his own initiative, to be meticulous in observing
obligations. This is especially essential when, as seen, administrations are typically neither
adequately equipped nor sufficiently inspired to monitor rules efficiently. Responsibility for
damage to the environment is usually non-contractual (responsabilite delictuelle and quasi-
144 Saule, p.9.
14^ Despite reluctance on the part of the CE, considering an EIS to be 'absent' when if fails
to cover all the elements listed in the contents, deeming the commissaire enquSteur's conclusions
to be negative, if they contain conditions that are subsequently unfulfilled.
146 See practical illustration, above; also point 5. Executing the judgment, below.
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delictuelle*47). Civil prescription is ten years, not from the time that the damage occurred but
from the time that it manifested itself448.
Often a civil offence also constitutes a penal offence. Since the civil jurisdiction must abide
by the penal decision, if a civil court is asked to judge the same facts it must suspend judgment
until the penal decision has been rendered (although it can order interim measures during this
time44^).
Bringing a suit in a civil court against a private person (natural or legal) for environmental
damage is a mined territory — as Despax phrased it, a "steeple-chase"4841; here difficulties are
examined more or less as they arise.
3.1. Interim relief:
As always, trying to halt the damage at least until the dispute can be resolved is a concern
particularly relevant to the environment. The judge of re/eres484 can be seized at any hour, on
the basis of Civil Code Article 809487, to prevent "imminent damage" or to make a "manifestly
illicit disturbance" cease. Works undertaken without EIA or without a construction permit, for
example, would qualify as "manifestly illicit". Despite the fact that the possibility exists,
applications for interim relief are very rare before civil jurisdictions. And if such an
application is made, Bonello and Fedida point out that the issue of interim relief depends upon
M-3-3 ■
the attitude of the judgefiinterim relief is not easily granted in civil jurisdictions.
447 The distinction is that quasi-delictuelle responsibility is engaged where no harmful
intention exists; Goubeaux, p.429. In fact, generally the distinction is not insisted upon and is not
useful to pursue here.
448 Civil Code, Article 2270-1: "Non-contractual civil liability actions are time-barred
after ten years, counting from the manifestation of the harm or its aggravation"; see also
Goubeaux, p.430.
44!4 Civil Code, Article 809; Code de procedure penale, Article 5-1, redact, loi 8 juillet 1983.
450 Despax, La Pollution des eaux et ses problemes juridiques, Litec, 1968, p.791.
454 See footnote 84, above.
487 Article 809: "The president can always...'even in the presence of serious opposition',
prescribe in a refere the conservation or restoration measures necessary either to prevent an
imminent damage or to make a manifestly illicit disturbance cease."
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3.2. Locus standi and collective interests:
The character of damage defines the legal title to make a claim (qualite pour agir). The
applicant must justify damage, which must be certain and direct153, to a legitimate, individual
right. Legitimation for individuals who have suffered a loss, material or moral, in their
property or person poses no particular problem. In the event of co-property the syndicate is
allowed to act where the harm has been suffered by each co-owner134; an association, composed
of the victims of a prejudice153, has standing in order to obtain a collective compensation (this
presents a problem where each member of the association is not individually affected).
The worst problem is that the environment is almost by nature a collective interest and is
almost always eliminated at this initial hurdle156. Regarding collective interests too diffuse
to be broken down into individual interests, and things belonging to no one (res nullius), direct
and personal injury cannot be established; therefore, neither can standing157. Without
targeting them specifically, such requirements affect environmental interests adversely because
of the nature of environmental harm.
Two principal problems are seen to impede the progress of collective interests in civil courts:
challenge surrounds not only the issue of who is entitled to claim, but also who should properly
be compensated. Advance could be made on both issues by entitling registered associations153 to
make a claim and by addressing the object of the action. The issue of who should receive
compensation would diminish in importance if, rather than monetary compensation, only
153 Discussed below.
154 Bonello and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.13.
155 Ibid.
156 It would seem that, although Community rules could be adversely affected, Community
law is not particularly helpful here: see for instance Case 158/80 Rewe-Handeslgesellschaft
Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Stejfen v Hauptzollamt Kiel 1981 ECR 1805, para.44 "...it must be
remarked first of all that, although the Treaty has made it possible in a number of instances for
private persons to bring a direct action, where appropriate, before the Court of Justice, it was
not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of Community
law other than those already laid down by national law...". This has evolved in other areas,
however.
157 Martin, RIDC 1992, p.73-75; bonello and FfiDlDA, 1994, p.31.
153 Rather than the State: systematically entitling the State to act would result in
difficulties where the State's enterprise is the cause of the damage, or where installations
important to the State and following State policy are. The Commission finds itself in a
similarly difficult situation regarding pursuit of breaches involving Structural Funds.
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preventive and restorative remedies (as well as compensation for trial costs) could be sought in
such cases. At present, however, as a means of upholding Community environmental rules that
may confer collective interests, French civil jurisdictions are inadequate139.
3.3. Certain harm:
The traditional requirement that harm be "certain" causes other potentially useful judicial
actions to fall by the wayside: such requirements are awkward where environmental harm is
alleged and in apparent conflict with the Precautionary Principle160. It is well-known that
scientific uncertainty surrounding environmental harm is reflected in legal difficulties in
distinguishing between what constitutes environmental harm161 and what grade of
deterioration or damage must be tolerated. Further, environmental harm often takes years to
manifest itself as "certain." Where harm is certain and the action can proceed, scientific doubts
concerning, for instance, the capacity of the natural world to regenerate itself affect the
compensation given: as Martin states "between the incalculable and the non-existent there is but
a step which our market-based society easily and frequently takes162."
Although a future (i.e. strongly probable) loss can also be compensated1 63, future
environmental harm is scientifically all the more difficult to demonstrate. Bonello and Fedida
suggest modifying the relevant juridical interpretation, by "asserting that the prejudice is
neither future nor uncertain, but already irreversible in its process, even if the effects are not yet
observed."164 Although unlikely to be readily accepted, the suggestion's simplicity is
attractive163. Uncertain harm becomes certain once the contributing causes are set in motion,
139 See prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.733; Martin, RJE 1982, p.51.
160 It would be more appropriate to require a disturbance to cease before harm is 'certain'.
161 Martin, G., "Notion de responsabilite en matiere de dommages ecologiques," in Droit et
Environnement: Propos pluridisciplinaires sur un droit en construction, Presses Universitaires
d'Aix-Marseille, 1995; see also Com(93)47, p.10.
162 Martin, G., "Reflexions sur la definition du dommage a l'environnement: le dommage
ecologique 'pur'," in Droit et Environnement: Propos pluridisciplinaires sur un droit en
construction, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 1995.
163 Goubeaux, pp.431-33.
164 Bonello and FEdida, 1994, p.40.
163 Admittedly, it leaves uncertainties: e.g., financial calculation of compensation, the
state of scientific certainty.
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lessening the burden on the applicant who need only prove the contributing causes. However,
adapting the legal requirement to fit an environmental situation seems unlikely at present.
Where future harm can be considered certain, jurisprudence on occasion tries to assimilate
future harm to the loss of an opportunity. Martin notes that this is inadequate, both because in
the French context, loss of opportunity is subjected to strict tests and above all, because
reparation does not seek to compensate the final damage but rather the chance of future gains
lost166.
3.4. Direct damage — causation:
Again traditional legal requirements are poorly adapted to the nature of environmental
damage: the 'steeple-chase' resumes with the difficulty of establishing a causal link between
the polluting behaviour and damage to the claimant167. Indirect damage is not normally
accepted168 yet environmental damage is commonly indirect. Frequently a probability is the
most that can be established. At times this problem seems intractable169.
Discussions of ways in which to relax the strict causal link often come to nothing, as the
Community has also been forced to recognise. Causation was one of the problems discussed in the
Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage170. The Commission was also compelled to
remove the terms "overwhelming probability of the causal relationship" from the Community
proposal for a directive on liability for waste: probability — even 'overwhelming' - did not
166 Martin, "Reflexions...," 1995, pp.120-21.
167 Com(93)47, pp.10-11.
168 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.735; Martin, RIDC 1992, p.71.
169 For example, one case involved a fish farm located downstream from an agricultural
undertaking that dumped a product into the river. The fish died. Various expert valuations
established that the fish deaths were linked to a product from the group of dithiocartamates
and that the agricultural undertaking used such a product. However, used in the recommended
doses, the product contained guarantees for fish life. Since nothing proved that the farmers had
exceeded recommended doses, or that they used a more toxic product from the same group, a
direct causal link was not established and they were not found liable; Civ.2. 22 octobre 1980, ^
inedit, cited in Martin, RJE 1982, p.51. Ruling of the Cour d'Appel de Paris confirmed by the <s
Cour de Cassation. Possibly, the causal link was not established because responsibility was^.
sought on basis of fault: possibly "responsabilite du fait des choses" (below) would have been a /
better choice of foundation. Arguably a 'negative' approach (absence of other causes) to
causation would have been appropriate, below.
170 Com(93)47 final, p.10-11.
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appear stringent enough1'7!. ^ t^e national level as well, advance is slow. However, in France
an encouraging sign was given by some lower courts: "[i]n many instances, in fact, the case-law
had admitted that, no other cause appearing relevant, it was necessary to decide that the
pollution was at the origin of the damage."177 It has even been suggested that solutions
available concerning nuclear accidents be expanded17-1. Once again the lower courts are more
adventurous than higher courts: the Cour de Cassation has only recognised a 'negative'174
approach in one case of damage caused by supersonic aircraft17-1.
3.5. Responsibility176:
One of the choices confronting the victim is whether to seek liability on the basis of fault or
not. In the French context several approaches are available, and the applicant must take care
to maintain the same foundation of liability throughout the hierarchy of appeals177.
Unfortunately, the judges tend to take a restrictive approach with regard to the foundations
most frequently used in environmental matters. Where a restrictive approach is taken, it would
be useful to discern whether this is because the foundation is perceived as too favourable to the
171 Original proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste,
Article 4:(6); OJ 1991 C192/6 at p.13.
177 Martin, RJE 1982, p.51, citing, e.g., TGI Albertville 26 aout 1975 JCP 1976.11.18304. A
polluter was unable to give a reasonable explanation for the death of the bees of an apiculturer,
therefore the waste of fluoride substances were regarded as the true cause of the damage.
171 A presumption of cause exists also concerning nuclear accidents: Article 10, of Loi du 30
octobre 1968, institutes a presumption for bodily harm noted after a nuclear accident. Were such
an accident to occur, the government must present, by decree, a list of illnesses that should thus
be presumed to have been caused by the accident. As Martin suggests (RIDC 1992, p.71-72) this
solution, already used in the area of work-related illnesses, could be widened to apply to other
types of environmental legislation.
174 I.e., no other cause appearing relevant.
175 Civ. 12 octobre 1971 JCP 1972.11.17044.
176 Specifically on the matter of EIA, the project developer is liable in civil law for
damage linked to the project just as the plant operator is for harm done by the installation. The
fact that damage may have been foreseen in the EIS does not release the developer from
eventual responsibility. Should a third party be called upon to draw up the EIS, he is
responsible only towards the developer, as for any research contract. The EIS is, after all,
submitted by the developer.
177 The Cour de Cassation found that responsibility without fault invoked for the first
time before it was a new argument and therefore inadmissable; Cass.civ.III, 12 oct 1978, RJE
1979,2, p.13.
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victim, a problem that is difficult to address; or whether this is due to judicial timidity in
taking a stronger stance, which might eventually be encouraged from the European level.
Fault-based liability: The approach provided in articles 1382178 and 1383179 of the Civil
Code requires fault, which the claimant must prove. Fault is the blameable conduct or illicit
act, which a prudent individual would not have taken in the same circumstances (an element of
subjectivity is thus injected which varies over time and circumstance); negligence or
blameworthy imprudence18® are also considered faults and entail an obligation to repair181.
This approach presents advantages182. The violation of an administrative rule would be
enough to prove fault183 (although fault can exist even where the polluter has respected
administrative rules). Failure to take advantage of technological developments in order to
minimise disturbance can also constitute fault: the operator has chosen a means of exploitation
that causes prejudice to another184. Furthermore, if fault is demonstrated, the judge may be
more inclined to find the threshold of tolerable damage has been crossed188. If fault-based
responsibility is established, the victim may obtain damages and interest, as well as cessation
of the illicit activity. Nonetheless, fault-based liability is mainly sought in matters related to
urbanism188: in general environmental matters the victim rarely chooses this approach182.
178 Article 1382, Code Civil: "Any event whatsoever of a person that causes harm to
another, obliges the person by whose fault the harm occurred to repair it."
17^ Article 1383, Code Civil: "Each individual is responsible for the harm he has caused,
not only through his action, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence."
180 "Une negligence coupable" or "imprudence fautive", referring to the behaviours
discussed in Articles 1382 and 1383, Code Civil, and not the English tort of negligence.
181 Cass, civ., 7 decembre 1960, Bull., p.510; Cass, civil, 16 juillet 1969, D. 1970, Somm., p.47.
182 Furthermore, if the victim fails to prove fault under Article 1382, the victim can try
again on the basis of Article 1384 without the fear of the exception of res judicata being raised;
Civ. 5 mai 1941, D. 1941.1.107.
183 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.732.
184 Bonello and ffidida, 1994, p.17.
188 It has been argued that, if fault is argued, the victim need not demonstrate "abnormal"
(troubles anormaux de voisinage) prejudice; others argue that case-law does not clearly support
this conclusion. For the former, G. Viney, note sous Civ.lre, 27 mai 1975, D.1976, 318; for the
latter Martin, RIDC 1992, p.68.
186 Bonello and FLdida, 1994, p.16.
187 See comments, prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.731; Martin, Gilles J., "La Responsabilite civile du
fait des dechets en droit fran^ais," RIDC 1-1992, p.65 at p.68.
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Presumed liability — 'Responsabilite du fait des choses' (responsibility for things in one's
care): Victims more frequently seek liability based upon Civil Code Article 1384188, which
stipulates that one must answer for the damage caused by persons or things in one's care. The
victim must prove that the damage proceeds from the thing in the guardian's care, that this
'thing' is the generating cause' (cause generatrice) of the harm. Once it is established that the
thing has contributed to the damage, according to a formula established by the Cour de
Cassation in the 1950s189, the thing is presumed to be the generating cause of the harm. The
burden of proof then shifts to the guardian of the thing, who may attempt to break the causal
link (e.g., by demonstrating the unforeseeability or the inevitability of the harm).
It has been argued that this type of responsibility is, in principle, difficult to apply to
pollution190 (although a chemical industry has been found to be the 'guardian' of the gas it
emitted191, this foundation is perhaps more suitable for waste-related damage, since waste is
more easily qualified as a 'thing in one's care' than other types of pollution192). Nevertheless,
a possible advantage in choosing this foundation, in effect a type of strict liability, is that it
requires neither fault nor abnormal inconvenience. Unfortunately, precisely because of this,
judges have been reluctant to find responsibility for pollution for things in one's care, perhaps
because they find it too favourable for victims193.
Strict liability — Responsibility for 'troubles anormaux de voisinage' (abnormal disturbance
of the neighbourhood): The path most consistently chosen by victims in environmental matters,
strict liability presents the main advantage that the victim need not establish proof of fault or
negligence on the part of the polluter, but rather a causal link between the polluter's action and
188 Article 1384, Code Civil: "One is responsible not only for the harm caused by one's own
actions, but also for that which is caused by the action of persons for whom one must answer or
the things which are in one's care."
189 "por the application of article 1384, first indent, of the Civil Code, the inanimate object
must be the cause of the harm; but from the moment that it is established that it contributed to
the realisation of the harm, it is presumed to be the generating cause, unless the guardian can
bring proof of the contrary"; Cour de Cassation consistent rulings, cited in BONELLO and FfiDIDA,
1994, p.20.
190 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.731.
191 Civ. 17 decembre 1969, Bull., p.261; also concerning machinery noise, Cass, civ., 8 March
1978, D. 1978, p.641.
192 Martin, RIDC 1992, p.68.
193 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.732.
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the damage*9"*. As the Commission has indicated, it "provides incentive for taking measures to
prevent damage occurring in the first place."195 Compensation can be accorded for harm even
where precautions were taken and the legislation was respected. Where strict liability is not
already provided in the legislation198 it can be sought for 'abnormal disturbance'.
This dominant principle in the area of civil liability for environmental damage comes from
a case of industrial pollution brought before the Cour de Cassation over 150 years ago197: the
fundamental idea is that some 'normal' inconvenience must be tolerated in an industrial society.
However, beyond a certain threshold, which varies according to neighbourhood (ex: residential
or industrial) and related to the duration and gravity198 of the disturbance, the inconvenience
or damage is judged to be 'abnormal' and reparation is admissible*99. 'Abnormality' can be
attached to the damage, the trouble or the inconvenience7®®. Appreciating what is 'abnormal'
is subjective and generally judges apply this restrictively.
A major obstacle here is the controversial defence of pre-occupation, embodied, since 1980, in
Article L.122-16 of the Housing Construction Code (CCH2®1): if the victim's lease or
194 Obviously, compensation cannot be based on the faults committed; Civ. 27 octobre 1982,
J.C.P. 1984.11.20152.
A possible drawback is that civil liability without fault cannot coincide with criminal
responsibility, which supposes a fault; Goubeaux, p.441.
198 Com(93)47, pp.7,17.
198 See, for instance, Article L.142-2 Civil Aviation Code; Civil Liability for Nuclear
Energy (loi 30 octobre 1968; modified Loi 16 juin 1990); Marine Pollution (Brussels Convention 19
November 1969, Loi 77-530 26 mai 1977).
197 Cass. Civ., 27 novembre 1844, S. 1844.1.211: "If one cannot fail to consider that the noise
caused by a factory that reaches a degree that is intolerable for the neighbouring properties is a
legitimate cause for compensation, one cannot, on the other hand, consider that any type of noise
caused by the exercise of an industry constitutes damage that can give rise to compensation."
198 The concept of 'gravity' remains subjective, despite attempts to distinguish
characteristices (e.g. the disturbance need not be 'excessive', but simply abnormal: M. Bergel,
cited in BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.23).
199 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.732; Martin, G, "Droit civil de l'environnement," RJE 1-1982,
p.46; Deruy, 1993, p.191.
20® PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.733.
2®* Article L.122-16, Code de la Construction et de l'Habitation: "...the harm caused to
occupants of a building by the disturbance due to agricultural, industrial, artisanal or
commercial activities does not entail a right to reparation when the construction permit
accruing to the exposed building was requested, or the authentic act noting the transfer of
property or the undertaking of the lease were established subsequent to the existence of the
activities giving rise to the harm, once these activities are exercised in conformity with the
legislative or regulatory dispositions in force and they have been pursued in the same
conditions."
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construction permit was obtained after the existence of economic activities giving rise to
nuisance or damage, and these activities are carried out according to legal dispositions and
have continued in the same conditions since the victim's arrival, the damage does not give rise
to a right to compensation2®2. Making specific reference to L.122-16 CCH, the polluter can
invoke the fact that the victim acquired his property at a lower price because of his proximity
to the source of the nuisance2®2. The justification for the theory of pre-occupation is that the
victim has thus already obtained a form of reparation.
The theory has been harshly, and rightly, criticised for bolstering the polluter's right to
harm while punishing the victim by blaming the damage to which he has been subjected on his
own, rather than on the polluter's, behaviour2®4. It also fails to consider that scientific
evaluation of the harm may have evolved. The more the latter is exposed to nuisance, the less
he is compensated. The theory was born of bureaucratic convenience, and Article L.122-16 CCH
was intended to limit litigation. It has failed2®5. Pre-occupation stands as a barrier to a case-
by-case examination of abnormal disturbance and where this affects a Community right should
arguably be set aside2®^. In sum, for now the outcome of arguing abnormal disturbance is
uncertain, and the case-law is unclear.
Increased European emphasis on strict liability might generally encourage judges to be less
restrictive in applying foundations that they now appear to consider too favourable to the
victim2®2.
Administrative authorisation: The Commission has indicated that where a polluting
activity was authorised and the polluter complied with the authorisation, "there may be
2®2 On the other hand, the polluter cannot successfully invoke the victim's past tolerance
(Civ. 2e, 9 janvier 1975, Bull, civ.II, no.17, p.14); the polluter cannot rely upon the victim's pre¬
occupation of the area if the 'troubles' have augmented in intensity since the victim's arrival
(Civ. 2e, 4 juillet 1984 U.I.E. c/ Dupuy, inedit, cited Martin 1985, p.41) or if the polluter's
activities were not pursued in the same conditions (Civ. 3,e 22 fevrier 1984, Willems c/ Alepee
et autres, inedit, cited Martin 1985, p-41).
203 Civ., 30 janvier 1985, S.A.N.A.M. c/ Nicolle, inedit, cited Martin 1985, p.41.
2®4 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.733; see also Martin, RIDC 1992, p.72.
205 Martin, RJE 1982, p.46, and 1985, p.41.
206 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 1978 ECR 629,
para. 24; Case C-213/89 Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433 at para.23.
202 Pre-occupation is considered to avoid that reparatio unjustly enrich the victim.
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reasons for holding the public authority -- and ultimately the taxpayer — responsible for
ensuing damage."208 However, absolving the polluter completely where the activity was
authorised may encourage him to disregard the actual effects of his activities; sharing
responsibility between the administration and the polluter is more in keeping with the Polluter
Pays and Preventive Principles, and encourages both parties to heed the environmental effects
of the enterprise.
In France authorisations are accorded without prejudice to the rights of third parties (sous
reserve du droit des tiers)2°9. Even if all administrative obligations are met, "the rights of
victims cannot be put in question solely because the Administration has approved or authorised
a practice or behaviour."210 The drawback is that administrative authorisation does limit the
remedies available2*1.
Joint or Joint-and-several liability: If, as is frequent with environmental harm, the causes
of harm are multiple, the issue of whether liability should be joint or joint-and-several is a
concern. From an environmental perspective, joint-and-several liability appears the preferable
solution. The victim's burden is eased by not having to bring several cases against each polluter.
Frequently degrees of participation in environmental damage are impossible to determine212;
this difficulty is avoided with a joint-and-several solution, since each polluter is liable for the
entire amount. The damage is more likely to be covered, and the reparatory mission of civil
action to be accomplished, even given the eventual bankruptcy of one of the polluters.
Furthermore, it is the solution increasingly opted for at Community level213. However, it must
be acknowledged that (as the Commission indicates) its adoption could lead to a 'deep pocket
effect' and judicial congestion, as responsible parties then try to recover from each other214.
20® Com(93)47, point 2.1.5. ii, p.9: as the Commission points out this would also provide
incentive for full disclosure.
2°9 E.g., Classified Installations Act, Article 8.
210 Martin, RIDC 1992, p.66; PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.433.
211 The civil judge cannot order the cessation of a lawful activity; below.
212 See HL Select Committee on European Communities, Third Report, Session 1993-94,
"Remedying Environmental Damage," with evidence, p.17, point 52.
213 Com(93))47, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, pp.17-19; also strict
liability is chosen in the proposed directives on civil liability for damage caused by waste (OJ
1991 C192/6) and on the Landfill of Waste, Article 14 (OJ 1991 C190/1).
214 Com(93)47, p.8, point.2.1.4.
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Although it may ease difficulties of proving of the proportion of responsibility in the first
instance, such difficulties may merely be postponed to a later proceeding, as polluters judicially
pursue each other (which still presents an advantage for the original victim).
In France, victims are technically able to pursue the most solvent of the responsible parties
in solidum215. (A civil party before a penal jurisdiction can seek reparation in solidum only
insofar as all parties have been tried in criminal court and condemned2^.) Unfortunately,
courts can be very severe in allowing this only where the damage is strictly indivisible and in
practice the tendency is towards joint liability212. Here, the rules themselves do not adversely
affect environmental interests, however, judicial interpretation limits the use of the most
favourable solution.
3.6. Other Remedies (reparation):
Compensation: Compensation is the remedy most widely sought and accorded, and certain
problems relate specifically to this. Where harm proceeds from a lawful activity, the victim is
entitled only to compensation for the damage suffered, not to cessation of the activity218
(although recent jurisprudence does seek to limit the disturbance where possible, below).
Should the action pass the obstacles discussed above, fixing the amount of compensation for
an environmental loss that is outwith the market structure -- determining the value of "the loss
of a species or of a picturesque landscape"219 -- is a well-known difficulty220. Judges are
215 Code Civil, article 1382.36: "Each of the responsable parties of the same harm must be
condemned to repair it in its totality, without it being necessary to take account of the sharing
of responsability to which the judges of the substance have proceeded between the responsable
parties, which affects only the reciprocal relations of the latter and not the extent of their
obligations towards the harmed party. It is so even if one of the responsable parties has
remained unknown."
Code Civil, article 1384.33: "The guardian of a thing that has been the instrument of
harm, except where a completely exoneratory event of force majeure has been established, in
his relations with the victim, is held for total reparation except in the case of eventual recourse
against the third party who contributed to the production of the harm."
216 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.734.
212 See comments, Martin, RIDC 1992, p.71. For instance, air traffic noise was held to be
divisible: T.G.I. Paris, 13 juillet 1977; CA Paris, 19 mars 1979.
218 BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p .9.
219 Com(93)47, p.11.
220 Although new methods for economic valuation of environmental goods are being
developed; Pearce, "Toward...", 1991; PEARCE, MARKANDYA, BARBIER, 1989.
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reluctant to rely on theoretical exercises of assigning 'market value' to environmental goods224;
unfortunately, courts often conclude that such elements required no reparation, and usually
accord only symbolic reparation222. Civil law is at a loss (not only regarding locus standi) to
deal with issues of a wider 'pure ecological loss'223 such as might affect the Habitat or Birds
directives.
Cessation of activity: Where the disturbance is unlawful224, the judge can and must225
order the defendant take the necessary measures to make the disturbance cease (a faire cesser le
trouble). The victim can request cessation of the harmful activity only where this activity is
illicit. Unlike in Spain, where judges have taken a more flexible approach22^, in France
ordering the cessation of a lawful activity (which nonetheless causes a disturbance) is not an
option. The classic formula227 (an 'auto-limitation'228 dating from the last century) views this
as an invasion of the Administration's attributions and contrary to the separation of powers229.
It would be tantamount to ruling on the legality of the administration's decision, which has
deemed the activity to be useful to the collectivity, (even if it disturbs certain individuals who
will be compensated230). The same argument that has been proposed in the Spanish context
could be applied here: that administrative authorisations are granted without prejudice to
third party rights and therefore ordering cessation of the activity where this is found to disturb
a third party should be within the competence of the civil judge.
224 bonello and fedida, 1994, p.45; Martin, "Reflexions...," 1995.
222 Martin, RIDC 1992, p.73; two recent exceptions come from the correctional court of
Rennes, 17 octobre 1990, awarded 10,000F in one recent decision, 10F per junked car in another;
Martin, RIDC 1992, p.75.
223 Martin, "Reflexions...," 1995.
224 Martin, RIDC 1992, p.74.
225 Cass. civ. II, 12 fevr. 1974 JCP 1975, II18106, note Despax.
226 In Spain, ordering the cessation of a lawful but disturbing activity is viewed as the
logical extension of ordering compensation: it would be paradoxical to order compensation for a
"tolerable" activity, and illogical to allow an "intolerable" activity to continue. See Chapter
9, point 4.7. at Cessation of harmful activity, adoption of corrective measures.
227 Cass, civ., 26 mars 1873, DP 1873.1.353: "Ordinary courts are competent either to
determine the compensation owed to the harmed third party, or to prescribe the measures
required to make the prejudice cease, provided that these do not contradict the measures
prescribed by the administrative authority in the general interest"; cited by bonello and
fedida, 1994~p7ll.
228 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p. 735.
229 Deruy, 1993, p.192.
230 bonello and FEdida, 1994, p.9.
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However, even where the activity is lawful, by creatively interpreting the formula, some
judges recognised their own power to restrict an abnormally troubling activity to certain hours or
to certain locations; this has since been approved by the Cour de Cassation234. Moreover, the
case-law leaves ambiguities232, and therefore possibilities, and since the Classified
Installations Act stipulates that authorisations are given without prejudice to third
parties233, on at least one occasion the judge has ordered an authorised polluting establishment
to close down234. Generally however, civil judges are extremely reluctant to impinge upon the
prefect's authority, and do not prescribe such measures, preferring to remain in the domain of
reparation rather than prevention of harm. A useful tool of environmental protection is set
aside.
Remise en etat des lieux (Restoration of the site): The most interesting remedy from an
environmental perspective, restoration, presents the shortcoming that it is not always
materially possible. Also courts habitually lack the resources to follow the works adequately
and consequently avoid ordering them235. A civil judge, if requested, may occasionally allow
the victim to carry out the reparative works at the polluter's expense. Although it would then
appear to be a remedy of a mixed nature (since the polluter pays a form of compensation not for
the harm but for the works to repair it) in this manner the restoration of the site is more surely
attained.
In its report on civil liability, the Commission envisages the problem of the financial
burden of reparation becoming too great a burden for undertakings235. In view of the difficulties
inherent in obtaining civil remedies for environmental damage, it seems that for the time being,
industries are not likely to be overwhelmed by the burden of compensation and reparation.
223 Cass.civ.I, 18 avril 1989, Bull.Civ. no.158.
232 Deruy, 1993,192; Martin, RIDC 1992, p.74.
233 Article 8.
234 Cour de Cassation Civ.2 20 octobre 1976.
235 Gilles Martin et Prieur XXX.
236 "...costs of restoring particular damage might be shared more broadly, with other
sectors or by taxpayers in general"; Com(93)47, p.20.
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3.7. Compensation funds/Insurance:
The Commission has rightly estimated cases where attempting to establish civil liability
is usually fruitless232. Here a joint compensation mechanism is preferable238. This option has
been investigated, although not extensively, in France. An example is the French fund for noise,
created in 1973, which compensates those living near Paris airports for noise pollution and is
financed by all the companies using those airports239. Although a wider use of such funds
should be encouraged, it is difficult to see such a solution being applied to pollution of a more
dispersed nature, such as acid precipitation.
The Commission points out that not all insurers cover pollution-related damage, and they
may limit coverage of accidents to "sudden events", excluding the slower degradation from such
things as leakages over time240. Indeed, French insurance policies for professional civil
liability cover "events which are independent of the intentions of persons, causing damage of a
'sudden, fortuitous and unpredictable nature'."241 The option of additional insurance against
the consequences of non-accidental pollution is available for operators of polluting
installations. An insurance pool also exists: Assurpol. Liability from nuisance arising
fortuitously (and not necessarily suddenly) is covered, as are expenses of limiting the
consequences of a disaster, where the operator has incurred these expenses with the agreement
of the insurer or by complying with measures imposed by authorities242.
3.8. Summary:
As seen, various difficulties are encountered because the existing tests for civil actions are
unsuited, by nature, to environmental interests. The most serious problem is that interests of a
collective nature are discarded from the outset; it seems unlikely that the suggestion as to how
- That is: where damage is unbounded or latent, for cumulative acts or incidents, where
liable parties are unidentifiable, where there is no basis for liability, where no causal link can








this could be addressed (by modifying the remedy sought) will be accepted soon. Occasionally,
furthermore, options exist that could help address problems that arise in the remaining cases242,
and yet remain unused or are restrictively interpreted244. Where possible, a break from
traditional approaches towards interpretations more suitable for particularly environmental
issues, or towards more innovative solutions, could possibly be encouraged from the
Community level.
4. Criminal Jurisdictions: Traditionally, it has not been considered within the Community's
competence to require Member States to criminalise infringements of Community law242.
Nevertheless, Member State power not to criminalise infringements is restricted in those cases
where similar national infringements would receive criminal sanctions (assimilation
principle)246. Both EIA85/337 and LCP88/609 could be the subject of criminal proceedings in
France, and here the worst problems appear to arise because, for a combination of reasons, the
available mechanisms are inadequately used.
242 See above, certain harm, new economic methods to attach value to environmental goods.
244 E.g. in not interpreting foundations of liability seen as too 'favourable' to the victim
restrictively, in ordering more than symbolic reparation, in order remedies other than
compensation, in resorting to new methods of calculating environmental losses.
245 See for instance, Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission 1992 ECR 1-5423: in which
Germany challenged the validity of Commission provisions, alleging that the exclusions that
were required "constituted penal sanctions which neither the Council nor the Commission had
the power to impose"(para.l7) This divide over issues of competence in criminal matters could
be subject to change, however. Notably, in this case the ECJ ruled that the exclusions satisfied
(para.18) "the sole condition imposed...in order to come within the powers of the Community,
namely that the measures contemplated should be necessary to attain the objectives of the
common agricultural policy." (Although it further stated that there was "no ground in the
present proceedings to express a view on the Community's powers in the penal sphere.") More
to the point, in this case, A.G. Jacobs pointed out that, although Community law "in its present
state" did not confer on the Community criminal powers, "that would not in itself preclude the
Community from exercising, for example, powers to harmonize the criminal laws of the Member
States if that were necessary to attain one fo the objectives of the Community." Also, although
cooperation in criminal matters was relegated to a separate pillar of the TEU, Community
involvement has not been definitively excluded (cf: Article K.9 TEU). For a discussion of Member
States' continued strong opposition to Community interference in criminal law matters, see
Swart, B., "From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond" in Enforcing European Community Rules:
Criminal Procedures, Administrative Procedures and Harmonization, eds., Harding, C and Swart, B.,
Dartmouth Publishing, 1996.
246 See Case 68/88 Commission v Greece 1989 ECR 2965, para.24 requiring "...that
infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar
nature and importance and which... make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive."
Although the ECJ has not yet taken as active a stance in criminal matters as it has in civil
remedies, it appears here to leave the door open in this domain should it, in a later case (and
depending upon the political climate), find it necessary to require action going beyond
"assimilation" in order to secure effective deterrence.
4.1. Infractions: Given the principle of legality — there can be no infraction or punishment
that is not foreseen by law242 „ Parliament delimits the framework of major offences and their
penalties248. Three basic categories of infraction exist: serious offences include delits, which
are tried before a correctional court (tribunal correctionnel249), and the graver of the two,
crimes (tried before the cours d'assises). Minor offences, contraventions280, are contained in
regulations and tried before a police court (tribunal de police251). The periods of prescription
for the public prosecution (action publique) for contraventions, delits, or crimes are respectively
one, three and ten years282. Where the offence is continuous, as with many instances of
pollution, the prescription runs from the time the infraction ceases283.
Concerning EIA and LCP examples: The EIA procedure may lend itself less well to criminal
acts than the running of a large combustion plant, yet these can still arise, for instance,
involving the intentional falsification of an EIS. In this event EIA legislation foresees no
specific penalty284, but Penal Code Article 153288 applies, sanctioning faults committed in
administrative documents. As for large combustion plants, criminal liability for classified
installations, based upon Title VI of the Classified Installations Act, does not require actual
harm to the environment to have occurred288. Other rules can be relevant; for instance,
regarding air pollution, the non-consultation of the administration on projects or installations of
247 Article 111-3 Nouveau Code Penal.
248 See, for instance, soyer, jean-claude, Droit Penal et Procedure Penale, Librairie
Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 9th Edition, Paris, 1992 at p. 17.
249 See appendix.
280 Article 466 Code Penal amended L.85-835 of 7 aout 1985; contraventions themselves are
divided into five categories.
284 See appendix.
282 Code de Procedure Penale, Articles 7,8,9; see comments SOYER, p.21.
283 bonello and fedida, 1994, p.111.
284 Subsequent environmental rules do, e.g. Loi 12 juillet 1977 on control of chemical
products, Article 10.
288 Article 153 Code Penal: "Whoever has counterfeited, falsified or altered permits,
certificates...or other documents delivered by public administrations with a view to
acknowledge a right...or accord an authorisation shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months to three years, and with a fine of 1500F to 20,000F.
The attempt shall be punished as the actual delit.
The same penalties shall be applied:
1. To he who has used such counterfeited, falsified or altered documents...".
286 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.711.
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important thermal units would also constitute an infraction257 as would failure to observe
prescribed measures in special protection zones258. The most typical infractions relating to
classified installations are exploiting without authorisation259, violating the rules imposing
conditions of exploitation260, exploiting the installation in infraction of a measure of closure or
interdiction or suspension261, obstructing inspection262. (Furthermore, certain sectoral laws263
provide for "paper-offences" -- delits-papiers - for the failure to fill out the correct
administrative forms: these receive the same punishment as physical harm to the
environment.)
Material and moral elements: The material element required in criminal prosecution
consists of the infringement, by act or omission, of one of the diverse legal or regulatory
provisions264. The risk, embodied by the violation of the safety level determined in the
administrative regulation, is incriminated rather than a concrete result that would be too
difficult to prove265 (e.g.: having 'contributed to acid rain'). Although an attempt to commit a
crime266 is considered equivalent to the crime, the attempted delit is punishable only if so
provided in specific dispositions267 (such as for falsification of administrative documents).
Attempted contraventions are not punishable.
Important in opening access to justice for victims in environmental matters, the requirement
of intention has been relaxed. Although normally a criminal infraction cannot exist without
intention (element moral, dol criminel), environmental infractions usually fall into a category
257 Article 13-6 decree, 13 mai 1974; see Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.708.
258 Article 13, decree, 13 mai 1974.
259 Classified Installations Act, Article 18, exploiting without a declaration (article 43,
decree 21 septembre 1977). Penal jurisdictions are competent to interpret nomenclature and are
not bound by the administration's interpretation of installations requiring authorisation.
260 Non-respect of the prescriptions of ministerial and prefectural arretes (articles 43-2
through 43-8 of decree 21 septembre 1977.)
261 Classified Installations Act, Article 20.
262 Ibid., Article 21.
263 For instance, the Loi sur dechets (modified by Loi 13 juillet 1992), compare Articles 24.6
(actual dumping) and article 24.1 and .3 (failure to complete forms).
264 prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.711; soyer, p.78; bonello and ffidida, 1994, pp.110-11.
265 Robert, J.H., "Le probleme de la responsabilite et des sanctions penales en matiere
d'environnement," 65 (1994) RIDP, 947 at pp.954-55.
266 If the execution has been commenced and in the absence of an exonerating desistment;
Article 2, Code Penal.
267 Article 3, Code Penal; this is the case for, e.g. falsifying administrative documents.
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of non-intentional infractions, contraventions and delits d'imprudence268. The moral element is
considered to be simply that the perpetrator was neither insane nor coerced269. The logic of this
stems partly from a tradition of protecting public health without regard for the good faith or
ill will of the violator2711; concern for good faith reappears at the time of sentencing271.
Physical or legal persons: The director of the company has a duty to monitor and to act in
order to preserve the area in which he exercises his activities in the collective interest of
society. Consequently, the director, the intellectual or moral author of the infraction, is
generally inculpated. Since, as potentially with LCP88/609, often pollution has a corporate,
industrial cause, an important recent development is that the Code Penal has been modified
(applicable since 1 March 1994272), to allow legal entities (except the State itself273; including
foreign legal persons), to be found criminally liable for damage to persons and property for acts
committed in the interest of the legal person274. Responsibility of a legal person does not
exclude responsibility of physical persons273. The fines that can be imposed upon these are five
times greater than those imposed on individuals276, ten times more in the event of recidivism.
Other types of penalties are also available: dissolution of the firm, limitation of the firm's
268 Articles 319-320, R.40-1,4 Code Penal.
See also nouveau Code Penal: Article 121-3: which qualifies negligence and imprudence
that endanger another as offences.
269 SOYER, pp.100-101, points 163-64.
270 Bouloc, B., "La responsabilite penale des entreprises en droit fran<;ais," RIDC 2-1994,
669-81; Robert, p. 955.
271 BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.112.
272 Lois 92-683; 684; 685; 686, of 22 juillet 1992, JO 23 July 1992, p.9857. See Deruy, 1993,
p.181; Dickson, 1994, p.99.
273 The reason for excluding the State itself is the difficulty of identifying who should
properly represent the State -- the President, the prime minister.... This exclusion does not
include 'emanations of the State', which may be found criminally liable.
274 Article 121-2 Nouveau Code penal: "...les personnes morales...sont responsables
penalement, selon les distinctions des articles 121-4 a 121-7, et dans les cas prevus par la loi ou le
reglement, des infractions commises pour leur compte par leurs organes ou representants" (...legal
persons...are criminally responsible, according to the distinctions of articles 121-4 through 121-
7, and in the cases foreseen by laws or regulations, for infractions committed on their behalf by
their organs or representatives).
275 Article 121-2, third indent: "La responsabilite penale des personnes morales n'exclut pas
celle des personnes physiques, auteurs ou complices des memes faits..."; Nouveau Code penal; see
comment Bouloc, p.677; BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.109-11.
276 Articles 131-38 Code Penal.
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stems partly from a tradition of protecting public health without regard for the good faith or
ill will of the violator270; concern for good faith reappears at the time of sentencing771.
Physical or legal persons: The director of the company has a duty to monitor and to act in
order to preserve the area in which he exercises his activities in the collective interest of
society. Consequently, the director, the intellectual or moral author of the infraction, is
generally inculpated. Since, as potentially with LCP88/609, often pollution has a corporate,
industrial cause, an important recent development is that the Code Penal has been modified
(applicable since 1 March 1994272), to allow legal entities (except the State itself273; including
foreign legal persons), to be found criminally liable for damage to persons and property for acts
committed in the interest of the legal person274. Responsibility of a legal person does not
exclude responsibility of physical persons275. The fines that can be imposed upon these are five
times greater than those imposed on individuals276, ten times more in the event of recidivism.
Other types of penalties are also available: dissolution of the firm, limitation of the firm's
activities, et cetera277.
The following obstacles chip away at the usefulness of criminal prosecution of
environmental offences.
Bouloc, B., "La responsabilite penale des entreprises en droit fran^ais," RIDC 2-1994,
669-81; Robert, p. 955.
271 BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.112.
272 Lois 92-683; 684; 685; 686, of 22 juillet 1992, JO 23 July 1992, p.9857. See Deruy, 1993,
p. 181; Dickson, 1994, p.99.
273 The reason for excluding the State itself is the difficulty of identifying who should
properly represent the State — the President, the prime minister.... This exclusion does not
include 'emanations of the State', which may be found criminally liable.
274 Article 121-2 Nouveau Code penal: "...les personnes morales...sont responsables
penalement, selon les distinctions des articles 121-4 a 121-7, et dans les cas prevus par la loi ou le
reglement, des infractions commises pour leur compte par leurs organes ou representants" (...legal
persons...are criminally responsible, according to the distinctions of articles 121-4 through 121-
7, and in the cases foreseen by laws or regulations, for infractions committed on their behalf by
their organs or representatives).
275 Article 121-2, third indent: "La responsabilite penale des personnes morales n'exclut pas
celle des personnes physiques, auteurs ou complices des mSmes faits..."; Nouveau Code penal; see
comment Bouloc, p.677; BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.109-11.
276 Articles 131-38 Code Penal.
277 Dickson, 1994, p.107; Deruy, 1993, pp.181-82.
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4.2. Civil parties to penal prosecution:
The role of the citizen regarding criminal infractions is to denounce, setting the public
prosecution in motion. However, where the criminal offence gives rise to damage, the
possibility of participating as a civil party278 to a criminal prosecution exists.
One practical advantage of such participation is that it forces the parquet279 to act28^ —
indeed, is often "the only means of overcoming the inertia of the public prosecutor."28^ Another
problem is then encountered: since at present nothing requires associations to apply
compensation that they may receive to repairing the harmed interests, most courts interpret
Article 2 of the Code de Procedure Penal, requiring that the civil party suffer a direct and
personal prejudice to have legal interest, very restrictively. Certain exceptions exist282,
notably in the matters of urbanism283 and classified installations284. Otherwise, however, the
civil action of associations is rarely admissible285. Again, this problem seems to stem from
justifiable concern about how compensation shall be used; taking action to restrict the remedy
sought, rather than to restrict admissibility, appears a preferable solution.




281 prieur, Dalloz 1991,, pp.114-15, p.715.
282 Consumers, (Loi 5 janvier 1988), and associations against racism, sexual violence, and
child abuse (Articles 2-1 through 2-8, Code de Procedure Penale). The actions of professional
unions is also less difficult.
283 Articles L.160-1 and L.480-1, Urbanism Code.
284 The Classified Installations Act includes such a derogation: associations that have
been active for at least five years from the date of the events (Article 22-2 loi 76-663 added by
loi 85-661) are entitled to be civil parties to criminal procedures, and can thus challenge
infractions relating to Articles 3,4,5,6,7, and 18: these treat, respectively: authorisation,
renewal of authorisation, procedures of authorisation, arrStes with conditions of exploitation,
arr§tes for certain categories of installations, and exploiting without authorisation).
285 The logic is that if the protected interest is very large, it is hard to distinguish from
the general social interest and therefore the action of the public prosecution should be enough to
satisfy it. If the interest of the association is narrow, many more than its members may be
affected; see soyer, pp.211-12, points 423 and 424; see critical remarks prieur, Dalloz 1991,
p.716.
Spanish judges have been much more avant-garde on the issue of allowing associations
to participate as civil parties, see Chapter 9, point 5. at Participation of associations in
criminal actions.
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4.3. Lack of resources: A fundamental perception — therefore difficult to address ~ of that
which can be considered 'criminal' affects the allocation of limited resources in criminal
proceedings.
Noting infractions: This familiar problem obstructs, first, pursuit of criminal infractions. An
offence can be recorded either by judicial police or classified installation inspectors. The police
are, however, poorly equipped, both technically and in terms of manpower, to deal with
problems of natural environment and pollution. Pollution must be spectacular for judicial police
to intervene; normally they leave environmental matters to the inspectors of classified
installations288. These inspectors, in turn, have fewer coercive powers and are unreasonably
few in number287. In fact, the task often remains unaccomplished.
Pursuing infractions: After the infraction has been noted, the same problem causes
infractions to be weeded out of the prosecution process. Much as the Judicial Service of the
Commission, the public prosecutor (parquet or magistrature debout288) is overwhelmed by the
number of incriminations, and tends to use its discretion to discontinue pollution-related
prosecutions, "public order not appearing to be sufficiently disturbed"28^. As at Community
level, although statistics exist on condemnations in environmental cases, transparency is
lacking on the number of discontinued prosecutions and out-of-court settlements.
Proving infractions: One of the advantages of criminal jurisdictions is that more stringent
means and wider powers of investigation are at the disposal of the public authorities in the
search for proof. The drawback is that the judge is not obliged to order complementary measures
of instruction if the proof brought by the victim is insufficient2^. In practice, it is rare that the
286 PRIEUR, Dalloz 1991, p.71; Fontaine, LPA 1991,p.4; bonello and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.121.
287 Chapter 5, point 2.2.2. Lack of personnel and resources.
288 See appendix.
28^ Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.714; see also Deruy, 1993, p.187.
Because of overwhelmed courts, techniques are being developed to expedite matters for
certain environmental offences, such as the payment of a "fine stamp" — timbre d'amende — for
the first four classes of contravention involving national parks; Art. L.241-20 Code Rural.
2^0 Cass, crim.22 mars 1960, D. 1960, 689.
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court will consent to use its limited resources in environmental matters, an efficient option is
thus discarded^!.
4.4. Piecemeal response to environmental infractions:
The necessary legal element for criminal prosecution of environmental offences is usually not
in the Penal Code but dispersed among various administrative regulations. This dispersion is a
significant problem which may influence whether criminal sanctions are sought for
infringement of Community rules at all. A certain wariness concerning administrative rules
(widely considered 'verbose' and 'vague') exists in criminal jurisdictions^^ and criminal
authorities are hesitant to wade through dispersed administrative provisions^. Rather than
developing a coherent approach in this area, legislative response has been reactive^4,
"intense, [and] frequently disorderly."295 a general provision for an environmental offence in
the Penal Code might help address this problem^. However, priorities emerge in treating the
issue: although two proposals have been made for statutes criminalising pollution as such
(which would apply to a wider range of Community rules), neither has been accepted or even
discussed in parliament.
4.5. Reluctance to use stricter penalties:
Community law requires that remedies "be such as to guarantee real and effective judicial
M-J Littmann-Martin, "Droit penal de l'environnement: apparence redoutable et
efficacite douteuse," Justice, Syndicat de la magistrature 1988, no. 122, p.26; Cass. crim. 23 juin
1987, Rev.sc.crim. 1988, p.323, obs J-H Robert, cited BONELLO and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.115.
292 Robert, p.954.
293 As a result, the few 'autonomous' penal rules (in which the criminal behaviour and
sanction are contained in the same penal text, rather than those in which the text contains only
the sanction and refers to administrative rules for the description of the behaviour. Example in
the Louis XIV tradition of protecting forests and rivers for hunting, are available in the Forest
Code and the Rural Code), tend to be more relied upon in criminal jurisdictions for repression of
pollution than administrative provisions; Robert, pp.953-54.
Robert refers also to the concern of the parquet in relying on administrative provisions,
of finding its efforts thwarted by some formal irregularity on the part of the Administration.
294 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.706; see generally Albertini, 1993, p.838.
295 Littmann-Martin, Marie-Jose, "Le droit penal des dechets en France," RIDC 1-1992,
p.184.
296 Prieur, Dalloz 1991, p.719.
However, Spanish experience with such a criminal provisions illustrates that this does
not always remedy this type of difficulty, particularly where the criminal provision refers to
administrative rules; see Chapter 9, point 5.1.
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protection" and "have a real deterrent effect"297. The Seveso incident revealed the gross
v
. —
inadequacy in terms of deterrence of sanctions initially foreseen in the Classified Installations
Act; these were tightened by the statute 85-661 of 3 July 1985, a new delit was created, financial
penalties were raised298, and a wide array of sanctions was placed at the judge's disposal299.
It remains that initial penalties are usually light300 and have little 'deterrent effect'. The
non-respect of the legal dispositions imposing conditions of exploitation, the most frequent
infraction, remains a contravention, no matter how serious the failure30!. The fact that harsher
penalties are not applied for the first infraction tends to lower the value of the initial
conviction303. Light fines are regarded as a relatively inexpensive permit to pollute. This could
encourage operators to wager against the likelihood of being caught at all, and to avoid taking
the necessary preventive measures until required to do so by a first conviction for a minor
offence.
297 Case 14/83 Von Colson 1984 ECR 1891, para 23; see also Case 79/83 Dorit Harz 1984 ECR
1921; Case 177/88 Dekker 1990 ECR 1-3941.
298 Sanctions were raised from the initial 2000F to 30,000F to the present two months to one
year in prison or a fine from 2000 to 500,000 F, or both, although notably the lower limit is the
same.
299 Article 18, Loi 76-663, added by law 85-661: exploiting without authorisation:
emprisonment from 2 months to 1 year or a fine from 2000 to 500,000F, or both. The court can
prohibit the use of the installation, and can require the rehabilitation .(remise en etat des
lieux) of the area within a period to be determined by the court. In this event the court can
either adjourn the announcement of the decision and give an injunction of rehabilitation with an
astreinte (a payment by day of tardiness).
Continuing the exploitation of an installation without conforming to the prescriptions
in the formal notice shall be punished by prison from 10 days to six months +/or a fine from 2000
to 500,000F. Use of the installation can also be prohibited and violation of this is punishable by
up to two years in prison, fine of 20,000 to l,00O,0O0F or both; Article 20, Loi 76-663.
Another sanction for major offences is publication of the decision of condemnation in the
press, at the expense of the condemned; Article 22-1, Loi 76-663. The cost of this should not
surpass 500,000F. See for instance, Cour d'Appel de Lyon, 6 juillet 1989 Groupe Ain-Nature
FRAPNA c/ Charveriat Jocelyne.
The most effective sanction is the order for the restoration of the site (remise en etat des
lieux) Article 19, Loi 76-663, added by law 85-661. The correctional court may either directly
order the site to be restored or require that the operator forfeit a sum of money equivalent to the
works to be carried out to a public accountant, to be reimbursed as the works are completed.
Furthermore, the Penal Code, Article 43-2, allows for substitute penalties such as
professional interdiction for a maximum of five years; see comments Littmann-Martin, RIDC
1992, p.204. See also Romi, Droit et Administration, 1994, p.354.
300 Decree 77-1133, Article 43 establishes fines from 600F to 2000F. See prieur, Dalloz 1991,
p.716; Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.206; bonello and FfiDIDA, 1994, p.123-24.
301 The possibility of cumulation with infractions in other codes is not excluded, and of
fines being applied per contravention; Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.208, note 58.
302 Except to provide the basis for the offender to be considered a recidivist.
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When the offence is more serious it is occasionally not dealt with as such. The non-execution
of works ordered as a sanction by the police court raises the qualification of the infraction to a
de/zf303; so does recidivism. However, examples exist where the aggravation to a major offence
was not retained, rather, the offence was "contraventionalised"3^.
Criminal judges have been reluctant to use the most innovative303 and effective sanctions at
their disposal. Although sufficient penalties exist, they are rarely applied and the link
between enforcement difficulties becomes evident. Recently a few decisions prohibiting use of
the installation have been noted, nevertheless courts almost never directly order site-
restoration works to be carried out at the expense of the operator308 because they lack technical
knowledge and the personnel to undertake the necessary follow-up, because total restoration is
'impossible'307, or even because the remedy "does not appear to elicit the enthusiasm of the
criminal judges who prefer to opt for proven solutions"308.
As for imprisonment, the popular perception — both of industrial operators and of many
judges — is that even where imprisonment is a possibility, it will be reserved for other than
environmental offences: i.e., for the 'true marginals'300. As Littmann-Martin has noted, the role
of the criminal judge is that of supporting the administration that cannot make its rules
respected. However, criminal judges "acquit themselves half-heartedly of [the] chore, the
significance of which sometimes escapes them"310. Since the problem appears linked to the
judges' sense of legitimacy regarding criminal penalties and environmental matters, and since
303 Also, obstructing inspection is punishable by 10 days imprisonment +/or 2000 to 100,000F
fine (Article 21). During the suspension of functioning the exploitant must pay salaries of his
personnel (Article 25). See also article 43 of the decree.301 See Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.207, citing examples in the area of waste.
303 See footnote 299 above.
306 Deruy, 1993, p.181; Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.205; Courts are equally reluctant to
issue orders for the adjournment of the penalty with an injunction to undertake restoration
works, which also require follow-up.
307 Although frequently it is true that restoring the site completely is impossible, this does
not mean that a serious attempt to restore is as closely as possible to its original state should be
ruled out.
308 Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.205.
300 Robert, p.956; see also Littmann-Martin, M-J, "Droit penal de l'environnement," RJE 2-
1982, p. 160.
310 Littmann-Martin, RIDC 1992, p.210; see also Prieur's comments (Prieur, Dalloz 1991,
p.706) on areas of water, waste and classified installations.
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the EC is theoretically unable to intrude in the area of criminal sanctions, addressing this issue
from Community level appears problematic except to continue generally to emphasise the
importance of enforcement of environmental norms.
4.6. Summary:
As Littmann-Martin points out, criminal prosecution of environmental offences is more
effective in theory than in practice311, which brings only 'mediocre results'312. First, despite
certain advances, it is difficult to bring matters to the stage of a judgment: the most common
infringements are considered mere contraventions; police tend to shift responsibilities onto rare
inspectors; the public prosecution is overwhelmed. And secondly, if a court decision is reached
the results are disappointing: stricter penalties are rarely applied. It appears that the various
actors of the criminal system are agreed not to waste their army on what they view as a losing
battle: such fundamental perceptions are difficult to alter. Improvement here could focus on
encouraging civil participation to apply pressure to the parquet; this itself entails improving
access of civil parties to criminal proceedings.
5. Executing the judgment:
In the event that an environmental applicant has successfully pursued the steeple-chase
until a favourable judgment is reached, the phase after a first court decision can be as troubled
as those preceding. Member States may delay execution of an ECJ judgment until such time as it
suits their agenda313; so in France, execution of a judgment is not infrequently delayed until
other interests have been satisfied. This problem is extremely serious in that it indicates, not
just the low priority of environmental matters, but also a lack of respect for the rule of law.
311 M-J Littmann-Martin, "Droit penal de l'environnement: apparence redoutable et
efficacite douteuse," Justice, Syndicat de la magistrature 1988, no. 122, p.26.
312 BONELLO and FfiDlDA, 1994, p.102.
313 See Chapter 3, point 3.
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Although not limited to environmental situations, the problem is not uncommon here and the
worst offender is the Administration314.
In fact, there are no means of forced execution against the administration; if it defaults, individuals
cannot coerce it...everything rests here on the conscience of public authorities, whose good faith is
presumed, perhaps with an excess of optimism. Practice reveals, unfortunately, cases of inexecution,
above all in matters of disputes of annulment.313
As Tercinet has said, in administrative matters, respect for la chose jugee often loses to the
principle of separation of the active administration and the judge, and the absence of means of
execution against public persons316. The authority of the judge and respect for the law are
undermined, extremely serious in an etat de droit.
...it can seem inadmissible that in a State ruled by law the respect of the judge or of res judicata are
not imposed from the outset.... certain local officials, determined to realise a planning project
whatever the cost, seek to evade not only legality but that which has been judged.31'
When a private party defaults on execution of a court decision (defaut d'execution), the
members of the Section of report studies of the Conseil d'Etat318, again too few, use both
telephone and letters to press for execution31^. The procedure of astreinte, condemning a party
to a payment per day of inexecution, is a lengthy320 procedure seemingly strewn with as many
obstacles and delicate interpretations as the original case (since it can concern only inexecution,
not delay in execution; it can concern only the decision issued, not the irregular modification of
the court's decision)321. As for the destruction of an illegal construction, one must begin a new
procedure before the judicial court. Morand-Deviller comments "[wjhat ferocious determination,
what respect for the law and the judge must in this event animate the associations of
environmental defence."322
314 See Morand-Deviller, "A propos des affaires du lac de Fabreges et du col du Somport,
chose jugee et fait accompli," LPA, 20 June 1990, p.12 at pp.16-17: "Les ruses et I'inertie de
I'administration." Dalloz administratis 1992, pp.192-95.
315 Dalloz administratis 1992, pp.192-93.
316 Tercinet, 'Vers la fin de l'inexecution des decisions juridictionnelles par
rAdministration?"; in KAHN-FREUND, LfiVY, RUDDEN, p.168.
31 ^ Morand-Deviller, LPA 1990, pp.13,16.
318 Section des etudes du rapport du Conseil d'Etat.
31^ Members of the section meet regional presidents of TA and Administrative Courts of
Appeal, and prefects, at times threatening exposure in the annual public report.
3 20 Requiring several months after the six-month period the administration is allowed to
execute the judgment, Morand-Deviller, LPA 1990, p.18.
321 See Morand-Deviller, LPA 1990, p.18.
322 Morand-Deviller, LPA 1990, p.18.
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Illustrations of evading court rulings are not rare323. As seen with the Tunnel du Somport
project, work commenced prior to the adoption of a new expropriation document. It seems that
even with the force of a court decision behind environmental protection, the presumption — that
the procedure will be regularised eventually — falls in favour of developer. For this reason,
economic actors are often unmoved by a first judgment against them and are able, for whatever
reasons, to continue as planned. Indeed, on occasion even the final judgment against them has
little effect; by then the project is usually finished. In one notorious project (lie de Re), despite
various annulments of authorisations by an administrative court32^, the first cars were able to
start using an illegal 2.9 km bridge in June 1988 — a few months after the Conseil d'Etat
confirmed the earlier annulments of the lower administrative court323.
6. Conclusions:
Community environmental rules are inserted into national enforcement machinery that is
plagued by an accumulation of difficulties and discretionary situations, beginning with the fact
that authorities prefer to persuade rather than enforce. Once the choice has been made go
before the courts, environmental applicants must contend with procedural rules ill-suited to
environmental protection. As in a war of attrition, many actions are eliminated before a
decision is reached. Often, where the actual rules may not disfavour environmental interests or
where potential solutions exist, the willingness to apply them appears to be lacking.
Determining which portion of this unwillingness can be attributed to deeply rooted perceptions
regarding environmental issues, or mere lack of judicial audacity when faced with relatively
new issues (and unfavourable case-law by the CE) could be instrumental in addressing this
323 Certain notorious examples include the Pont de l'lle de Re (Morand-Deviller, "Le Pont
de l'lle de Re et le juge," LPA 23 September 1988, p.5) and the Lac de Fabreges (Morand-
Deviller, LPA 1990, p.xx).
32^ T.A. Poitiers, 3 juillet 1985: Declaration d'Utilite Publique annulled; T.A. Poitiers, 24
juin 1987, the second DUP was annulled (and work on the bridge continued in spite of the fact
that the DUP on which these works were based had been twice annulled); T.A. Poitiers, 16
decembre 1987, the administrative authorisation was itself annulled.
325 CE 8 mars 1988 Departement de la Charente-Maritime, req. 90.453, AJDA July-August
1989, pp.487-88.
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problem. At present court decisions, if reached, often fall short of that which is needed to give
force to environmental law: remedies available on paper are discarded in practice.
A possible way of avoiding at least some of the shortages of personnel and disinclination to
use available tools is to emphasise the prospect of civil liability. This might inspire private
parties to apply environmental rules more assiduously to themselves through fear of having to
pay compensation, rather than the (greatly less motivating) fear of being 'caught' by
authorities. At present, however, such hopes founder on the significant obstacles present in civil /
jurisdictions; perhaps favourable solutions could be encouraged from Community level326. Inatasuxf
short, Community environmental rules fall victim to the same lack of rigour and lack of judicial
audacity as national environmental rules.
The major problems of enforcement do not have a Community source and would exist without
Community intervention. In fact today, the most disturbing trend in France is that, even where
rules could efficiently protect the environment, economic and industrial actors deploy all the
political forces at their disposal to modify them32'7. Where modifying the legislation fails,
attempts have been made to limit litigation328 that may hinder economic actors. Where judges
326 Conclusions, point 3.1, at civil liability; see general Commission statements,
Com(95)600, point 43, p.13. ^5"37" .
32' E.g. the protective elements of the Coastal Act have peen called into question.
Similarly, the Mountain Act (Loi Montague, Loi 85-30 du 9 janvier 1985,) is so resented by local
authorities and developers that administrative judges hesitate to rely upon it (Chapter 5,
footnotes 101 and 102); Parliament considered amending it to make it not more, but less
protective. During the voting of a project on the fiscality of local authorities (29 June 1991) a
provision was adopted "surreptitiously" modifying one of the cornerstones of the Loi Montague
(Loi 85-30 du 9 janvier 1985, a law for the protection of fragile mountain areas): the prohibition
of construction on the shores of high altitude lakes. (On this occasion, the Conseil
Constitutionnel rose to the challenge, declaring the amendment devoid of any link with the
text under discussion. Consequently the procedure for its adoption was irregular; Romi, RDP
1991, pp.1097-98.
328 See Article L.122-16 CHH, above.
The Loi Bosson (8 decembre 1993) exludes the possibility of contesting urbanism plans or
rules more than six months after their adoption on the basis of vices de forme ou de procedure
(the category into which challenges on the basis of faulty or inadequate EIS or inquiry would
fall). Furthermore, it is insisted that this does not harm the citizens right to have illegal
decisions annulled, although commentators heatedly disagree.
Art. L.600-3 Urbanism Code (Loi 9 Febl994), introduces a procedural limitation. Failure
to respect this formality renders the recourse inadmissible, without possibility to regularise.
See Ricard, Michel, "Les vices de forme et l'Etat de droit," Etudes Fonci&res, no.62,
March 1993, p.10-11; Romi, RDP 1994, p.1201-6; Romi, Raphael, "La Loi Bosson; un ecocide
parlementaire," 1994 Ecologie Politique, no. 9, 101 at p.103; Combat Nature, no. 108 Feb 1995,
p.67.
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do enforce protective provisions, developers and local authorities practice a policy of fait
accompli, rushing to finish the project before a decision can be rendered, or modifying land-
planning documents in order to avoid interim measures that have been ordered32^.
Indeed, whatever the shortcomings of Community environmental rules, a strong argument in
favour of Community involvement in environmental law is illustrated. The Community can
exert a restraining influence on national attempts to modify and weaken rules that are
potentially effective. National legislation is no longer dependent only upon shifts in
Parliamentary majority; procedures can be altered and diminished only in so far as this does not
conflict with Community-imposed norms33®. The Community, for its part, perhaps because of
the input of fifteen Member States in adopting legislation, is not as buffeted by the political
shifts seen at the national level, where one Parliamentary majority's work is undone by its
successor.
32^ Morand-Deviller, op.cit.,; see also Chapter 5, footnotes 101 and 102.
33® An illustration of this is provided by the French Water Act, which was shielded from
Parliamentary tampering precisely because the norms were largely imposed by the European
Community; Romi, RDP 1994 p.1208.
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1. Upstream Issues — The Spanish Context
In addition to characteristics mentioned in the Introduction^, two essential differences with
the other Member State examined here must be noted at the outset. First, the Spanish Constitution
of 1978 includes a reference to environment, a factor which is rich in potential if somewhat
disappointing in actual returns. Secondly, administrative fragmentation is compounded by the
division of Spain into seventeen autonomous territorial entities, the Comunidades Autonomas
(autonomous communities, hereinafter CA); the administrative context therefore provides a
rather disjointed backdrop for the implementation and enforcement of Community
environmental law in this Member State; against this backdrop, formal implementation is
reviewed.
1.1. Constitutional Reference: an unrealised potential
Adopted in the wake of the Stockholm Conference, Spain's 1978 Constitution elevates the
environment to a constitutionally protected value:
Article 45.1: Everyone shall have the right to enjoy an environment suitable for personal
development and the duty to preserve it. 2. The public authorities, relying on the necessary public
solidarity, shall ensure that all natural resources are used rationally, with a view to safeguarding
and improving the quality of life and protecting and restoring the environment. 3. Anyone who
infringes the above provisions shall be liable to criminal or, where applicable, administrative
penalties as prescribed by law and shall be required to make good any damage caused.^
The text refers to a derecho — right — and is included in Title I, Constitution 1978: of
fundamental rights and duties (De los derechos y deberes fundamentales); still, it is not listed in the
chapters on rights and freedoms but rather in the third chapter "Of guiding principles of social
and economic policy (De los principios rectores de la politica social y economica ). It therefore does not
enjoy the protection accorded to fundamental rights and only an extremely progressive
interpretation could consider that it constitutes a directly enforceable "right to environment"3.
However, by placing duties upon both public powers and citizens the Constitutional reference
delivers certain concrete benefits.
1 At point 5. The Choice of Member States.
2 Translation by ECHR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain (41/1993/436/515).
Unless otherwise noted, the Spanish has been translated by the author and should not
be taken as authoritative. Where legislation or case-law is cited, the original Spanish text is
provided in an appendix.






Duties imposed upon public powers: As Article 53.34 of the Constitution clearly spells out, the
inclusion of the environment among the guiding principles is intended to shape the creation of
legislation, the realisation of policy by public powers, and the judicial enforcement of
environmental norms, echoing Article 130r(2) EC8. Thus the effects of the reference should be
discernible in the three corresponding stages of this research: transposition, practical
implementation and enforcement. The juridical value of the guiding principles has been
consistently supported by respected Spanish jurists6 and by the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court, which insists that "the public powers are obliged to facilitate their adequate
application"^. It is the duty of public powers generally8 to see that the "right to enjoy an
environment suitable for personal development" informs positive legislation: the constitutionality
of other laws with respect to the guiding principle can be brought by ordinary courts before the
Tribunal Constitucional9. Article 45 (theoretically) limits other policies, which cannot have as
purpose the irrational use of natural resources40. Public powers must further ensure that the
execution of public policy and judicial practice are guided by the principle: the fact that
frequently they fail to do so does not diminish the nature of the duty imposed upon them.
. • >•.. J'
4 Constitution 1978, Article 53.3: "The recognition, respect and protection of the «»■>' j
principles recognised in the third Chapter shall inform positive legislation, judicial practice ,
and the actions of the public powers. They can be invoked before ordinary jurisdictions only
in accordance with the dispositions of the law that develop them." '
5 Although not as clearly stipulated as the requirement that "environmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community
policies"; Article 130r(2) EC.
6 For example, Garcia de Enterria. However, some writers caution against attaching too
great an importance to the guiding principle; Bano Leon, pp.614-15.
"...adecuado ejercicio los poderes publicos vienen obligados a facilitar," Sentencia de
Tribunal Constitucional (STC), 32-1983, fundamento juridico 2; STC 18-1982, fundamento
juridico 6.
The Tribunal Supremo (see appendix) has not hesitated to found its judgments on the
guiding principles maintaining that these have a "[njormative value and bind the public
powers, each in their respective sphere, to make them effectively operative"; Sentencia del
Tribunal Supremo (STS), 9 May 1986; see Real Ferrer, 1994, p.324.
8 Article 53.3, Constitution 1978, above.
9 Constitution 1978, Article 161.1. The possibility of "interposicion del recurso de
inconstitucionalidad" is available for three months starting from the publication of the law or
similar norm (Ley Organica 2/1979,3 October, del Tribunal Constitucional, Art. 33); after this
time only its application to a concrete case can be challenged, not its entry into force (Article
163 Constitucion 1978).
For the Tribunal Constitucional, see appendix.
40 Perez Moreno, Popnencias, p.102.
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The principle of "collective solidarity", mentioned here, has significance for both Spanish
citizens and for relations between administrative authorities11. The various separate
administrations at State, CA and local levels are required to assist and co-operate with each other
when requested: refusal is permitted only where the administration is incapable of lending
assistance or when to do so would gravely affect the administration's own activities, and must be
communicated detailing reasons111.
Duties imposed upon citizens: Although those legally obliged to undertake the tasks necessary
to attain the objectives of Article 45 are clearly the public powers, citizens are expected to support
the public powers' efforts, again in the spirit of public solidarity13. It falls upon individuals to
collaborate with authorities in supervising the rational use of natural resources, to denounce
harmful activities and to have recourse to courts to solicit protection or repair of environmental
harm14.
Limitations of the constitutional reference: Despite its importance this reference has limitations.
Undeniably, as formulated, it is ambiguous15 and appears to include all that which is "suitable for
personal development"16. Formulated thus, it cannot be directly invoked before ordinary courts,
but rather, as Article 53.3 indicates, "in accordance with that disposed in the laws developing
11 Constitution 1978, Article 2: "The Constitution is founded on the indissoluble unity of
the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible motherland of all Spaniards, and recognises
and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed
and the solidarity between all of these."
See also, Article 156, Constitution 1978; Sentencia Tribunal Constitutional, 64/1982.
13 Ley de Regimen Juridico de las Adminstraciones Publicas y del Procedimiento
Administrativo Comun (LRJPAC), Article 4 (in appendix).
See comments, Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.165.
13 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.163; Real Ferrer, 1994, p.322.
14 Other Constitutional articles may be relied upon by individuals indirectly to protect
indirectly the environment, for instance through protection of the citizen's right to privacy
and the inviolability of the home. See ECITR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain (41/1993/436/515); Bano
Leon, pp.621-22 (referring to Articles 15; 17 and 18 and 19; see Chapter 9, point 3.1. at- Right).
15 Although some may interpret more narrowly, based on natural resources mentioned
in Article 45.2, it seems untenable to propose two interpretations — one narrow, one more
general — for Article 45. It appears more reasonable to accept the wider, and more imprecise,
of the two. Real Ferrer, 1994, p.320-21; see also Garcia ureta, 1994, p.162.
16 Article 45, Constitution 1978. Although this is mitigated by reference to 'natural
resources, Opinions vary as to what this includes: see Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.151 notes
601,602 and 603; Real Ferrer, 1994, p.321 note 6.
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it"*2. The public powers, then, are obliged to use the constitutional principle for the benefit of the
citizens, but the latter are not entitled, based upon only this, to demand a concrete environmental
standard.
Further limitations arise in the light of other societal values. Already Article 45 is based upon
human utility rather than an inherent value attached to the environment: human quality of life is
to be protected and improved, the environment simply defended and restored^8. Even "rational
use" is still grounded in the idea of that which is useful; it seems to justify subordination of
environmental to economic concerns when the 'development of the individual' is deemed to be
better served by economic than by environmental priorities.
Moreover, tension between economic and environmental objectives exists at Constitutional
level*9. Article 45 does not state that the environment is a priority superior to others, but simply
that it must be used rationally, defended and restored. Modernisation and development of all
economic sectors, particularly agriculture, livestock, fishing and craftsmanship are also given
constitutional status29, as is the principle of economic equilibrium (seeing to it that no region is
socially or economically favoured over the others2*). In particular, no authority can adopt rules
that impede the free circulation of goods and the movement of people throughout the Spanish
territory22; a distinct resemblance to the conflict that can exist at Community level between
environment and 'economic freedoms' is evident. Therefore, as Bano Leon points out, with or
*7 As Bano Leon says, "the Constitution is not a substitute for the legislator", p.613; see
also Real Ferrer, 1994, p.325; garcia ureta, 1994, p.165-66.
18 de vega Ruiz, Jose Augusto, El Delito Ecologico, second edition, Editorial Colex, 1994,
p.21; Garcia Ureta, 1994, pp.160-61; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.152.
*9 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.161; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.152; Bano Leon, p.619.
20 Constitution 1978, Article 130: "Public powers shall see to the modernisation and
development of all economic sectors, and in particular, agriculture, livestock, fishing and
craft-making, in order to place at the same level the standard of life of all Spaniards."
21 Constitution 1978, Article 138.1:" The State guarantees the effective realisation of the
principle of solidarity consecrated in Article 2 of the Constitution, overseeing the
establishment of an adequate and fair economic balance between the diverse parts of the
Spanish territory...".
22 Constitution 1978, Article 139.2: "No authority shall adopt measures that directly or
indirectly obstruct the free circulation and establishment of persons and the free circulation of
goods throught the Spanish territory."
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without a Constitutional reference, the legislator will always have to strike a balance between
ecological and other public and private interests23.
Unrealised potential: Certainly, much remains to be gleaned from this constitutional article.
Untapped potential exists for practical implementation: the reference may be general, but as
Garcia Ureta notes, logically, this duty should lead to the introduction of mechanisms facilitating
the obligation24. It could be considered to provide a constitutional basis for the access to
information and access to justice so emphasised at the Community level, a justification for
sacrifices that may be necessary (environmental taxes, for instance)23, and support for the polluter
pays principle ("...make good any damage caused")26. Furthermore, "collective solidarity" may
eventually be interpreted to refer to ideas gaining popularity since the Brundtsfield commission
and the Rio Conference, such as the rights of subsequent generations22, and serve as a basis upon
which to introduce concrete measures. In enforcement, Article 45.2 could help to ground
arguments centring on the preventive principle (since the public powers must 'protect'), if not the
precautionary principle. Furthermore, Article 45.3 is perhaps on the verge of important
consequences for establishing legal interest28.
1.2. Territorial and Administrative Structures:
Spanish implementation of Community (and national) environmental law is greatly
23 Bano Leon, p.618-19; STC 64/1982, 4 November on conflict between Article 45 and
other Constitutional values.
24 garcia Ureta, 1994, p.163; see also Constitution 1978, Article 9.2, Below, footnote
179.
23 Real Ferrer, 1994, p.322.
26 Perez Moreno, Alfonso, "Instrumentos de Tutela Ambienta," in I Congreso Nacional de
Derecho Ambiental: Ponencias, Sevilla, 1995, at p.104.
2/ Real Ferrer, 1994, p.322; a recent judgment by the Tribunal Supremo refers to the duty
that this generation has to leave a clean and habitable world for future generations, STS 30
November 1990; (decision reproduced in DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, pp.63-97 at p.87).
28 Chapter 9, footnote 44.
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affected by two-fold fragmentation: the division of Spain into seventeen Autonomous
Communities (CA), each with its own governmental departments and competences; and the fact
that, on any one level (State or CA) environmental competences are sprinkled among ministerial
departments.
1.2.1. Territorial Divisions:
During the elaboration of the Constitution, the territory was divided into 'pre-autonomous
entities' corresponding generally to historical regions, which have become the Autonomous
Communities. Limitations of competence operate in both directions. The CA (and other territorial
entities) enjoy the autonomy to manage their own interests2^ within the limit of the competences
reserved for the State, which is guarantor of the general interest; the State is justified in
intervening to defend the general interest (for instance, if a CA takes a decision in environmental
matters that produces effects beyond its territory) but must respect the competences of the
territorial entities3®.
In certain ways, the Spanish State resembles a microcosm of the EC. In both there exist:
potential conflicts of concurrent competence; powers of the smaller entities to adopt additional
norms provided they do not undermine generally applicable rules; the potential clash between
economic freedoms and protection of the environment; the capacity of the larger entity to issue
harmonising legislation applicable across the smaller autonomous bodies33. Problems similar to
those between the Community and the Member States can therefore be expected to emerge at
times within the Spanish State. For example, subsidiarity-type tensions surface occasionally as
various bodies attempt to pull competences into their sphere.
The regions of Spain have their own ambitions with regard to membership in the European
Community. In view of the strong regionalism, dissatisfaction exists with representation of the
2y Constitution 1978, Article 137.
30 Domper Ferrando, 1992, pp.140-42.
31 Constitution 1978, Article 131.1: The State, through law, can plan the general
economic activity in order to address collective needs, to balance and harmonise the regional
and sectoral development and stimulate growth and income of wealth and its more just
distribution.
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regions at the European level: European norms affect areas that are the competence of the CA,
"and yet, the person who sits and votes in the Council is a representative of the State
Government."32 Another dimension of political tension is thus added to the problem of
implementation and enforcement of Community environmental rules in Spain: regional and local
authorities, on whom the performance of the rules depends, would prefer to participate in
European decision-making on a separate basis from the State33. Particularly where
implementation requires considerable effort, European Community rules can be seen as imposed
upon them by the central State against their will.
The Spanish Constitution does not establish powers definitively. Keys to the definition of
spheres of competence lie in the Constitution, in the CAs' founding Statutes of Autonomy (which
serve almost as constitutional documents, and lay claim to specific lists of competences34), and
lastly in State legislation relevant to specific subjects or circumstances33. The CAs are divided into
two groups: those with full autonomy, limited by powers reserved for the State, and those still
moving towards full autonomy.
Diversity of competence in CA regimes - adoption ofadditional rules or executive powers: The power
to adopt basic legislation, inter alia legislation transposing Community rules, is reserved, "like it or
not,"33 for the State (Cortes Generales37 and the Government). The first-level CA38 have a power
reminiscent of Article 130t EC: they are competent, through their Legislative Assemblies, to adopt
32 Gutierrez Espada, p.172.
33 Ibid., pp.172-73.
Although regional representation in the Council is permitted, the Spanish
Comunidades Autonomas do not enjoy the position of, for example, the German Lander.
Spain's Constitution clearly reserves international relations within the exclusive competence
of State (Article 149.1.3).
34 Legislative and executive - never judicial; Rubio Llorente, p. 132.
35 domper Ferrando, 1992, pp. 137-39.
33 "...guste o no"; Rico Gomez, J.I.,"Las Competencias autonomicas de desarrollo
legislativo en materia de proteccion del medio ambiente y espacios naturales protegidos: El
caso de la Comunidad Autonoma de Castilla y Leon," 127 (1992) Revista de Administracion
Publica 325 at p.325.
37 See appendix.
38 With founding statutes of autonomy adopted under Article 151.2 of the
Constitution:The Pais Vasco; Catalunya; Galicia; Andalucia. Autonomous Communities
founded under Article 143 Constitution: Asturias; Cantabria; La Rioja; Murcia; Valencia;
Aragon; Castilla-La Mancha; Canarias; Extremadura; Islas Baleares; Madrid; Castilla-Leon.
Navarra obtained autonomy via a special procedure alluded to in the disposicion adicional l.a
de la Constitucion."
282
additional protective norms developing the State's basic legislation39. Legislative competences
have been extremely varied, even between CAs of this first level; where one statute of autonomy
mentions a general, all-encompassing power, another can be very precise4®.
The second-level CA4^ have executive competences that are also immensely diverse. They
were offered a choice of two 'menus'4^ available in the Constitution, and their statutes figure on a
spectrum of competence between those listed in Article 14843, which they can assume, and those
reserved for the State in Article 14944. Those executive competences not assumed in these
Statutes, are reserved for the State43. An examination of each statute is therefore necessary to
determine which subject areas have been claimed by the various CAs46.
This maximal level of autonomy was reserved principally for Andalucia and for
autonomous communities based on separate nationalities (Pais Vasco, Catalunya and
Galicia).
40 Thus for example, the Pais Vasco claimed in its initial statute the legislative
development in matters, simply, of "environment and ecology"; Article 11.1.a Ley Organica
3/1979, 18 December. Catalunya's Statute is more specific, claiming exclusive competence in
"woodlands, forest exploitation and services, livestock paths and pastures, protected natural
areas and special treatment in mountain zones in accordance with the dispositions of Article
149.1.23 of the Constitution"; Article 9.10, Ley Organica 4/1979, 18 December. Catalunya's
Statute further claims the competence to develop and execute basic State legislation in
protection of the environment (Article. 10.6) and to the power to execute State legislation in
"Maritime salvage and industrial and contaminating wastes dumped into the territorial
waters of the State that correspond to the Catalan coast" (Article 11.10).
41 The statutes of which were adopted pursuant to Article 143, Constitution 1978.
4^ Rubio Llorente, p.131.
43 Constitution 1978, Article 148: "The Autonomous Communities can assume
competences in the following matters... 3) Organisation of the territory, urbanism and
housing...9) management in matters of environmental protection)."
44 Constitution 1978, Article 149: "The State has exclusive competence in the following
matters...23) basic legislation in matters of environmental protection, without prejudice of the
capacity of the Autonomous Communities to establish additional norms of protection. Basic
legislation on woodlands, forest exploitation and livestock paths."
43 Constitution 1978, Article 149.3: "Those matters not expressly atributed to the State by
this Constitution can correspond to the Autonomous Community, by virtue of their
respective Statutes. The competence for matters that have not been assumed by the Statutes of
Autonomy shall correspond to the State, whose norms shall prevail in case of conflict over
those of the Autonomous Communities, in all that is not attirubted exclusively to their
competence."
46 Extremadura, for example, claims exclusive competence in "hunting, river and lake
fishing, aquaculture, and protection of the ecosystems in which these activities are
developed" (Article 7.8, Ley Organica 1/1983, 25 February); competence to develop (although
this was probably overstepping its powers) and execute legislation in "woodlands and forest
exploitation, with special reference to the juridical regime of neighbouring woodlands in
common hands, communal woodlands, livestock paths and pastures, the regime of the
mountainous zones (Article 8.2)" and executive competence in protection of the environment,
including industrial and contaminating wastes dumped into water (Article 9.2). Another
community, Baleares, "con dudoso apoyo constitucional (with dubious constitutional support";
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Thus, implementation of legislation is mainly in the hands of the CA, whether of first or
second level47. Also, the designation of second-level CA is actually temporary4®, until gradually
all the competences not reserved for the State have been assumed4^, usually in a fragmented and
sectoral manner not conducive to coherent action50. Finally, differences in competences to adopt
additional legislation existed when rules concerning LCP and EIA were adopted. Since then,
those CAs that had not yet assumed competence to adopt additional environmentally protective
norms received such powers through Ley Organica 9/199254.
The 'exclusivity' of domains of competence that can be claimed by the CA as opposed to those
reserved 'exclusively' for the State, is relative: there can be no draconian separation of the two
domains52. This is particularly true in environmental matters because the Constitution, statutes of
autonomy and other laws often take a piecemeal, sectoral approach. The demarcation of
attributions in one element ~ fresh water, for instance -- does not always coincide with the
MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.262) attributed to itself "Additional norms of environmental
protection. Protected natural spaces. Ecology." (Article 11.5, Ley Organica 2/1983, 25
February) — in spite of being constituted on the basis of Article 143 of the Constitution.
47 See generally Rubio Llorente, p.130-31; garcia Ureta, 1994, p.169-75; Rico Gomez,
p .325-27; Lopez bustos, pp.71-78; MartInMateo, 1-1991, pp.259-264.
48 These autonomous communities can only assume initially such competences as are
enumerated in Article 148.1, Constitution 1978. If not claimed at that time, .a possibility to
reform the statute exists five years after its approval, at which point additional Article 148.1
competences can be assumed, always within the limits of those enumerated in Article 149.1;
see Article 143.3 Constitution 1978; Rico Gomez, p.328.
A significant problem, too vast to be investigated here, is that many of the first rank
autonomous communities also see their status as temporary. Although they have assumed all
the competences not reserved for the State, they still claim not only a reinterpretation of their
Statutes, but above all a transfer of those competences still held by the State; Rubio Llorente,
pn.131-32.
4^ Furthermore, the government has the power to transfer and delegate competence
(Article 150) which has been used to attribute to two autonomous communities (Canaries and
Valencia) competences without approval by referendum, and in a few other cases to
harmonise competences held by the various communities.
50 To illustrate, Aragon, has assumed functions and services in environmental matters
(Real Decreto 3504/1983, 14 December); in land planning and environmental studies (Real
Decreto 3316/1983, 2 November); in architectural heritage, control of the quality of life and
housing (Real Decreto 699/1984, 8 February); in nature conservation (Real Decreto 1410/1984,
8 February); in matters of provision, channelling and defense of the banks of rivers (Real
Decreto 1598/1984, 1 August); in matters of Vexatious Activities (actividades molestas)
agriculture, urbanism and housing (Real Decreto 299/1979, 26 January).
54 Transferring powers of the State's exclusive competence to the Autonomous
Communities; Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p.10724; garcia ureta, 1994 p.169-70.
52 domper Ferrando, 1992 pp.147-49; garcia Ureta, 1994, p.169.
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powers and functions in related issues — for example, emissions of certain industries into water53.
Also, even if claimed by a given CA, the powers revert to the State if more than one CA is
affected54.
In fact, despite the decentralising rhetoric, the State is reluctant to relinquish power to the
CAs and municipalities55. Local authorities lose competences in favour of more specific texts that
designate agents of the state58, and generally decision-making powers tend to gravitate towards
the State's greater resources. The fundamental justification given by the State for repatriation of
decision-making powers is that the centre is better equipped than local entities to exercise these
competences. Such re-centralisation is perhaps beneficial where LCP-type legislation is
concerned, as this requires a vision of State emissions as a whole. The same tendency is, however,
negative with a procedure such as EIA, where local realities are a critical part of the decision to be
taken.
Consequences for applying Community rules: Community environmental rules are grafted upon
a system of dividing competence that is both ambiguous5'7 and of a "diabolical complexity"58.
Whereas environmental administration is generally an area of considerable administrative
fragmentation and confusion, Spanish territorial divisions further cloud the waters. Even internal
observers find it difficult to delineate, within the range of seventeen possibilities, which
competences are held by each CA at any point in time59; the dilemma is more intractable from the
distance of the European Commission. The development of each CA's list of competences needed
to be followed in order to determine when a CA was authorised to adopt additional protective
norms developing the State's basic legislation; or when theTfA had only executive competences
and the state legislation was the only applicable nonjn. Since LO 9/1992, givjng all CAs power to
adopt additional norms, this issue has become one ofVerifying whethgrvr not each CA has used
53 domper ferrando, 1992, pp.159-60; Munoz Machado, p.323.
54 Domper Ferrando, 1992, p.163.
55 MartInMateo, 1-1991, pp.264-65; Lopez Bustos, pp.87-90.
58 As lopez Bustos points out, p.87, a proliferation of ways for the State to penetrate
local competences exists, through Gobernadores civiles, Delegados territoriales, etc. This bears a
similarity to the French situation, where prefects are Commissaires de la Republique.
57 Ibid., p.72.
58 "...diabolica complejidad"; Rubio Llorente, p.130.
59 Lopez Bustos, pp.76-77,79; MartInMateo, 1-1991, pp.26l-66.
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that power, and if so, how it has done so. In formal implementation, Community law then passes
through a double filter, as it were, of both State and regional legislation60. The fact that
harmonisation is elusive within this Member State bodes ill for harmonisation across the
European Community.
In the Spanish context, discord can emerge regarding Community rules not only between
European Community and Member State, but also between this State and the CAs61. In relations
with the European Community, Member States tend not to dispute supremacy62, but rather
whether the Community had competence to act at all. Within Spain challenge tends also to
surround the issue of competence, yet in the Spanish context one cannot assume that State law
has supremacy over legislation issued by the CAs63. Rather, as sustained by the Tribunal
Constitutional64, one must examine each act to determine if each entity has acted within its
respective attributions63.
In practice, it is difficult to deny66 that the State has competence to dictate norms applying
European Community law, even in areas where all the competence has, in theory, passed to the
CA67 The responsibility conferred upon the Government and Cortes Generates by Article 9368, to
60 In practice, of course, this is more complex. The competence of a CA to dictate the
legislation developing a directive is not automatic: other titles (for example, ensuring the
basic conditions of equality, Article 149.1.1) or circumstances (necessity, urgency) may confer
this task upon the State; see also domper Ferrando, 1992, pp.145-46.
61 In fact conflicts are not unusual: see for instance, the Statutes of Baleares Art 11.5; and
Madrid Art 27.10, MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.262. See generally Rico Gomez, op.cit., on the
competence of Castilla y Leon to adopt additional protective norms in the area of protected
natural areas (Ley 8/1991,10 May).
62 Which applies within the sphere of Community competence.
63 The competences of the State and CAs are of different types rather than hierarchical.
If this were not the case, the 'autonomy' would be illusory; see comments Lopez Bustos, p.72;
Domper Ferrando, 1992, pp.162-163; Rico Gomez, p.333; Fuentes Bodelon, p.80.
64 "Conflicts must be resolved by virtue of the principle of competence to determine
which matters have remained constitutionally and statutorily conferred upon the legislative
organs of the autonomous communities and which correspond to the Cortes Generales of the
State," STC 5/1981,13 December, cited Rico Gomez, p.333; see also Rubio Llorente, p.133.
65 MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.259; lopez bustos, p.72; Rico Gomez, p.333.
66 Although some do indeed deny this; see Rubio Llorente, p.36.
67 One such area is agriculture, a domain with an enormous impact on the environment.
68 Constitution 1978, Article 93:^lt is for the Cortes Generales or the Government,
according to case, to guarantee the accomplishment of those treaties and resolutions
emanating from international or supranational orgnisations...."
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ensure the fulfilment of international or supranational obligations, is usually considered sufficient
to issue rules that will serve in the eventual failure to do so on the part of the CA®.
1.2.2. Environmental Administration:
The difficulty reported by the Commission'70 in monitoring application of environmental
rules is further borne out by the complexity of the Spanish administrative situation.
Prior to the Sixties, the structure of Spanish ministries was vertical; neither much co¬
ordination between them existed, nor much concern for environmental matters. When action
related to the environment was taken, a sectoral approach was adopted and commissions were
established to tackle specific problems, not very effectively71. However, the Stockholm
Conference in 1972 promoted a more unified vision of environmental issues in Spain, and a
Delegated Commission for the environment72 (which was never noted for its success) was created
to co-ordinate initiatives on specific issues such as pollution; the Inter-ministerial Commission of
Environment (CIMA)73 was designed to be the working organ of the former74. In 1977 a new
department was established within the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism (MOPU73): the
General Directorate of Territorial Action and Environment76.
As in France, the environment was allocated to a subordinate department within the ministry
of a potential competitor. The environment's rank within the ministry was the subject of a good
deal of experimentation77. In 1991 MOPU was restructured78 to integrate the Transport Ministry
69 Rubio Llorente, pp.136-67, citing Ortega Alvarez, L., "El articulo 93 como titulo de
competencia concurrente para los supuestos incumplimientos autonomicos de las
obligaciones comunitarias," REDA 1987; and perez tremps, p., Comunidades autonomas, Estado
y Comunidad Europea, Madrid, 1987.
70 Eighth Application Report, points 32-33, pages 271-72.
71 Lopez Bustos, pp.41-42.
72 Comision Delegada del Gobierno para el Medio Ambiente.
73 Comison Interministerial de Medio Ambiente. Both Commissions were created by
Decree 888/1972,13 April.
74 It has since been eliminated (Real Decreto 1327/1987, 16 October) although nothing
was immediately created to take its place.
75 Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Urbanismo.
76 Direction General de Action Territorial y Medio Ambiente, Article 5.c, Real Decreto
1558/1977 4 July.
7 lopez Bustos, p.43. When MOPU was reorganized, a Subsecretariat of Land
Planning and Environment was created (Article 1.1 RD 754/1978) containing a General
Directorate of Environment (Articles 33.2.a and 48 -52 of Real Decreto 754/1978).
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into the structure. Only in the early Nineties was the environment elevated to the rank of State
Secretariat for Water and Environment Policies79. its commitments were widened, and an
attempt was made to group activities and competences into functional areas.
In its latest ministerial incarnation the Environment has been elevated to ministerial status,
though still without succeeding in divorcing its potential competitors: the Ministry of Public
Works, Transport and Environment (MOPTMA80). The principal environmental organ, the State
Secretariat of Environment and Housing81 (although again, environment and housing are often at
odds) is responsible for elaborating and co-ordinating basic legislation in matters of environment
and industrial pollution, and for overseeing its application; co-ordinating between the ministries
and the CAs; and organising relations with the European Community and other international
organisations87.
Unfortunately the battle to obtain coherence in environmental administration is not over:
significant problems remain, the first being that environmental competences are still not grouped
within one ministry.
Administrative fragmentation: Efficiency of implementation and enforcement of environmental
rules, Community or national, is sorely tested by the fact that government bodies implicated in
environmental administration at State level are many83. Usually environmental matters are
In 1990, the environment was elevated to the rank of Subsecretariat (Secretaria
General de Medio Ambiente) and was responsible for proposing and carrying out
environmental objectives and policies and to coordinate the functioning of MOPU's
attributions, with specific attention to its European Community and international
commitments (Real Decreto 199/1990 16 February, Article 1.1 and 1.2).
78 Real Decreto 576/1991, 21 April 1991.
79 Secretaria de Estado para la Politicas del Agua y el Medio Ambiente, restructured by Real
Decreto 1316/1991, 2 August.
80 Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente.
81 Secretaria de Estado de Medio Ambiente y Vivienda. Within this are General directorates
of Water Quality, Coasts, Information and Environmental Evaluation, Environmental Policy,
and for Housing, Urbanism and Architecture, as well as the National Institute of
Meteorology: Organigrama, J uly 1995, MOPTMA.
The environmental departments have been restructured still more recently by RD
1894/1996, 2 August 1996; see Garcia Ureta, "Current Survey: Spain," 1996 Environmental
Liability CS96.
87 Specifically relevant to this research, it also undertakes the realisation of EIS for
public works and tire analysis of meteorological data in order to adopt a climate policy.
83 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.252-54; lopez Bustos, chapter IV; Manzana Laguarda,
"Residuos industriales: aspectos juridicos de un problema irresoluto," (1994) 51 Revista
General de Derecho 10715, at p. 10723.
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entrusted to bodies whose basic priorities are often neither environmental nor environmentally
friendly, making it easier where conflict arises to overrule environmental goals in favour of
economic concerns.
Almost all ministries have some environmental competence, and although attempts to
regroup them have been made, environmental powers remain dispersed among the Ministries of
Health and Consumer Affairs; Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; Industry and Energy84, Economy
and Finance; Education and Science; and the Interior85; and the predominant ministry,
MOPTMA86. Thus scattered, the environment is often considered a secondary issue87 and even
within these ministries competences are not grouped coherently but dispersed throughout
various sub-directorates88. Also, a sectoral approach still predominates, and the environment
administration is frequently fragmented into its natural elements (atmosphere, water, energy,
sanitation, natural resources, natural areas).
The two directives examined in this research illustrate the fragmentation. Competences
regarding EIA have been grouped principally in MOPTMA and the Institute for Nature
Conservation (ICONA89), although EIA legislation affects the activities of almost all the other
84 Since Real Decreto 135/199, 20 June and Real Decreto-Ley 5/1995, 16 June;
previously it had been the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism.
85 Ministerios de Sanidad y Consumo; Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentacion; Industria,
Comercio y Turismo; Economla y Hacienda, Educacion y Ciencia; Interior.
86 This alone includes the General Directorate of Environmental Policy (responsible for
natural resources planning; coordination with competent organs of CA, EIA) containing five
general subdirectorates: Analysis, Statistics and Data Banks; Planning and EIA; Regulation
and institutional relations; Waste; and Protection of the Atmospheric Environment.
Moreover, within MOPTMA "there exists a whole constellation of organs linked or
related to the State", not enumerated here; see lopez Bustos, p.67-68.
87 A contrario, Martin Mateo finds that, although fragmentation is a problem, the fact
that the environment is included in the Ministry of Public Works can be an advantage;
MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.251; this would be more likely to constitute an advantage were
measures of environmental protection considered more a tool for improvement and less an
obstacle to economic goals.
88 For example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food contains General
Secretariats concerned with various agricultural, maritime fishing, and nature matters (The
autonomous Spanish Institute of Oceanography is linked to one): all of these secretariats have
competences linked to environmental protection. Most importantly, ICONA -- the National
Institute for Conservation of Nature) is linked to this Ministry.
89 TnslWidopWaTa 'Conservacwn de la Naturaleza; which is obligatorily contacted when a
project authorised at State level may affect conservation oFTTor^TauharTrafuraTpToTected
areas or forest (Real Decreto 1131/1988, Article 13).
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Ministries. As for LCP, principally the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MINER9^) oversees, inter
alia, installationfrf-oew'plants, modernisation of existing ones and development of methods for
reducing polluting emissions9^. Within this, the General Directorate of Energy's Centre of Energy,
Environmental and Technological Research (CIEMAT92) is particularly concerned with the
problem of forest residues (for example, acid rain). Also MOPTMA's General Sub-directorate of
Environmental Protection is in charge ofmonitoring and control of atmospheric pollution93.
Fragmentation at level o/CAs9"*: As execution of the Community legislation is ultimately in the
hands of the CAs, these too have a considerable role to play; yet these administrations are as
susceptible to change and fragmentation on a sectoral and functional basis95 as those at the
central level. Catalunya is the main exception; its government approved the creation of a
Department (Consejeria96) of Environment in February 1991. A few other CAs have also tried to
assemble environmental functions into one agency. Extremadura, with an Environment Agency
linked to its Department of Public Works, Urbanism and Environment, provides another positive
example,, yet even here not all competences are united; some remain linked to the Department of
Health and Consumer Safety92.
More typically throughout the CAs, the environment is situated in a department subordinate
to Public Works, Transport, Urbanism, Land Planning or a combination of these. For instance, in
Aragon, the organ principally concerned with environmental protection is the Regional Service of
Environment within the Directorate General of Urbanism in the Department of Land Planning,
Public Works and Transport; however, the Departments of Agriculture, Livestock and Mountains;
90 Ministerio de Industria y Energia.
91 Although the Ministerio de Sanidad has certain general powers.
92 Direction General de la Energta, Centro de Investigation Energetica, Medio Ambiental y
Tecnologica.
93 Article 6.7, Real Decreto 1361/1991, 2 August; and the National Meteorological
Institute has been incorporated into this ministry. See MARTIN Mateo, 1-1991, p.253-55;
MARTlNMateo, 11-1992, p.303; lopez Bustos, p.56; Sanz Sa, p.425.
94 The sources for the regional structures are MARTlN MaTEO, 1-1991, pp.263-266 and
lopez Bustos, Chapter v. They should be considered only on an indicative basis; as the
structures are prone to rapid change, accuracy is fleeting.
95 MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.264; Lopez Bustos, p.78.
96 The equivalent of a ministry on the regional level.
92 Via the Health and Consumer Safety's Regional Commission of Vexatious,
Insalubrious, Noxious and Dangerous Activities.
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Industry, Commerce and Tourism; and Health, Social Welfare and Work hold environmental
competences as well. A consultative organ also exists, the Environment Commission^8. And
Aragon is not the most extreme case^. "As can be observed, total dispersion"100.
Thus, to trace the implementation and enforcement of environmental rules and policies
implies a paper chase through administrative structures that, dispersed once at the national level,
are splintered once more at the level of the CAs. Furthermore, competences for certain issues10*
lie with the municipalities102, and difficulties arise here as well.
Co-ordination: Efficiency of administrative activity in an area so fragmented supposes
adequate co-ordination between bodies entrusted with an environmental mission. Unfortunately,
in spite of the various 'reforms', attributions remain dispersed and ministerial co-ordination is
insufficient103, a factor which the European Court of Auditors had correctly noted was one of the
main problems behind controversial use of European Structural Funds10,1. For instance, the Inter-
ministerial Commission of Environment, intended to co-ordinate ministerial initiatives, was
always "inoperative"105. The lack of co-ordination takes on a territorial dimension10^ and in
practice, external agencies of the central administration have difficulty co-ordinating endeavours
at the local level102.
08 Decree 190/1988, 20 September.
In Galicia, for instance, environmental responsibilities are distributed among the
General Directorate of Environmental Quality (Direccion General de Calidad
Medioambiental) within the Consejeria of Land-Planning and Public Works; the General
Directorate of Mountains and Natural Environment within the Consejeria of Agriculture,
Livestock and Fishing; the General Directorate of Historial and Monumental Heritage within
the Consejeria of Culture and Youth (Consejeria de Cultura y Juventud; Direccion General del
Patrimonio Historico y Monumental); the General Directorate of Shellfish Farming and
Aquaculture within the Consejeria of Fishing, Shellfish Farming and Aquaculture; and the
Comisidn Gallega de Medio Ambiente, linked to the Consejeria of the Presidency and Public
Administration (Consejeria de la Presidencia y Administracion Publica).
100 "Como se aprecia, total dispersion"; Lopez Bustos, p.80.
101 Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Regimen Local (LRBRL), 2 April 1985, Article
26.1(d), Article 86.3.
102 LRBRL, Article 25.2.f.
103 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.250-51; Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p. 10723; domper
Ferrando, 1992, Garcia Ureta; Lopez Bustos, Rubio Llorente.
101 Court of Auditors Report 3/92, p.C245/7 at point 1.15.
105 "Inoperante";MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.252.
Rubio Llorente, p.137.
102 Also, a variety of peripheral organisations op external services of the various
ministries still exist, a few Direcciones Provinciales tlwmstill exist, but their role is largely
irrelevant since most of their functions have been taken over by CA; Letter of 22 December
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Fragmentation of powers and inadequate co-ordination foster a disjointedness in
administrative initiatives at all levels, and lead to duplications of certain activities and lacunae in
other areas108. Furthermore, political competition is evident:
Each one of these (ministerial departments) has systematically seen to it that it is endowed with
norms applicable to each sector, to widen and develop those existing, increasing its particularities
to the extreme of making it practically impossible [to have] a unified perspective10".
The rapidity and frequency of administrative change, as seen with MOPTMA, compounds
the confusion. Worse, it appears that change is often precipitous, as with the elimination of body
responsible for inter-ministerial co-ordination — a crucial task, given the situation — before a
replacement had been foreseen110.
Indeed it appears that much administrative reshuffling, "the weather-vane plan"111 , is more
to do with political shifts than rationalisation of commitments in the environmental area. Again
the State-level pattern is repeated at CA level, where environmental organs are in constant
evolution and it is "impossible to establish the basic organic structure"112. Again, variations exist
across CAs113.
1995, Luis Mas Garcia, Subdirector General de Planificacion Energetica y Medio Ambiente,
MINER.
108 Rubio Llorente, p.133; Lopez Bustos, p.96; Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.171.
109 Lopez Bustos, p.48.
110 The pattern of ill-advised change was repeated in the suppression of another
mechanism for co-ordination of initiatives. Initially within MOPT there existed a Secretaria
General del Medio Ambiente with links to a variety of Directorates General; this has been
eliminated, "and with it disappears a fundamental mechanism for the co-ordination that is so
necessary"; lopez bustos, p.51, p.63, note 72; martln Mateo, 1-1991, p.25.
111 "These brusque alterations or interruptions...have always come from the continuous
j reforms improvised by the change of the head of the Ministery or simply of the
environmental organisation in question, that seem to be the means by which the arrival of a
new official is marked; they are most frequently realized — the reforms — without a firm and
appropriate criterion and have only resulted in a 'dance' of organs, on occasion of short
duration, and that, concretely, have not served the proposition of building an environmental
Administration that efficiently protects the environment. The weather-vane plan has been
^ realised, constantly changing the direction to follow"; Lopez bustos, p.60.
112 Lopez Bustos, p.79; for instance, see also MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.342, who lists CA
organisms in the area of classified activities "without pretension of exhaustivity".
113 For instance, in the manner and the efficiency of pollution control; lopez bustos,
p.77.
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It has been suggested that the Commission would find its monitoring tasks easier if it were
able to contact a local authority directly114; certainly some improvement needs to be made on the
current procedure118. However, in the Spanish context it is likely that the Commission would
waste considerable time and energy tracking down the appropriate local authority itself. Finally,
fragmentation and the rapidity of change do nothing to aid the citizen who wishes to participate
in environmental protection, or who seeks to register a complaint; although citizens are entrusted
with assisting the public powers in their environmental tasks, in specific situations which public
power to assist is far from clear.
Lack of resources and power: Public expenditure in environment as a percentage of total public
expenditure116, in 1987, was 1.78; by 1990, it had risen to 2.20; and in 1992 was 2.39117 — therefore
proportionally greater than that spent at the European level (which appears logical, since
implementation and enforcement are mainly in the hands of Member States), as well as that spent
in France118. In 1987 23% of the total expenditure was for personnel; in 1990, 20.39% and in 1992,
19.80%11?. This is still insufficient evidently; MOPTMA does not have agents in the field to
"impose environmental discipline"120 where it is most required. "The Administration on many
occasions, above all in the local sphere, does not possess the technical and human means
necessary to exercise efficiently and diligently its powers of intervention and monitoring in the
activities with an impact on the environment."121 As seen, constitutionally the majority of
114 Cf: Richard Macrory, "The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law Against Member
States," presentation during the conference "The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the
United Kingdom," London, 3 November 1995.
115 Whereby everything passes through the Member State representation in Brussels,
with all the delays this implies (see Chapter 2, point 2.3. Limits to Commission powers).
116 Regarding the classification as "investment in environment", see for instance, the
Court of Auditors report OJ 1992 C245/14.
117 Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente, Direccion General de
Politica Ambiental, Gasto publico en medio ambiente en 1991 y datos comparativos 1987 - 1991,
serie estadisticas, 1994, p. 282 (Monografia MOPTMA).
118 See chapter 4, point 1.3. Reform.
Monografia MOPTMA, p.290.
120 lopez Bustos, p.49. MINER, in charge of implementing large combustion plants
legislation, also relies on Provincial Directorates in each province, depending organically on
the Delegate of the Government in the CA in which the provinces lies, and depending
functionally on the Civil Governor of the Province; Letter of 22 December 1995, Luis Mas
Garcia, Subdirector General de Planificacion Energetica y Medio Ambiente, MINER.
121 Beltran Aguirre, p.298.
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concrete actions fall to the CAs and municipalities, yet the inadequacy of resources is even more
marked here122. Furthermore, variations between CA are enormous, ranging between the
extremes in public expenditure of 7,311 pesetas/inhabitant in Asturias and 28,362
pesetas/inhabitant in Baleares123.
1.3. Summary:
The consequences of the situation described here can be expected to flow downstream,
affecting the efficiency with which the public powers, both State and Autonomous, tackle the
tasks of formal and practical implementation and enforcement. Generally the situation is
characterised by fragmentation, confusion, and a great potential for clash between priorities, both
in terms of constitutional goals and administrative divisions. The returns of the constitutional
reference remain limited at present. The rapid change and fragmentation indicate that, despite
being enshrined in the Constitution, environmental matters are of low priority, suggesting
somewhat obviously that it will be difficult to muster the political will to redress subsequent
difficulties.
2. Problems of Formal Implementation/Transposition:
Within the context described above, attention shifts to the transposition of Community
obligations into national rules. Of particular concern is the manner in which public powers have
made use of their margin of discretion in transposing Community obligations.
122 Amounts for CA personnel, and goods and services are not even double those at the
central level, although concrete actions are largely in their hands. Figures for 1991 (in
thousand pesetas): total public expenditure 107,541,966 on personnel; 137,240,299 in goods
and services; 242,215,017 in real investments. For the central administration the same figures
are 14,319,045 (personnel); 5,324,573 (goods and services) and 71,040,293 (real investments).
For the CA, 22,529,868 (personnel); 6,560,838 (goods and services); and 94,200,354 (real
investments); Monografia MOPTMA, Table 1.3, p. 16.
At times local budgets are strained enough that associations between close localities
are created to pay for basic services in areas such as sanitation, et cetera; LOPEZ BUSTOS,
p.90,94.
123 Monografia MOPTMA, p.13.
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2.1. Types of legislation
Organic Laws (leyes orgdnicas) are those acts directly specified by the Constitution; approval,
modification or suspension must be voted by absolute majority of the Congress124, and power to
adopt organic laws cannot be delegated to the Government. Acts voted by Cortes Generates are
leyes (statutes). The power to adopt norms with the rank of statute can be delegated to the
Government; an act thus adopted is a legislative decree (real decreto legislativo). Decretos
(regulations) are acts drawn up by the regulatory power, the government.
In order for Spain to meet the many obligations it faced upon entering the Community, the
government was empowered123 for a period of six months to adopt norms with the rank of "ley"
(statute, act) regarding a series of matters included in an Annex. Real Decreto Legislativo
1302/1986 was adopted in this manner to fulfil the requirements of EIA85/337126.
Provisions transposing EIA85/337 and LCP88/609 were enacted specifically to transpose
European legislation and are less fragmented across legislative acts than the French transposition.
The principal texts are: for EIA85/337, Real Decreto Legislativo 1302/1986127 on environmental
impact assessment, and Real Decreto 1131/1988128 for the execution of RDL 1302/1986. CA
measures129 are mentioned where appropriate, rather than systematically analysed. The main
text implementing LCP88/609 is Real Decreto 646/1991139 establishing new norms on limitation
124 Congreso de los Diputados, in appendix.
125 Ley 47/1985, 27 December 1985.
126 Approved by the Consejo de Ministros on 28 June 1986, it was published on 30 June —
the last day of the six-month delegation of Ley 47/85; Fuentes Bodelon, p.74. Problems arose
with EIA: no express reference was made to previously existing EIA-type rules. The
government's power to modify or derogate from these was contested. The Consejo de Estado
stated that the Disposicion Adicional in the RDL's accompanying regulation (RD1131/1988),
which mentions the previous legislation, could be considered a "clarifying disposition"
(Consejo de Estado, Dictamen 59.269 MM, p.18; cited Garcia ureta, 1994, p.220) of the
existing legislation.
127 Real Decreto Legislativo 1302/1986, de 28 dejunio, de evaluacion de impacto ambiental.
128 Real Decreto 1131/1988, de 30 de septiembre por el que se aprueba el Reglamento para le
ejecucion del Real Decreto Legislativo 1302/1986.
129 List provided in Chapter 2, footnote 19.
130 Real Decreto 646/1991, de 22 de abril, por el que se establecen nuevas normas sobre
limitacion a las emisiones a la atmosfera de determinados agentes contaminantes procedentes de
grandes instalaciones de combustion.
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of atmospheric emission of certain contaminating agents proceeding from large combustion
plants; no CA has adopted developing legislation131.
2.2. Formal Implementation — EIA85/337:
Although examples of rules containing early elements of EIA exist132; these were "precarious
and of little significance"133 and not coherent enough to be used in transposition of
EIA85/337134. Despite such precedents (which continue in force), Environmental Impact
Assessment was a new procedure in Spain imported through Community legislation133.
Comparison between Community and Spanish legislation is easier than that observed in the
French context. Spain based its legislation on the European model and the result, as expected,
more closely follows the European requirements without being distributed over various Acts and
regulations. The comparison reveals that the most serious problems surround the conflict
between economic and environmental priorities, even more evident here than in France; and the
131 Letter of 10 January 1996, Luis Mas Garcia, Subdirector General de Planificacion
Energetica y Medio Ambiente, MINER.
132 Various rules contained elements of EIA, and are mentioned in the Preamble of Real
Decreto Legislativo 1302/1988.
However, the Regulation on Vexatious, Insalubrious, Noxious and Dangerous
Activities (hereinafter, Vexatious Activities Regulation, Decreto 2414/1961) is considered the
precursor of EIA legislation, both because it contained a preventive emphasis and more
specifically because it required that any applicant for an authorisation include a technical
project and descriptive memorandum detailing the characteristics of the activity, its potential
repercussions on environmental health and the corrective measures proposed (Article 29).
Nonetheless the description of the activity was more emphasised than the evaluation of its
effects. An extremely brief period of public participation was included (Art 30.2.a); see
comments Fuentes Bodelon, pp. 78-80; martln Mateo, 1-1991, pp.309,320; garcia ureta,
1994, p.193-215; Rosa moreno, 1993, pp.143-48, p.205.
One sectoral rule links both areas of legislation studied here, EIA and air pollution:
Ley 38/1972 de protection del ambiente atmosferico, Decree 833/1975, Orden 18 October 1976 on
prevention and correction of industrial atmospheric pollution; setting up a system of licences
and of air pollution monitoring stations. The law attempted to introduce an evaluation
procedure and conditioned authorisations on administrative prescriptions.
Importantly, the Order (Articles 8 and 45) contains a positive point that, regrettably,
was not taken up in subsequent EIA legislation: the Ministry of Industry could require the
preparation of an EIS to be prepared by an independent centre on atmospheric pollution, enhancing
the quality of the EIS.
133 Fuentes Bodelon, p.69; and, as Rosa moreno (1993, p.148) points out regarding the
environmental aspects of these: "their non-fulfillment in the daily chores of urbanism was
total."
134 Fuentes Bodelon, p.80.
135 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.223.
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fact that, as in France, a strong tradition of administrative secrecy impedes public participation. A
problem particular to Spain is the lack of harmonisation across CAs.
The transposing legislation for EIA was adopted late, on 20 July 1988, roughly two weeks
after the European limit (3 July 1988) had passed. Therefore authorisation requests made after 3
July 1988 but prior to 20 July 1988 without an EIA should have been refused; it remains uncertain
whether those requests initiated prior to 3 July 1988 but accorded after the directive's deadline
passed required an EIA136.
Real Decreto Legislativo (RDL) 1302/1988, the Spanish EIA Act, is a concise document
containing ten articles, two additional dispositions, and one annex. Many of its shortcomings can
be attributed to its accelerated, six-month elaboration137 and are addressed in its regulation, Real
Decreto (RD) 1131/1988, which provides greater detail. The regulation is composed of four
chapters: the first contains general dispositions; the second treats the evaluation of impact and its
contents; the third discusses the EIA with transboundary effects; and the fourth concerns
monitoring and responsibility. An additional disposition refers to the earlier legislation
containing elements of EIA. A first annex provides definitions of 30 terms used in the legislation
and a second annex specifies (actually adds) more projects 'included' in the Annex of
RDL1302/1986. The EIA procedure is thus to be inserted into a much larger authorisation
procedure, such as the procedure for Vexatious Activities138.
2.2.1. The projects covered (EIA85/337, Article 4, Annexes I and II):
The Spanish legislation does apply to both public and private projects likely to have
important repercussions, included in an annex that contains a positive list of twelve projects: the
nine foreseen in the European legislation and three of the 80-odd projects from EIA85/337 Annex
136 Case C-396/92 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern v Friestaat Bayern 1994 ECR 1-3717; see
discussion Chapter 3, point 1.2.
137 Fuentes Bodelon, p.76.
138 Reglamento de Actividades Molestas, Insalubres, Nocivas y Peligrosas: Regulation on
Vexatious, Insalubrious, Noxious and Dangerous Activities, Decreto 2414/1961,30 November
(Vexatious Activities Regulation).
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II (RDL 1302/1986, Article 1, Anexo*3^). An initial comment is that, as in France*4®, not much is
made of the concept of projects likely to have 'significant effects' in the Community legislation*41
— a casual approach that is generally followed in the CAs*4^.
However, from the Community point of view the largest problem in the entire Spanish
transposition concerns Annex II projects, those projects that EIA85/337 requires be subjected to
EIA "where Member States consider that their characteristics so require"*43. This Member State
simplified its approach by considering that all but a few of the eighty-odd Annex II projects did
not warrant even the elaboration of criteria for submission to the EIA procedure. The Directive's
Annex was thus nicknamed "the criterion for that which is never evaluated"*44. Although some
CAs' legislation elaborate criteria for EIA85/337 Annex II projects*45, most CAs have not further
developed the deficient State list. The result is that harmonisation within this Member State and
across the Community is undermined. Also, since generally no criteria to determine whether an
EIA should be carried out have been adopted, the majority of Annex II projects escape the EIA
procedure. The State's approach has not been modified in subsequent legislation*46; a draft bill
*39 These cover EIA85/337 Annex I projects, which must always be subject to EIA, as
well as (10) large dams, (11) afforestation when this entails risk of serious negative ecological
transformation, (12) open-cast mining of bituminous coal, lignite or other minerals. Notably,
these are not always adequate. For instance, number 10 gives no indication of the point at
which a dam is considered 'big'.
140 Chapter 4, 2.2.1. Projects Covered Financial thresholds.
141 EIA85/337, Article 2(1).
143 Also, generally the regulation's definitions restrict the application of EIA85/337;
Garcia Ureta, 1994, pp.223,27.
143 EIA85/337, Article 4(2). See Ninth Application Report, p.154; Rosa Moreno, 1993,
P-171-
144 "...el criterio de que nunca se evaluen"; Gonzalez Alonzo, cited Garcia Ureta, 1994,
p.229.
*45 Or have added criteria that practically include some Annex II projects: Catalunya,
Galicia, Valencia have added agricultural projects for example, which suits the characteristics
of the regions. Valencia also amplifies the national list of projects in that which concerns
zoology and energy.
The Canaries have adopted criteria related to finance, location, and type of project
and furthermore envisage three types of study of varying depth.
Madrid's legislation has defined two types of study and includes a number of Annex
II projects.
See Fuentes Bodelon, p.84-85; garcia ureta, 1994, p.237; MartIn mateo, 1-1991,
p.325; Com(93)28, p.234.
146 For example, the Ley de conservacion de espacios y especies protegidas (Conservation of
Protected Areas and Species Act), 27 March 1989, attempts to amplify the list of activities of
the RDL 1302/1986. However it is frankly insufficient with regard to EIA85/337 Annex II
projects referring to the natural environment; Fuentes Bodelon, pp.90-91.
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amending the Spanish EIA legislation exists, but as of winter 1996-97, the parliament was still in
the process of adopting the relevant legislation14'7.
Further difficulties arise concerning project exemptions. Article 3.a of the regulation stipulates
that the European Commission must be informed of projects exempted from EIA, exceptionally,
by the Consejo de Ministros148 as required by EIA85/337, Article 2(3)c14^. A problem remains,
stemming from the territorial structure of Spanish government: some CA have also made
provisions to exclude projects approved by their regional legislative assemblies150, adding another
administrative level at which projects can be exempted from the Community legislation — in
essence, diminishing unilaterally the effect of Community law in certain regions under certain
circumstances151. Even if this possibility remains theoretical for the moment, it is debatable
whether the second-tier exemption is in conformity with the provisions of Community law153.
The issue has apparently not elicited much attention either from national or Community sources.
Certain elements — most urgently the Annex II projects — must be addressed before the
Spanish rules can be considered to conform to Community obligations regarding projects covered
by EIA85/337. Despite the gravity of the situation, the infringement continues to be tolerated by
the Commission153.
1417 Garcia Ureta, A., "The E.C. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive before the
European Court of Justice," 5 (1997) Environmental Liability 1 at p. 3 note 24-25.
148 Noted in the RDL's Additional Disposition (Disposition adicional segunda). The
Consejo must give a reasoned accord that includes provisions in order to minimise the
environmental impact of the project, and making this public.
149 Not surprisingly, considering the Commission's complaints concerning obtaining
information from Member States, EIA85/337's requirement to communicate certain
information (e.g. concerning exempted projects) was neglected in the RDL although remedied
subsequently in the regulation.
150 For instance, the Canarias and Valencia; seeGarcia Ureta, 1994, p.239.
151 And in fact, without notifying the central government. Presumably however, since
the LRJPAC, Article 10 (which specifically mentions notification of Community institutions)
applies, the Commission would be notified of such an exemption.
153 Other examples of incongruities exist: Article 1(5) of the Directive provides for
exemptions from the EIA process for projects especially approved by Parliament. In the area
of water, public works of great interest or affecting more than one CA are necessarily
approved by an act of Parliament (ley) and incorporated into the Plan Hidrologico Nacional
(Article 44 de la Ley de aguas); Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.198.
153 A reasoned opinion was sent in 1992 Bull.EC 12-1992, p.180; since then, however, the
yearly application reports make no mention of a referral to the ECJ.
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2.2.2. Environmental Impact Study (Article 5.2 EIA85/337):
The minimal required contents of the EIS have been transposed (RDL1302/1986, Article 2)
closely following the guidelines in EIA85/337, Article 5(2), with the addition of an unspecified154
'environmental monitoring programme' (programa de vigilancia ambiental, RDL Article 2.1.e). A
factor that has potential to improve EIS quality is that in the Spanish context the developer's
subjectivity in drawing up the EIS is somewhat tempered by the fact that an environmental
authority examines it and can request more information. (Although it is optimistic to rely on this
occurring in practice, since understaffed administrative units wish to avoid delays155.)
Moreover, the Spanish authorities have used the margin of discretion afforded by the use of a
directive to go beyond present European requirements156 concerning the preliminary contact
between the administration and the developer. RD1131/1988, Article 13 stipulates that the person
requesting an authorisation must communicate this intention to the environmental authority, and
give that organ a "memorandum/summary" (tnemoria-resumen) describing the principle
characteristics of the project. The environmental authority then has ten days in which it 'can'
contact other persons, administrations and institutions for their observations. With the answers of
the other parties contacted (which must reply within 30 days) the environmental authority gives
the applicant initial information, as well as its view of the most significant features to be taken
into account in the EIS (RD1131/1988, Article 14). This initial contact has the potential to be
extremely beneficial for EIS quality, since the developer is given important hints on which aspects
the environmental authority foresees as problematic. (Actual practice indicates that for now this
potential remains unfulfilled157.)
154 RD1131/1988, Article 11: where it speaks of the content of the Programa de vigilancia
ambiental: simply says "it shall establish a system that gaurantees the accomplishment of the
indications and means, protective and corrective, contained in the impact study". The
developer prepares the monitoring programme; garcia ureta, 1994, p.330. As rosa
Moreno says (1993, p.239),"Raquitico pronunciamiento que no exterioriza, en modo alguno, la
magnitud de este documento (miserly statement that in no way reveals the magnitude of the
document)."
155 Chapter 8, point 1.7, at Delay.
156 EIA85/337, Article 5(3). However, "scoping" provisions are foreseen in the proposed
amendment to EIA85/337; see Conclusions, point 2. Lessons learned- Amendments to the
EIA legislation.
157 See Chapter 8, point 1.4. Reluctance to modify project.
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Authorities also made positive use of their margin of manoeuvre in describing the contents of
EIS. RD1131/1988, Article 7 provides an outline of the EIS that is a great deal more detailed than
in the directive. It indicates that the EIS must include :
Description of the project and its activities; an examination of technically viable alternatives and a
justification of the adopted solution; an environmental inventory and description of the key
ecological or environmental interactions; identification and evaluation of the impacts, both in the
proposed solution and its alternatives; establishment of protective and corrective means; a
programme of environmental monitoring; a summary document188.
An explanatory article is then devoted to each of these elements. To illustrate, the summary
document (Documento de sintesis), further elaborated in RD1131/1988, Article 12, must contain:
a) The conclusions related to the viability of the proposed realisation.
b) The conclusions related to the examination and election of the various alternatives.
c) The proposal of corrective means and the environmental monitoring programme, both in the
phase of execution of the proposed activity as in its functioning.
The summary document must not exceed twenty-five pages and shall be drafted in terms that are
accessible to general understanding.
The informational or technical difficulties encountered in carrying out the study shall be indicated,
specifying the origin and cause of such difficulties.189
In effect, regarding the EIS, the Spanish transposition has gone further in positively
influencing practical implementation than the Community legislator required.
2.2.3. Public consultation (Articles 6.2 and 6.3 EIA85/337):
By contrast, the Spanish transposition of the public consultation obligations illustrates the
manner in which, without breaching formal requirements, Member States can utilise the margin
of discretion left by the Community directive to render certain elements almost meaningless. A
serious deficiency of Spain's formal implementation of EIA85/337 lies in the inadequacy of the
public participation provisions, which has been particularly criticised by national
commentators160. Yet although the European Commission has recognised this inadequacy161, it
158 Original language version in appendix.
159 Ibid.




has apparently chosen not to take Article 169 action in this regard162. The only actor likely to
fulfil the preventive purpose of EIA85/337 is distanced.
The public's input has been minimised. RDL1302/1986 makes half-hearted mention of 'public
participation' in the preamble, stipulating only that the EIS be submitted to a "stage of public
information as provided in the relevant legislation" (i.e., the sectoral legislation applicable to the
specific type of project). If none is foreseen in that legislation, the environmental authority
submits it to the 'public information stage'163. The regulation's provisions (Articles 15 and 17164)
do not adequately compensate the RDL's brevity. As Garcia Ureta says, "one must make an effort
to infer that the public has the right to participate in the evaluation procedure"165. Several aspects
of the national rules lead to the conclusion that this Member State has failed to use the methods
most appropriate to implement the procedural right embodied in the Directive.
Vagueness of "public information": The Spanish legislation fails to indicate what type of
involvement is implied by a "public information stage", nor does it specify the conditions under
which the dossier can be examined, or photocopies can be obtained. No provision is made for a
public meeting. Greater precision regarding the form and content of public consultation could
reasonably be expected166. Vagueness and lack of guidance in the State provisions invite regional
162 Indeed, the Commission's discretion in enforcement is perhaps understandable in <
this instance, since, although it can be argued that the methods used are less than those most j
appropriate, the European legislation does not lay down a clearly enforceable obligation. '
16:3 RDL1302/1986, Article 3: "1. The impact study shall be submitted, within the
applicable procedure for the authorisation or realisation of the project to which it
corresponds, and jointly with this, to the stage of public information and other reports
established during the same. 2. If such stages were not foreseen in the above-mentioned
procedure, the environmental organ shall proceed directly to submit the impact study to a
period of public information and to claim the reports that in each case it considers opportune.
164 The EIS must be submitted "to the stage of public information" within the appropriate
authorising procedure (Article 15). Also (Article 17), if no stage of public information is
foreseen in the relevant substantive authorisation procedure, the environmental organ shall
submit the EIS to public information for thirty days; it can request such information as it
deems appropriate.
When the authorisation of the project is within the competence of the State, the public
information stage is announced in the Boletin Oficial del Estado (Official Journal). Before
drawing up the Declaration of Impact, the environmental organ shall communicate to the
developer/applicant the aspects of the EIS which should be completed (twenty days period)
after which it shall draw up the Declaration.
165 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.308.
166 For instance, the French provisions on the matter are extremely precise, down to the
notebook with non-removable pages, signed by the enquiry commissioner, in which the
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variation: in some CAs, the EIS is submitted to scrutiny separately from other documentation
regarding the project167. (Again the complexity of the Commission's verification task is noted, as
is the detrimental effect on harmonisation.)
Time allocated for consultation: To fail to provide a period of public participation would render
the procedure void16®; however the length of this consultation varies according to the
authorisation procedure into which the EIA is inserted. For instance the Vexatious Activities
Regulation, under which classified activities fall, provides an extremely short period for public
participation: regardless of the seriousness of the activity at issue, the time period is always,
implacably, ten days, for "a butcher shop as for a chemical plant"169 — or for a large combustion
plant170. For other authorisations, the period varies. Water legislation provides a period of
between 20 days and two months; thus a water project may require a longer period of
consultation than the 30 days stipulated for a nuclear project171. (Again, some CAs have modified
the provisions: Aragon172, establishes a period of 30 days if the substantive procedure establishes
less.) A further problem is that, as in France, the consultation hours generally coincide with
working hours.
Publication of the announcement of public consultation: Despite the suggestions of EIA85/337173,
the Spanish legislation requires the announcement of the period of public information to be
published in only the Official Journal, or the Autonomous Bulletin. Although strictly speaking
'accessible' to the public, confining the announcement of the event to official sources, in effect,
public notes its comments; Public Enquiries Decree 85-453, Article 15; Classfied Installations
Decree 77-1133, Article 7.
167 Decreto 50/1991 Article 16 Cantabria; Articles 4.1 Ley 2/1989 and Article 14 of the
regulation, Valencia; garcia ureta, 1994, p.271, note 147).
16® STS 14 October 1977.
169 "...una carniceria como de una planta quimica"; Castanyer Vila, cited by garcia ureta,
1994, p.295. Nonetheless, it is very positive that the municipal authority must send personal
notification to the immediate neighbours of a proposed location, particularly given the fact
that public consultation is announced only in the State and CA Official Bulletins.
170 Which figures in the nomenclature of the Vexatious Activities Regulation,
clasificacion decimal 511.
171 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.271.
172 Decreto 118/1989 article 3.
173 EIA85/337, Article 6(3) suggests that Member States "specify the way in which the
public may be informed, for example by bill-psoting within a certain radius, bpulication in
local newspapers, organisation of exhibitions with plans, drawings, tables, graphs, models...".
303
excludes that portion of the public that fails to scan regularly the Official Journal174 — a point
which needs little elaboration. The above complications regarding public participation may be
dead issues; the public may never know of the project's announcement at all, and therefore details of
the time allocated, or the absence of public meeting are irrelevant.
The lack of concrete obligation in the Community legislation is largely at the root of the
inadequacy of the national provisions178. In sum, without violating the rules:
The Spanish EIA legislation side-steps these commitments and follows the formalism of the norms that
manage the substantive procedures, maintaining the inefficient traditional ritual regarding the
communication of its opening178.
Examination of a potentially incomplete study: Finally, if the public finds out about the
project, and indeed shows up, it may in some cases examine an incomplete study. Although the
possibility exists for the environmental authority to request more information, the legislation
allocates no further time for the public to look over the completed and more informative study.
Public participation in conflict with tradition of administrative secrecy: A deep-rooted tradition of
administrative secrecy, embedded in the system during Franco's regime177, lies beneath the
Spanish authorities' use of their discretion to restrict public participation. Although the system
has progressed considerably towards openness, Spain's government remains "characterised by
dirigiste administrations which do not co-operate with interest groups in a formalised way."178
Constitutional Articles 5.2179, 23.1180 and 105b181 give citizens the right to participate in public
174 In another context (but relevant here), Garcia de Enterria and Tomas Ramon Fernandez
comment that expecting citizens to read the Boletin Oficial "is something which lowers the limit
of that which is reasonable and, for this, cannot seriously be supported"; p.529.
175 See comments in Chapter 1, point 2.5.1. ELA.85/337, Final version- Public consultation .
176 MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.328
177 garcia Ureta, 1994, p.294; Sanchez Moron, M, "El derecho de acceso a la informacion en
materia de Medio Ambiente", in I Congreso Nacional de Derecho Ambiental: Ponencias, Sevilla,
1995, at p.61
178 Aguilar, p.227.
179 Constitution 1978, Article 9.2: "It is for the public powers to promote the conditions so that
liberty and equality of the individual and of groups in which the individual is integrated is real
and effective, to remove the obstacles that impede of make difficult their fullness, and to
facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social life".
1811 Constitution 1978, Article 23.1: "Citizens have the right to participate in public affairs,
directly or through the medium of representatives freely elected in periodical elections by
universal suffrage."
181 Constitution 1978, Article 105: "Shall be regulated by statute a) the audience of citizens
directly or through the organisations and associations recognised by law, the procedures of
elaboration of administrative dispositions that affect them, b) The access of citizens to
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activities and require the Government to facilitate this participation. However, the right to
participate must be implemented by the legislator and it is no accident that the mandate of Article
105.b Constitution 1978 was one of the last Constitutional provisions to receive implementing
treatment182. In practice Spain has not managed to overcome a pervasive and general malaise
where public involvement is concerned183. As in France, it seems this deficiency does not target
only environmental interests; as it happens, however, the effects are particularly damaging for the
application of environmental law, which closely depends on the public's ability to obtain
information and act as defensor184.
A general administrative rule on access to information (LRJPAC183), passed in 1992, partially
addressed the deficiency of the EIA transposition but took a more restrictive approach than the
Community guidelines indicated, and was not in conformity with Community directive 90/313
on access to environmental information186. Article 37.7 LRJPAC187 requires the right of access to
procedures of elaboration of administrative dispositions that affect them, b) The access of
citizens to administrative archives and registers, except in that which affects the security and
defense of the State, the verification of crimes and the privacy of individuals". See also
Constitution 1978, Article 129.
182 The Supreme Court had ruled out the direct applicability of this article (STS, 16
October 1979), which meant that 'legislative inactivity' was truly problematic for the exercise
of this right. Piecemeal development did take place, regarding for instance the electoral
regime (Ley Organica de Regimen Electoral General, Article 41), public statistics (Ley de la
Funcion Publica Estadistica, Article 13) computerised personal data (Ley Organica de
Regulacion del Tratamiento Automatizado de los Datos de Caracter Personal), et cetera, but a
general provision was adopted only in 1992: LRJPAC, Article 37 (discussed in this section,
below). The latter is restrictive in scope; Sanchez Moron, p.61-63.
183 For instance, the tradition of administrative secrecy is very pronounced in the
preparation of urban documents. The Ley del Suelo foresees the use of newspapers for
announcing periods of public participation. However, no State or CA legislation foresees use
of methods other than the official bulletins; GARCIA URETA, 1994, p.306,p.310.
184 The government has made few attempts to set up organisms to involve the public in
environmental decision-making (Aguilar, p.236-37).
183 Harsh (and deserved) criticism of the LRJPAC is provided by Garcia de Enterria, "Un
punto de vista sobre la nueva ley de regimen juridico de las administraciones publicas y de
procediminto adminsitrativo comun de 1992," 130 (1993) RAP 205.
LRJPAC, Article 37 defines, in ten paragraphs, the right of access to archives and
registers. For example, Article 37.8 allows individuals to obtain copies of the documents
whose examination is authorised by the State.
186 For example, by using the term 'interes directo', the provision seems to attempt to
exclude collective or 'diffuse' interests, of obvious relevance to environmental associations,
allowed longer time periods for the Administration to answer and referred only to Spanish
citizens; GARCIA URETA, 1994, p.303; Sanchez Moron, pp. 61-64.
187 LRJPAC, Article 37.7: "The right to access shall be exercised by individuals in such a
way that the efficiency of the functioning of public services is not affected."
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information to be exercised in such a way that administrative efficiency is not affected: as
formulated, it appears that the smooth functioning of the administration is elevated above the
right to participate. The situation has only recently been remedied with Statute 38/199518®,
adopted specifically to remedy deficiencies in the Spanish transposition of directive 90/313. The
right to participate can be directly enforced in court18^, although given the time required^0 this
is usually too late to ensure the exercise of procedural rights.
2.2.4. Administrative consideration of the EIS and the results of the public consultation
prior to granting permission or authorisation (Article 8, EIA85/337):
EIA rules notified to the Commission must provide that administrative consideration be
given to both the EIS, and the (problematic) public input before granting authorisation. Two
administrative authorities are involved in the authorisation process: the organ competent to
authorise the particular project, as determined by the project's substance (the substantive
authority); and the environmental authority. The environmental authority is the body exercising
environmental functions within the administration of the substantive authority (RDL Article
Fortunately, limits exist to what can be sacrificed in the name of administrative
efficiency and the Tribunal Supremo has redressed the balance of both concerns:
"administrative efficiency is a good juridically protected although of inferior rank than
fundamental rights (emphasis added)"; see also Constitution 1978, Article 20.1: "Are recognised
and protected, the rights, d/ to communicate or receive freely truthful information by any
means of diffusion".
188 Ley 38/1995, de 12 de diciembre 1995 derecho de acceso a la informacion en materia
de medio ambiente. The preamble mentions directive 90/313 and expressly acknowledges
that the earlier Spanish legislation failed to meet Community obligations. For instance, only
Spanish national were given access, the Administration was given three months to reply
where the Community rules only allowed two. Many of these problems are remedied,
although the Statute still contains ambiguities. For instance, the Administration can refuse
information where this regards goverment activities (at all levels) not subject to
administrative law (Article 3.1.a); it would be extremely interesting to know which these are
exactly. Furthermore, application can be rejected by Administrative silence (Article 4.2)
always a problem where administrators are not assiduous in their duties to begin with.
Both according to the Spanish Constitution (below) and given the fact that directive
90/313 on access to environmental information and EIA85/337 arguably confer a directly
effective right to participate.
Constitution 1978, Article 53.2: "Any citizen can claim the enforcement of the liberties
and rights recognised in Article 14 and in Section 1 of Chapter 2 before ordinary courts
through a procedure based on the principles of preference and brevity and, eventually, by
appeal before the Constitutional Court...."190 See Chapter 9, point 3.4. Duration of judicial action.
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5494). On the basis of the EIS and the results of public consultation it draws up a Declaration of
Environmental Impact (hereinafter, Declaration), determining "the conditions necessary to
adequately protect the environment and natural resources" (RDL Article 4.1492), which it then
forwards to the competent authority493.
The significance of the Declaration, an innovation of the Spanish legislation, is clarified in the
regulation: Article 18.1494 provides that the Declaration, "based only on environmental effects",
shall determine the "benefit" of carrying out, or not, the project498; it shall list the conditions
necessary to adequately protect the environment and resources. These conditions must form a
"coherent whole" with conditions imposed by the substantive organ's authorisation
(RD1131/1988, Article 18.2); and shall include prescriptions related to the follow-up of the project,
in conformity with the 'monitoring programme' (RD1131/1988, Article 18.4). Subsequently, the
Declaration must be adapted in light of scientific and technical progress, unless the effects are
such that a new Declaration is required496.
As formulated, the innovation of the Environmental Declaration appears positive and indeed
surpasses Community requirements: theoretically the decision of the environmental authority is
not subordinate to the decision of substantive authority, but rather binding upon it497. Conflicts
between the two are to be submitted to arbitration by an outside body, the Consejo de Ministros (if
the project is authorised at State level) or the equivalent organ of the CA (if the project is
authorised at CA-level)498. The wording of RD1131/1988, Article 18.1 implies that the
*91 RDL1302/1986, Article 5: "that which exercises these functions in the public
administration where the substantive competence to accord the authorisation resides."
192 RDL1302/1986, Article 4.1.
193 The latter then weighs the environmental effects with all the other considerations.
194 RD1131/1988, Article 18.1: "The declaration of environmental impact shall determine,
by only the environmental effects, the benefit or lack thereof of carrying out the project, and
in the affirmative case, shall fix the conditions in which it should be carried out".
495 This gives the Declaration more force than announced by the RDL, which requires
only that the Declaration include the conditions necessary to adequately protect the
environment and natural resources — seemingly taking as given that the project would be
authorised.
496 RD1131/1988, Article, 18.3: "The conditions to which the first paragraph of this article
refer shall be adapted to innovations brought by scientific and technical progress that alter
the authorised activity, unless because of the impact on the environment a new Declaration of
impact becomes necessary."497 MartinMateo, I-1991, p .331.
498 RDL1302/1986, Articles 4.2,6.2.
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environmental authority can halt authorisation of a project: it shall determine the utility of carrying
out the project and, if it finds in the affirmative, fix the conditions of environmental protection^.
The implication is that in the negative case, fixing conditions would be pointless since the project
would not be undertaken. Furthermore, Article 27200 specifically states that the conditions
imposed by the Declaration shall have the same value and efficiency as the conditions in the
project authorisation20!.
The potential of the above provisions is immediately undermined, unfortunately. The
environmental authority lies within the administration concerned with the authorisation of the
project. The environmental authority itself is not an autonomous body, but rattier attached to the
administration that is generally pre-disposed in favour of the project202. In fact, negative
environmental Declarations have (with one regional exception) never been issued.
2.2.5. Other EIA85/337 Requirements:
Other obligations imposed by EIA85/337 are covered relatively well by the Spanish
legislation. These include the notification of other Member States likely to be significantly affected
by a project202; the public's notification of the decision204; the safeguarding of industrial and
commercial secrecy and the public interest, within the limits of relevant national regulations202.
2.2.6. Important inclusions in the Spanish transposition:
199 For instance, Rosa Moreno views it as a sort of 'authorisation of environmental
impact'; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.274; see also Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.260: "it is possible that the
Environmental Declaration is the most important factor to be taken into account, despite its
analysis in conjunction with other considerations."
200 RD1131/1988, Article 27: "Value of the environmental conditions. For all purposes, en
especially regarding surveillance and follow-up of the fulfilment of the Declaration of
Environmental Impact, the conditions of the latter shall have the same value and effect as the
rest of the conditions of authorisation."
2°1 By contrast, in France the conclusions of the commissaire are seen as foreshadowing
doubts as to the value of the project in the event of judicial proceedings, but until recently
lacked the power to stall commencement of the works prior to such proceedings, i.e., prior to
the enforcement stage, at which point it may be too late.
202 The practical consequences are seen below.
202 EIA85/337, Article 9, covered in RDL Article 4.3.
204 EIA85/337, Article 7, covered in RDL Article 6.
205 EIA85/337, Article 10, covered in RDL Article 8.
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The transposition contains a variety of provisions that are not strictly required by EIA85/337
that support later implementation and enforcement efforts. For instance, the substantive organ
must monitor respect for the Declaration's requirements, and the environmental authority can
demand information and carry out necessary verifications206. RDL1302/1986 stipulates that, if a
project requiring EIA is commenced without having completed the procedure, it "shall be
suspended"; however, the automatic nature of this appears mitigated by the addition of "at the
request of the environmental organ"207. In addition, certain problems witnessed in the French
legislation are not particularly troublesome here208, such as the issue of sanctions209.
2.2.7. Underlying causes, and general problems of transposition:
A variety of forces have influenced the formal implementation. The most important of these
are the clash between short-term economic benefits and long-term protection of the environment,
and the tradition of administrative secrecy. Nonetheless, other factors also contribute to
downstream problems, such as the variation between legislation across CAs, and ambiguities and
logical inadequacies in the State legislation.
206 RDL1302/1986, Article 7.
207 RDL1302/1986, Article 9.1. "If the execution of a project of those obligatorily
submitted to the stage of environmental impact assessment is undertaken without the
accomplishment of this requirement it shall be suspended, at the request of the competent
environmental authority, without prejudice to the responsibility to which this may give rise.
2. Thus, the suspension can be accorded when concur any of the following circumstances: a)
the dissimulation, falsification or malicious manipulation of data in the evaluation procedure,
b) the failure to accomplish or transgression of the environmental conditions imposed for the
execution of the project."
208 The delay in the adoption of the regulation of application (not to be confused with the
delay in adopting the basic text of the Spanish transposition, RDL 1302/1986) apparently did
not have a significant effect on enforcing the rules.
Nor did differences between the Act and regulation pose a problem. The regulation is
not permitted to modify the scope of application of the higher norm: Dictamen del Consejo de
Estado de 5 de diciembre de 1989. Here however, variations between the RDL and its
regulation serve generally to bring it more in line with European requirements (see
discussion Rosa moreno, 1993, p.197; garcia ureta, 1994, pp.325) and have not been
challenged.
209 By contrast with France, where specific sanctions were not originally foreseen, RDL
Articles 9 and 10 discuss the issues of penalties, which include successive coercive fines, and
restitution as disposed by the Administration. As an aside, these are significantly less than
those initially envisaged; Fuentes Bodelon, p.75.
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Hierarchy of priorities: Most of the above problems — for example, the reluctance to widen
application of EIA to Annex II projects -- have an underlying economic cause. It will be difficult to
muster the political will to address problems stemming from fundamental perceptions. The
formal implementation of the Spanish EIA legislation illustrates the tug-of-war of economic and
environmental priorities210 in its preamble, which announces that the procedure is to cause
minimum disturbance to economic activity and to take place "without other stages than those
strictly required by procedural economy and those necessary for the protection of general
interests"211. The regulation's preamble further 'sells' the procedure: "...far from being a brake on
development and progress, [EIA] supposes and guarantees a more complete and integrated
vision of proceedings in the medium in which we live, greater creativity and ingenuity, increased
social responsibility..."212. This is, as Garcia Ureta points out, "a wee bit optimistic."210
The reasons behind official reluctance regarding the EIA procedure could not have been more
plainly spoken, nor the procedure more effectively damned, than in a statement by the Minister of
Public Works and Urbanism cautioning against "obsessive" application of EIA. He pointed out
that where other Member States have finished accumulating infrastructure, Spain, coming from a
crisis:
cannot stop thinking of the necessity to expand economic, industrial and other activities. For this
reason, we cannot make of the necessity to incorporate the value of the environment a straight-
jacket, or an impediment to economic growth, to investment, to development of the regions with
more difficulties and needs 21^.
He further asserted, in a somewhat contradictory manner, that Spain had "perfectly" fulfilled its
obligation and that no other Member State had included the Annex II list210 (forgetting,
apparently, that the ECJ has made it clear that a Member State may not rely on the failure of
another in order to justify its own). Furthermore, the Commission disagrees: in its Ninth
210 Seen also at the Constitutional level; above, point 1.
211 "without other stages than those strictly required by procedural economy and those
necessary for the protection of general interests."
212 The procedure is to be completed 'without unnecessary delay.
213 "...im tanto optimista"; Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.224.
21^ Congreso de los Diputados, Comision de Industria, Obras Publicas, Servicios, 4 May
1988, pp.9474 and 9476; cited garcia ureta, 1994, p.232.
215 Cortes Generales, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Comision de
lindustria, Obras Publicas y Urbanismo, III Legislatura, no. 145, Martes 23 de Junio de 1987,
p.5375; cited garcia ureta, 1994, p.232.
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Application Report it points out that deficiencies in Spain's transposition still exist, particularly
regarding Annex II and despite the initiation of infringement proceedings216.
Lack ofharmonisation: In France certainly regional variations exist, particularly as a function of
the prefect's attitude. In Spain, however, the lack of harmonisation takes on quite another
dimension, and allusions have previously been made to variations across CA.
Regarding formulation of EIA rules, CA intervention has been a welcome addition at times;
the CAs' legislation 'developing' the State norm provides a chance to clarify it. For instance, the
national legislation leaves uncertainties as to which organ, substantive or environmental, is
competent to suspend a project217; Valencia's legislation states that the environmental authority
must give an account to thi^Consell^vhich will decide the interim relief, making it clear that the
substantive authority is not implicated218. Furthermore, CA legislation can make national
provisions more stringent: to illustrate, Galicia and Valencia provide for suspension of the project
if severe or critical impacts result, even if legal dispositions have been observed219. Where
national, legislation may be insufficiently strict, CA legislation can tighten provisions; e.g.
Madrid's legislation extends the causes of suspension to include failing to facilitate the data
requested and the obstruction of administrative inspectors220.
216 Ninth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1991, OJ
1992 C250/1, at C250/154. In the Twelfth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law 1994, the Commission notes that there are still problems with the
transposing measures for EIA85/337 in Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom;
Com(95)500 final, p.60.
217 RDL1302/1986, Article 9.1, above.
218 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.349.
219 Galicia: Decreto 442/1990 Articulo 7.1 cited garcia ureta, 1994, p.344; Valencia: Ley
2/1989, 3 March, Article 7, cited martln Mateo, 1-1991, p.334.
220 Ley 10/1991, Art. 30.6.
Other examples of CA legislation being stricter than the State provisions include:
- Whereas the State legislation indicates simply that the environmental authority can
request information regarding follow up of the environmental conditions it imposed,
Madrid's legislation (Article 23) and the Canarias' (Article 32) state clearly that the
environmental authority is empowered to send inspectors (in Madrid's case, without
warning); garcia ureta, 1994, p.342.
- The quality of the EIS is addressed in some CA by requiring the study to be carried
out by qualified professionals who must sign the document; Baleares, Decreto 4/1984, anexo
I, para.4.7; Valencia, Decreto 162/1990, Article 15.
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Nonetheless, where one CA may improve State provisions, not all will. Moreover, the State
legislation is not always improved by CA development221. A parallel with the Community can be
drawn: where the larger entity (Community or, in this case, the State) justifies legislative
vagueness with the argument that the smaller entity must fill in details as appropriate, too often
the smaller entity (Member State or, in this case, CA) simply does not222.
The result, of course, is a state of implementation that is highly variable across the CA. Such
variation is serious from a Community perspective, since one of the driving forces behind
Community environmental policy and legislation is that economic players face a 'level playing
field' and have the same restrictions and costs imposed upon them. Given the lack of
harmonisation within this Member State, the EC's goal of harmonisation across all Member States
seems unrealistic. While it is not suggested that the goal of establishing equitable economic
conditions across the Community be abandoned, Community decision-makers must be aware of
what can realistically be achieved.
Ambiguity: Ambiguity is a problem at times encountered in the Spanish transposition.
Occasionally it is born of too encompassing a definition: for instance, so many effects are included
in the content of EIS (Article 6223), that "...it is a tool for evaluating the sector, not only
environmental but natural, social and economic"224. Confusion is then amplified by the
221 For instance, Martin Mateo sums up the Canaries' legislation as an "inviable and
tautological text of impossible practical application, and responding to wanaering theoretical
premises"; MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.336.
222 Any attempt to justify inadequacies of the State legislation by pointing out that the
developing legislation of the CAs remedy the disregards the fact that prior to Ley Organica
9/1992 not all CAs were empowered to issue developing legislation; and that now, not all
CAs will make appropriate use of this power.
223 RD1131/1988, Article 6 requires that the evaluation include "at least, the estimation of
effects of human population, fauna, flora, vegetation, la gea, the ground, the water, the air, the
climate, the countryside and struction and function of ecosystems present in the area
foreseeably affected. As such, it must include the estimation of effects that the project, work
or activity has on the elements that compose the Spanish Historical Heritage, on the social
relations and the conditions for public peace, such as noise, vibrations, odours, light
emissions and that of any other environmental impact derived from its realisation".
Furthermore Article 10, referring to the factors in Article 6, requires that "positive
effects be distinguished from negative effects, temporary from permanent, simple from
cumulative and sinergetic, direct from indirect, reversible from irreversible, recuperable from
irrecuperable, regular effects from those of irregular appearance, and continuous from
discontinuous...."
224 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.223.
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production of a list so vast of effects to be contemplated (RD1131/1988, Article 10) that one can
doubt both its actual application and the extent to which it is enforceable. For instance Article 10
(sixth indent) requires that "the procedures used to know the degree of social acceptance or
rejection of the activity, as well as the economic implications of its environmental effects" be
indicated in the EIS. Where already the idea of public participation is approached with reluctance
and parsimony, it would require a great deal of determination on the part of the courts to annul
an authorisation because of one detail concerning public participation, i.e.: that the EIS on which
authorisation was based failed to indicate the procedures used to know the degree of public
rejection of the project.
Although many terms used in RD1131/1988, Article 10 are subsequently defined in the
annex, this does not always dissipate ambiguity: in areas that appear highly subjective, some
definitions appear to assume an objective standard, such as between 'severe environmental
impact'225 and 'critical environmental impact'226.
More limited ambiguities222 also exist: e.g., the 'environmental monitoring programme,'
mentioned everywhere, is nowhere described, neither in form nor content225. Although the
inclusion of such a programme appears to advance practical implementation by setting up some
sort of schedule of surveillance, in reality little guidance is given.
Inadequacies and logical flaws: Reflecting poor drafting rather than lack of priority of
environmental issues, this problem can nonetheless create difficulties of interpretation. For
example, the RDL1302/1986(Article 10.1) requires that where an "alteration of the physical
reality" (una alteration de la realidad fisica) has occurred, the developer must proceed to restitution
225 "That for which the recuperation of the sectors conditions requires the use of
protective and corrective means and that which, even with such means, the recuperation
requires a lengthy period of time."
226 "That of which the magnitude is greater than the acceptable threshold. With this, a
permanent loss of the quality of environmental conditions is produced without possible
recuperation, including with the adoption of protective and corrective means".
222 Those looked at here do not constitute an exhaustive list. For instance, a variety of
ambiguities surround the actual projects listed in the RDL's annex, such as, in the category of
large dams, from which point should a dam be considered 'large'; when afforestation can be
considered to entail risk of serious negative ecological transformation.
228 Although Article 18.4 requires the Declaration of Impact to include the relevant
prescriptions "in conformity with the environmental monitoring programme" without
explaining what this programme is.
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as disposed by the Administration ; since there is little point in carrying out a project with no
physical results, one can wonder how this could be enforced22^.
2.2.8. EIA Summary:
In the Spanish transposition, at times the margin of discretion has been used in a manner
which goes beyond Community requirements and, were the provisions to be used correctly,
could be extremely positive230. The fact remains that, in other instances, this Member State's
discretion in formal implementation has been used to devastating effect: the exclusion of most
Annex II projects, the submission of the environmental authority within the administration
concerned by the project, the almost total dismissal of the public's voice. Against this black letter
background, a dent has been put in practical implementation that is possibly irremediable.
2.3. Formal Implementation of LCP88/609:
Pre-fonstitutional legislation concerning atmospheric pollution exists23^, yet the
requirements it imposes are lax: at the time, public opinion strongly favoured that industrial
environmental regulation be less strict in less-industrialised countries232. (This continues to be a
common argument today, where particularly labour unions fear that the costs of environmental
legislation will force Spanish factories to dismiss personnel or close down233.) Therefore, the need
to meet Community-imposed obligations has been the main force behind adequate regulation of
— ' Also, if judged "only on environmental effects" (above), one can wonder if any project
would be authorised.
230 For instance, introducing a "monitoring programme," extending the initial contact
between the developer and the environmental authority, et cetera.
231 The framework of air pollution control is contained in Decreto 2107/1968; Ley de
Proteccion del Ambiente Atmosferico de 1972 (38/1972), of 22 December, controlling
emissions of certain substances, etablishing a network of monitoring stations and providing
for Polluted air zones to be declared in emergencies; and the latter's decree, number 833/75 of
6 February 1975 (which was considerably late, given that the law foresaw the elaboration of
the decree within one year); MARTlN Mateo, 11-1992, p.298, note 12; Bennett, p.19).
232 MartinMateo, 11-1992, pp.298-99.
233 Double, Mary Beth, "Spain Confronts Environmental Issues," 113 (1992) Business
America 5, at p.6.
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atmospheric pollution234. Spain's economic situation233 contributes to a general resistance and
delays in the transposition of European directives regarding atmospheric pollution236.
The Spanish energy situation is critical in that Spain has difficulty meeting growing demands
and energy is used inefficiently. These factors obviously affected the attitude Spain brought to the
Council negotiations of LCP88 /609237. The costs to Spain of the agreed version are, in the end,
significantly lower than in the proposed version233. Several derogations were agreed: one
specifically for Spain, and others because of the protests of both Spain and the United
Kingdom239. Although the objective of LCP88/609 is to reduce emissions from existing plant and
see that new power stations are 'low acid', the general ceilings and reduction targets listed in
Annexes I and II take the specific circumstances of Spain240 into consideration244.
Real Decreto 646/1991 is the text notified to the Commission, and essentially copies the
directive. The same basic structure is reproduced: a preamble, eighteen articles, and nine annexes.
In addition, the Spanish text contains a transitional disposition (disposition transitoria)^-^. The
preamble notes the two principal modifications to the Spanish approach to atmospheric pollution:
global maximum emissions (the 'bubble'243 concept), which did not exist in Spanish legislation,
and different specific limits for new installations.
234 VALERIC), 1991; Bennett generally; MARTlN MATEO, 11-1992, p.298-99.
235 Introduction, point 5. Economic strength.
236 MartInMateo, 11-1992, p.xx.
237 Chapter 1, point 2.5.2. Large Combustion Plants Directive.
233 See Chapter 1, point 2.1. at Consideration ofcosts.
239 For instance, new plants burning indigenous solid fuel that would have to use
excessively expensive technology may exceed the limit values in Annex III (Article 5(2)
LCP88/609); Until December 1999 Spain may authorise new power plants, burning imported
solid fuels, to meet a sulphur dioxide emission limit value of 800mg/Nm3 as opposed to the
400mg/Nm3 foreseen in Annex III; and, burning indigenous solid fuels, to reach only a 60%
rate of desulphurization rather than 90% (Article 5(3). Other derogations are possible in case
of "unforeseen reasons" (Article 7) and "malfunction of breakdown of the abatement
equipement" (Article 8).
240 And various other Member States, for instance Portugal, Greece and Ireland were
allowed to increase total SO2 emissions during all three phases.
244 For obligations imposed by LCP88/609 see Chapter 1, point 2.5.2. Adopted version.
242 Below.
243 Nigel Haigh gives a definition: "In essence, an imaginary bubble is drawn around a
given area (in our case, a country) and a limit put on the total amount of pollution from any
source allowed to enter into that bubble"; Haigh, "New Tools...", 1989, p.31.
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2.3.1. Problems of transposition:
Timely transposition: LCP88/609 entered into force on 30 June 1990244; the Spanish regulation
was adopted on 22 April 1991, almost a year late. Moreover, the programmes of reduction were to
have been drawn up and forwarded to the Commission no later than 31 December 1990245; the
transposition had not been adopted in time to meet this deadline either.
Little development of the Community directive: The Real Decreto covers the Directive's provisions
by reproducing the obligations it contains, article by article, and almost246 word for word,
unquestioningly. Herein lies the principal problem of its transposition: generally the Spanish text
"suffers from a large poverty of juridical expressiveness, which it takes from the directive itself
that it translates with excessive and unnecessary literalness..."247.
It bodes ill for practical implementation that the Member State's discretion was not used to
add precision and to tailor the legislation to the specific Spanish situation. Were the text of
LCP88/609 extremely precise, this would not be a problem. However, details that were meant to
be filled, in by Member States are simply left ambiguous. For instance, Article 10, (of both
LCP88/609 and the Real Decreto) provides that the chimney must be constructed "in such a way
as to safeguard health and the environment"248. As seen, the French provision had given
considerable detail on the required specifications for chimneys and relevant studies249. By merely
reproducing the text of the directive250, the Spanish legislation gives no indication of which
measures are considered to 'safeguard health and environmental requirements'; actual technical
characteristics are not indicated. Again, this implies lack of harmonisation both within Spain and
244 LCP88/609, Article 17(1).
245 LCP88/609 Article 16(1).
246 The principal difference is that where the Directive includes obligations of the
Commission, the Spanish legislation simply omits this, and includes them in a general
provisions subsequently, Real Decreto 646/1991, Article 16.^47 MartInMateo, 11-1992, p.354.
248 "deforma que se salvaguarde la salud Humana y el medio ambiente."
249 Chapter 4, point 2.3.1. at Elaboration on the basis ofLCP88/609.
250 LCP88/609, Article 10: "Waste gases from combustion plants shall be discharged in
controlled fashion by means of a stack.
The licence referred to in Article 4(1) shall lay down the discharge conditions. The
competent authority shall in particular ensure that the stack height is calculated in such a way
as to safeguard health and the environment."
RD646/1991, Article 10, repeats the Community formulation word for word.
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across the Community: in this instance, French industries face precise requirements that their
Spanish counterparts do not.
In fact, technical indications were not officially available until late December 1995, when an
Order of MINER25!, establishing the systems and methods for measuring the emissions of large
thermoelectric stations252, was adopted in order to develop the national LCP legislation. It
contains practical clarifications as well as technical specifications — such as formula for calculating
concentrations given various conditions of humidity, excess oxygen, et cetera; parameters that
must be included; indices of desulphurisation. It is very encouraging, for example, that where
continuous measurements are required the fourth disposition stipulates that a certificate of
accomplishment of European norms, established by a 'collaborating organ in environmental
matters,' be given to the competent authority253. The valuable guidance it offers would have been
welcome in 1990, when the European norm entered into force; one can question the practical
effect of the legislation prior to the Order's 1995 appearance.
Furthermore, where the Spanish legislator has copied the Directive's starting date for
installations to be classified as "new plant" (Article 2(9)), the question of practical difficulties
associated with retroactivity and changing the status of a plant prior to publication of the act
5
arises. For instance: 'new plant' are required to construct their chimneys following certain
specifications, apparently indicated by the competent authority. Unfortunately, plants that
receive the initial exploitation authorisation between 1 July 1987 (the date by which new plant are
defined in LCP88/609, reproduced in RD646/1991, Article 2.10) and the date of the transposing
251 Order of the Ministry of Industry and Energy (Orden 27977) of 26 December 1995 for
the development of RD 646/1991, which transposes Directive 88/609 EC.
252 The most pressing, since 90% of the emissions come from large combustion plants.
Another Ministerial order was being drawn up for oil refineries; Letter of 22 December 1995,
Luis Mas Garcia, Subdirector General de Planificacion Energetica y Medio Ambiente, MINER.
253 MINER Order, 26 December 1995, fourth disposition: "Operators of thermoelectric
plants must measure continuously and show justification of fulfilment of European Norms
(EN) of the European Union applicable to them, according to the previous section, by
certification sent through an entity collaborating on environmental matters.
This certificat must be sent and presented to the competent authority before the end
of six months from its opening, and afterwards, at least every three years.
For thermoelectric plants which opened prior to the promulgation of this Order, the
certificate to which reference is made in the previous paragraphs smust be sent and
presented, for the first time, within one year of the entry into force of this Order...".
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legislation (22 April 1991) will not have discovered their classification as new plant, or the
chimney requirement, until the date of publication of RD646/1991 (25 April 1991) — by which
point, presumably, the chimney has been built. Reproducing the exact date here carries negative
consequences for the plant operators' legal certainty; they could not reasonably be expected to be
aware of their classification prior to publication of the national text. A further observation is that,
across the Member States the definition of "new plant" is not uniform. Between the two examined
here already differences are apparent: France has used the date of entry into force of its arrete as
the starting point for such classification254, Spain uses the Commission's starting point, 1 July
1987.
Discrepancy between the European and Spanish legislation: On the rare occasions where the
Spanish authorities have used their discretion, this is in debatable conformity with the Directive.
In keeping with the impression that, when not merely recopying, the Spanish legislation seeks to
keep the Commission as little involved as possible, a difference exists between LCP88/609 Article
3(5) and Real Decreto Article 3(4). In case of an unforeseen change in energy needs, the Spanish
legislation provides that "the organ where substantive competence for the authorisation of
installations resides shall determine the modifications of the ceilings of emissions and/or the
dates that figure in Annexes I and II of this Real Decreto, which must be communicated to the
EEC Commission"255. In the Spanish text, the power to take the decision has shifted to the
Spanish authorities, who must then communicate their decision to the Commission, although the
wording of the Directive clearly indicates that it is the Commission that decides the values and
then communicates these to the Member States256.
A provision of purely national origin257 departs definitively from the Community text: the
final "transitional disposition"258 implies that until the dispositions of the directive are completely
254 27 June 1990.
255 Original language version in appendix.
256 Article 3(5) "...the Commission, at the request of the Member State concerned, and
taking into account the terms of the request, shall take a decision to modify, for that Member
State, the emission ceilings and/or the dates set out in Annexes I and II and communicate its
decision to the Council and to the Member States."
257 See comments martln Mateo, 11-1992, p.354; valerio, 1991, p.97.
258 "Those thermoelectric plant that burn coals of low quality, those that are existing
large combustio plants in the meaning of this Real Decreto, shall continue fulfilling the levels
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implemented, existing plant shall at least follow the general disposition of Decree 833/1975,
although this not clearly stated. Emission levels set by the General Directorate of Energy269 are
alluded to, which opens the possibility "that these may be more generous than those of Decree
833/1975"260. Indeed, the Ministry of Energy has, in practice, issued individual authorisations
unlawfully allowing higher emission values than provided in the legal provisions in force26*.
Regarding both discrepancies the Commission again has apparently not decided to take
action262.
2.3.3. LCP Summary:
Closely concerning Spain's critical energy situation, LCP88/609 was transposed late, giving
no technical details, and apparently in order to keep the Community's input and even awareness
to a minimum. The fact that Spain was given various concessions in emissions ceilings does not
mean that it had no obligations, yet the transposition indicates that Spain does not intend to make
the considerable effort required to meet these.
of emission specified for SO2 and dust, with reference to gases in actual conditions of
emission, that in each case have been determined by the Directorate General of Energy...."
259 Direction General de la Energia.
260 MartInMateo, 11-1992, p.354.
26* Sentencia de la Sala II del Tribunal Supremo, 30 November 1990; Chapter 9, point 5.2.




It is evident, from both political comments and the negotiations that took place at Community
level, that in this Member State, both Community directives examined here were perceived as
serious threats to economic development. Accordingly opportunities (occasionally left
unintentionally^) have been seized to minimise this threat and possibly bureaucratic
inconvenience. Incidentally, effectiveness of the provisions has been minimised as well (for
instance, by playingthe public's input, the one actor involved in the procedure that is likely to try
to direct the project towards less harmful alternatives). At times transposition seems to hold
valuable potential (creation of monitoring programmes, the theoretically binding opinion of the
environmental authority); this is undermined however. In other instances the very fact that the
margin of discretion left by the European norm has not been used to adapt the rules to national
technical situations foreshadows a laxity regarding meeting obligations. Where considerable
political opposition exists regarding obligations imposed by the Community, this will be difficult
to overcome and it seems unlikely that the situation shall improve during practical use of the
rules. Furthermore, the Commission appears to be passive in requiring Spain to take its
obligations more seriously.
263 E.g., the phrasing of EIA85/337 regarding Annex II projects.
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CHAPTER 8: Spain — Problems of Practical Implementation
1. Practical Implementation — EIA:
1.1. Magnitude of the problem:












Failure to use available tools:
Administrative presumption in favour of authorisation:
Lack of resources:















In a fragmented and confusing administrative context, on the basis of formal
implementation that, despite certain positive features, plays down elements that might cause
economic inconvenience, practical implementation further empties the rules of their substance.
1. Practical Implementation — EIA:
Examining the sparse available data on practical implementation it becomes clear that





goal of requiring environmental effects of projects to be seriously considered — still less of
encouraging the modification of projects to attenuate environmental damage. The Commission
was not incorrect in finding that "taking account" of the environment means little more than
including the Declaration of environmental impact in the project authorisation4, indeed, if the
environmental Declaration is elaborated at all3. The evidence available both from national
and Community sources sustains the hypothesis that practical implementation is where Spain
experiences the greatest difficulty.
As noted, practical implementation is extremely difficult to investigate and to verify. In
the Spanish context the problem is accentuated by the scarcity of practical data. A good deal
of Spanish material exists describing and analysing black letter provisions or actions before
the courts, yet little documentation focuses on the complex stage between the adoption of
legislation and eventual litigation, during which the procedure unfolds in reality and many
problems emerged A helpful MOPTMA Memorandum4 contains a valuable but extremely brief
reference to Spanish experience with the EIA procedure. Otherwise, information is to be
gleaned from various sources, generally in the form of comments made as an aside. The
available evidence on the actual situation is examined here, as well as problems specifically
related to the procedure.
1.1. Magnitude of the problem:
Problems arise in this Member State that are similar in nature but seemingly worse in
degree than those seen in France. In France, a few very large projects stand out for violating
EIA rules and creating an enormous scandal (for instance, the Tunnel du Somport). In Spain one
is spoilt for choice regarding large projects that violate EIA rules, even considering that fewer
projects are submitted to EIA under the national law in force5. Furthermore, difficulties do not
necessarily arise regarding the quality of an existing study or the artificial division of projects
1 Com(93)28, p.238, p.242.
Below, point 1.7. at Delay; see also T-585/93, Greenpeace and others v Commission.
3 Significantly however, national sources discuss the legislation and judicial
proceedings in a manner indicating that the potential of the law has not been tested, or is not
adequately secured in practice, and that administrative performance is poor.
4 MOPTMA, Medio Ambiente en Espafla 1992, "Evaluacion de Impacto Ambiental,"
pp.205-210.
5 The exclusion of the majority of Annex II projects is recalled.
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into units small enough to fall beneath thresholds, as in France, but rather because no study
has been carried out at all, an even more flagrant violation of the rules. The Commission
receives a large number of complaints from Spain, concerning mainly EIA, and regional access to
information6.
Examining the sheer number of infrastructure projects remaining to be carried out (e.g., the
construction of 92 dams, below), it becomes evident that the fact that industry and
development have done less damage in Spain (when compared to more industrialised Member y
cw i'
States) is not viewed as a natural advantage to be preserved7, but rather as an economic void '
to be filled with haste. The rush to bridge economic gaps causes public concern at the national
level, which members of the European Parliament are able to address insofar as Community
funds are implicated and/or Community rules are violated. Question 78 by Mr. Bandres Molet,
for instance, provides an illustration both of the quantity and types of projects underway and of
the public's concern:
The Commission has granted Spain a total/of PTA 127 billion under the Structural Funds to finance
the country's Regional Development Plan. There h^s been a public outcry by various social,
ecological and other groups against the aaVefse gffetft which the projects in question may have on
the environment. Among the projects are the construction of a number of high-speed rail links
(TGV), the creation of eucalyptus plantations in Galicia and Andalusia, urban development along
the coast, open-cast mines, 92new dams, river-channelling projects and many others. In light of all
the above, and of Council Directive 85/337 of 27 June 1985 on environmental impact assessment,
can the Commission give details of projects forming part of Spain's Regional Development Plan
which are to be financed by the Community and does the Commission know which environmental
impact studies must be carried out, under Community legislation, in respect of these projects?®
As an aside, in this instance the Commission replied inter alia that it did not have "at
present, detailed knowledge of all the individual projects which might be carried out as part
of these programmes..."^, illustrating the inadequacy of Commission verification of
Community-funded projects alluded to previously10. Although the Commission's response is
6 Sanchis Moreno, F., "Spain," in Access to Environmental Information in Europe: the
Implementation and Implications of Directive 90/313/EEC, Hallo, R., Ed., Kluwer Law
International, London, 1996, pp.242-47; also Eleventh Application Report, pp.72,74.
And one which may produce economic benefits in terms of costs of clean-up and
restoration saved.
8 Question 78, H-603/89, Mr. Bandres Molet, Parliamentary Debates Session 1989-90,
No.3-385, pp.199-200.
9 Debates of the European Parliament no.3-385/199-200, 17.1.90.
10 Chapter 1, point 3. Decision-making in other areas - Integration of environmental
protection into other Community policies.
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insufficient, the underlying problem is national: the Commission would not need to be so
vigilant if Member States were not so eager to avoid their obligations.
The data available at the Community level indicate both the failure of national
authorities systematically to apply the implementing legislation, and the Commission's
distance from the Spanish reality. For instance, the Commission11 stated that "...in practice it
is virtually impossible for projects part-financed by the ERDF to infringe the guidelines laid
down by the Directive."13 It added that "to date no project in Spain has given rise to the need
for the recovery of undue payments as a result of failure to comply with Community measures
on the environment"13; although it has been alleged that at this time, on at least one
occasion14 the Commission should have suspended funding to a Spanish project.
To some degree, the Spanish and Community authorities share responsibility for the poor
state of practical implementation of Communi^^I/CTyles. Discipline that is lacking from
within the Member State is not insisted on from external sources — not even where Community
funding is involved.
1.2. How the procedure unfolds:
✓
With some regional variation13, th^^EIA)begins with the 'scoping process', expanded in
the Spanish context from the original mention in EIA85/337. The developer presents a
memorandum/summary of the project's principal characteristics to the environmental
authority enabling the latter to collect relevant information from other administrative bodies
and give it to the developer, indicating which aspects the authority sees as deserving special
attention16. The developer carries out the study and it is submitted, with the request for
11 Given the date, possibly as yet unaware of the abundant evidence compiled by the
Court of Auditors. See Court of Auditors Report 3/92. At approximately this time also the
Commission was involved in preliminary procedures of an action brought by Greenpeace and
eighteen other applicants regarding Community funding of two power stations in the Canaries
despite the absence of EIAs. The Commission had received complaints to this effect; see T-
585/93, order of the Court of First Instance, 9 August 1995).
13 In response to written question 596/91 (OJ 1992 C102/2).
13 Written question E-1197/93 (OJ 1994 C371/2-3).
14 See Chapter 3, point 2.1. Practical Illustration: T-585/93.
15 Regional differences exist, see examples in Valencia, Catalunya, Aragon, Castilla y
Leon and Navarra, Baleares; GARCIA URETA, 1994, p.269 note 140.
16 Bodelon, p.75; GARCIA URETA, 1994, p.265; ROSA MORENO, 1993, p.244.
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authorisation, to public consultation. On the basis of the above^2, the environmental
authority draws up the Environmental Declaration, which cannot be excessively abstract^,
and presents this to the substantive authority (i.e.: given the substance of a project, the organ
competent to authorise it). The substantive authority decides whether to issue the
authorisation and, if so, incorporates the conditions contained in the Declaration. Should
conflict arise between the two organs, the Consejo de Ministros or the CA's Consejo de Gobierno
is, in theory, called upon to resolve it*9.
Again, problems with the procedure are examined as the actors involved intervene, after a
brief mention of general efforts of the administration to help the procedure run more smoothly.
1.3. Administrative Guidance:
Prior to the initiation of any one procedure, by publishing a collection of sectoral guides,
Guias Metodoldgicas sobre Evaluation de Impacto Ambientafi0, MOPTMA has tried to orient
the application of the legal texts. Some CA Agencies have produced similar works2*.
Although the approach is different, these address similar issues that the administrative
circular did in France. Designed to be an "orienting complement" to the legal texts, the Guides
provide extremely useful clarification22 and, where legal provisions were too sketchy, help
fill these out23.
l/ That is, the EIS, the authorisation request, technical documents, results of public
consultation. Should the environmental authority consider that more information is required
of the developer, it 30 days in which to request more information. Unfortunately, as noted
above, no provision is made for public examination of the EIS thus completed. To compare, in
France, the commissaire enqueteur is theoretically able during his preliminary contacts, to
request more information that is included in the file for public examination (if the developer
agrees to furnish it).
1 s Consejo de Estado, Dictamen 52.269/MM, p.10; cited garcia ureta, 1994, p.257.
19 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.262.
20 For instance, separate guides exist for roads and railroads; dams; power stations, open¬
cast mining, toxic waste installations, airports, chemical plants, reforestation, et cetera;
Letter received from Luis Penalver Camara, Jefe del Area de Coordinacion Institucional,
MOPTMA, Direccion General de Informacion y Evaluacion Ambiental, 13 October 1995.
2* Canarias has also published EIA guides on quarries, golf courses, and urban
developments Com(93)28, p.240.
22 For instance, the Guides specifically avoid language that is too technical, include
graphic illustrations, and are consciously not so prolific as to discourage the reader. For
example, chapter 5 of the guide designed for roads and railroads covers the impacts to be
foreseen very thoroughly, devoting separate sections to, for instance, the description of
changes to be taken into account for the physical medium (air quality, noise, climate, geology
and geomorphology, surface and ground water, soil, flora, fauna, countryside). It proceeds to
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Drawback: While of undeniable aid for the developer and the administrator, the general
shortcoming is that, in Spain, this guidance is offered on a purely voluntary basis2^. Whilst it
is encouraging that the Guides are in demand and well-received23, whatever contribution they
can offer to proper implementation is wholly dependent on the good will of those using them.
The text itself recognises that many of its suggestions to rationalise and resolve the
implementation problems of EIA have been ineffective — "have remained in the ink-well."26
No action can be taken if the recommendations are ignored. Because in the French context
administrative circulars have judicial value27, the European Court of Justice's insistence that
Community norms be transposed by means other than circulars and unenforceable texts did not
seem particularly relevant in terms of justiciability there (although still valuable in terms of
legal certainty and uniformity across the Community). In the Spanish context, however, the
same insistence is both relevant and necessary.
1.4. Developer:
The first stage of the procedure is the developer's elaboration of the EIS. The most serious
problems are linked: the EIS is usually of very poor quality, and the developer is determined
not to modify his project. Given the second, it seems reasonable that he does not devote much
energy to preparation of a study, the purpose of which is to investigate modifications.
discuss impacts to the socio-economic medium, the various indicators of impacts, and the
criteria and methodology for evaluating them, with the same detail; Monografias de la
Direccion General de Medio Ambiente, Guias Metodoldgicas sobre Evaluation de Impacto
Ambiental, I Carreteras y Ferrocarriles, MOPU, 1989, p. 15.
23 Specifically, for example, the purpose of the "monitoring programme", included in the
legislation without elaboration, is discussed. It is to include fixing objectives (identifying
affected systems, types of impacts, defining what the indicators of these impacts are);
collection and analysis of data (by whom is still not specified); interpretation of the data; and
it stresses the importance of "retroalimentacion", or feedback that modifies the initial
objectives; Carreteras y Ferrocarriles..., p.39-41.
24 it is recalled that in France similar guidance was contained in circulars, official
instructions to the prefect.
25 Carreteras y Ferrocarriles..., p.9; Com(93)28, p.240.
26 "...habran quedado en el tintero"; Carreteras y Ferrocarriles..., p.8.
27 The French Conseil d'Etat accepts the judicial review of circulars insofar as they add
to the substance to the original legal provision; see Chapter 5, point 1.1. Administrative
Guidance.
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EIS Quality: Despite a fairly strong formal transposition of this element, only an
estimated 20% of EISs submitted by developers are of an acceptable quality28. Many factors
are incorrectly analysed, particularly interaction of elements29. Judging by other commentary,
the Commission assesses the situation fairly:
The more common deficiencies are: poor description of the project; lack of accuracy in the selection
of significant variables for the particular case; excessive attention paid to trivial points which are
easy to deal with; lack of consideration of activities associated with or induced by the project
(quarries, dumping sites, temporary roads); routine use of evaluation techniques which are
frequently unsuited to the task; lack of reference to and/or implementation of monitoring and
control; mitigation measures considered in a very general ways, without proper definition in
technical and economic terms. One of the more frequent and critical deficiencies is the absence of the
on
non-technical summary, which is a mandatory requirement, strictly defined in the legislation JV
The MOPTMA memorandum adds that the developer fails to focus on significant effects,
that generally scientific rigour is absent (corroborating the Commission's statement that
studies are carried out with little or no fieldwork)3^ and that, not only are the various
dimensions of the corrective and mitigating measures incorrectly anticipated, the economic
costs of these measures and the implementation of the 'monitoring programme'32 are not
foreseen33 — perhaps foreshadowing the attention that the developer intends to give these
factors later.
Reluctance to modify project: The attitude witnessed in France on the part of the developer
manifests itself here, too. Project authorisation is usually sought only once the developer has
taken the essential choices concerning the project, normally on economic and technical grounds.
The determination to continue with the project in its original form impedes, first, serious
consideration of project alternatives: for example, when selecting a route for a railway or
highway, developers might go through the motions of including a minor variation through the
same corridor of the planned route, but they fail to consider the choice of another corridor34.
Secondly, later inclusions -- for instance, modifications suggested during the public
participation process — are also disregarded. With few exceptions35, the EIA process is
28 Com(93)28, p.239.
29 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.331.
30 Com(93)28, pp.239-40.
31 Ibid., p.240.
32 An innovation of the national legislation.
33 MOPTMA, Memorandum, pp.208-209.
34 Ibid., p. 208; Com(93)28, p.237.
35 The Commission has noted that RENFE and ENRESA (national railroads and nuclear
industry) do make considerable effort to carry out the procedure efficiently Com(93)28, pp.238-
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perceived as a bureaucratic exercise to be endured, rather than a tool for helping the project
evolve towards less environmental harm. This attitude inspires the same type of manoeuvre
witnessed in France: for instance, artificial division of the project is also a problem here36.
Thus the overwhelming precision of the RD1131/1988 regarding EIS contents37 comes to
very little in practice. Although these deficiencies originate with the developer, it must be
emphasised that the administrators whose task it is to verify that the black letter law is
observed are implicated. Again indications of priorities are evident.
The developer himself faces problems: given the inadequate state of environmental data
available in Spain, it appears the initial 'scoping' contact between the developer and
environmental authority has not yet attained its potential. The developer often must start
from zero and compile himself the necessary data concerning the original site3®. Certainly,
administrative procedures that are unusually slow compound the organisational pressures and
time constraints the developer faces. Nevertheless, the difficulties they face fail to justify
the poor quality of the EISs produced.
1.5. Public Involvement:
Next to intervene in the process is the public, and notably in the Spanish context, public
involvement in environmental protection is significantly less than the European average39, an
initial obstacle that is extremely difficult to address. Should individuals wish to voice their
opinion, a significant problem is that often a non-technical summary of the project is missing
from the file4^, rendering the EIS inaccessible to the layman. However, the main problem
39; see also Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.231 citing Mercedes Pardo "Entra en vigor el Real Decreto
sobre Evaluacion del Impacto ambiental. Medir la huella" en Revista MOPU, num.353, 1988
pp.37-38; Jorda i Sanuy, "Aspectos ecologicos de la autopista del Garraf", Revista O.P. 1990,
P-67-
36 European Parliament question 103 Debates of the European Parliament No. 3-409/224,
9.10.91, concerning the construction of a section of the trunk road linking A6 with Castile.
Highway between Pinar de las Rozas and Pozuelo which runs from Boadilla road (M516) to
the Aravaca Pozuelo for which no EIA carried out; see also Com(93)28, pp.239-40.
37 Chapter 7, point 2.2.2. Environmental Impact Study.
38 For example, developers have encountered administrative secretiveness when
requesting relevant cartography; Rosa Moreno, 1993, pp.226-27; see also Com(93)28, p.237.




concerning public involvement is that the public's access to information remains severely
restricted and, next, the results of the public participation are, for the most part, neither
assimilated into the project through the Declaration or through modifications to the original
project by the developer41.
Lack of power: As mentioned, various concrete obstacles concerning consultation are
embedded in the national implementing legislation42. Furthermore, the individual's exercise
of the procedural right to participate proceeds with extreme difficulty: 80% of requests for
information receive no reply; 15% receive a reasoned refusal; and in only 5%, information is
received43. Moreover, if the citizen is denied information, there is little that he can do
quickly to resolve the problem44.
Also problematic are the less tangible difficulties the public encounters in the initial
procedure. As in France, the public's impression that all the important decisions concerning the
project have been taken prior to public consultation is not mistaken. Discussing the purpose of
EIA, the Secretary General of Environment in 1991 indicated that "in many instances, the
evaluation of the projects arrives too late, when the principal alternatives of greater
environmental interest have been already taken and cannot be corrected."45
Apathy: Again as in France, at times public administrations complain that they get little
response from the public45. It is difficult to say whether this is because of widespread
indifference, simple lack of awareness of particular consultations42 or, as in France, if this is
another consequence of the perception that participation is futile anyway. Although
environmental protests are not unheard of48, here environmental concern does not seem to have
41 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.328.
42 Gathering awareness of the commencement of public consultation, hours during which
the EIS is available for consultation, the possibility of obtaining photocopies.
43 Sanchis Moreno, op.cit., p.243.
44 Sanchez Moron, p.64; even Article 4.1. of Ley 38/1995 on access to environmental
information indicates that requests for information can be rejected by administrative silence.
45 Domingo Ferreiro Picado, "Mas vale prevenir que curar", El Pais 5 June 1991, p.16; Rosa
Moreno, 1993, p.179, note 728. Even the official Guides to the procedure recognise this
practical reality; Carreteras y Ferrocarriles..., p.8.
46 Com(93)28, p.238.
47 Chapter 7, point 2.2.3. at publication of the announcement of public consultation.
48 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.204; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.325; Valerio, 1991, p.100
(speaking only of protests; apparently nonviolent).
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fuelled extreme reactions (except, of course, in the Pais Vasco where apparently heated
protests have taken place451).
Public involvement should not stop after the consultation process: Article 45, Constitution
1978, indicates that the public is expected to aid and encourage the public powers in their task
of protecting the environment. Indeed, the Commission also relies on monitoring by private
actors (complaints). Here that implies some measure of awareness on the part of the concerned
public on how the projects, once authorised, comply with the environmental conditions
imposed upon them. Unfortunately, in reality it appears that there is little the public can do
to goad the various authorities into action, or worse, surmount their obstructiveness511.
1.6. Environmental Authority:
The environmental authority is next to intervene in the process. On the basis of the usually
poor EIS and inadequate public consultation, it is called upon to draw conclusions on the impact
of the project, from an environmental perspective. In this it fulfils a similar role as the
commisdaire enqueteur in France: in spite of differences in duration and quality of
intervention51, they both examine available documentation and the results of public
consultation. Certain differences are pertinent, however. In theory the Spanish Declaration is
more significant than the cotnmissaire's conclusions52. The Declaration is an administrative
act55, theoretically binding upon the substantive authority5"1.
4" MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.159; Garcia Ureta (personal correspondence) refers to heated
protests concerning, inter alia, the construction of an express road to link Guipuzcoa and
Navarra, the 'Autovia de Leizaran'; the construction of a waste disposal site near Bilbao; and
a road to link Madrid and Valencia to run through 'Las Hoces de el Cabriel', an area recently
designated as a nature reserve (under Act 4/1989, article 14).
5(1 The Lopez Ostra Case, European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 9 December 1994,
ref. 41/1993/436/515 illustrates the administrative obstructiveness; below, at footnote 118.
51 The Spanish environmental authority is present more consistently throughout the
procedure and, theoretically at least and possibly in practice, its intervention is of greater
value.
52 At least until recent modifications: a project of a collectivite territoriale that has
received unfavourable conclusions must now be the object of a discussion by the deliberating
body of the collectivity: Article 8 of Loi 83-630, as amended by 95-101.
55 There is some debate as to the characteristics of the Declaration. It is an acto
motivado (a reasoned act). Debate surrounds whether this is a final administrative act (acto
resolutorio), or an act of a phase (dcto de tramite); an operative authorisation (autorizacion
operativa) or a declaration of will (declaration de voluntad); see Rosa Moreno, 1993, pp.271-
277; Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.278-81; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.331-33. The Consejo de Estado,
Dictamen 52.269/MM (cited garcia ureta, 1994, p.259) has ruled that it is an autonomous act
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The main difficulties with the environmental authority's intervention concern its
autonomy55, particularly when confronting internal pressures, its use of discretion, and its lack
of resources. Also problematic are technical issues concerning administrative silence.
Internal administrative pressure: As formulated, Spanish EIA legislation seemed to give
the environmental authority considerable power to decide whether a project should go
forward; if conflict arises between the substantive and environmental organs, an outside body
arbitrates56. Practically, however, as of 1996 not one instance of conflict forwarded to an
exterior body at national level for arbitration had been noted57. The environmental authority
is usually situated within the administration of the substantive organ58, in principle because
the former is then in a better position to understand the project's characteristics. Just as within
the European Commission, the Legal Service often finds itself reining in an overly eager DG-
XlW, so can it easily be imagined that where the environmental authority takes a very pro-
environment stance, the mam administration applies pressure on it to modify its position.
Martin Mateo cautions that the Declaration cannot go so far as to prohibit the establishment
of new installations that fulfil legal emission standards and requirements: "this is not a blank
cheque written out to the environmental authorities"60. If this is indeed the case, it constitutes
a blow to the power of the environmental organ.
Worse still, if the main administration undertakes the EIA exercise in order to authorise
its own project, a certain lack of objectivity regarding environmental consequences is inherent in
the procedure: the administration is both juez y parte64. In practice, it is harder to see the
belonging to the principal procedure ending with a final act. Even if it were an dcto de trdmite,
according to Garcia de Enterria and Ramon Fernandez, "the fact that an 'act of a phase' cannot
be challenged, upon which the distinction has originated, is a simple rule of order, it is not an
absolute material rule."
The issue is not further investigated here: the essential point, for this research, is that
it is susceptible to judicial review.
54 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.272; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.331; Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.257.
55 Com(93)28, p.243.
56 RDL1302/1986, Articles 4.2,6.2.
57 Although this may have occurred in one regional case in Valencia; Com(93)28, pp.239,
243; confirmed in correspondence with Dr. Garcia Ureta, in 1996.
58 RDL1302 /1986, Article 5.
5^ Chapter 3, point 1.1. at - Lack of accord within the Commission.
60 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.332.
64 Literally, both judge and an interested party; see, e.g. Garcia ureta, 1994, p.263.
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effects of the Declaration on public projects than on private62; and environmental concerns tend
to "cede dangerously before the requirements of ministerial or autonomous departments with
direct competence over large public works"63. The environmental authority here is frequently
not disposed to impede the projects proposed by its colleagues64.
In this situation, once again the effects of the environmental organ's lack of independence
are carried downstream and monitoring is simply abandoned: the Commission indicates that
this is "patently the case for State highways."68 As Rosa Moreno says, the hope that the
monitoring programmes attain their potential does not seem to be the result intended by the
administration, "but rather the reverse."66
Discretion: The absence of a Declaration invalidates the procedure67. Barring that, it
would be extremely difficult to obtain the annulment of a Declaration on the grounds that the
conditions it imposed were disproportional (i.e., its contents were insufficiently68
protective69). The environmental authority retains the discretion to draw the conclusions it
sees fit73. Although its discretion is subject to judicial review, the environmental authority
commonly does not treat equally all the aspects it is theoretically required to consider in
elaborating the Declaration74. An example is that certain crucial elements, such as the
corrective measures foreseen or the reference to alternatives, are frequently simply designated
62 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.275.
63 Bano Leon, 1996, p.626.
64 The situation varies according to administration: for instance, some public developers
(RENFE and ENRESA (network of railways and national Enterprise of Radioactive wastes) do
attempt to take their obligations seriously, while others such as MOPT, Roads Directorate
stand out because they do not; Com(93)28, pp.238-39.
65 Com(93)28, p.240-41.
66 "...sino mas bien lo inversoRosa Moreno, 1993, p.275.
67 And traditionally provoked the nulidad relativa (nullity which may only be claimed
by a party in interest). In the 80s such a text is considered "a requirement of significant
consequence for the validity of the act". The Tribunal Supremo has taken a more innovative
stance; the omission of such an "informe preceptivo" (indispensible report) entails the nulidad
radical (the absolute or fundamental nullity): SSTS 12 April 1983, 15 November 1983, 20 April
1985, 21 March 1986; see also Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.282.
68 Or even excessively, if the applicant is the developer.
69 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.332.
70 RD1131/1988, Article 18.1, above ~ this, in spite of the requirement that it take
account of the public's observations, the technical studies and the developer's EIS; see also
Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.256-58; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.276-80.
74 Moreover, in practice, the elements to be considered are frequently treated distinctly,
without interaction between them; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.328; garcia ureta, 1994, p.275.
332
with reference to "another source", or "by reference"77 ~ are not actually given in the EIS
itself. Where in France similar deficiencies have been (eventually) remedied in the courts, in
Spain, as yet, an authorisation based on an EIA with such deficiencies has not been
invalidated for as much73. Thus the preventive spirit of the Community legislation (and of its
transposing legislation) is diluted to a series of disjointed exercises of little relevance to the
environment.
Failure to use available tools: An offshoot of internal pressures and of the environmental
authority's discretion is its failure to use the tools available to it. It is very disappointing
that, on the occasions where the legislator has provided tools for effective implementation or
enforcement, they are commonly ignored in practice. For example, it is extremely rare for
environmental authorities to issue negative Declarations. By 1993, at national level only one
negative Declaration had been issued, only one project (a limestone quarry) was not
authorised74. Furthermore, Article 18.3 RD1131/198875 implies that a Declaration can be
revoked if, because of the impact on the environment or new scientific and technological
developments, more appropriate conditions for environmental protection can be fixed.
However, since already authorities are reluctant to issue negative Declarations, it seems
optimistic to expect them to revoke a Declaration that has been issued. More administrative
determination is required to 'overturn' an earlier administrative decision, and to stop an actual
activity, than to prevent such an activity from commencing in the first place.
Administrative presumption in favour of authorisation: Administrative inefficiency or
lack of strictness with an uncooperative developer can set into motion administrative rules
that tend to presume in favour of project authorisation despite environmental consequences.
Furthermore, where normally procedural rules are neutral with regard to environmental
interests (even if in fact they affect such interests adversely) it appears that here an exception
has been made to the normal situation, particularly favouring economic interests.
Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.280, note 1063.
Ibid., p.280.
The CA had also issued a few negative Declarations.
RD1131/1988, Article 18.3, cited Chapter 7, footnote 196.
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Within thirty days of receiving the completed study, the environmental authority may
request additional information from the developer'76. Administrative procedure indicates
that, when the developer is requested to provide information or corrections77, "if this is not
accomplished, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his petition and this will be archived
without further stages, with the effects foreseen in Article 42.1."78 By contrast with these
general provisions, the developer receives a more specific and lenient treatment regarding EIA
than in other administrative procedures79. In keeping with the idea announced in the EIA
regulation's preamble that the EIA procedure is not to constitute a brake on progress and
development, Article 17, RD1131/198880 indicates that, if the information/corrections are not
provided within twenty days the environmental authority shall proceed with the
Declaration anyway. The situation may vary between CA8^ but normally, with or without the
additional information, the Declaration is drawn up. It is illogical to expect the developer to
exert himself to furnish what may be incriminating details if there is no negative consequence
for failing to do so82. Simply by waiting out the administrative request, it is likely that the
authorisation will go ahead as planned.
On the other hand, if the environmental authority fails to issue the Declaration, the EIA
regulations are silent on the consequences. In the absence of a declaration, Article 43.2
76 RD 1131/1988, Article 17.
Within ten days according to Article 71.1, LRJPAC; nevertheless, the more specific
provision, Article 17 RD1131/1988, accords twenty days for completion to be carried out.
s LRJPAC, Article 71.1. Article 42.1 LRJPAC requires the administration to expressly
resolve solicitations, except for procedures that have been renounced or abandoned.
79 In the more general administrative framework it appears to be up to the
administration to decide how serious the omission or error is: LRJPAC,Article 92.2 provides
that "caducity cannot be for simple inactivity of the interested party if the necessary
information/corrections are not indispensible for elaborate a resolution. Such inactivity shall
have for effect no more than the loss of the right to the phase referred to."
RD1131/1988, Article 17: "[the environmental authority] shall communicate to the
developer those aspects which, in a given case, must be completed, fixing a delay of twenty
days for the fulfillment, after which it shall proceed to formulate the Declaration of Impact
within the delay established by Article 19" (emphasis added).
81 In Aragon, for example, if the additional information is not provided within one
month, the project's documents are archived without prejudice to opening a new EIA procedure
(Decreto 148/1990, Article 4); however, in Catalunya only 10 days are allowed, after which
the environmental authority determines the declaration of impact anyway (Decreto 114/1988,
Article 4.2); -- "lo que esta en sintonia con el Reglamento estatalGarcia Ureta, 1994 p.276,
note 178, pp.284-86.
82 This parallels the French situation where in case of the developer's refusal to
cooperate, the commissaire "notes it in the file".
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LRJPAC83 applies, which provides that silence indicates the presumption of a positive
resolution — a possibility that presents obvious problems for the Community legislation and
the environment. Garcia Ureta argues84 logically that such an interpretation would go against
the spirit of RDL1302/1986 Article 4 (and the less forceful Article 8, EIA85/33788), which
requires, in the event of a positive decision on the part of the environmental organ, that the
conditions for realisation of the project be fixed. These essential conditions would be absent if
administrative silence were interpreted as a positive response, and the preventive intent of
EIA85/337 would be reduced to nothing. Furthermore, the legislation requires that the
Declaration be published, patently impossible if none is issued. As compelling as these
arguments are, it occurs in practice that projects are authorised without Declarations86; this
undeniably cannot be considered an "appropriate" means of fulfilling Community obligations.
Lack of resources: The familiar problem of insufficient resources is quite marked in the
Spanish context87. Thus although procedural law requires that the substantive and
environmental authorities co-operate, the means are lacking for carrying out such co¬
operation. For both the substantive and environmental authorities, the EIA procedure and
subsequent monitoring of the project's environmental compliance suffer from the lack of
personnel generally, and more specifically, of qualified experts and pluri-disciplinary teams
of evaluators88. Again the importance of this must be stressed, for the practical effect of the
legal rules often comes down to the human operatives89. Ultimately responsibility is shifted
83 LRJPAC, 43.2: "When procedures initiated by virtue of solicitations formulated by
interested parties are not resolved within the time period, can be understood as approved the
following suppositions a) solicitations for concessions of licenses and authorisations of
installation, transfers of amplification of undertakings of work centres... c) In all cases, those
soliciations in which the applicable norms do not establish that these will not be approved
without express resolution."
84 Garcia Ureta, 1994, pp.284-86.
85 Article 8, EIA85/337: "Information gathered pursuant to Articles 5,6, and 7 must be
taken into consideration in the development consent procedure." Whether 'taking into
consideration' entails the fixing of conditions is admittedly uncertain.
86 For instance, Unelco commenced the construction of two power stations in the Canary
Islands prior to the issue of the two relevant Declarations of Environmental Impact (T-585/93
Order of 9 August 1995, paragraphs 3-6); see also Com(93)28, p.237.
87 E.g. Com(93)28, p.242.
88 MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208; Com(93)28, p.241-42.
89 E.g. in another national context, Cross, G., "Enforcement of Environmental Rules: the
UK Experience," in Enforcing European Comtnunity Rules: Criminal Procedures,
Administrative Procedures and Harmonization, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996.
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down to the local authorities where the absence of necessary technical and of human means is
especially acute9®.
1.7. Substantive Authorities (Central and Local):
Finally the Declaration is submitted to the authority responsible for granting permission
or authorisation. At times the EIA procedure unfolds at State level91 although more
frequently at the level of the CA92.
Delay: Completing the procedure poses organisational problems93. The whole process is of
an "odious slowness"94 and figures provided by MOPTMA give cause for deep concern: between
1989 and 1992, of 312 EIA procedures undertaken at State level, 97 Declarations of
environmental impact were published (i.e. 31% of those applied for), 215 were still being
processed (68.9%). And this is an improvement: by the end of 1991, 292 projects had been
submitted, yet only 29 Declarations published (9.9%); 263 authorisation requests (90%) still
awaited resolution95. The quality of the procedure is undermined by the delays, as no one is
willing to ask for necessary expertises for fear of further drawing out the process96. The effect
on Community law is significant since it appears that the provisions of EIA85/337 are at times
simply by-passed: "... sectoral authorities complain about delays in project authorisations, or
90 Beltran Aguirre, p.298, although he points out that the problem of 'desidia'
(indolence) should not be ignored; also Bano Leon, 1996, p. 626.
A Tribunal Supremo ruling (STS 25 April 1989) stated that it is the obligation of local
authorities to include in their budgets the means to put an end to the situation that was
threatening the applicant's the right to an adequate environment (in appendix). Positive
consequences of the ruling depend on the resources generally available and whether when, for
instance, personnel is lacking, manpower is first substracted from environmental activities.
91 The centralising effect of certain administrative competences, on which a variety of
sources have commented negatively (MartInmateo, 1-1991, p.330; garcia ureta, 1994, p.253-
54; Rosa moreno, 1993, p.244) have augmented tensions between region and centre. From the
Community perspective, internal divisions of power are not of concern. However, it is relevant
for practical implementation of EIA that the power to take decisions that ultimately have
serious environmental consequences, is subtracted from the level where awareness of site, and
local situations and characteristics are greater, and placed at a level where important factors
are reduced to abstractions on paper.
92 MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208.
93 It is recalled that Spain does not have the same extensive experience with the
procedure that France does.
94 "...odioso lentitud"; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.181.
95 MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.207-10; Com(93)28, p. 235.
9 6 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p. 180.
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even go ahead without the Declaration of Environmental Impact"97 (emphasis added). It is
difficult to discern whether this is simply a result of an administration that is overwhelmed
or, more intractably, because the procedure is considered of little importance.
Complexity: The entire procedure is very complex, somewhat inevitably in such a context.
Several factors aggravate the complexity. The national legislation left the specification of
substantive and environmental authorities to the CA, which in turn did not specify exactly
which organs are involved in the procedure. Moreover, a variety of authorisations and licences
may be required for a given project, and the substantive and environmental authorities are not
the only administrative bodies involved in the process. Three types of authorisation are
generally required9®: the main authorisation99, the authorisation for the activity100, and
the licence from the municipal authority regarding the use of the land101. The plurality of
administrative actors involved engenders a variety of difficulties both during the
authorisation process and, further downstream, for monitoring the project's compliance with
environmental conditions.
Where several EIAs are required, the reduction of duplications is not provided for102
(except, rarely, where specified in CA legislation103). However, common wisdom is that only
one environmental Declaration is needed, inserted into the substantive procedure104. Still, co-
97 Com(93)28, p.237.
9^ Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.242. For an installation such as a nuclear power plant, obviously
other authorisations are also required. One authorisation cannot be binding upon another; STS
Sentencia 3 November 1975.
1
From the authority competent in the substantive area for execution of the project.
100 Vexatious Activities Regulation; Decreto 2414/1961.
101 Where a municipality (ayuntamiento) has adopted a land-use plan (plan de
ordenacion urbana) this must be respected by the various authorities: Ley del Suelo, Article
134; for instance, Dangerous Activities must be carried out 2000m from the nearest urban centre.
Furthermore, conflict can arise between authorising bodies, complicating and drawing out the
procedures.
102 The Disposicion Adicional of Real Decreto 1131/1988 makes an attempt to address the
issue, with reference to some of the earlier legislation that contained elements of EIA prior to
the existence of RDL1302/1986; however, the approach is piecemeal and does not foresee a
variety of cases that may arise.
103 por instance, Ley 11/1990 Canarias provides that "The obligation to carry out an
impact evaluation shall exempt from the obligation of another or others of an inferior
category, when these are concurrent for the same project of activity."
1°4 jtie subsequent but necessary procedure linked with classified installations, which
must be maintained particularly with respect to local competences, is "emptied of substance,
given the assumption of the previous declaration of impact"; Rosa moreno, 1993, p.289. Some
CA have resolved the problem of duplication in their developing legislation, with the
consequence of course, that harmonisation is disturbed.
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ordination is almost non-existent with regard to certain sectoral procedures (such as toxic and
dangerous waste dumping) with the occasional result that parallel studies are carried out,
emphasising the need for co-operation between ministerial or CA departments105.
Administrative inertia, obstructiveness: Of course, insufficient funds and personnel, the
complexity of relations between authorities, and the relative106 inexperience with the EIA
procedure107 contribute to an administrative inertia (entorpecimiento108) of monumental
proportions. This is the most widely cited problem of practical implementation generally1 09
and it would require an equally monumental determination (that is visibly lacking) to address
this issue. As in France, the substance of the exercise itself is not taken seriously; the entire
procedure was initially regarded as a valueless bureaucratic exercise to be gotten out of the
way110. Although environmental considerations are not the only elements not properly
considered111, lack of attention to detail is particularly evident where questions of public
participation and coherence of the various procedural elements are concerned. The immediate
result is that the value of the procedure is diminished: the authorities take an
"undemanding"117 attitude towards the exercise and little interaction takes place between
the various elements considered113.
More than inaction, administrative obstructiveness often affects public participation,
first, with the procedure; not only is the public barely invited to the consultation process114, it
is "not a common practice to provide copies of these documents for purchase."115
(Alternatively, in a few exceptional cases, copies have been provided at enormous cost116.)
105 Rosa Moreno, 1993, pp.290-92
106 As compared to France.
107 Garcia Ureta, 1994, pp.276,331.
10® "...numbness"; Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.181.
109 estevan bolea, 1991, p.184; rosa moreno, 1993, pp.177-85; martin mateo, 1-1991,
p.199; Beltran Aguirre, p.298; garcia ureta, 1994, p.331; Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p.10728;
Bano Leon, 1996, pp.620, 624, 627; Jordano Fraga, p.472; Esteve Pardo, p.620.
110 MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208.
111 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p. 183.
112 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.33l.
113 Com(93)28, p.238; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.328; MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208.
114 See Chapter 7, point 2.2.3. at Publication of the announcement of public consultation:
115 Com(93)28, p.238.
116 In one instance, after a year's delay information was provided for the fee of
approximately ECU 3750. This was perceived as a means of discouraging participation;
Sanchis Moreno, op.cit., p.244.
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Second, where the public attempts to involve the authorities in the subsequent functioning of
the plant the administration has shown itself to be obstreperous, citing the length of judicial
proceedings to discourage public action117. Where judicial decisions have been rendered, the
administration has been known to suspend judicial orders for closure of plants that do not
comply with environmental rules1
Article 45 of the Spanish Constitution requires citizens to help the administration in its
duty to protect the environment: in sum, the process becomes one of "forcing the administration
to carry out its duties"119.
Failure to monitor: A variety of sources indicate that in reality little monitoring takes
place17®. Monitoring is principally in the hands of the substantive organ121. The local
administration is competent to control activities and establish later modifications with an eye
to technical and scientific progress122. The environmental organ, co-operating with the
117 Chapter 9, point 3.4. Duration of judicial action.
11 ® The European Court of Human Rights has been called upon to rule on the Spanish
government's failure to act in the Lopez Ostra Case, Judgment of 9 December 1994, ref.
41/1993/436/515; the case illustrates the extent of administrative obstructiveness. See also
Garcia Ureta, Agustin, "Lopez Ostra v Spain: Environmental Protection and the European
Convention on Human Rights," 1995 Environmental Liability 81.
The facts of the case concern a family (and indeed an entire neighbourhood) that were
adversely affected by an unlicenced waste treatment plant very close to their home. The
release of gases and treatment of water contaminated with chromium brought on health
problems (vomiting, nausea, allergies). Notably, in the course of national proceedings on the
same matter brought by other members of the family, judges twice ordered the plant operations
to be shut down (administrative judge on 18 September 1991; Criminal judge on 13 November
1991). Twice execution of these orders was suspended by the administration, which lodged
appeals.
In this instance, the European Court of Human Rights noted that authorities had first,
failed to protect rights embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8,
regarding protection of private family life and the home); secondly, authorities had resisted
judicial remedies that had been ordered; and thirdly, they had prolonged the unlawful
situation.
Such obstructiveness is even more striking in light of the fact that a) the plant was
operating without a licence and, b) the plant's emissions were known to exceed the legal limits
(report by the National Toxicology Institute).
119 MartInMateo, 1-1991, p. 199; see also Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.296.
120 Com(93)28, p.241; MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208; rosa moreno, 1993, pp.285-92;
Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.263.
121 Real Decreto 1131/1988, Article 25.1: "The follow-up and monitoring of the execution
of that which is established in the Declaration of Environmental Impact belongs to the organ
competent by reason of the material, empowered to accord the authorisation of the project.
Without prejudice to it, the administrative organ of the environment can request information
on the matter, as well as to carry out the investigations necessary to verify said execution."
122 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.322, referring to the Ley de Regimen Local, which declares
local authorities competent for protection of the environment (Article 25.f, Ley 7/1985); STS 12
December 1977.
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substantive organ, is also authorised to verify that the conditions included in the
authorisation are carried out correctly123; again, co-ordination between authorities is
problematic124. In sum, it appears that the authorisation of a project is regarded, somewhat
like a ship that has left port, like the starting point of a journey that is of little concern to
those in the authorising administration.
The value of the EIA procedure depends greatly upon monitoring and feedback
(retroalimentacion) regarding the initial environmental conditions imposed and this, as Rosa
Moreno points out, is the "weak flank of actual evaluation systems."125 The results of the EIA
are ignored in practice. Consequences of the European directive's failure to include provisions
on monitoring are notable here: failure to monitor undermines the purpose of the environmental
Declaration, and the entire procedure that went into its elaboration. Nonetheless, even the
proposed amendments to EIA85/337 decline to address the problem125.
1.8. Summary:
Keeping in mind that the number of EIAs carried out is greatly reduced as a result of the
Annex II exclusions, the procedure's useful effect is dismantled by the interventions of the
various actors. The public is often unaware or not motivated enough to contribute to the
procedure, or considers that its input will be disregarded. The developer rigidly sticks to
original plans; alternatives are not seriously put forth. The environmental authority is in such
a position that it never issues a negative Declaration, and corrective measures — indeed the
purpose of the exercise - are often not noted in the authorisation, but included in "another
source". Finally, the substantive authorities are, at best, uninterested, particularly where
public projects are concerned; at worst, efficiently obstructive. The whole process is of
exaggerated length and comparatively few environmental Declarations have been issued:
works are frequently commenced without an environmental Declaration, an illegallity that
123 Real Decreto 1131/1988, Article 25.1, above.
124 MOPTMA, Memorandum, p.208; Domper Ferrando, "Las licencias...", pp. 120-22; Rosa
moreno, 1993, pp.285-92. As Garcia Ureta says, "[i]t is not difficult to imagine that the most
frequent consequence is the duplication of controls on the same project or activity (if such
controls are carried out)"; Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.263.
125 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.293.
126 See Conclusions, point 2. Lessons learned— Amendments to the EIA legislation.
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the authorities, apparently, make little effort to redress. Breakdowns in practical
implementation seem due to attitudes so deeply ingrained as to be almost intractable;
assiduous enforcement might at least demonstrate that legal consequences are attached to such
attitudes.
2. Practical Implementation — LCP
2.1. Approach:
Assessing the practical implementation of RD646/1991, implementing LCP88/609 is still
more difficult than assessing the practical implementation of the EIA measures. Vertical in
nature, it concerns mainly the energy industry. Therefore, it is of less concern to the public, or
even academics, than EIA procedures and information regarding practical implementation of
LCP88/609 is difficult to obtain.
Commission: It is recalled that the Commission declined to answer specific questions
concerning the compliance of France and Spain with LCP requirements127. Little is unearthed
by referring, in turn, to the EC Bulletins which merely indicate that in 1990 a letter of formal
notice was sent to Spain128 for failure to inform measures. The proceedings were terminated in
late 1991129. Apparently, with reference to LCP88/609, no proceedings concerning correct and
complete transposition or concerning practical implementation have been commenced120 .
National Sources: In light of the pessimistic views put forth by the few national authors
concerned specifically with large combustion plants121, the information obtained from helpful
national authorities122 regarding Spanish compliance appears rather optimistic,
127 See for instance, Chapter 4, point 2.3.1. at Differences between European and national
provisions.
128 As well as the FRG, Greece, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and later Portugal, Belgium, Greece; Bull.EC 9-1990, p.119, Bull.EC 12-1990, Bull.ECl/2-1991,
p. 136; Bull.EC 10-1992.
129 Bull EC 12-1991, p.155.
120 Although apparently, communication of compliance with the various obligations was,
as of 1994, extremely poor — not only in Spain but in most Member States — and this is in itself,
an infringement; see also Ninth Application Report, at p. 160.
121 For instance, valerio, 1991, and Estevan Bolea, 1991.
122 Letter of 22 December 1995, Luis Mas Garcia, Subdirector General de Planificacion
Energetica y Medio Ambiente, MINER.
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particularly since the latter seem to equate the elaboration of 'necessary reports' with
practical compliance:
The necessary reports related to emission ceilings for existing installations (authorised prior to 1
July 1987) for both the first and intermediate phases (between 1988 and 1993 and between 1993
and 1998) have been drawn up, in which it is observed that Spain has complied with the objectives
established in the Directive 88/609 for the total existing installations! 33 in 1993 and it is
foreseeable that it will comply with these in years 1998 and 2003."134
In a subsequent letter, MINER failed to mention whether the first-phase goals had
actually been met. Certain factors (below) and indeed non-official national sources indicate
that some scepticism is justified.
2.2. LCP88/609 requirements:
Spain was given concessions regarding new plant until 1999: first phase reductions for
existing plant (1993) are 0% for SO2 emissions (Annex I) and a 1% increase in emissions of NOx
is allowed!35. The requirement is deceptive: the baseline year taken for calculating emissions
was 1980136; however, Spanish SO2 emissions peaked after 1980. Therefore even to meet the
"0 reduction" of the first phase required a substantial actual reduction of emissions!37, and
133 It is recalled that Spain was given a derogation for new plant, LCP88/609 preamble,
Article 5(3).
134 "...se han elaborado los preceptivos informes, establecidos en esta Directiva, relativos
al cumplimiento de los topes de emision para las instalaciones existentes (autorizadas con
anterioridad al 1 de julio de 1987), tanto de la Primera Fase (afto 1993), como de la intermedias
(entre 1988 y 1993 y entre 1993 y 1998), en los que se constatq que Espafla ha cumplido los
objetivos establecidos en la Directiva 88/609 CLE para el global de las instalaciones de
combustion existentes en el afto 1993, siendo previsible que cumpla el resto de los mismos de los
ados 1998 y 2003. "
135 Annexes I and II: Spain is not required to reduce its 1980 (baseline) SO2 emissions at all
in the first phase, and only by 24% and 37% respectively in the second and third phases; its
NOx emissions are allowed to increase by 1% in 1993 and must be reduced by 24% by phase 2 in
1998.
Paradoxically, within Spain the time periods fixed in LCP88/609 have been criticised
for being generally too long; environmental deterioration in Europe requires methods both more
rapid and efficient, and Spain's deadlines are even longer; Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.407.
valerio, (1991, p.106) regards the relaxing of European standards in the Spanish case, as a
"feeble favour" to have done Spain, concerning the requirements of efficiency and in the search
for cleaner technologies; thus Spanish air is allowed to continue "ensuciandose" (dirtying
itself) by burning high-sulphur coal. This is perhaps a realistic attitude: although Spain is
able to impose stricter levels upon itself, it is highly unlikely that it would do so without
European pressure.
136 fa which time Spain was the fifth largest emitter of SO2 in the world, with 2,938
million Kilotonnes/year; valerio, 1991, p.98.
137 valerio, 1991, pp.98-99; Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.396.
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was thought by some national sources to be "almost certainly impossible"138 (particularly
since energy demand has grown about 20% from 1980 to 1992139). "Adjusted" to accord with the
emissions of 1987 (during LCP88/609 negotiations), the necessary reductions are 21% in 1993;
40% in 1998; and 50% in 2003143. Even the concessions made to Spain during the negotiations of
LCP88/609 may have been insufficient given the Spanish situation.
LCP88/609 introduces a bubble concept into Spanish atmospheric law: since the goal is to
obtain an overall reduction of emissions, a global vision of emissions is required. In turn this
supposes administrative co-ordination and a unified approach to managing the information
that must be collected at local level, but interpreted and used centrally to give authorisation
with a view of the whole. The authorities must not only issue the licences but also monitor
subsequent compliance, communicating difficulties to the Commission. Industry, for its part,
must sink considerable investment into the technology necessary to reduce emissions.
2.2.1. Authorisation:
On the basis of the emissions information, central authorities must decide how to allocate
emissions and incorporate these into authorisations in order to comply with the legislation.
Furthermore, although it may seem an obvious point (but one which, as shall be seen below141,
requires attention) the authorisations that are accorded must comply with the limits foreseen
in the legislation.
Co-ordination of roles: As seen, the Spanish LCP legislation did not elaborate upon the
European norms and therefore does not indicate the roles played by the various authorities.
The LCP rules are imposed upon a "varied normative mosaic"143 of pre-existing atmospheric
pollution rules143. Nonetheless, while certain authors recommend generally a clearer
delimitation of powers144, the situation as regards LCP at least, seems sufficiently clear.
138 Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.396; valerio, 1991, p.99.
139 valerio, 1991, p.99.
140 MINER Letter, 25 June 1996; Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.396.
141 Chapter 9, point 5.2.
143 Lopez Ramon, Fernando, "Regimen juridico de la proteccion del aire," in Derecho del
Medio Ambiente y Administracion Local, ed. Jose Esteve Pardo, Editorial Civitas, Madrid,
1996, p.290.
143 Such as the Air Pollution Act 38/1972 and RD 1975, and Vexatious Activities
Regulation 2414/1961 of 30 November. Furthermore, the catalogue of activities that
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Municipalities generally have extensive powers regarding practical implementation of
rules concerning atmospheric pollution control145; these powers have been eroded by concurrent
competences of the CA and State146. The municipality issues the industrial licence147.
However, an authorisation from the central MINER imposing emission limits (after the EIA
procedure overseen by MOPTMA in the case of new plant)145 is necessary. Generally concerning
industrial authorisations, the main uncertainty surrounds which is to be considered the
principal procedure149, the binding opinion of the competent ministry or technical body, or the
municipal licence.
Although administrative co-ordination presents occasional difficulties regarding EIA-
related procedures, here visibly the State has ensured that it has tighter control (notably over
emission authorisations and, below, information). Evidently where the link to industry and
energy is so strong, administrative coherence is a more prominent concern. A step toward
coherence was taken with the establishment of provincial directorates of MINER, in each
Spanish province, functionally dependent upon the civil governor (gobernador cz'uz'/150), the
potentially contaminate the atmosphere (Annex of regulation of 1975 in application of Article
33 Ley 38/1972) is not coordinated with Vexatious Activities, yet problems are avoided since
latter is not an exhaustive list; Lopez Ramon, 1996, pp.295-96; MartIn Mateo, 11-1992, pp.315-
16; The latter urgently needs updating; Domper Ferrando, 1996, p.135.
144 Domper Ferrando, 1996, p. 135.
145 The municipality declares polluted air zones (only after the issue of a binding report
by AC technical body), issues ordenances for the protection of health and the environment
(Article 25.2.f LBRL, Article 9.1 Ley 38/1972): however some of the most significant local
measures have been annulled for contradicting State provisions (STS 12 November 1984
Tribunal del Consejo Regional de Asturias -- Ordenanza de Aviles). The Comision Provincial
de Servicios Tecnicos has power to modify partially or totally such ordenances (Point 5,
Circular for the instruction of the Vexatious Activities regulation). See generally Lopez
Ramon, 1996, p.295, p.292n8; Bennett, pp.20-21)
146 See generally Domper Ferrando, 1996, pp.99-135; also Lopez Ramon, 1996, p.292-96;
STC 149/1991 4 July, recurso contra Ley de Costas.
147 Art 29 et seq., of Vexatious Activities; MartIn Mateo, 11-1992, p.312; MINER Letter,
25 June 1996.
145 After a binding report by the appropriate Autonomous technical body or the Comision
Provincial de servicios tecnicos; MINER Letter, 25 June 1996; Domper Ferrando, 1996, pp.121-22.
The State authorizes electrical installations that supply more than 1 CA or energy
transport leaves the CA (Constitution 1978, Article 149.1.22); this is the general situation, as
the Constitutional Court has acknowledged, since networks are linked. MartIn Mateo, II-
1992, pp.304-305.
149 Lopez Ramon, 1996, p.296, p.298. Furthermore, Article 3.4, Ley 38/1972 prohibits that
the municipal licence of opening (del apertura) be denied for reasons of protection of
atmosphere when the applicable levels of emission or inmission are respected. However
where EC requires a standstill, this cannot be rigidly enforced.
150 Appointed by the Minister for Internal Affairs.
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State representative. Each Provincial director provides a link between MINER and the CA
administration*5!.
Unified vision/Data Collection: Accurate information on which to base authorisation
levels is essential. Gathered throughout the different CA, the data must be processed and co¬
ordinated at a central level, in order to "avoid the mistakes caused by decisions based on
fragmentary and static analytical procedures that have not permitted to perceive the lateral
negative effects on other parts of the whole."*52 Concerning actual data collection, a regional
perspective was emphasised in Spain, and the National Network of Vigilance and
Forecasting of Atmospheric Pollution*52, established a system of data collection based upon
climatic and geographic regions*54. These do not necessarily match administrative lines*55.
The Ministerial Order of 26 December 1995, adopted specifically in order to achieve
homogenous and comparable data, provides for MINER to receive information on power
stations' emissions independently from, and without prejudice to the powers of the CA
authorities*56; it began receiving this information during 1996. A similar order is being
elaborated regarding large combustion plants in the oil refining industry. When adopted, this
will give MINER direct access to information regarding 90% of the combustion plants in the
country. Prior to the adoption of such provisions, the main difficulty concerning co-ordination
of information between the CA authorities and the Central administration was apparently
the delay the Central Administration faced in receiving information from the CAs*52. As
seen, these will now be by-passed.
Regarding measurements of levels of atmospheric pollution, a national source wrote in 1991
that 465 stations monitored SO2, and 151, NOx*58- MINER reports that in 1995, 702 manual
*5* MINER Letter, 22 December 1995.
152 Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.332.
153 Red Nacional de Vigilancia y Prevision de la Contaminacion Atmosferica, required by
Ley 38/1972 and RD 833/1975, Article 6.
154 Related to economic level, industrial activity, demographic density, climatic
conditions — all of which are logical from the perspective of atmospheric pollution.
155 MartIn Mateo, 11-1992, pp.311,321.
*56 Ministerial Order of 26 December 1995; the sixth provision requires that information
must be sent monthly to the Central Administration where continuous measurements are
required, and each trimester, where continuous measurements are not required.
152 MINER Letter, 25 June 1995.
*58 These were also established in order to comply with the Long Distance and
Transboundary Pollution Convention; Sanz Sa, p.426.
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and 408 automated stations measured SO2; 325 automated (and almost no manual) stations
monitored NOX/ and 710 manual and 287 automated stations monitored dust particles. Here, an
enormous discrepancy is noted between the information given by the national sources and that
noted in the Commission's Eighth Application Report159, which lists fifteen air monitoring
stations in Spain, without indicating what types of emissions they monitor. It is positive that
stations designed especially for monitoring large industrial concentrations are located near
them.
It seems that data collection is adequate: as a cautionary note, it has been alleged that the
information obtained from the stations is unreliable160 due to the conversion from manually
operated to automated stations. The conversion is proving more difficult than thought at first
since the responsible authority, the Ministry of Health "wishes to place the stations in the
hands of the autonomous communities, which lack the funding needed for modernising and
maintaining the network."161
2.2.2. Monitoring compliance:
The power to monitor and control is also basically in the hands of the municipality162,
although the CA and the civil governor can also exercise such functions163. (Where specified
in other legislation, other organs may also have competence to monitor.) The Autonomous
authorities then remit this information to the central Administration. Likewise regarding
sanctions164, mayors have basic competence; the CA have competence where the mayor has
failed to act, after his notification165 (or where the mayor cannot impose the amount of a
159 Com(91)321, p.292.
160 Bennett, p.62, p.lll, p.199.
161 Ibid., p.62.
162 Vexatious Activities, Articles 6, 24, 26.2; MartIn Mateo, 11-1992, p.312;
163 Vexatious Activities, Articles 9 and 37.
164 The possible sanctions include: fines, temporary withdrawal of licence for duration of
sanction; definitive withdrawal of licence; Article 38, Vexatious Activities.
165 Otherwise the imposed sanctions are null; Articles 37, 39, Vexatious Activities; STS 30
June 1975, Ar. 3465; cf: Domper Ferrando, 1996, p.125.
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specific fine); and the civil governor can also require 'exercise of due responsibility by
negligent municipal authorities'1^ (although what exactly this means is not specified167).
Next, practical implementation of LCP rules requires that the industry operators monitor
emissions. As seen, MINER has reported that it has not encountered difficulty in obtaining
data, implying that industry operators are indeed carrying out these obligations. The
administration must then verify compliance.
Lack of resources/expertise: Regarding administrative vigilance in monitoring compliance
of large combustion plants, problems arise that are extremely similar to the EIA situation. The
local administrations lack resources168; technical expertise is scarce; and monitoring is
undertaken sporadically if at all. "[I]n the end, it is impossible to carry out the periodic or
continuous controls foreseen in the laws."169 There is a breakdown in the essential function of
monitoring compliance170 and, consequently, a "generalised lack of compliance and [a] tolerant
impotence of agents of control."171 This is the main problem with atmospheric pollution
control: after the adoption of rules, the operators responsible for their application appear to
be left to their own devices.
2.2.3. Co-operation of Industry:
The co-operation of the industry concerned is another crucial factor if implementation of
vertical (sectoral) legislation such as LCP88/609 is to be useful.
Industrial costs: By contrast with EIA-type legislation, where the costs of carrying out the
procedure are relatively small, LCP88/609 adds another dimension — that of crippling costs
upon the affected industry - to practical implementation. Lack of resources then entails not
only the familiar difficulties of the administrative services called upon to verify
166 "...exigir la debida responsabilidad a las autoridades municipales que fuesen
negligentes"-, Article 9, Vexatious Activities.
16' Domper Ferrando, 1996, p.127.
168 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.273: other agencies involved pass monitoring responsibilities
to their few available agents, with the result that the attention given the issue is insufficient.
Nevertheless, occasionally it appears the excuse of lack of resources is mere rent-
seeking in the case of some large municipalities; Domper Ferrando, 1996, ppl03-4.
169 MARTIN MATEO, 1-1991, p.273; Bennett p.199; see also Double, M.B., p.6.
170 Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p. 10728.
171 MartInMateo, 11-1992, p.312.
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implementation, but the industry that must purchase, construct, and install costly technology
and equipment to meet the legal obligations. LCP88/609, and its Spanish transposition are the
most expensive pieces of environmental legislation in force in Spain172. The government is
sensitive to the impact of its implementation on the energy sector (which already faces an
extremely high level of indebtedness173) and the fact that, by affecting the supply of energy,
it could also significantly effect the rest of Spanish industry174. The investment costs vary
between 5% and 36% of the total cost of the installation, and the annual operation costs vary
between 5% and 32% although in Spain generally the higher costs apply because of the poor
quality coal173. Therefore it is fundamental to evaluate all the alternatives, starting with
the possibility of not desulphurising but rather reducing the hours that the stations function,
also the option of mixing carbons and combustibles176. Facing such costs and knowing that
administrative verification is unreliable, it can be questioned whether plant operators would
be motivated to comply with strict obligations.
Official guidance Prior to the recent MINER Order177 containing technical specifications
and calculations that were lacking in the LCP regulation, no official guidance existed.
However, industry operators could have access to information relating to the methods,
technologies and their costs for reduction of emissions via 'on line' computer programme. The
Programa BRISA is available after payment of a subscription fee and offers recent information
concerning, inter alia, the latest methods and technologies as well as the associated costs; the
addresses of the technological engineering and equipment vendors is also provided173.
Incentive: By contrast with France, no tax exists on the national level to add incentive to
meet the legal obligations17^. Indeed, given the difficult Spanish situation it is possible that
172 For a discussion of costs see Chapter 1, point 2.1. at Consideration of costs, especially
footnote 41.
173 valerio, 1991, p.106. Also, despite the fact that its own nuclear industry provides
some of its energy needs, Spain continues to struggle to meet demand and has purchased 1000
MW/year nuclear energy from Electricite de France, and may increase its purchase to 2000MW.
174 However, since 1972 industry has been urged to consider reduction of emissions as a part
of production costs; Lopez Ramon, 1996, p.291.
173 Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.406.
176 For descriptions of other technical processes, see estevan bolea, 1991, pp.406-407.
177 Order of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of 26 December 1995.
178 MINER Letter, 22 December 1995.
17^ However, some CA have imposed environmental taxes that are applicable to a wide
range of industries, and among these, combustion plants; MINER Letter, 22 December 1995.
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such a tax would function not as an incentive to reduce emission, but as a disincentive to
applying the legislation.
2.2.4. Communicationwith Commission:
Transmission of information to the Commission is the responsibility of the central
State180. However, authorisation for such derogations as those provided in Articles 6 and 8 of
LCP88/609 is in the Autonomous authority's hands. To the knowledge of MINER, no derogation
has yet been made and therefore no information has been forwarded to the Commission181.
2.2.5. Uncertain practical compliance:
An initial observation is that since the Spanish legislation arrived late18^, an. obvious
consequence for practical implementation is that no obligations from LCP88/609 were placed
upon Spanish industry (at least private operators188) until April 1991. MINER has notified
that, despite the 21% actual decrease in SO2 emissions required in the first phase, it has not
been necessary to reduce the hours of functioning, and no authorisation has been revoked for
lack of compliance. It does not mention whether the required reductions were attained.
Scepticism concerning Spain's ability to attain in practice the goals imposed by LCP88/609 is
heightened when Spain's precarious energy situation is considered184.
Scepticism is also warranted by the fact that the Ministerial Order that completes the
extremely vague national LCP regulation was adopted only recently. Given the general
situation in Spain, it seems optimistic to hope that practical implementation has proceeded
smoothly in the absence of necessary technical specifications and requirements.
Furthermore, compliance with the limits established in environmental legislation is not
the Ministry of Industry's first priority; fulfilling the needs of industry, and of energy
production, are. This somewhat obvious point is illustrated by the fact that the General
180 SSTC 172/1992 29 October, 329/1993 12 November; Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p.10724.
181 MINER Letter, 25 June 1996.
188 Real Decreto 646/1991, of 2 April 1991.
183 Since Directives are addressed to Member States and cannot create responsibilities for
private actors; C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Sri, 1994 ECR 1-3325.
184 VALERIO, 1991, pp.104-107.
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Directorate of Industry188, disregarding applicable legislation, has in the past issued
resolutions 'authorising' emissions many times greater than the limit allowed in other
atmospheric pollution norms186 (albeit prior to the entry into force of LCP legislation).
Visibly, in some instances administrative resolve to abide by the legislation is lacking.
2.2.6. Summary:
Generally Community directives on atmospheric pollution have had a strong impact in
Spain18'7, entailing marked differences in control practices and introducing requirements that
would not exist otherwise. Here Community law serves also to bolster application of
international obligations imposed by the Geneva Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Convention188. In Spain LCP88/609 has laid the groundwork for future reduction of emissions.
Still, in this Member State, it seems that actual results are insufficient. As one source pointed
out regarding another Community air pollution directive, "one need only refer to certain
requirements of Directive 75/442 to note the distance of its provisions from the actual reality
of our country."189 Fundamentally, as Aguilar has noted, because of the low political priority
of the environment, the interests of government and industry coincide substantially: "neither
public nor private actors have felt compelled to enforce or to abide by environmental
regulation respectively"199.
3. Conclusions:
On the basis of rules that were transposed to cause minimal disturbance to economic forces,
practical implementation of both texts is extremely problematic. Regarding EIA, the public is
185 Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, 20 February 1988 (Seccion 3).
Sentencia de la Sala II del Tribunal Supremo, 30 November 1990 (judgment reproduced
in de vega Ruiz, 1994, pp.63-97).
186 E.g. for dust 2000mg/Nm3 as opposed to 500mg/Nm3 provided in Decreto 833/1975.
Furthermore, the subdirector of Territorial Services of Industry in Catalunya affirmed, and
therefore authorities were aware, that in fact emissions were never below 3458mg/Nm3, more
than nine times the lawful limit; see Chapter 9, point 5.2.
187 As in Greece, Italy, and Portugal; Bennett, p.199.
188 Lopez Ramon, 1996, pp.286-87, 289; see estevan Bolea, 1991.
189 Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p.10728.
190 Aguilar, p.236; see also MARTlN Mateo, 11-1992, p.312, who discusses the ability of
large industrial actors to influence the fixing national levels of pollution.
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generally less motivated than in France, and more effectively distanced from the proceedings.
The developer, as in France, is not obliged by the Administration to correct his errors. The
environmental authorities, if ever inclined towards strictness, are overshadowed by the
substantive authorities; the latter, in turn, are usually within the Administrative structure
that promotes the projects under consideration, and cannot be expected to be objective. The
entire procedure is excruciatingly slow, and frequently construction begins without awaiting
the environmental Declaration. The LCP rules demonstrate similar tendencies: it is considered
that the Spanish energy industry can ill-afford to comply with its obligations. Although the
interventions of the administration appear better organised, they are also apparently overly
tolerant of failure to comply. Unofficial sources indicate that practical compliance, even with
"0" reductions in the first phase, is impossible.
Difficulties in practice are the most difficult not only to monitor but to address. This is
particularly true given that administrative actors are lax in their duties, and tolerate
violations ~ in practice seem determined not to endanger projects and industrial activities
perceived as essential. The Commission has no 'agents' in the Member States with which to
tackle such problems efficiently.
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CHAPTER 9: Spain - Problems of Enforcement
1. Which Jurisdiction?:
2. Administrative Sanctions:
3. Administrative disputes (Contencioso Administrative>):
What can be challenged:
3.1. Locus standi:
3.2. Interim Relief:
Wide criteria, restrictive approach:
Inadequate reasoning:
New criteria?:
3.3. Need for an Administrative act:























Diversity of administrative texts:
Sanctions:






Against a fragmented administrative backdrop in which environmental administrators
have seemingly little true independence or authority, rules have been transposed in order to
minimise potential disturbance to economic forces. Practical implementation has been lax and,
as always, wherever administrative actors are called upon to intervene inactivity is a central
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problem1. Although this section concerns principally actions before the courts, it must be
recognised that many judicial actions could be avoided if the Administration were less
lethargic both in its monitoring duties and in using administrative sanctions. In view of the
preceding weaknesses, efficient enforcement is all the more essential.
Authors generally agree that, regarding enforcement, the environment is a poorly protected
juridical good2. A multitude of problems discourage recourse to the courts or, once judicial action
has been commenced, reveal the poor suitability of procedural rules to environmental
situations. In broad terms, at this stage the most serious problem, common to civil and
administrative jurisdictions, appears to be that once an environmental problem affects the
many rather than the few, establishing standing is a hurdle that many applicants never
surmount. Slowness of judicial action regarding administrative disputes, runs a very close
second. The picture is not entirely negative, however: if an environmental matter reaches the
stage of consideration of its merits, it appears that judges (at least in all three divisions of the
highest court) make strong efforts to interpret and adapt procedural rules in order to take
account of the particularities of environmental protection.
In Spain, unlike in France, no separate jurisdiction exists for Administrative and judicial
disputes; these are heard in certain divisions (salas) of the 'ordinary' courts. Administrative,
civil and penal jurisdictions are examined in this order, giving examples applicable to EIA and
TCP, where appropriate and possible3.
1. Which Jurisdiction?:
Determining which jurisdiction is most appropriate may confuse the applicant trying to
choose the path that will yield more favourable treatment. In Spain administrative court
1 See, for instance, SSTS 7 November 1990, 30 November 1990 mentioning administrative
inactivity; Beltran Aguirre, pp.292,297; MARTlN Mateo, 1-1991, pp.197,199; Jordano Fraga,
P-472-
2 "...es un bien poco protegido"; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.629.
Finding concrete illustrations presents difficulties: Spanish cases involving
environmental issues are relatively few; de vega ruiz, 1994, p.49; rosa moreno, 1993, p.301-
302, particularly in criminal and civil jurisdictions.
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actions (contencioso-administrativo) are not strictly separated from civil disputes. A first
choice arises as to which jurisdiction to apply to, administrative or 'ordinary'. An
administrative dispute, is "an action between parties, one of which is always the Public
Administration..."4. Conversely, civil courts have jurisdiction where conflict arises between
natural or legal persons.
Less clear-cut is the distinction between civil and administrative jurisdictions in certain
cases involving the Administration. Civil jurisdictions prevail over administrative in those
cases where the Administration does not act in its governing capacity5 (although such cases
have been heard both in civil and administrative courts6). For example, in the case of harm
caused by a public sewage facility, civil jurisdiction prevails over administrative^. If a choice
arises between civil and administrative jurisdictions, the preferred path is through civil
courts, because the duration of procedure is usually less, and a more helpful concept of what is
considered harm exists8. The Supreme Court (TS, Tribunal Supremo), recognising that most
environmental legislation is administrative in essence, has commented on the attractive pull of
civil jurisdictions^.
4 Technically, the contentious administrative procedure is "articulated on the same bases
as the ordinary civil process, from which it is separated only by its condition of challenge
resulting from the requirement of a previous act, which constitutes the point of reference around
which the demands of the parties revolve"; garcia de Enterria, Eduardo and Tomas Ramon
fernandez, Curso de Derecho Administrativo II, 2nd edition, Civitas, Madrid, 1986, p.525.
The defendent (parte demandada) can also be the person who obtained a right from the
challenged act (Art.9.1.b) of LJ; which confers upon them the right to act in defense
autonomously on same level as Administration; DE ENTERRIA, and RAMON FERNANDEZ, p.528.
5 STS, 3 December 1987: "Civil jurisdiction enters into play even in those issues derived
from acts in which the Administration does not act as a power in the exercise of ius imperium."
6 STS 23 March 1983, in which the Administrative division of the TS refers to cases in
civil courts condemning the Administration to compensation; see MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.165.
See STS 12 December 1980: "...in this tangential zone between common and
administrative contentious jurisdiction, one must distinguish between those matters that link
private property to its protection, of unquestionable civil character, and those which affect
general or public interests, of unequivocal administrative nature, aspects which are properly
separated..."; comments in moreno trujillo, E., 1991, pp.233,242,272-73; Blasco Esteve, 1996,
pp.642-43; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, pp.89-90.
8 Navarro Mendizabal, I.A., "La Incidencia de la accion negatoria en la defensa del
medio ambiente como complementario de la responsabilidad civil," I Congreso Nacional de
Derecho Ambiental, Comunicaciones, ed., Cima Medio Ambiente, Valencia 1996, p.481.
STS 12 December 1980: "according to the doctrine of this Division (of the Court), the
ordinary jurisdiction is the fount or root of all the others and for this has vis atractiva in
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An illustration of the choice between jurisdictions is given in the context of disputes arising
from the establishment or functioning of large combustion plants: on the one hand, the
Administration has the power to impose sanctions111, the legality of which can be examined by
the administrative judge. On the other hand, civil courts are competent to hear cases concerning
damage caused to a third party and further, to adopt corrective measures in order that
contaminating emissions cease1
Another choice can arise between administrative and criminal jurisdictions. The line
delimiting the criminal offences from administrative infractions is one of gravity of the threat
or damage, a vague concept indeed12 (which has been applied to damage from large combustion
plants13). Where it is felt that this threshold has been crossed, criminal courts systematically
prevail1^.
In sum,
the criminal jurisdiction is competent when a crime has been committed, ...the contentious jurisdiction
is for the cases in which the harmful act constitutes an administrative infraction, and ... in the latter
supposition the jurisdiction competent for resulting damage.... is the civil; the result is duplications
and interferences leaving the field subscribed to continuous conflicts of jurisdiction.13
doubtful cases). See also STS 16 January 1989 treating an alleged lack of jurisdiction in case
concerning atmospheric pollution; commentary MARTlN MATEO, 1-1991, pp.163-65; MORENO
TRUJILLO, E., 1991, pp.272-74.
10 Article 15 Ley de Proteccion Ambiente Atmosferico.
11 See below, point 4.7.
12 Below, point 5.1, Article 347-bis: vagueness of tests.
13 Below, point, 5.2.




The legislator16 extends the power to impose administrative sanctions to the
Administration1'7. However, use of these powers is consistently disappointing18. The
legislation studied here provides for administrative sanctions. The EIA regulation19 lists three
types of sanctionable conduct: absence of a Declaration, a fairly frequent problem; failure to
comply with imposed conditions, probably the most common infraction211; falsifying, hiding, or
manipulating data. The sanctions include: "indefinite"21 suspension; restoration22; successive
coercive fines22 ; or the Administration can carry out the necessary works itself, at the charge of
operator24. In the case of an industrial installation such as a large combustion plant a variety
of administrative sanctions are applicable: those sanctions related to EIA procedures, those
included in the Vexatious Activities regulation28, and in air pollution legislation26.
16 Administrative infractions and their corresponding sanctions can be created only by
laws approved by Parliament, although an exception is made for preconstitutional rules, such
as the Vexatious Activities Regulation; LRJPAC, Articles 127.1, and 129.1. For instance, a
frequent problem of local ordenances is that they fail to mention which law they are intended
to develop, thus the infraction they create and sanctions they impose are "huerfana(s) de
coberatura legal" (orphans of legal cover); see Trayter Jimenez, p.568, pp.552-60.
12 Jordano Fraga, pp.466-67.
18 de Vega Ruiz, 1994, p.134.
19 RD1131/1988 Article 28.
20 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.343.
21 The RDL proposal had included a "temporal or definitive" suspension: the distinction
was dropped in favour of 'indefinite': Consejo de Estado, Dictamen 52.269/MM p.14 cited
Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.344.
22 Article 10.1, RDL1302/1986. It is extremely positive that the regulation includes both
physical and biological restoration (Article 29.1). Unfortunately, the regulation fails to
indicate which authority, environmental or substantive, prescribes these, giving rise to some
uncertainty regarding this crucial point; compare Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.345 and Rosa Moreno,
1993, p. 300-301.
22 Of 50,000 pesetas each, although the Government had proposed fines of up to 15 million
ptas: the Consejo de Estado viewed this as not within the ambit of the Directive: Dictamen
49.291/FF, p. 22; cited Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.347.
24 See also articles 96 - 100 LRJPAC.
25 Vexatious Activities, Article 38 provides for fines, close or cessation of the activity,
revoking the licence which the Gobernador Civil of the province imposes when the amount is
too high for the mayor to impose, fines imposed by local mayors (up to 100,000 ptas) provincial
governors (up to 250,000 ptas, Industry Ministry (fines over 250,000 ptas). In the event of
repeated offences the facility in question may be closed down by the authorities.26^ Article 12 of Ley 38/1972, RD 833/1975.
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Were these to be used, they would provide a cost-effective and, above all, speedy way to
deal with many environmental problems. Unfortunately, they are rarely used in practice27.
This is in part due to administrative passivity. As seen, the Administration rarely monitors
compliance with requirements of environmental rules; it follows logically that it rarely
imposes administrative sanctions for infractions noted during the process of monitoring.
Reluctance to use administrative sanctions is also attributable to a more technical
difficulty: the legal principle non bis in idem, as embodied in Article 133 LRJPAC28, impedes
the duality of administrative and penal sanctions29. (Both administrative and penal sanctions
are however compatible with civil liability30.) The Constitutional Court has ruled that the
administrative jurisdictions are subordinate to the penal33. In other words, where the
possibility arises that the facts/situation can be considered a crime under the Penal Code, the
administration must communicate this to the penal judge and cannot act until the penal judge
has pronounced on the matter32.
A sizeable problem is posed, even where the Administration might discover the infraction
and wish to impose an administrative sanction. Since the principal provision of the Penal
Code33 is very widely constructed, administrative sanctions are avoided for fear that they
l' See below.
28 LRJPAC Article 133: "Concurrent sanctions. Those facts which have been sanctioned
criminally or administratively, in cases in which the subject, facts and basis are deemed
identical, cannot be sanctioned."
LRJPAC Article 137.2: "Those facts declared proven by firm judicial penal resolutions
shall bind the public authorities with respect to sanctioning procedures that they
substantiate."
29 The Constitutional Court has ruled (STC 77/1983, 3 October) that the same facts cannot
give rise to both administrative and penal sanctions; comments in DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, pp.34-35.
See further, Trayter Jimenez's comments on the potential unconstitutionality of Article
41, Vexatious Activities Regulation (adopted prior to the Constitution) which permits double
sanctions (administrative and penal) for the same illicit facts; p.560.
30 Rodriguez Ramos, p.78.
31 STC 77/1983,3 October.
32 SSTS 23 December 1959; 23 May 1986; see Trayter Jimenez, p.577; Jordano Fraga, p.468.
Furthermore, the Administration must respect the facts as accepted by the criminal courts; STC
20 January 1987, Ar.256.
33 See below, point 5.1, Article 347-bis: delito ecologico.
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would then be paralysed 'in eternum' in favour of criminal procedures34. A potentially swift
and efficient remedy yields few results in practice35.
3. Administrative disputes (Contencioso Administrative)):
Judicial experience with EIA-related cases is minimal:
...on the one hand, still judicial practice with respect (to EIA) is lacking in our country and, on the
other, the jurisdictional control of Declarations of impact stirs up a series of material and formal
obstacles tnat stem either from the nature of the administrative act of evaluation itself or from the
diffuse character that environmental interests represent35.
Although these obstacles do not discriminate against Community law particularly, judicial
enforcement of Community (and national) norms is not always adequate. A judge can annul the
administrative act, although he cannot substitute his own act and decide "where a road should
pass, or'a nuclear station, or a waste treatment plant"37. Without going this far, the judge is
able to take measures to rectify a harmful situation, for example, to modify the prescriptions
imposed on the functioning of an installation. Formal difficulties are examined below.
What can be challenged: Challenges before the administrative judge are likely to involve
a formal irregularity in the authorisation, violation of urban planning rules35, or the legality
of the activity itself. EIA legislation provides that the Environmental Declaration has the
"same value as the authorisation"39, and therefore the Declaration alone could be challenged
by those prejudiced by it40 (although it would normally be challenged with the authorisation
incorporating it). Concerning the stringency of imposed conditions, it is recalled that although
34 Trayter Jimenez, p. 578.
35 de Vega Ruiz, 1994, p.134.
36 Rosa Moreno, 1993, pp.301-302.
37 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p. 167.
35 Which presents advantages concerning standing.
39 RD1131, Article 27.
40 martin mateo, 1-1991, p.331; in Aragon this is expressly provided for: Decreto
118/1989, Article 8: The declaration of environmental impact shall be reviewable in
administrative courts, either through challenge to the act of decision or authorisation in which
it is integrated, or directly when the declaration is itself the act of decision.
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the administrative use of discretion is subject to judicial control, materially it is difficult to
challenge an authorisation on the grounds that the conditions imposed were inappropriate4*.
3.1. Locus standi:
Restricted access to justice for the defence of collective interests due to procedural
inflexibility42 is a serious problem of judicial protection of environmental norms before
administrative (and civil) courts. Familiarity with the debated terms is useful to
understanding the problems of establishing locus standi.
- Right: Constitution Article 24.I43 expressly states that all persons have the
right to obtain effective control by the courts of the exercise of their rights and legitimate
interests. In no case is the inability to defend these rights (indefension) acceptable. Article 45,
as seen, refers also to a "right to an adequate environment", and it may therefore seem that a
collective 'right' should be enforceable before the courts. In fact, in justifying the applicant's
standing in a much celebrated case, the TS appeared to try to link standing more closely to
Article 45 of the ConstitutiorT^although this is far from a direct application of that articie)44.
41 Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.303; MartInMateo, 1-1991, p.332.
42 Bano Leon, 1996, p.627; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.629.
43 Constitution 1978, Article 24.1: "All persons have the right to obtain effective control
by judges and courts in the exercise of their rights and legitimate interests, without, in any
instance the inability to defend these rights arising."
44 The case has been the subject of much commentary, (STS 25 April 1989, Ar.3233 ). The TS
overturned the decision of the Audiencia Territorial de Palma de Mallorca (Recurso 56/86, 24
December 1987) that had declared inadmissible, for lack of title, the application of Don
Gabriel P.S. challenging the municipality's accord concerning dumping of waste waters. The
health of the applicant's family had been affected by the latter.
Drawing a link with Article 45, the TS stated that, "since Article 45 of the Constitution
confers upon 'all' the right to enjoy an environment adequate for the development of the
individual, establishing, further, the duty of public powers to protect, defend and restore the
environment, to deny the legitimation of don Gabriel P.S. is to deny the obvious. ...those
precepts contained in the third chapter, Title 1 of the Constitution, despite their lying beneath
the rubric of 'guiding principles of social and economic policy' do not constitute mere
programmatical norms whose effectiveness is limited to the field of political rhetoric and
useless semantics, proper to demogogical affirmations..." (fundamenta de derecho tercero,
emphasis in original).
The TS found that the applicant clearly had standing and overturned the earlier
sentence. Perceptively, Bano Leon (op.cit., pp.617-18) has commented that the applicant in this
case easily had standing under traditional criteria: the applicant was a resident of the
municipality (Ley Basica estatal de Regimen Local, 2 April 1985, Article 26 entitles residents
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However the Constitutional Court has held that the catalogue of fundamental rights includes
only those in Section 1 Chapter II48, of the Constitution48, which are individual and
anthropocentric47. Therefore, although the TS frequently refers to a 'right to environment'4®,
this is generally in obiter dicta: its decisions are limited to applying positive law. Use has
been made of other Constitutional articles that have indirectly addressed environmental
problems, yet these imaginative solutions are only applicable where such individual rights
such as privacy, liberty and security are concerned4^.
to dema,nd services of sewage); the dumping by the administration affected his individual
interests (the hygienic situation of his family); the fact that the disturbance caused to the
applicant was "modest" does not disturb his legal title. Nevertheless, the Audiencia
Territorial had considered his application inadmissible; it is therefore still more notable that
in reversing the lower court's decision, the TS does not discuss the traditional bases of legal
title. Rather, it refers to Article 45 and 'right to an adequate environment' (although it does
reinforce this subsequently by discussing rights of neighbours as provided in the LBRL). At the
least, the judgment is a reminder to the courts that the Constitutional reference to environment
must be seriously considered in the issues they are called upon to resolve.
45 De los derecho fundamentales y de las libertades publicas; Of fundamental rights and
public liberties.
6 STC 161/1987, 27 October; see also Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.629; Jordano Fraga, p.472.
47 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.144-45.
48 SSTS 16 October 1978, 30 April 1979; Martin Mateo, "Jurisprudencia ambiental del
Tribunal Supremo espahol des el cambio politico," 108 (1985) Revista de Administracion Publica
187; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.153.
49 For example, as relied upon in a national case exhausting local remedies prior to Lopez
Ostra v. Spain (41/1993/436/515), before the ECHR. Furthermore, a restrictive approach has
been taken to the special procedure for providing accelerated defense of fundamental rights (in
Ley 62/1978), to both admissibility and object of the action; Bano Leon, 1996, p.625.
Various fundamental rights protected by the Constitution (as translated by the ECHR)
were relied upon:
Article 15: "Everyone shall have the right to life and to physical and psychological
integrity, without being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment
under any circumstances. The death penalty shall be abolished except where it is provided for
by military criminal law in time of war."
Article 17.1: Everyone has the right to liberty and security..."
Article 18.1"The right to honour and to private and family life and the right to control
use of one's likeness shall be protected. 2. The home shall be inviolable. It may not be entered or
searched without the consent of the person who lives there or a judicial decision, except in cases
of flagrant offences "
Article 19: Spanish citizens shall have the right to choose freely their place of
residence and to move around the national territory...."
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- legitimate interests: The idea of direct, personal interest511 as a requirement of
standing has ceded to the wider concept51 of legitimate interest5^, direct and possibly
indirect53. Legitimate interests that are protected by legislation can have a personal
character, or can be common. Common interest is composed of various individual interests. When
a member of a group supports a personal interest he simultaneously supports the interest of the
group54. With legitimate interests — even common — an individual element remains.
Insistence on the individual nature of the interests defended is the principal problem
surrounding legal title, although administrative courts are less strict than civil. To limit title
to those holding legitimate interests is still restrictive in an area such as the environment,
where collective interests predominate. Associations, better equipped to make claims than the
individual55, do at times face problems establishing legitimate interest. It would perhaps be
more helpful if, as in France, legally registered associations were allowed to defend the
interests listed in their founding statute56. Nevertheless, restriction of standing to those
demonstrating legitimate interests cannot be judged inadequate from the EC perspective, since
5U Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo, Article 23: "intereses legttimos, personates y
directosSTC 14 February 1983. This consisted of the personal utility that the applicant had
in obtaining his claim, the benefit he received or harm he ceased to suffer (which could be
putative; STC 1 September 1988) by the annulment of the act (SSTC 27 February 1980; 11 June
1982; 10 May 1983; 10 February 1987; also, direct interest is derived by the fact that the
relationship of the actor to the challenged act or disposition is not distant, derived, or indirect:
STC 22 October 1966). Interest can be moral or material (STC 11 October 1976), but simple
interest in legality is insufficient (Rosa moreno, 1993, p.305; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.190-95;
Manzana Laguarda, 1991, p.4703,4713).
51 Manzana Laguarda, 1994, p.10732.
rz See Ley Organica del Poder Judicial, Article 7.3, below; Manzana Laguarda, 1991,
p.4709.
53 STC 62/1983,11 July, STC 60/1982, 11 October; see also STC 257/1988 22 December; STC
93/1990, 23 May.
54 "... those in which the satisfaction of the common interest is the manner to satisfy all
and each one of those composing the society, therefore it can be affirmed that when one member
of the society defends a common interest, he defends simultaneously a personal interest that
may or may not be direct..."; STC 62/1983 11 July; see also Manzana Laguarda, 1991, p.4709, and
1994, p.10732; rosa moreno, 1993, p.307.
Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.305; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.190; Manzana Laguarda, 1991,
p.4713.
56 Perhaps with conditions regarding the length of time they have been in operation,
geographic area; see Chapter 6. point 2.4.
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the EC also remains attached to an 'individual' element of interest (as in Article 173 EC); and
has also refused to extend legal title to include interests of a less individual nature57.
- 'Diffuse' or collective interests (intereses difusos): The concept of 'diffuse'
interest (and the possibility of 'popular action') is especially current in academic commentary
on judicial protection of the environment. Diffuse interests possess various characteristics. Not
to be confused with common interests, they are more than a sum of identifiable individual
interests55; a new collective dimension is added, transcending the individual. Above all,
procedural difficulty in their defence is a characteristic: most ordinary judicial channels are
not available for their protection59. In fact, the concept of diffuse interests
is perhaps no more than a tool that will disappear once it accomplishes its function of sounding the
alarm before the legislative and judicial lack of protection in which certain juridical materials of
supreme social interest find themselves6®.
The concept is secure for the present, despite the existence of legislative foundations
(besides Article 9.2 of the Constitution61) for wider protection of diffuse interests, specifically
mentioning the ability to invoke 'collective' interests67. This would require legislative
57 See Chapter 3, point 2.1. Practical Illustration; see also Case T-219/95R Danielsson and
others v Commission, 1995 ECR 11-3051; Case C-131 Arnaud and others v Council 1993 ECR I-
2573; Case T-475 Buralux and others v Council, decision of 17 May 1994 (appeal rejected); Case
T-117/94 Rovigo v Commission 1995 ECR 11-455 (appeal C-142/95).
55 Individual, subjective rights are not at issue; the problems surrounding diffuse interests
would disappear if subjective rights could be invoked.
59 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.183-85; Rosa Moreno, 1993, pp.304- 307; Moreno Trujillo,
E., 1991, pp.283-85; Gil-Robles, p.171.
60 Almagro, Proteccion procesal de los intereses difusos, cited MartIn Mateo, 1-1991,
pl84.
b 1 Constitution, Article 9.2: "It is for the public powers to promote conditions so that
liberty and equality of the individual and of the groups in which [the individual] belongs are
real and effective, to remove the obstacles that impede or make difficult its fullness and to
facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social life".
Article 9.2 is not insisted on here as a foundation for the protection of diffuse interests
because the reference to 'groups in which the individual belongs' can easily be considered to
refer to the concept of common interests, above.
67 For instance, Ley Organica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ): Ley 6/1985) Article 7.3 disposes:
"The Courts and tribunals shall protect rights and legitimate interests, both individual and
collective... For the defense of the latter, shall be recognised the legitimation of corporations,
associations and groups that are affected or are legally entitled for their defense and
promotion." The legislator is to define the rules for recognising this legitimation.
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development, which has since taken place for consumers63 but is still lacking regarding
environmental matters — "which is highly significant given the time that has passed"64.
'Popular action' (action popular), where title to act is conferred upon all those who hold
the right that is prejudiced (and is available in certain cases66, a fraction of which concern EIA
projects66), is again the subject of much national commentary as a potential channel through
which to defend diffuse interests67. It is not supported here since it is not available in other EC
Member States68 and is, at present, unrealistic given the general Spanish situation.
However, a variety of sound arguments69 support wider access to justice, particularly for
not-for-profit associations and groups7®. Considerable pressure for wider access to courts has
Also, the Constitutional Court, (referring to the constitutionality of an autonomous —
Pais Vasco — rule giving legal title to consumers associations), found that the extension of legal
title to (consumer) associations required a State law; STC 71/1982, 30 November.
63 Ley 26/1984,19 July, General para la defensa de los consumidores y usuarios.
64 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.191; see also, Real Ferrer, 1994, p.326, note 29.
66 Popular action has been made available sporadically before administrative courts, via
legislation on land use, historical sites, and coasts; Article 8.2 Ley 16/1985, 25 June Patrimonio
Historico Espanol; Article 109 Ley 22/1988, 28 June, Costas; Article 304, Ley del Suelo, RDL
1/1992, 26 June. See also accidn publica vecinal, Ley Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen Local.
66 For example, on grounds such as that the project's site was assigned another purpose in
urban plans, since the Land-Use Act (Ley del Suelo) allows for popular action, at which point,
possible problems could arise concerning such issues as being time-barred....
As for large combustion plants, the hope that popular action is available in cases of air
pollution appears mistaken: Although some argue that the Atmospheric protection rules (RD
833/1975, Article 16) pave the way for an accion popular, this is, in Martin Mateo's opinion,
deceptive: in reality the citizens role is reduced to denouncing violations or petitioning the
Administration for action; p.201; see also Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, pp.190, 194.
6^ Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.308; Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, pp.193-94; Bano Leon,
1996, p.615-16; Jordano Fraga, p.465; Real Ferrer, 1994, p. 325-36.
68 Kramer, JEL 1996, pp.13-14.
69 For instance, Sendra and Llobregat point out that, although included in Chapter III
title 1 of the Constitution, Article 45 states that "all" (todos) have a right and duty
(derechodeber), not only individuals with a personal juridico-material relation to a specific
Administrative act; Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, p.193-94. (Importantly for the
European dimension, unlike other rights in Chapter 1 of the Constitution, Article 45 does not
refer to Spaniards only -- presumably then this includes non-citizens).
Regarding EIA and challenged projects, garcia ureta (1994, p.315) points out that,
where more possibilities exist to analyse the project in previous stages, the less the likelihood
that the authorisation will be taken before the courts. See also Real Ferrer, pp.326-27, note 29.
70 MartIn mateo, 1-1991, p.186; Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, p.193-94.
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been applied, both by academics and the courts71. A general Environment Act ("la deseada"72)
dealing with such issues remains "often announced, often deferred."73
The Spanish situation illustrates the disarray of traditional legal systems before new non-
individualised rights and their consequent failure to adequately protect related interests. In
this case, the problem is not only one of legal adaptation; it appears also to contain an element
of political choice.
This leads one to think that the reasons for said negation are of a political order, and founded on
irrational fears. It should be recalled that injustice (in this case, not to accept the existence of the
right to enjoy an adequate environment) is always more de-stabilising than the hypothetical outsized
economic cost of living in compliance with the norms.74
Besides difficulties of access to justice, judicial disputes encounter various other obstacles,
the most intractable of these is probably the overall slowness of judicial machinery.
3.2. Interim Relief:
Interim measures are obtained only with difficulty. A case before the administrative
jurisdiction does not halt the effects of the contested act unless the court specifically so
decides73. Petitions for interim measures have been inadequately treated: common — even
general — practice has been to reject applications by using printed forms concerning general
points of doctrine in which only the dates of the application must be filled76. When not
71 Using an effet utile type argument, the TS has authorised a wide interpretation of the
concept of legal title in order that the judicial control and the prohibitions on the incapacity to
defend (indefension) stipulated in Constitution Article 24.1 be given effect; STS 24 June 1989.
A few cases and a growing body of doctrine gave consideration to participation in the
public consultation stage of EIA procedures in order to attribute legal standing in subsequent
litigation. The legislator explicitly ruled this out with the LRJPAC, which first, makes
abundantly clear that "appearing in the stage of public information does not authorise, of
itself, the condition of interest (Article 86.3)," and secondly reiterates the need for developing
legislation where diffuse interests are concerned (Article 31.2).
"...the desired one"; moreno trujillo, E., 1991, p.221.
73 Manzana Laguarda, 1991, p.4712. Many Spanish authors comment on its tardiness: see
for instance, Diez-Picazo Gimenez, p.449; Jordano Fraga, p.472, Rodriguez Ramos, p.83.
74 Jordano Fraga, p.472.
75 LRJPAC (1992), Article 111.1: "The commencement of any action, except in those cases
where a provision establishes the contrary, shall not suspend the execution of the challenged
act"; STC 22/1984,17 February.
76 Garcia de Enterria, La Batalla..., pp.162-63, 176.
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actually using printed forms, the decisions have often been reasoned with only vague standard
formula77.
Wide criteria, restrictive approach: The conditions for obtaining interim relief, in this
case, suspension, have been provided in the Law on administrative disputes ^(LJCA^ "A
suspension shall be accorded when the execution (of the act) would cause harm or damage that
is impossible or difficult to repair,"78 recalling the Community's criteria for proving urgency.
As a guideline this is obviously vague and wide. In applying it, courts7^ have tended to weigh
the interest of the applicant against the public interest proclaimed by the Administration, an
extremely subjective exercise, given that the Administration claims to act always in the public
interest8®.
Following from this, in practice a restrictive approach to granting suspensions has been
adopted81. Especially where an installation such as a large combustion plant is concerned, it
would be illusory to hope for effective control of environmental damage by obtaining interim
relief, given the relative weight of the public interests involved87 (keeping in mind that
energy production tends to be a more immediate, easily defined interest than concern for the
environment).
New criteria?: Off-handed practices (printed forms rejecting applications) have now been
denounced by a 1990 judgment of the TS, in many respects a leading case83. The High Authority
insists that a specific and reasoned reply is essential; without this the decision is arbitrary and
prohibited by Article 9.3 of the Constitution. The judgment also clearly espouses what is
Garcia de Enterria notes that this is perhaps born of the vagueness of Article 122 LJCA;
ibid., p. 163.
78 Article 122.2 LJCA: "The suspension shall be issued when the execution would cause
harm or prejudice that is impossible or difficult to repair."
'
Basing themselves upon the Exposicion de Motivos of the LJCA and Article 7 of Ley
62/1978, 26 December, on Jurisdictional Protection of Fundamental Rights; commentary, garcia
de Enterria, La Batalla..., pp.163,175.
80 Ibid., pp.163-65.
81 Garcia Ureta, 1994, p.319.
87 Bano Leon, 1996, pp.627-28.
83 Auto de la Sala 3.a del TS de 20 December 1990 (Seccion 5.a, ponente F. Gonzalez
Navarro) "the need to resort to judicial action in order to be recognised as being right should not
be a source of harm for the party who is right."
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arguably a general principle of law84: periculum in mora or as AG Tesauro has phrased it "the
need to have recourse to legal proceedings to enforce a right should not occasion damage to the
party in the right."88 Such criteria may be better adapted to environmental situations. Rather
than basing the decision on a balance of the public's against the applicant's interests, or the
possibility of harm that is impossible to repair, the TS states that the criterion should be that
of fumus boni iuris, the appearance of good law and the risk that judicial control of the issue
might be frustrated by the time the decision is handed down88. It insists on the appearance:
"[tjhis appearance, even being only that, is enough in an interim procedure to authorise the
provisional protection requested."87
A right to interim measures, based on Article 24 Constitution, is clearly established:
...but this Supreme Court must add that the narrow limits of Article 122 of the Law regulating this
jurisdiction must today be understood as widened by the express recognition of a right to effective
judicial control in the Constitution (article 24), a right which implies, among other things, the right to
an interim control...(emphasis in original)88.
Alluding to Community Law, the TS widens the possibilities of interim relief available from
suspension of the administrative act to "whatever measure is necessary to ensure the
effectiveness"89 of the judgment, including positive measures. Soon after this judgment, the
84 Accepted, for instance, by Italian and German jurisdictions.
This line of reasoning was previously discernable in SSTS 27 February 1990 (628/1988
Aranzadi 1523); 20 March 1990 (2580/1986 Aranzadi 2243); Garcia de enterria, La Batalla...,
pp.167-74.
88 Case C-213/89 R v Secretary for Transport, ex parte Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433, p. I-
2456, point 18.
86 See garcia de Enterria, La Batalla..., pp.172-180; Chinchilla Marin, pp.173-177.
Auto de la Sala 3.a del TS 20 December 1990 (Seccion 5.a, ponente F. Gonzalez
Navarro); see also STS 17 January 1991: "the appearance of good law must be the determining
basis in the ensemble of elements of interim measures".
vS STS 20 December 1990: "However this Supreme Court must add that the narrow limits
of Article 122 of the Law regulating this jurisdiction must be today considered to be widened by
the express recognition of the right to an effective judicial control in the Constitution itself
(article 24) which implied, among other things, the right to a preventive control."
89 STS 20 December 1990: "Our national law — and on the occasion of its inevitable
insertion in the Community system — harbours in its breast this right to preventive control, that
the latter inserts in the former. This, seen from the other side, signifies the duty that both the
Adminsitration and the Courts have to accord those preventive measures necessary to ensure
the full effectiveness of the final act (administrative resolution or, as it happens, judicial)."
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Superior Court of Justice90 of the Pais Vasco made the first known application of positive
interim measures. It imposed a certain conduct91, in a move judged to have "blown into the
air...old dogmas"9^, including the presumption of validity of administrative acts.
However, where the courts have tried to widen criteria for interim relief, the legislator
acts to restrict this trend: subsequently, the LRJPAC further elaborated criteria for suspension of
an administrative decision9^. Article lll9^~?5refhphasises a balance of interests — the public's
and possible third parties against the applicant's -- and the possibility of harm that is
difficult or impossible to repair as the criteria on which to base the decision. LRJPAC, Article
13695 does allow for consideration of the possibility that judicial control would be made
fruitless by the duration of the case — where this is foreseen in the norms regulating sanctions.
90 See appendix.
91 The inscription of the claimant company in a register of Societies of Regulatory
Inspection and Control, an inscription which the Administration had previously refused.
Auto de la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del
Pais vasco, 21 March 1991. Garcia de Enterria points out that "the automatic presumption of
validity from which administrative acts benefitted, even those purely presumed by silence,
without the possibility for judges to ask explanations on the significance of these acts in a case,
however enigmatic or arbitrary they seemed, the limitation of the action to the judgment on a
matter already concluded and not on a living behaviour, that continues and is still relevant once
the proceedings have commenced; all of these old dogmas have been blown into the
air...because of a rigorous and strict application of th? norm specifically applicable in the
situation, Article 24 of the Constitution"; Garcia de Enterria, La Batalla..., pp.213-17.
Q O 1 *
Apparently applicable also to applications during the administrative appeal, prior to
the judicial phase; LRJPAC, Article 111.1 refers to "cualquier recurso", any recourse. See also
Sanchez Moron, 1993, p. 334.
94 LRJPAC, Article 111.2. "Notwithstanding that disposed in the previous paragraph,
the organ competent to resolve the recourse, after consideration, sufficiently reasoned, of the
prejudice that the suspension would cause to the public interest or to third parties and the harm
cause to the applicant as a consequences of the immediate effect of the challenged act, can
suspend of its own initiative or at the request of an applicant, the execution of the challenged
act, when certain of the following circumstances are present: a) that the execution could cause
harm impossible or difficult to repair, b) that the challenge is founded on any of the causes of
full nullity foreseen in Article 62.1 of this Law."
The causes of full nullity (nulidad pleno) foreseen in Article 62.1 LRJPAC, includes
violation of rights and liberties protected by the Constitution, those dictated by an incompetent
organ, exces de pouvoir, of impossible content, that constitute a penal infraction or are a
consequence of one, or dispensing with established legal procedure (for example, authorisation
given without a Declaration of impact)
95 LRJPAC, Article 136: "Measures of a provisional character: When this is foreseen in the
norms that regulate the sanctioning procedures, measures of a provisional nature can be issued
after a reasoned agreement in order to ensure the effectiveness of the final resolution that could
be issued."
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An area of uncertainty is created — will this factor be systematically considered, as implied by
the judgment, or only in cases where rules specifically mention this, as provided in the
LRJPAC? While the rule does not target environmental interests, the use that can be made of it
in environmental situations can be extremely problematic98.
More positively, the LRJPAC maintains that rejection of an application for suspension must
be sufficiently reasoned. Also, an "immensely important"97 inclusion is made that could help
prod the authorities to act, at least regarding interim measures: if, thirty days after the
request for suspension has been delivered to the competent body, the latter has not dictated an
express resolution, the challenged act is to be understood to be suspended, without need for
requesting further certification98.
Nonetheless, in practice, obtaining interim relief remains 'a battle'99, in which judges
have proven to be more useful allies than the legislator1®0. It remains that, in given instances,
where European environmental rules require the protection of such measures their purpose may
not be attained.
3.3. Need for an Administrative act:
This procedural issue has unfortunate consequences where environmental interests are at
stake, making it difficult to combat the Administration's passivity in matters of, for instance,
monitoring imposed conditions (such as required by LCP88/609101 and in the national
transposition of EIA85/337). An action before administrative courts must commence with a
96 Another restrictive inclusion is that an "injunction of the injunction" is available:
LRJPAC, Article 111.3: "When drawing up the suspension those precautionary measures that
may be necessary to ensure the protection of the public interest and the effectiveness of the
challenged resolution can be adopted". Similarly, see Article 138.3 LRJPAC. For critical
commentary, see Chinchilla Marin, p. 181.
97 Sanchez Moron, 1993, p. 335; Chinchilla Marin, p.182.
98 LRJPAC, Article 111.4.
99 Cf: Garcia de Enterria, E., La batalla por las medidas cautelares: Derecho
Comunitario europeo y proceso contencioso-administrativo espaflol, Civitas, Madrid, 1992.
100 Chinchilla Marin, p.182.
101 LCP88/609, Article 31(1).
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specific administrative act102; the Administration's omissions are therefore inadequate to
commence an administrative court action, unless some sort of act is adopted103. As Martin Mateo
notes, "recourse to procedural devices of presumption of acts by way of interpreting silence
provide, without doubt, some relief but are not a satisfactory solution for situations that require
energetic and rapid responses..."104. If no notification is received from the Administration
within three months103 of the petition being lodged, it is esteemed to have received a negative
answer and recourse can be had to the courts108.
3.4. Duration of judicial action:
Article 24.2 of the Constitution requires that justice be available "without undue
delay"107. Yet typically the length of time necessary to obtain a judicial settlement in Spain is
so long that, as one source says, it "no longer has anything to do with efficient control". This
extremely serious difficulty103 can render the recourse to administrative judges meaningless. In
fact, the European Court of Human Rights has condemned Spain regarding the excessive length
of judicial action, because Spain's Constitutional Court found no violation of the Article 24
102 Similar problems have hindered enforcement actions at Community level, see Case T-
461/93 An Taisce, Chapter 3, footnote 124.
103 A third party can request the Administration to revise the conditions of authorisation
and to introduce stricter requirements (SSTS 17 December 1956; 22 November 1963; 9 December
1964). This may not motivate the Administration to act, and adds nothing to the quest for legal
standing; however, should the Administration fail to act, this administrative 'refusal' will
constitute the dismissal of a petition, providing an administrative act which can then be
challenged.
104 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.197-98; see also Rosa Moreno, 1993, p.296.
105 With in addition, twenty working days for "certification", which is "incomprehensibly
required even in the case of negative silence"; Garcia de Enterria, "Un Punto de vista...", p.208.
103 LRJPAC, Article 119.3: "After a period of three months from the commencement of the
extraordinary recourse of revision without there being adopted a resolution, shall be understood
as dismissed, and expedited the passage to the administrative dispute jurisdiction".
The LRJPAC has shortened the waiting period: before the LRJPAC, the Administration
had three months in which to respond to a petition. After this time expired the period for a
denunciation of the delay (denuncia de mora) began to run; only after another three months did
the Administration's silence have procedural meaning; Article 94 Ley de Procedimiento
Administrativo. See Navarro Mendizabal, p.481, citing Sosa Wagner; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991,
p.200 note 216.
107 Constitution, Article 24.2: "Thus, all have the right to ... a public process without
unnecessary delay...".
108 Bano Leon, 1996, p.627; see also Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, p.190.
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requirement in a case that took five years and two months to resolve10^. (This is of course, more
frustrating since interim measures are difficult to obtain.)
First, before a matter can be brought before a court (not to mention the slowing effect of the
courts' caseload once it gets there) enforcement actions are hindered by delays. The requirement
to appeal first within the administration is, by contrast with France and most other Member
States, not optional1^. This has been very harshly criticised4!! for impeding access to courts
for four months, at which time the administrative act has possibly exhausted its effects, and
practically making a request for interim measures pointless. Arguably, where the application
of Community law is adversely affected, such a rule must be set aside, as per Simmenthafi^
and Factortame!!^. Furthermore, the period before action was time-barred was extremely short
(fifteen days) and failure to apply within this time also ruled out subsequent recourse before an
administrative judge, since this was a required first step114; to challenge an administrative act
required hawk-like vigilance. The LRJPAC has somewhat modified the requirement of prior
administrative appeal (it is no longer obligatory in all cases, the time-bar for appeal has been
Union Alimentaria Sanders, S.A., 7 July 1989. The ECHR, Article 6, refers to a
reasonable time period for judicial action.
!!° The Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo of 1958 required this systematically. See
comments Manzana Laguarda, 1991, p.4702; Sanchez Moron, M., "Recursos Administrativos," in
La Nueva Ley de Regimen Juridico de las Administraciones publicas y del Procedimiento
Administrativo Comun, editors Leguina Villa, J., and Sanchez Moron, M., Editorial Tecnos,
Madrid 1993, pp.322, 336.
!!1 Notably by respected jurist Garcia de Enterria, who points out that, particularly in
light of Articles 24 and 106.1 of the Constitution, the Administration is thus given an
illegitimate advantage; Garcia de Enterria, "Un Punto de vista...", pp. 209-10.
LRJPAC Articles 107 and 109 make exceptions for certain acts, for example against
which no hierarchical superior exists (Article 109 c). Ministries, such as the Secretary of State.
See Sanchez Moron, 1993, p.340.
!!2 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 1978 ECR 629,
para. 24 "...a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply
provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary
refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if
adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting
aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means."
!!3 Case C-213/89 R v Secretary for Transport, ex parte Factortame 1990 ECR 1-2433 at
para.23; the obligation to set aside obstacles to the exercise of Community rights applies to
other areas as well, and arguably its potential in certain circumstances remains untested. For
instance, with regard to time limits, see Case C-208/90 Emmott 1991 3 CMLR 894, para. 24.
!!4 Sanchez Moron, 1993, pp. 321-22.
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lengthened to one month**5), yet where required, it continues to constitute an unfortunate loss of
time*16.
Secondly, while delay might be due to neutral issues surrounding an excessive case-load and
the requirement of prior administrative appeal, it is apparently not uncommon for the
Administration to use the well-known problem of extremely slow justice to its advantage in
order to come to some arrangementwith the complainant:
...which throws upon those administrated the tremendous burden of judicial challenge, the end of
which is delayed for four, or seven, or ten years. This abuse is each time more frequent, it must be
said and we all know it. With a certain habit, the Administration says to the affected [complainant]
that it is possible that they are right, and even that they are right (which is an expression of
cynicism, if not of that virtually unapplied offence that prevarication constitutes), but that it will be
many years before the courts recognise it, which is why [the complainant] would do better to come to
some agreement with the Administration...**7
Applicants must be truly fearless, under such circumstance, to take on the Administration.
Garcia de Enterria makes the essential point that, more and more frequently, would-be
applicants dismiss the idea of judicial challenge as futile because of the duration of the case,
and this social cost is never accounted for in evaluating the judicial system. A problem which
may have arisen because of neutral factors, is used in a manner detrimental to environmental
interests. In such a situation, the Commission's reliance upon individuals to have recourse to
national judges to uphold Community law is unrealistic in practice.
By contrast with the length of time a matter takes once before a court, a short time-bar is
provided for judicial recourse (one month)**8.
3.5. Administrative Responsibility:
Article 139 LRJPAC**^ outlines the principles of responsibility, stipulating that
individuals have the right to be compensated by the public authorities for any harm done to a
115 LRJPAC, Article 114.2.
**6 LRJPAC, Article 117, gives the Administration three months to resolve the issue.
117 Garcia de Enterria, La Batalla..., p.166.
**8 Manzana Laguarda, 1991, p.4702.
**9 LRJPAC Article 139: "Principles of responsability. 1. individuals shall have the right
to be compensated by the corresponding public administration for all harm they suffer in any of
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goods or rights, if the damage was due to the normal or abnormal functioning of public
services12®. Where the administration is found responsible, liability is strict121. Where
various administrative actors are responsible, responsibility is joint-and-several122.
Concerning administrative responsibility123, harm must be individualised and 'economically
calculable', the type of procedural requirement that is always a stumbling block in
environmental protection124.
An ambiguous situation arises where, by act or omission, the Administration has
contributed to environmental harm. As seen, administrative authorisation does not shield from
responsibility. However, it is logical to assume the Administration is also at fault where harm
occurs as a result of an authorised activity123. Ruis Balle makes a valid point that, on the one
hand:
...if it is essential that the prejudiced third party have the right to be compensated in all cases of harm
to his property, on the other hand, it does not seem just that the polluting agent assume, without more,
the totality of the responsibility derived from the harm when he could have acted in good faith, in
strict compliance with the law and regulations applicable to the industrial activity and having all
the required administrative authorisations12^1.
Arguments for sharing responsibility between Administration and polluter are all the more
logical because, where the operator was authorised, often pollution could have been avoided
had the Administration monitored the functioning of the installation and revised
administrative conditions accordingly.
their goods and rights, except in those cases of force majeur, provided that the harm is the
consequence of the functioning, normal or abnormal, of the public services."
120 pUbijc authoritiy determines the amount, which can be judicially reviewed; cf
Article 130.2 LRJPAC.
121 Article 40 Ley de Regimen Juridico de la Adminsitracion del Estado; Article 45 de la
Ley de Regimen Local.
122 LRJPAC Article 140.
123 LRJPAC Article 139.2: "In any case, the alleged harm must be actual, economically
calculable, and individualised with relation to a person or group of persons."
124 Furthermore, in EIA-related cases, theoretically both the environmental and the
substantive authorities participate in the calculation of damages (GARCIA URETA, 1994, p.260,
264) with all the problems of lack of real autonomy and conflict of interest that this implies.
125 And where the harmful activity is covered by EIA legislation, under national EIA
rules, the Administration has a duty of vigilance.
126 Ruis Balle, p.488; also Beltran Aguirre, pp.297-98.
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Indeed, it seems untenable that the Administration should 'benefit' from its failure to carry
out its legal duty of vigilance by not having to participate in compensation. Furthermore, one of
the most intractable failures of environmental protection would be addressed if the
Administration were simply to carry out its duty of vigilance. Shared responsibility would be a
valuable incentive for the Administration to do so*27.
On the other hand, the Commission has indicated that, where the activity was
authorised, it favoured holding the Administration (and ultimately the taxpayer)
responsible*2®. It is argued here that exonerating the polluter completely might encourage a
certain measure of carelessness on his part once authorisations had been complied with*25*.
3.6. Summary:
Incremental improvements*30 have been made and an apparent willingness exists on the
part of administrative judges, once a matter is before them, to interpret in order to give meaning
to the rules (for example, in matters of interim relief*3*, standing*32). Nonetheless, the
problems of standing and, above all, the intimidating effect of delays in obtaining justice, and
the Administration's willingness to use this to its advantage mean simply that, frequently a
proceeding is abandoned before a judge examines the merits. Administrative judicial control is
often an inadequate means to uphold environmental rules.
*2/ Indeed, a recent ruling by the Tribunal Supremo seems to open the way for co-
responsibility of the Administration, at least where express fault of the Administration is an
issue; see Practical Illustration, below.
*28 Com(93)47, point 2.1.5. ii, p.9.
*29 See Chapter 6, point 3.5. at Administrative authorisation.
*30 E.g., shortening the period of delay before the administration's inaction can be brought
before the courts.
*3* Above, point 3.2. at New criteria?: and e.g. the Superior Court of Justice of the Pais
Vasco footnote 92, above.
*32 STS 25 April 1989, footnote 44, above.
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4. Civil Procedures:
One methodological difficulty that colours the outcome of research is that environmental
disputes are relatively rare133.
4.1. Diffuse interests:
Despite the protection of legitimate interests134 and the interpretative efforts of the courts
to keep up with the rhythm of society133, the legislative void concerning representation of
collective interests has not been covered by jurisprudential constructions133. In the Spanish
civil context, even more so than administrative, this protection is inadequate137. As in France,
collective environmental harm can be protected only insofar as it happens to coincide with
individual interests; no civil case-law exists concerning defence of collective interests
independently of property or person138. The defence of "diffuse" interests would require that
traditional criteria for standing be abandoned; neither the Codigo Civil nor the Law on Civil
Procedure139 have done so140. Again, it is hoped that the awaited general law on the
environment will develop the representation of collective interests141, perhaps for certain
accredited groups.
133 Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p.218; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.98.
134 Article 24, Constitution; Article 7.3 LOPJ: "The courts shall protect rights and
legitimate interests, individual as well as collective, so that in no case inability to defend
these arises. For the defense of the latter, the legitimation of corporations, associations and
groups that are affected or are legally entitled to for their defense and promotion shall be
recognised."
135 Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.642; Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p. 199,201; MartIn Mateo, I-
1991, p.193.
133 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.190; Diez-Picazo Gimenez, pp.449-51.
137 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.98; Gil-Robles, pp.168-69; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.177-78;
moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p.202-203; Also recognised by the Jueces, Fiscales y Abogados del
Estado, who proposed that the inadequacy lead to interpretations less "entorpecedoras" of
access to Courts, in the Conclusiones de las Jornadas Sobre Medio Ambiente, Poder Judicial no.4
special; cited by moreno trujillo, E., 1991, p.292; this hope remains unfulfilled at present.
138 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.98.
139 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.
140 Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p.285.
141 In Spain, a good deal of commentary exists regarding the possibility of developing some
form of 'popular action'. It is noted that, in other national contexts (E.g. the United States) the
possibility to bring a class action has been raised, in which a representative acts on behalf of a
collectivity, the members of which have been affected by an identical harm and where the
causal link is the also same. In the Spanish context it often argued that this type of action could
be adapted to protect diffuse environmental interests. Nonetheless in Spain, class action — or
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Were EC legislation to require that Member States provide access to justice for "common
interest groups or associations which have as their object the protection of nature and the
environment"142, it might force Spain to accept a wider legitimation of collective interests in
specific sectors. Nonetheless, at present, in this context, the focus has not strayed from the
individual143 and the issues and cases examined here reflect this.
4.2. Interim Measures:
Certain civil remedies can be preventive and obtaining interim relief becomes relevant.
Opting for a periculum in mora criterion, Article 1428 of the Law on Civil Procedure authorises
the adoption of "whatever measures are necessary to ascertain the effectiveness of the
ruling"144. Unfortunately in civil jurisdictions the problem of cost makes interim measures
unlikely to be obtained143: a down-payment is required in order to obtain interim measures (a
cross undertaking in damages), amounting to some percentage of the value of the harm that the
interim measure could cause to the defendant146. Without openly discriminating, the rule
nevertheless has unfortunate consequences where poorly funded associations apply for interim
relief: the larger the industrial or commercial project or interest, the less likely that the
environmental applicant in any given case will be able to afford these.
some form of 'popular action' -- though widely called for, is not yet widely available;
Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.98; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.645-46; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.178-
79; Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, pp.286-93, p.289 note 119.
142 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damage caused by
waste, OJ 1991 C192/6.
143 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, pp.177-78; Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, pp.282-93; Diez-Picazo
Gimenez, pp.449-50; Jordano Fraga, p.468; Rosa moreno, 1993, p.305.
144 "...que fuesen necesarias para asegurar la efectividad de la Sentencia que en el juicio
recayere"-, see Garcia de enterria, La Batalla..., p.173-75. Although, apparently in practice
judges tend more to balance interests; Sendra and Llobregat, p. 197.
143 Sendra y Llobregat, p.197.
146 Recommendations have been put forth to exclude such a payment for certain applicants,
including environmental organisations.
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4.3. Insufficient time prescription:
The time-bar in civil actions is extremely short: one year 'from when the aggrieved
discovered the harm'14'7. Comparison with France (civil prescription is ten years148) would
seem to provide a justification for Community harmonisation in this area. When civil
responsibility emanates from an environmental offence condemned in a criminal court, the time
bar is fifteen years149; however, the one year time-bar applies when the criminal case had not
ended in a condemnation150.
In an effort to counteract the inadequate time-prescription, and with the support of
academic opinion, the courts have on occasion considered that time runs from the point at which
harm is fully verified151. A period of fifteen years has been suggested, since harm may
manifest itself after many years157.
4.4. Harm:
To be recoverable, damage must meet certain criteria, which themselves present obstacles
regarding environmental situations. As in France, harm must be individualised; once again,
many environmental cases cannot proceed beyond this point. It must also be certain153; problems
surrounding scientific certainty are well-known. Continuous damage can be compensated154. No
147 "...desde que lo supo (el daflo) el agraviado"; Civil Code: article 1968.2.
However, when inmissions cause cause harm to human health the action is
imprescriptible, since health is one of the imprescriptible goods or rights of personality;
Article 1902 Civil Code; STS 16 January 1989; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.88.
148 Chapter 6, point 3.
149 Civil Code Article 1964.
150 Jordano Fraga, pp.467-68.
151 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.100; for instance, Sentencia Audiencia Territorial de
Oviedo, 31 March 1987.
157 Jordano Fraga, p.472; see also Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.647.
153 Although this can include harm that is certain to occur in future; STS 16 January 1989:
the Court ordered the owner of steel works and a lime oven to pay compensation for the damage
that would be caused until the imposed corrective measures were verified.
Usually damage to mere expectations not recoverable in Spain; Blasco Esteve, 1996,
pp.638-39.^54 STS 5 April 1989.
376
reparation is available for pollution which is 'tolerable', implying no abuse or antisocial use of
a right1 55, a subjective criterion indeed.
4.5. Proof/Causation:
As always in environmental matters, causation is an issue that is technically complicated
to prove, given that damage can appear years after the causing event, can accumulate over
years, can have multiple authors156.... The Civil Code spells out clearly that the victim must
provide proof of the causal link, and the defendant shall bring forth those circumstances that
might break the link157. While inverting the burden of proof might advance environmental
claims, this would clash with the presumption of innocence in the Spanish Constitution158.
Moreno Trujillo argues that in almost all cases, the economic and financial inequality
between the polluter and the victim is flagrant, and the situation would be more equitable if
the causal link were proven by a Council of certification of damage159, as in Japan. Although
the point is certainly valid, it would require considerable political determination to create and
train such a body, and is perhaps not realistic at present.
However, the TS has shown itself to be lenient in considering the particularities of
environmental situations. Three elements can break the causal chain: caso fortuito and force
majeure; an act of a third party160; the guilt of the victim. These elements have been
interpreted restrictively161. Furthermore, it once appeared that the TS was immovable in
155 Article 7.2 Civil Code refers to abuse or antisocial use of a right; regarding that which
is tolerable see cabanillas sanchez, A., La Reparacion de los Daflos al Medio Ambiente,
Aranzadi editorial, Pamplona, 1996, pp.59,63, 79-80.
156 Which may of itself place strain on the causal link: STS 19 June 1980, a much criticised
ruling, which exonerated one defendant simply because it was deemed that others also
contributed to the harm; see cabanillas sanchez, 1996, p.84-86.
157 Article 1214 Codigo Civil.
158 Article 24.2, footnote 107, above. .
159 Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p.251, taking up the ideas of Despax, M., Droit de
I'environnement, Litec, Paris, 1980, who in turn bases the suggestion on Japanese experience.
160 Logically this provokes concurrent causes, and the burden of proof falls upon the
defendant, who is arguing a third party's responsibility; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.636.
161 For instance, with regard to force majeure: STS 14 February 1944; a power station argued
natural forces caused harm; the Court ruled that the power station, by extracting sands, had
weakened the natural defenses of the site.
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requiring a high standard of proof, i.e., "full certainty" (plena cerfeza)462; rulings were often
overturned on appeal, because the causal link was found to have not been proven with full
certainty4^, However, it has relaxed the full certainty requirement484, and seems now to
espouse a theory of adequate cause (causalidad adecuada)165:
the cause is that which, even with the concurrence of others, is the adequate and determining cause of
the harmful event, in relation to the circumstances of the case and common sense488.
More strikingly, in keeping with the tendency to objectivise responsibility, it has found
that the fact of an accident was sufficient to justify the conclusion thah^highlj^jaixjb^ly, the
defendant was negligent and this negligence caused the accid ; ipsa loquitur)^87. A
similar result as responsibility without fault has been produced. As Cabanillas Sanchez says,
the TS takes a "realistic" stance488; such recognition of the specific nature of environmental
problems is helpful in giving meaning to attempts to make the polluter pay for environmental
harm.
4.6. Responsibility:
A variety of issues arise regarding responsibility, whether this should be fault-based or
strict; whether, if proven, it should be joint or joint-and-several; what the Administration's
part in responsibility should be.
However, guilt of the victim has led to a reduction in compensation; for instance, STS 17
March 1981: the Tribunal Supremo held that although the dust from the nearby industry was
the cause, the compensation was reduced because the care taken by the farmer was below
average in matters of pruning trees and controlling insects.
482 Considered "indispensable": SSTS 28 June 1979; 29 June 1980.
163 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1996, p.84.
However, the TS has also held that determining the causal link is a matter exclusively
for the sentencing court's appreciation. STS 13 June 1988: "Once the muddying of the waters and
dumping of concrete or pollution is shown, the judge does not presume but rather affirms that
this is the cause of the trouts' deaths"; see Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.95; moreno trujillo,
E., 1991, p.250.
164 SSTS 30 December 1981; 14 July 1982.
165 moreno trujillo, E., 1991, pp.246-47; Blasco Esteve, 1996, pp.636-37; cabanillas
Sanchez, 1996, pp.85-86.
166 STS 14 July 1982; also STS 19 Dec 1992.
167 STS 31 January 1986; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.634; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.92.
168 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1996, p.88.
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Towards strict liability: Responsibility is essentially for culpa169, as indicated in Article
1902 of the Civil Code: "He who by action or omission causes harm to another, where fault or
negligence intervene, is obliged to repair the harm caused."170 The requirement of unlawfulness
(antijuridicidad) is essential for the existence of civil responsibility171, which poses problems
notably of proving fault or negligence (although at times strict liability is stipulated in
legislation172). Despite this, responsibility is steadily evolving towards a more objective
concept173.
Although the Civil Code remains based on the idea of fault, courts have "resorted to
multiple shadings and subterfuge in their understandable eagerness to protect those who suffer
harm from a distant source"17,1 so that remedy can be required for even lawful behaviour
causing harm. In keeping with the movement of social opinion and trends at Community-
level17^, both doctrine and jurisprudence increasingly tend to make the polluter pay for the
damage he causes. Unlawfulness is seen not only in illicit actions, but also in legal behaviours
169 Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.634-45; moreno trujillo, E., 1991, pp.200-201.
17(1 Original language version in appendix.
171 Cabanilla Sanchez, p.93; MORENO TRUJILLO, E., 1991, pp.203, 227.
172 E.g. in the nuclear domain (Ley de Responsabilidad civil en materia de energia nuclear,
29 April 1964) and in keeping with the Community rules, concerning toxic waste (Ley de
Residuos Toxicos y Peligrosos, 1 May 1986); Ley de Caza, Article 33.5
173 Such as that expressed in Article 1908.2 of the Civil Code: "Owners shall answer for
damage caused by... excessive fumes that are harmful to persons or property (however, Civil
Code Article 1908.1 and .4 do make reference to 'due diligence' and 'adequate precautions'). See
Moreno trujillo, E., 1991, pp.226-45; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.166-69; Cabanillas Sanchez,
p.90-92; Blasco Esteve, 1996, pp.634-36.
174 MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.169.
The reference to a distant source contrasts with responsibility towards one's neighbours,
as in Civil Code Article 590, which prohibits construction near a neighbour's or intervening
wall of such things as sewers, ovens, vapour-powered machines, factories that are dangerous or
noxious, without keeping within regulated distances. Faulting regulatory provisions, necessary
precautions, after expert opinion, must be taken "in order to avert all harm to the neighbouring
estates or buildings (a fin de evitar todo dano a las heredades o edificios vecinos) (emphasis
added). Articles 590 and 1908.2 facilitate strict liability in, for instance, industrial
neighbourhoods; MartIn Mateo, 1-1991, p.171; cabanillas sanchez, 1996, p.73. Pointedly
Moreno Trujillo comments that pollution is not a neighbourhood phenomenon; Moreno Trujillo,
E„ 1991, p.204.
175 Com(93))47, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, pp.17-19; also strict
liability is proposed in the directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste (OJ 1991
C192/6) and in the Directive on the Landfill of Waste, Article 14 (OJ 1991 C190/1). See also
Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, pp.238-245, who notes that culpa is more appropriately required in
criminal offences; cabanillas sanchez, 1996, pp.69-79.
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carried out withoutch^e^liligence176. Even if diligence has been exercised and harm occurs, the
assumption is that the diligence was insufficient: "mechanical compliance with the
regulations" is insufficient when "reality demonstrates that the adopted methods yielded no
result"177. The general principle alteram non laedere has been violated. Diligence must
measure up to the specific circumstances178. The TS has repeatedly ruled that:
"unlawfulness...is not eliminated with the supposition that an action is in conformity with the norms
but rather is included in the default to the general mandate of acting with diligence with respect to
nearby goods that are juridically protected... even in the cases where an industry functions
according to the precautions noted m the regulations, its exercise must maintain the respect due
another's property in such manner as to compensate abnormal harm caused from this lawful
exploitation. Thus, rather than on the unlawfulness of act, which is to a point not contrary to law,
the obligation to compensate is based on the requirement of commutative justice that he who has
defended his interest to the detriment of another s rights, although authorised, must compensate he
who had to endure the disturbance or lessening of his right to property179 .
In short, compliance with regulations does not shield from responsibility180. Licenses are
granted, without prejudice to third party rights181, and abuse or antisocial use of a right182
must be compensated183. Nor does the fact that an economic activity is pursued in favour of a
social interest constitute a viable defence: even such activities (referring expressly to a
thermoelectric plant, "notwithstanding its interest for the national economy") cannot be
allowed to harm or lessen rights of individuals without fair compensation184. Here the trend
towards objective responsibility is explicit: the TS refers to "compensation dispensing with all
1 Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991,232-34; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1996, pp.79-83.
177 STS 14 May 1963. See also SSTS 17 May 1981,16 January 1989.
178 STS 3 December 1987; Audiencia Provincial de Granada, 8 February 1990, and as a
rigourous application of Article 1104 Civil Code (extracontractual responsibility) suggests;
Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, pp.233-34.
Furthermore, the TS has ruled that the possible responsibility of the designer of
industrial installation, or the engineer in charge of materials does not rexclude the direct
responsibility of the owner of an installation; SSTS 23 June 1913, 27 October 1993; cabanillas
Sanchez, 1996, pp.94-96.
179 STS 17 May 1981. See moreno trujillo, E., 1991, p. 233-34; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.635;
Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.93; Ruiz Balle, p.487; see also STS 3 December 1987.
180 SSTS 22 November 1960; 18 January 1961; 14 May 1963; 19 February 1971; 22 December
1972; 12 December 1980; 27 September 1985; 3 December 1987; 19 June 1994.
181 Article 12, Reglamento de Servicios de la Corporaciones Locales, 17 June 1955
182 Article 7.2 Civil Code.
183 STS 16 January 1989; Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.635; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.90.
184 "...justo contravalor"; STS 12 December 1980; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.91; moreno
Trujillo, E., 1991, p.242.
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ideas of fault to treat responsibility with an objective note"188. Nonetheless, some courts limit
objectivisation to easing the burden of proof (above).
Mancomunicad or solidaria: If, as is common, there are multiple causes of damage, and if
the causal link is proven, the type of responsibility that should be attached must be decided:
joint (mancomunidad) or joint-and-several (solidaria). The issue has not been definitively
settled*86, although for reasons previously discussed, joint-and-several liability is generally
preferable from an environmental perspective187. Occasionally the legislator has resolved the
issue, and both Community and Spanish legislators have tended to opt for joint-and-several188.
Although case-law can be found espousing both, here also the courts tend to opt for the
environmental solution: more recent and numerous examples exist for joint-and-several189.
4.7. Other Remedies:
Genferally three types of remedy are available190. Much as in France, the remedy that is
least useful to the environment per se, compensation, is most relied upon. Prevention of damage
and rehabilitation are very much the exception.
185 STS 12 December 1980.
186 In Spain opinion has been divided as to which, joint or several, is the rule and which
the exception. It has been argued that Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code, which seem to
indicate that joint responsibility is the rule, apply only to contractual situations.
187 See Chapter 6, point 3.5. — Responsibility: Several or joint-and-several.
See also Moreno trujillo, e., 1991, p.215, taking up the arguments of de Angel Yagiiez;
Cabanillas Sanchez, 1996, p.90.
188 The Hunting Act, provides an interesting example. Article 33.5: "If the author of the
harm caused to persons is not noted, all the members of the hunting party shall respond jointly
and severally". And the Mining Act, Article 81: "Shall be responsible for the harm and
prejudices that are caused all holder or possessors of mining rights recognised in this law".
Other examples include: Urban Waste Ley 20/86, 14 May; Reglamento Montes, Decreto
485/1962, Article 15.1,15.2; Nuclear Ley 25/1964 29 April, Article 52.2; Nuclear Risks
regulation 2177/1967, 22 July, Article 20; see moreno trujillo, E., 1991, pp.222-23; Blasco
Esteve, 1996, p.647.
189 Mancomunidad was favoured in SSTS 23 March 1921; 21 June 1946; 19 February 1959.
Solidaria was favoured in: SSTS 23 December 1903, 2 March 1915; 25 March 1957; 20 May 1959
(pp.210) as well as in 24 December 1941; 14 February 1964; 20 May 1968; 26 October 1971; 15
October 1976; 8 May 1986. Doctrine on the issue is also divided; moreno trujillo, E., 1991,
pp.210, 216, 220; Blasco Esteve, 1996, pp. 632-33.
190 Obviously, the fact that where harm is not individualised, remedy is unavailable in
civil courts remains a sizeable problem.
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Compensation: Compensation is supposedly a remedy of 'last resort', used only when
reparation in natura and removal of the cause of harm are not possible191. However, costs and
interpretations of 'impossibility' are pivotal and compensation appears to remain the most
commonly used remedy. It has the inherent deficiency of being applicable only after damage
has occurred and of doing nothing practical to repair it192; familiar problems of attaching
economic value to the environment also arise.
Cessation of harmful activity, adoption of corrective measures: This is clearly provided in
some sectoral legislation192. Where the legislation has not so provided, it is harder to construe
from the Civil Code194 but courts have made considerable efforts to arrive at this result. In an
early case the TS held that the cessation of the activity was logical, given that it would be
paradoxical to order reparation in the form of compensation for a tolerable act; it has since
reiterated this reasoning195. The competence of civil courts to order corrective measures post
damnum has been specifically upheld196. The TS ruled that "the protection of civil
rights...must also be extended, once harm has occurred, to those measures of prevention that
reasonably impede further proprietary harm"197. Unlike in France, this is not perceived as an
191 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1996, p.103.
However, a section of doctrine insists that compensation alone is the purpose of civil
action; see comments Diez-Picazo Gimenez, p.450.
192 Bano Leon, 1996, p.628; Jordano Fraga, pp.179-208.
1 ?2 Ley de Aguas, 29/1985, 2 August, Article 45; Ley del Suelo, Article 236.
194 Blasco Esteve, 1996, p.641-42; however, Article 7.2 Civil Code, prohibiting abuse or
antisocial use of a right, can be useful.
195 g-pg 23 December 1952. In the same vein, see SSTS 5 April 1960; 14 May 1963 (in which
the question was raised for controlled activities, where the Administration has duty of
vigilance and a possible conflict of competence presents itself: the TS reiterated that it would
be paradoxical to order compensation for a tolerable act); STS 12 December 1980.
196 gjs 16 January 1989, with reference to "compensation for the harm and, where
appropriate, the adoption of measures to avoid and end it, both aspects within the competence
of civil jurisdictions."
197 Challenging the measures ordered by a civil court, the defendant argued that only the
Directorate of Mines was competent to order such measures; STS 5 April 1960; see also SSTS 3
December 1987; 16 January 1989.
This has occasionally been taken up by lower courts, e.g.: Audiencia Territorial Oviedo:
3 November 1978, specifically from an environmental viewpoint: "...such measures are fully
justified to obtain — within the technological awareness of the time — a diminution of the
environmental degradation and the harmful results that this produced in the property of
individuals." See Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, pp.270-75.
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invasion of the Administration's attributions, but rather as a logical consequence of a legal
claim against an unlawful act198. it is not unusual for civil courts to impose measures to prevent
damage from reoccurringl". Although civil courts cannot revise the granting of a licence, they
are required to intervene in those cases where imposed conditions are unfulfilled or
inadequate2®®.
The difficulty here is that such a remedy can be ordered to prevent further damage from
occurring, to prevent harm that is foreseeable on the basis of harm already produced. Some
damage must have already been sustained before this remedy can be requested. Moreover, as
with any risk, the risk of further disturbance must be proven before the judge objectively in
terms of probability.
- Action negatoria (the Spanish term is used as no English translation is
available): Preventive control becomes more important where an economic remedy is
irrelevaht2®!. This action, available to a proprietor to shield his property from disturbance,
appears to be little used in practice2®2. Originating in Roman Law, action negatoria was
played down during the expansion of industry, in favour of liability mechanisms more
favourable to owners of industrial resources (such as fault-based responsibility). However, as
other interests gain importance, the concept of action negitoria is enjoying a resurgence, at least
198 STS 14 May 1963.
As Cabanillas Sanchez mentions, it should not be seen as an invasion of the
administrative domain also because authorisations are accorded without prejudice to third
parties; cabanillas sanchez, 1996, p.lll.
It has also been established that the civil judge can revise the appraisal of interests
made by the Administration; STS 12 December 1980.
199 SSTS 17 March 1981, 23 September 1988; also STS 16 January 1989 (concerning
atmospheric pollution), compensation and preventive measures were ordered: "requiring in all
cases, the compensation of the harm, and where appropriate the adoption of measures to avoid
or end it, both aspects within the competence of the civil order of jurisdiction."
200 gyg 20 March 1989; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.90.
201 Navarro Mendizabal, 1996, p.479; Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.96.
202 MartIn mateo, 1-1991, p. 173; Coderch y Santdiumenge, "La accion negatoria:
Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 3 de dicienbre de 1987," 1988 Poder Judicial,
117, at p. 124 .
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in academic opinion203, and presents definite advantages where environmental interests are at
issue.
The aims of this action are twofold: first the cessation of the illegitimate disturbance204
and, secondly, abstention from the disturbing activity205. The differences between normal civil
action for cessation and action negatoria seem to be206 that while the former aims also at
compensation, action negatoria strives to prevent. Also, while the normal civil cessation action
is based only on existing harm, in keeping with the Preventive Principle action negatoria does
not require that a disturbance have caused harm, but rather that an illegitimate disturbance
exist202: "the danger of damage is in itself damage."203 The purpose of the action is "to avoid
that this harm be caused through the paralysis of activities that cause illegitimate
disturbance, potentially harmful to the environment."20^ Another significant advantage of
action negatoria is that the time prescription is much longer than usual: thirty years210.
Restoration of the site: Once damage has occurred, the most environmentally useful remedy
is that the responsible party "be obliged to repair the harm caused", as can be inferred from
Article 1902 of the Civil Code. Though theoretically possible, as in France it is not used in
practice211: issues of the cost or rehabilitation, or 'impossibility' consistently intervene.
203 Coderch y Santdiumenge, p.120. Also Catalunya has adopted a law: Ley 9 julio 1990, on
action negatoria, inmisiones servidumbres y relaciones de vecindad.
204 Disturbance must be of human origin, continuing, illegitimate.
205 Coderch y Santdiumenge, p.123-24.
206 Here it must be noted that while many authors cite the need not to confuse action
negatoria with the regular action for cessation in civil liability, few provide a clear account of
the difference between the two, and in fact are often content to cite each other. More usefully,
Coderch and Santdiumenge (p.123) indicate that "One must distinguish the action for cessation
from that of civil responsibility....While the former is directed at obtaining the contrarius
actus of the disturbance, this one is, by contrast, a compensatory action."
202 See Navarro Mendizabal, 1996, p.482; also Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.96.
208 Cabanillas Sanchez, 1990, p.96; Civil Code Article 590, establishing the possibility to
prevent the cause of harm, must be interpreted extensively in all its aspects.2°9 Conde Pumpido "La responsabilidad civil por danos al medio ambiente" cited Navarro
Mendizabal, 1996, p.482.
210 Since it falls within the ambit of Article 1963 Codigo Civil, as opposed to Article
1968.2 fixing the one-year limit; cabanillas sanchez, 1996, pp.117-18.
211 Blasco Esteve, 1996, p,640; Moreno trujillo, E., 1991, p.275.
Furthermore, the Constitutional court has recognised that, practically, restoration of a
site cannot always be complete and total; Sentencia TC 64/1982,4 November, concerning mining.
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Specifically the predominance of economic and industrial development over environmental
interest, despite the declarations of the Constitutional Court regarding the harmonious
conjunction of these, has not been altered in practice2*2. One small exception is that
rehabilitation was ordered for a contaminated well. Significantly this was more for the
environment as such than for the well's usefulness2*2.
Occasionally sectoral legislation provides for reparation in natura2*4. Often, however, a
loophole is left softening the obligation: for example, the phrase 'insofar as possible'2*5. A
similar tendency is visible at Community level, for instance in the extensive exception in the
proposed directive on civil liability for waste2*5. This provides that the plaintiff cannot seek
"reinstatement of the environment" where "the costs substantially exceed the benefit arising
for the environment from such reinstatement, and other alternative measures to the
reinstatement of the environment may be undertaken at a substantially lower cost." How to
measure the "benefit" to the environment, where "environment" is typically not attached a
market value, is unclear. The dissuasive role that a stronger obligation might have played is
abandoned.
4.8. Summary:
Within limits imposed mainly by the legislator, the TS has tried to ensure that civil
procedural rules offer meaningful protection where environmental issues are raised; lowering
the burden of proof; progressing towards more objective responsibility; addressing technical
issues such as those concerning the time-bar by taking a lenient view on when the time-bar
212 See, for instance, Moreno Trujillo, E., 1991, p.276.
212 "...be [the waters] or not drinkable, whether or not they are consumed in fact by the
personnel of the farm and the livestock of the applicant"; STS 23 September 1988.
2*4 Ley de Aguas 1985, Article 110; Ley de Costas 1988, Article 95; Ley Basica de residuos
toxicos y peligrosos, Article 19.1.
215 Ley 4/1989 27 Marzo, conservacion de Espacios naturales y de la Flora y la Fauna
Silvestres, Article 37.2; without prejudice to penal and administrative sanctions: infractor
shall repair harm caused or reparation insofar as possible.
216 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damage caused by
waste, OJ 1991 C192/6, Article 4(2) at C192/13.
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begins to run. Protection remains inadequate concerning collective interests. However, it appears
that, at least once a matter reaches the highest court, procedural problems are approached
with flexibility.
5. Criminal Procedures:
Dissatisfaction with the almost total lack of penal protection212 Gf the environment led to
the introduction in 1983 of an ecological offence (delito ecologico), Article 347-bis of the Penal
Code218. With this, a variety of conducts previously punishable only by administrative
sanctions could be prosecuted21^ including various infringements of obligations stemming from
Community environmental rules (although the Community cannot require criminal penalties,
these must be applied where similar infringements of national provisions would be criminally
sanctioned220). Still more recently, the Penal Code was modified221, and two new titles were
added: Title XVI on offences related to organisation of the territory and the protection of the
historical heritage and the environment222, and Title XVII of offences against collective
security223. The new provisions entered into force six months after publication22,1, on 25 May
1996. Offences committed prior to the date of publication are judged on the basis of Article 347-
212 Prior to the creation of Article 347-bis, dispersed provisions existed in the Penal Code
(for example, concerning fires). Exceptionally, other rules provide for criminal prosecution: for
example, Nuclear energy Act 25/1964, 29 April articles 84-90; Hunting Ley 1/1970, 4 April,
Articles 41-45; Fishing with explosives, Ley 31 December 1946.
218 In the section on "offences against public health and the environment" (De los delitos
contra la salud publica y el medio ambiente). Other articles were relevant to the environment,
e.g., Articles 507 on hunting and fishing; Articles 346, 347, 348-bis, on fires.2l^ de vega Ruiz, 1994, pp.19-20; Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, p.79; a few other offences could be
punished in criminal courts, including forest fires, nuclear risk and the violation of safety rules
of dangerous substances.
220 See Chapter 6, point 4.
221 By Ley Organica 10/95, 23 November.
222 Chapters III and IV specifically address offences against natural resources and the
environment and offences related to the protection of flora and fauna.
223 Titulos XVI De los delitos relativos a la ordenacidn del territorio y la proteccidn del
patrimonio historico y del medio ambiente and XVII De los delitos contra la seguridad
colectiva.
224 BOE 24 November 1995.
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bis223. in this section the earlier provision and experience with it are examined. The new
provisions are then discussed, although it is yet too early to judge their performance.
Experience of criminal courts with environmental cases is extremely limited. Regarding
Article 347-bis (ecological offence), from its entry into force in 1983 until 1995, three cases only
reached the Supreme Court226. Therefore, uncertainties left by the texts are frequently not
clarified through judicial interpretations. This scarcity of cases further suggests that, as in
France, a combination of factors marginalises recourse to criminal jurisdictions — uncertainties
surrounding ArticIe-347-bis itself, lack of forces to note infractions or to provide expert
testimony. Also, as Misol Sanchez notes, for a law to be effective, social awareness is needed:
this is a fundamental problem in the Spanish context, with the result that infringements, "even
the most serious, can remain practically unpunished"222.
Civil parties to penal prosecution: An initial point is that standing is not an issue in penal
prosecutions: a claim can be rejected by a criminal court only if the grounds for action do not
constitute a penal infraction228. By contrast with other jurisdictions, popular action is
expressly allowed in criminal prosecutions229, and it parallels that of the prosecuting
authorities.
Anyone who is criminally liable is also civilly liable28®, yet it long remained uncertain
whether associations could participate as civil parties23^. In 1993 the Tribunal Supremo, in
strong terms, allowed the legitimation of environmental associations as civil parties for
223 Seventh final disposition of LO 10/1995.
226 SSTS 30 November 1990, Ar. 9269; 11 March 1992, Ar.4319; 5 October 1993, Ar. 7694.
Examples of criminal cases based on other provisions have also reached the TS, for instance,
STS 1 April 1993, Ar. 9165, concerning a violation of the Hunting Act.
227 Misol Sanchez, p.586; see Introduction, point 5; Chapter 8, point 1.5.
228 Gil-Robles, p.170.
229 Articles 100 and 270 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal (LECrim); comments Gimeno
Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, pp.192-96.
230 Article 19, Penal Code; Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, pp.78-79.
231 SSTS 30 November 1990, Ar. 9269; 11 March 1992, Ar.4319; STS 5 October 1993, Ar. 7694
did not pronounce on the issue. Jordano Fraga, p.469, note 9.
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environmental 'goods'232. The case concerned a challenge, brought by FAPAS233, to the
decision of an Audiencia Provincial234 that absolved an infraction of the Hunting Act with
regard to the death of a brown bear. Annulling the ruling of the lower court, the TS stated that:
It cannot be understood that the accusation of FAPAS had not found legitimation to bring before the
Court the compensatory claim to which reference has been made. The death of the bear can give rise
to corresponding civil compensation... in the case studied, a juridical good has in effect been
sacrificed, not of one person but of concrete societies ... We find ourselves, therefore, before a good in
which the human collectivity finds itself interested. Civil liability can perfectly be postulated by
anyone of those exercising the criminal action233.
With this positive move236, the threat of civil liability for collective environmental harm is,
ironically, possibly more significant in criminal courts than in civil (although cost issues may
discourage participation232).
5.1. Article 347-bis (ecological offence):
Article 347-bis provides238:
"Shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor239 and a fine of 175,000 to 5,000,000 pesetas,
he who, contravening the laws and regulations that protect the environment, provokes or realises
directly or indirectly emissions or dumping of any kind, in the atmosphere, the soil, or surface or
maritime waters, which puts in grave danger the health of persons, or can gravely prejudice the
conditions of animal life, woods, natural spaces, or useful plantations."
The conditions under which the penalties are aggravated are listed in the next paragraphs of
the same article:
232 STS 1 April 1993j(Ar. 9165).233 Fondo Asturiana^para la proteccion de los Animales Salvajes (Asturian Fund for the
protection of Wild Animals).234 In appendix.
235 STS 1 April 1993 (Ar. 9165).
236 Although the ruling has been criticised with regard to other elements; see Jordano
Fraga, p.470.
237 Below, Lack of resources.
238 Penal Code, Article 347-bis. (Article 348, concerning the aggravation of penalties if a
death occurs, is not discussed here.)
239 Penal Code, Chapter III, Article 30 on penas graves (serious penalties):
Arresto mayor: imprisonment of between 1 month and 1 day, and six months;
prision menor : imprisonment of between 6 months and one day, and six years;
prision mayor : imprisonment of between 6 years and one day and 12 years;
reclusion menor: imprisonment of between 12 years + one day, and twenty years, if a death occurs
because of the above offences.
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The penalty of a superior grade shall be imposed if the industry functioned clandestinely, without
having obtained the required authorisation or administrative approval of its installations, or if it
had disobeyed the express orders of the administrative authority of correction or suspension of the
contaminating activity or if it had given false information regarding environmental aspects of the
same or had obstructed the inspecting activity of the Administration.
The superior penalty shall also be imposed if the acts previously described create a risk of
irreversible or catastrophic deterioration.
Vagueness of tests: A basic problem affecting recourse to criminal courts is that the tests for
establishing an ecological offence are both clouded by uncertainty and difficult to meet. Article
347-bis makes no mention of subjective elements; theoretically the offence can be the result of
dolo or culpable negligence24®. The ecological offence refers to 'concrete danger' (delito de
peligro concreto): for an act to be qualified as an ecological offence, actual pollution that is,
furthermore, in violation of administrative rules to the atmosphere, ground or wafers, must
have occurred244. The reference to "laws and regulations" gives rise to complications, both in
terms of constitutionality242 and, seemingly of more practical importance, clarity243.
Much hinges upon the 'gravity' of the resulting danger: this essential, but juridically
indeterminate244 concept serves as the barrier separating administrative from penal
infractions. Even surpassing administrative limits, if the pollution is not serious enough to
generate a "grave danger," it cannot be prosecuted as an ecological offence245. The pollution
must endanger collective human health rather than of only one person245, or the conditions of
animal life or useful plantations. The TS has tried to better delineate the concept of
240 See Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, pp.84-85; de Vega ruiz, 1994, p.26, who discusses the
uncertainty of whether dolo is required, but later points out (p.29) that STC 27/1990 refers to a
sentence of an Audiencia Provincial which ruled on the basis of a 'negligent' (culposo) offence;
Misol Sanchez, pp.588-89, notes that elsewhere in the Penal Code infractions that, through
imprudence constitute a fault, with malice constitute a crime.
244 de Vega Ruiz, 1994, pp.24, 103-104; Varela Agredo, J.A. "El Delito ecologico: El
proyecto de Codigo Penal de 1994," I Congreso Nacional de Derecho Ambiental,
Comunicaciones, ed., Cima Medio Ambiente, Valencia 1996, pp.282-83; Rodriguez Ramos, 1995,
pp.80-81; Misol Sanchez, p.590.
242 De Vega Ruiz refers to the fact that, while criminal law is generally elaborated in
Leyes Organicas and modified by acts with the rank of statute, Article 347-bis is 'blank law'
that refers to other legal texts of inferior rank. The constitutionality of this has been debated;
de Vega Ruiz, 1994, pp.30-3l.
243 Below, Diversity of administrative texts.
244 Varela Agredo, 1996, pp.281-82; de Vega Ruiz, 1994, pp. 103-104; Misol Sanchez, p.589.
245 Varela Agredo, 1996, p.283.
246 STS 11 March 1992, Sala ii; de vega ruiz, 1994, p.25.
389
gravity247: the upper limit (as in the aggravated offence of the second paragraph), is the risk
of irreversible or catastrophic deterioration24®; the violation of administrative rules that does
not threaten human health or animal life would fall beneath the lower limit, under which
administrative sanctions should be applied. What exactly can be considered 'irreversible' or
'catastrophic' is nebulous and leaves room for subjective interpretation249 (although the TS has
been generous in its interpretation250).
Lack of resources: As seen, lack of qualified staff impedes surveillance of industrial and
economic activities. The "Justice Administration, lacking the means, and in many cases, the
interest"254 regularly fails to investigate and prosecute; thus a variety of ecological offences
simply pass unnoticed, an initial failure in the enforcement process. Debate also arises between
administrative organs as to v hich is called upon to intervene252.
The Spanish system presents an advantage, similar to that proposed at Community
level253^a |jopularji«;user ^is^able to prosecute a criminal offence, even if he is not the
victim254. However, those wishing to initiate a criminal action also face difficulties related to
funding and personnel, which highlight the economic inequality between the popular accuser
and the industrial enterprise. To begin, lawyers with expertise in environmental matters are
usually employed by the polluting enterprise255; the environmental lawyer rarely seeks poorly
remunerated256 employment with environmental associations — "not to say never"257. The
247 STS 11 March 1992.
24® For the offence to be aggravated, further conditions are examined, below.
249 Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, p.86.
250 By taking into account the costs of rehabilitation in order to determine that which is
'irreversible'; below, Practical Illustration.
254 Aedenat, p.3.
252 DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, pp.34,57: Co-ordination between administrative and criminal
authorities concerning such issues as interim relief also presents problems.
252 Dr. Kramer proposes amending Article 169 EC to enable parties other than the
Commission to move to the judicial phase of infringement proceedings; see Conclusions, point
3.1. at - Centralised enforcement.
254 Constitution 1978, Article 125; LECrim, Articles 100 and 270.
255 "...despite their appearances at environmental conferences."
256 As noted in the Introduction, (point 5, Public involvement) only a very small proportion
of environmental organisations are able to remunerate personnel at all.
257 Viader Pericas, p.289; Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, p.197.
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participation of popular accusers (acusador popular) may be discouraged by the uncertain258
requirement of a financial down-payment259. Next, during the instruction of a case, the nature
of the danger or risk to the environment must be ascertained by expert testimony260. However,
the public prosecutor lacks the technical experts and therefore declines to accept the burden of
providing the expert valuation. Recourse must be made to private experts for costly multi-
disciplinary studies264, leading to the paradoxical situation in which judges often accept
valuations furnished with the help of the industry under investigation262. Furthermore, it has
occurred that the popular accuser was left to pay a substantial bill263. Certainly such prospects
discourage participation in criminal judicial actions.
Diversity of administrative texts: In France, criminal authorities hesitated to turn to the
dispersed administrative texts; the fact that a provision exists in the Spanish Penal Code does
not completely remedy this type of problem. 'Blank penal law' (ley penal en bianco) requires
recourse to various administrative provisions for punishable conduct264, and similar problems
of tracking down provisions and cross-references arise, since a vision of the entire body of
258 The Law on Criminal Procedure (LECrim), Article 280 indicates that a downpayment
(fianza) can be required; Article 281 LECrim provides for possible exemptions for those
prejudiced by the offence. Sendra and Llobregat (p.196) argue logically that with a collective
good such as the environment "society" is prejudiced and therefore should be exempted.
259 Gimeno Sendra and Garberi Llobregat, p.195; the possibility to exonerate
environmental organisations exists; Articles 280 and 182 LECrim.
260 Viader Pericas, pp.287-88.
264 Although a literal reading of the LECrim indicates the accuser should not face this
cost; see Article 463 LECrim.
262 Viader Pericas, p.288. The administration must be more flexible in covering the
honoraria for the testimony, making the duty to collaborate with the administration of justice
possible; Varela Agredo, 1996, p. 283; see also Aedenat, p.38.
263 After various associations dropped out of a querella (criminal action) against a power
plant because an agreement was reached (although a lower court had already noted that that
emissions had surpassed the 'already excessively benign and tolerant limits' in the legislation
with 'devastating' effect), one popular accuser, armed with a report costing 2,750,000 pesetas
(plus 412,500 in VAT) continued to attempt to reach a judgment. Eventually the case was
dimissed and he was condemned to pay the expenses (Auto 9 February 1995, confirmed 20
February 1995).
264 de Vega Ruiz, 1994, pp.42-46.
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administrative rules is necessary265. Furthermore, gaps persist in administrative rules; certain
areas remain untreated by the legislator266.
Possible diversity across the CAs complicates the situation: criminal responsibility may be
provided for differently in the autonomous rules, and variation exists concerning legal and
illegal levels of pollution267. Controversy as to whether this violates the constitutional
principle of equality in application of penal law is unresolved268.
Sanctions: Although the preparatory works had foreseen higher penalties26^, those
adopted in Article 347-bis were criticised for their lenience ("absurd"27^, "miserly"271). As in
France, they were easily supported by a polluting industry. The penalties were later
significantly raised; some still consider them too low272. A remaining problem is that, as in
France, even where prison is possible, the penalty almost always takes the form of a fine.
According to the second paragraph of Article 347-bis, it appears that only industries are
susceptible to receive the aggravated punishment. This has been criticised since many other
commercial conducts, such as agricultural undertakings, are capable of causing significant
pollution yet it is uncertain whether these can be considered industries273. Furthermore that to
which "acts previously described"274 in the second paragraph of Article 347-bis refers is
uncertain; whether an offence, once aggravated according to paragraph two, can be again
aggravated should it be deemed "irreversible" or "catastrophic" is unclear275.
265 Misol Sanchez, p.587.
266 Ibid., p.591.
267 Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, p.83.
268 Varela Agredo, 1996, p. 283; Misol Sanchez, p.594.
2651 Earlier projects for penal code foresaw inter alia six months to four years prison,
disqualification from profession or public office (three years); DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, p. 17.
270 Misol Sanchez, p.594: she points out that certain recent rules provide administrative
fines that were higher than those possible under Article 347-bis.
271 Jordano Fraga, p.469, note 9.
272 Aedenat, p.3.
273 Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, p.86; DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, p.27.
274 ...los actos anteriormente descritos.
275 Infraction of Article 347-bis is punishable by arresto mayor and 175.000 to 5.000.000,
aggravation in second paragraph prision menor and fine of 5.000.001 or more; with possible (and
again he notes that this is uncertain) accumulation in third paragraph, prision mayor and
7.500.001 to 11.250.000; DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994, pp.26-27; Rodriguez Ramos, 1995, p.85; compare
with Misol Sanchez, p.594.
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5.2. Practical illustration: Sentencia de la Sala II del Tribunal Supremo, 30 November 1990:
One case highlights both the laxity of administrative actors, if not their bad faith, in a
situation relevant to LCP88/609 (although LCP88/609 was not in force when the action was
initially brought), and the stance of the highest national court in dealing with ecological
offences. The case also has an important demonstrative value, yet only certain points are
examined here. A challenge was made to the decision of the Audiencia Provincial276 de
Barcelona, of 20 February 1988, condemning X, the director of a large combustion plant (La
Central Termica de Cersc, property of FECSA) for an offence against the environment277. The
appeal was brought before the TS, on one hand by FECSA and the accused, X, and on the other,
by four individual accusers.
The facts, as established by the Audiencia Provincial, are as follows: the power station
had operated since 1966 using high-sulphur lignite as combustible. Since 1980 it had been
directed by X. The fumes it emitted were highly charged with SO2. After 1985278 it was noted
that emissions exceeded 9000mg/Nm3 and were thus greatly in excess of legal norms27^.
However, the lower court had decided that the emissions of solid particles had not been proven
to be greater than 500mg/Nm3. One of the individual accusers challenged this fact, pointing out
that a statement from the Sub-director of Territorial Services of Industry of the Generalitat de
Catalunya stated that the concentration of solid particles was never below 3458mg/Nm3 —
more than nine times that authorised in Decree 833/1975 (500mg/Nm3. To compare standards,
LCP88/609 Annex VII sets a limit of 100mg/Nm32®^). The TS notes that FECSA itself, in a
l/b In appendix.
277 The Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona condemned the accused for an offence against
public health and the environment, and had sentenced him to one month and one day of arresto
mayor, with a fine of 30,000 pesetas (or arresto substituario of fifteen days). The accused was
also ordered to pay compensation for the land privately owned.
278 LIntil 1985 the exact composition of the fumes was not controlled.
27^ Specifically, Ley 38/1972, 22 December; and Decreto 833/1975, 6 February 1975.
280 por piants with a thermal capacity of over 500MW; for those below 500MW the limit is
50mg/Nm3.
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communication to the meteorological service of Catalunya281 estimated that its solid particles
emissions had been approximately 2000mg/Nm3. The TS accepts these arguments and modifies
the facts to take account of this.
The emissions provoked the acid rain that caused the die-back of approximately 30,000
hectares282 of surrounding woods. Although the objective effect on human health, livestock
and water courses could not be determined, the pollution was deemed to be "grave" and to
present a "grave and potential danger" for surrounding vegetation.
One argument raised by the accused illustrates the striking disregard of public authorities
for the letter of environmental law. The accused brought forth two resolutions from the
Directorate General of Industry282 that 'authorised' emissions of SO2 up to 12,500mg/Nm3,
levels superior to the norms in force. The accused therefore contended that the transgression of
norms required by Article 347-bis was not present. The TS observes that the Audiencia
Provincial was justified in doubting the validity of the resolutions, which do not legitimise the
conduct of the accused. The TS notes that X was aware of the legal limits and "at no time put
into motion those mechanisms necessary to interrupt the polluting emissions or to reduce their
intensity to levels tolerated by the affected surroundings, by installing corrective
apparatus."284 Thus an important warning is given to industries functioning with permits that
authorise emissions exceeding the limits defined in the legislation.
28^ Of 16 May 1986; the company register notes the same.
282 As controlled by ICONA.
282 The first dated 2 August 1985, the second 24 July 1987.
284 The TS points out that, in continuous communications between the Central and
Autonomous Administration, their "permissiveness and excessive tolerance" could lead the
director of the power station to think the emissions were authorised, notwithstanding his
awareness of the legal limits in force. (Also, since the TS used records provided by the director
to modify facts, it would be paradoxical to qualify his behaviour as obstructive.) It is
interesting that the TS expressly notes the possible shared responsibility of the
Administration. Although pursuing the matter in this instance would violate principles of
effective judicial control, since the Administration was not a party to this dispute and had had
no occasion to answer the accusation, strong terms are nonetheless used to indicate that the
Administration must be answerable not only for express violations (now reinforced in the new
Penal Code, Articles 320 and 329), but also for failure to carry out its duty of vigilance, on which
effectiveness of environmental rules depends.
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The TS also gave a generous interpretation into what can be considered "catastrophic". The
lower court had not accepted the aggravation of the penalty provided for Art 347-bis for
irreversible and catastrophic harm. The Tribunal Supremo did, stating that, in interpreting the
second and third paragraphs of Article 347-bis
...the [lower] court aligns itself with a concept of irreversibility that is excessively literal,
considering that with the actual level of technology it is always possible to return from the state of
deterioration to the state prior to the degradation, judging that human knowledge knows no limits to
repair ecological harm.
Such an affirmation does not concur with the spirit and content of the provision that
elevates the penalty according to the intensity of the harm caused and the extent of the affected zone...
...the expanse affected allows us to affirm that the necrosis and clorosis described in the
proven facts can reach the characteristics of catastrophic given its entity and effects, all this without
prejudice that an extremely costly action renovating the affected mantle of earth and substituting it,by proceeding to the plantation of new tree species that, in the very long term, can restore ecological
balance to the area, provided that the functioning of founts of pollution is stopped 288
Shedding light on that which can be termed "irreversible" or "catastrophic", the TS indicates
the offence can be aggravated, notwithstanding the advanced state of human knowledge, and
pragmatically focuses on the practical consideration of the cost of reversing the damage. This is
a more effective criterion, which brings the actual likelihood of restoration, rather than
hypothetical, costly and unlikely possibilities, into the evaluation.
The TS annuls a portion286 of the decision and condemns X, as the author of an offence
against public health and the environment, to eight months of prision menor, and a fine of
1,400,000 pesetas287. Significantly for the purpose of encouraging public participation, the TS
also included the costs to the individual accusers, which the lower court had excluded288.
It is not scientific to extrapolate from one example; however, this judgment seems to
indicate that norms that have been poorly implemented by both the Administration and the
private actor will nonetheless receive meaningful, pragmatic treatment before the highest
court. Although it is inefficient to ensure the effect of environmental rules only after litigation,
in the final resort, the obligations imposed by environmental rules are here taken seriously.
STS 30 November 1990.
It maintained most of the proven facts as established by the Audiencia.
With suspension from public office and of his right to vote.
Noting that they had been useful in supplying inspections and technical reports.
395
5.3. New provisions:
The penal provisions that entered into force in May 1996 are in part the result of a
campaign by various environmental associations289. Despite certain shortcomings, a variety of
new offences are elaborated29^, increasing potential recourse to criminal courts on issues
regarding inter alia Community Law. For example, Article 330291 makes it a criminal offence to
cause grave harm to a protected area, opening the possibility that violations of, for instance,
the Birds or Habitats Directives or harm caused by Structural Funds projects that are not
checked at Community level292, may be penalised at national level293. Furthermore, the
criminal liability of the administrator294 is included in Article 329295; it is likely that, for
actions such as those seen in the case examined above ("knowingly296 authorising illegal
activities"), the administrator would now have to answer criminal charges.
Articles 325 and 326 of the new Penal Code most closely reprise the earlier Article 347-bis.
Article 325 of the new Penal Code reads:
289 Particularly through the Council on Assessment of the Environment (Consejo Asesor de
Medio Ambiente) of MOPTMA. Of the amendments they suggested, Parliament accepted
twenty.
290 For instance the "urbanism offences", proposed and refused in 1983 version, have been
adopted -- this is extremely important, given the harm caused by urbanism.
The delitos urbanisticos are provided in Article 319 (those carrying out unauthorised
constructions), Article 320 (public authorities knowingly authorising illegal constructions).
291 Article 330: "Whoever, in a protected natural area, gravely harms any of the elements
that have serve in its qualification, shall incur the penalty of prison from one to four years and
a fine of twelve to twenty-four months."
292 See Chapter 1, point 3. Decision-making in other areas — Integration of environmental
protection into other Community policies, and Chapter 3, footnote 124.
293 Article 338 refers to the aggravation of offences to protected natural spaces. It also
refers to Articles 319 (above); to harm to flora (Articles 332 and 333); hunting and fishing
offences (Articles 334, 335, and 336); the illegal actions of public authorities (Articles 320, 329);
the setting of forest fires (Article 353); and pollution of the environment (Articles 325, 328).
294 Which had been struck from the final version of Article 347-bis; DE VEGA RUIZ, 1994,
P-17-
New Penal Code, Article 329: 1. "The authority or administrator who, knowingly,
favourably informs the concession of manifestly illegal licences, that authorises the functioning
of industries or polluting activities to which the previous articles refer or who, during
inspections has silenced the infraction of laws or normative dispoitions of a general character
that regulate them shall be punished with the penalty established in article 404 of this Code
and, furthermore, with that of prison from six months to three years or of a fine from eight to 24
months)".
296 Although obviously proving an action was 'knowingly' undertaken presents difficulties.
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Shall be punished with the penalty of prison from six months to four years, a fine of eight to twenty-
four months292 and barring from profession or office for a period from one to three years he who,
violating laws or other provisions of a general environmentally protective nature, provokes or
carries out directly or indirectly, emissions or dumping, radiation, extractions, excavations, land-
shifting, noises, vibrations, injections or deposits, in the atmosphere, the soil, the subsoil, or surface,
subterranean, or maritime waters, with an impact, including in transboundary areas, as well as
captation of waters than can gravely harm the balance of natural systems. If the risk of grave harm is
to the health of humans, the penalty of prison shall be imposed in its superior half.29®
Many of the previous uncertainties persist. Reference is still made to dispersed
administrative texts. The idea of 'gravity' remains the barrier between criminal offences and
administrative infractions; the notion is still subjective and unclear299. However, Article 325
significantly widens behaviours which can be qualified as offences300; the physical elements
listed are also wide, covering basically everything (as did Article 347-bis, arguably) but
adding "subsoil" and "subterranean waters" for clarity. Furthermore, where human health has
been harmed the penalty of prison "in its superior half" is required. From a Community
perspective, it is important that transboundary harm is specifically qualified as a criminal
offence. However, a possible drawback is that the phrase can "gravely harm the balance of
natural systems", instead of "can gravely prejudice the conditions of animal life", is perceived
as more stringent a test30!
Article 32630 , regarding aggravation of offences, is roughly the same as before, though
more clearly stipulated. Confusion surrounding possible accumulation of aggravation has been
• " ■ Article 50 of the Penal Code establishes a system of daily quotas that are translated
into pecuniary sanctions: paragraph 4: "The daily quota shall have as a minimum two hundred
pesetas, and as a maximum, fifty thousand. For the purposes of calculation, when the period is
fixed in months or years, months shall be understood to have thirty days and years, three
hundred sixty".
298 New Penal Code, Article 325.
299 Aedenat, p.5.
300 By introducing radiations (reference to be made to Law 25/64 on Nuclear Energy), noise
(which apparently is not covered by national, but by local rules, which raises questions of
Constitutionality), extraction and excavation, aterramientos (harmful activities to the land,
including terracing), deposits, injections (introducing pressurised gases or liquids), vibrations.
30! Aedenat, p.12.
302 Article 326: "The penalty of a superior grade shall be imposed, without prejudice to the
fact that other provisions of this Code can apply, when in the commission of any of the facts
described in the previous article concurs with any of the following circumstances:
a) if the industry functioned clandestinely, without having obtained the required
authorisation or administrative approval of its installations
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eliminated. The principle new element is the inclusion of illegal extraction of waters among
aggravated offences, a problem particularly relevant to Spain's geographic characteristics.
Point b) regarding disobedience of orders, apparently excludes orders of a judge or court by its
express reference to the administrative authority303; this is specifically unfortunate since
execution of judgments presents considerable difficulties. Also, certain matters remain unclear,
as before, such asl that which ban be considered "industry". However, it is positive that at least
the lower limit of the aggravated penalty has been raised304.
A/1 Moreover, point c) appears to refer to any falsification or dissimulation of information.
Unlike the other indents, no public authority is mentioned. Aedenat305 suggests that this couldt \>
apply to information requested by a third party or even emitted voluntarily by the
undertaking306; thus it appears that criminal sanctions are available to protect the individual
rights of Community Directive 90/313 and national legislation307.
The provisions are too recent to judge their practical effect, yet an effort seems to have been
made to broaden the protection of environmental rules before criminal judges.
b) if the express orders of the administrative authority of correction or suspension of the
activities qualified in the previous article have been disobeyed
c) if information regarding environmental aspects of the same has been falsified or hidden
d) if the inspecting activity of the Administration has been obstructed
e) if a risk of irreversible or catastrophic deterioration has been produced
f) if an illegal extraction of waters in a period of restriction has been carried out. "
303 Aedenat, p.15.
304 Calculating on the basis of Article 70 of the new Penal Code the penalty for Article 326
is from four to six years. Article 70 indicates that the superior penalty is calculated starting
with the maximum penalty attached by law to the offence under discussion, and augmenting
this by half its quantity. The result is the maximum aggravated penalty. In Article 325 the
maximum penalty is four years, therefore for Article 326 the penalty is from four to six years.
303 Asociacion Ecologista de Defensa de la Naturaleza.
306 Aedenat, p.15.




Indeed, as one source phrases it, "[t]he situation and attitude both of the Justice
Administration and of the Environment Administration do not allow for much optimism."3^
Attempting to obtain criminal sanctions for infringements of Community environmental
directives in criminal courts can be problematic (as for national rules). Again, some of these
reflect the attitude of the administration and the public prosecution, which has shown little
sensitivity towards environmental issues3^. por instance, generally at regional level, while
the directors of small and medium enterprises may be made to appear before the criminal judge
for pollution-related offences, there is a noticeable reluctance to pursue more powerful
industrial actors. Viader Pericas points out that the mega-enterprises responsible for pollution
greater than the combined emissions of all the SMEs are not even brought to the stage of oral
proceedings3^.
However, certain technical difficulties have been addressed, by wider and seemingly
stronger provisions in the new Penal Code. Furthermore, the willingness demonstrated by the
judges to interpret provisions in order to make possible the maximum protection of
environmental rules once a matter is before them is a very positive sign. Notably criminal
judges appear to be much more forward-looking than in France.
6. Enforcing judgments:
In Spain, as in France, executing a judicial decision can present problems. The
Administration has been notoriously lax generally in executing specifically administrative
judgments that were unfavourable to it3'1. Due to the length of time required for an
administrative matter to reach a decision at all, and the relatively few environmental cases
308 Aedenat, p.3.
3°9 Ibid., p.3.
310 Viader Pericas, p.288.
311 Dominguez Luis, J.A., "Notas en torno a las ideas de seguridad juridica, justicia y bien
comun," no. 80, Curso 1991-92 Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense
de Madrid 259, pp.113-117; see also Navarro Mendizabal, 1996, p.481; NlETO GARCIA, A., La
Organization del desgobierno, Ariel, Barcelona 1984; cited in Dominguez Luis, pp.134-35.
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available for consideration, it is uncertain whether this is worse concerning environmental
cases. Certainly the environment has been affected by such tactics: two judicial decisions to shut
down a waste plant operating without licences were suspended by the Administration312.
The earlier LJCA313 attempted to address the general problem of non-execution by
according to the sentencing court certain coercive power and by providing for the personal and
direct, civil and criminal responsibility of Administrative agents who delayed the fulfilment
of such obligations. The situation did not improve remarkably:
The system in force of executing administrative judicial sentences has not proven more efficient, an
the frequent controversies raised before the administration for non-fulfilment or partial an
defective fulfilment of condemning decisions of administrative courts are good proof of this31"1.
and
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Article 117.3313 of the Constitution now makes it the responsibility of the courts to see that
the judgment is executed; the Administration has the positive duty to collaborate with due
diligence316, and the negative duty to abstain from any impediment to carrying out what the
judicial organ has disposed. It is for the sentencing court to determine the reasons for which a
decision is materially or legally impossible to execute (inejecutabilidad)3^; as well as the
point at which, and under which conditions, this impossibility is noted31
312 The Lopez Ostra Case, Judgment of 9 December 1994, ref. 41/1993/436/515 offers an
illustration; see Chapter 8, footnote 118.
313 LJCA, Article 10.
314 Dorrunguez Luis, p.114; see also Garcia de Enterria y otros, "La ejecucion de sentencias
condenatorias de la Administracion," 209 (1987) Revista de Documentacion Administrativa;
Pinar Manas, "Sobre la ejecucion de sentencias contencioso-administrativas: la sentencia TC de
12 de noviembre de 1985," 1986 Poder Judicial.
315 Article 117.3: "El ejercicio de la potestad jurisdiccional en todo tipo de procesos,
juzgando y haciendo ejecutar lo juzado, corresponde exclusivamente a los juzgados y tribunales
.... (The exercise of jurisdictional power in all types of procedures, judging and ensuring the
execution of that which has been judged, belongs exclusively to the courts...)"
316 Constitution 1978, Article 118; see also SSTC 12 October 1985; 22 September 1989;
Dominguez Luis, p.118.
312 Also the possibility exists for the judicial organ to substitute the content of the decision
by another 'equivalent' intervention once the presence of such circumstances that impede the
execution of the original decision are determined; SSTC 29 June 1983; 7 June 1984; 22 September
1989. Here financial compensation, so poorly adapted to environmental situations, seems the
obvious alternative.
318 STC 25 September 1985; Dorrunguez Luis, p.120.
Uncertainty stems from the fact that two rules in force, LOPJ, LO 6/1985, 1 July 1985 and
LJCA (portions of which continue in force), give rise to certain conflicts of interpretation. A
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However, the Organic Law of Judicial Competence, in an article widely considered to be
unconstitutional31^, allows the government "only for reasons of public utility and social
interest, declared by the Government, to expropriate rights recognised in the face of the Public
Administration in a firm sentence prior to its execution."3211 As Garcia de Enterria has said this
is effectively an unlimited widening of grounds for suspending judicial sentence321. At issue is
the guarantee of a fundamental right to effective judicial control322. Notwithstanding, the
government can decide
"not from objective juridical criteria but from the fluctuating stance of that which is convenient or
not convenient, opposing the principle of legality used by the judge in all his decisions and that of
political opportunity that constitutes the basic foundation of the decisions of the power."323
Given that the government generally views the tension between environment and economy as a
zero-sum game324 , executing condemning decisions in environmental matters can easily be
perceived as inconvenient.
Whatever the exact modalities of determining execution, the fact remains that non-
execution is a common and serious problem. Nieto Garcia refers to non-execution as "the great
weapon of the administration... In the face of all the truly forceful declarations of laws and the
Constitution, and in the face of orders, at times categorical, of courts and including the
Constitutional Court, it is a fact that, when the Administration does not want to, it does not
carry out rulings"325. As the Constitutional Court has stated: "[t]he insincerity of the hidden
doctrinal minority gives more emphasis to the LJCA, which indicates (Article 105) that the
government can decide that which is impossible to execute; Dominguez Luis, p. 118-20.
319 LOPJ Article 18.2; although the Constitutional Court did not pronounce; Dominguez
Luis, p. 130.
320 "...solo por causa de utilidad publica o interes social, declarada por el Gobierno, podran
expropriarse derechos reconocidos frente a la Administration Publica en una sentencia firme
antes de su ejecucion."
321 Cited Dominguez Luis, p.131.
322 Effective control by the courts of rights and legitimate interests, Article 24.1
Constitution, above footnote 43.
323 Dominguez Luis, p.120-21.
324 See generally Aguilar, op.tit.; Cini, Porter, Pridham, op.cit.
325 nieto Garcia, A., La Organization del desgobierno, Ariel, Barcelona 1984; cited in
Dominguez Luis, pp.134-35.
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disobedience of the administrative organs"32^ threatens not only the juridical system in
general, but also the integrity of the rights of the citizens327. Such a situation is incompatible
with an etat de droifi™ and undermines all the preceding efforts concerning implementation
and enforcement
7. Conclusions:
As seen in previous chapters, prior to enforcement the administration's handling of
implementation of environmental norms is very poor. During enforcement a wide array of
procedural problems emerge, most of which do not discriminate against environmental interests
specifically, but happen to affect these very seriously. The most striking of these is the
requirement that interests be somehow "individualised" in order to be defended32^. Other
difficulties more visibly reveal underlying priorities, such as the administration's willingness
to play upon the unreasonable length of judicial proceedings to discourage judicial action330.
Importantly, and perhaps because of an awareness of the previous flaws of implementation,
judges seem more disposed to give meaning to the environmental norms they are called upon to
protect, and could be valuable allies in enforcing Community environmental obligations. A
willingness to adapt the rules to defence of the environment, a recent addition to juridically
326 STC 28 October 1987.
327 STC 15 July 1987: "During the stage of execution problems related to a fraudulant or
simulated execution of the judicial decision can arise, and in that case must be resolved, in the
measure that they imply an effective inexecution of the sentence, and repel the effectiveness of
the judicial control, through action of this nature, and successively and indefinitely throws
upon the affected the burden of commencing new actions and recourse in order to obtain the
complete satisfaction of the rights and interests that have already been recognised by judicial
decision."
32® Dominguez Luis, p.135.
329 Other examples include the requirement of financial downpayments, the requirement to
exhaust administrative appeals.
330 Also where personnel and financial resources are stretched, environmental issues are
less strongly enforced than others.
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protected goods, has been demonstrated in administrative334, civil332 and criminal333 court
divisions. Perhaps the fact that judicial treatment of environmental issues is recent is an
advantage in that progress is a matter of filling a void rather than overcoming an existing body
of negative case-law334.
The positive approach taken by the courts in limited, specific cases is not enough to
counteract the difficulties that have hindered implementation of the norms from the point of
transposition onward; nor to prevent the administration from once again intervening to
diminish the effect of environmental rules once judgment has been made. Nevertheless, it seems
to indicate that progress at the enforcement stage is more practicable and less dependent on a
factor as intangible as the 'attitude' of the administration.
331 E.g. STS 25 April 1989, above, footnote 44.
332 For instance, relaxing the full certainty requirement and finding negligence in the mere
fact of an accident, leaning towards strict liability, and joint-and-several liability.
333 For instance, regarding civil participation of associations in criminal procedures, giving
consideration to the likelihood and costs of reparation in determining that which is
"catastrophic and irreversible."
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1. What has emerged?:
Among the problems that emerge throughout the stages examined previously it is difficult
to discern a pattern across the different Member States studied, and applicable to both
legislative texts traced. The phenomenon of non-compliance is, as seen, undeniably complex.
Nonetheless it seems that the problems that have emerged can be placed under two broad
heading^: those problems that concern the poor adaptation of legal rules to environmental
situations on the one hand, and on the other, those problems that are rooted in the low political
priority accorded to environmental issues. The first category of problems could be addressed,
often without too much difficulty, where the will to treat the issues can be found. The second
category remains intractable precisely because the underlying problem is that the will to
resolve the problems is absent.
The first group, problems stemming more from the poor adaptation of legal rules or
administrative situations to environmental issues, does not discriminate specifically against
environmental issues. Examples of such problems include, for instance, the fact that no deadline
exists for granting interim measures in France, with the result that these are frequently without
object by the time they are considered. Similarly, the Spanish requirement to request
administrative review of a decision prior to making a judicial application is poorly adapted to
environmental situations, where speed is essential. Legal tests for an action to proceed — for
instance, that harm be certain, that direct causal links be established, that the prejudice
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suffered be individualised — are also poorly suited to environmental matters. Yet these rules
apply to environmental issues as they do to any other. As it happens, however, the consequences
in environmental matters are very serious. To take a different example, when called upon to
provide information or to co-operate with the public, administrators are rarely reputed to co¬
operate smoothly in any area of administrative activity: the public's intervention is generally
viewed as an unwelcome intrusion. However, here the effect is serious: environmental law and
particularly procedural rules such as EIA85/337 depend upon the public's vigilance and ability
to intervene.
An issue such as establishing standing to bring a legal action illustrates the bridge between
the two categories of problems: the problem of standing is rooted in the fact that legal
traditions have historically developed in connection with the protection of property and
individual interests, and are poorly adapted to the defence of collective interests. However,
the fact that environmental priorities are extremely low where economic interests risk being
inconvenienced, or doubts concerning who should appropriately receive compensation for harm
to a collective good, can translate into a situation where the criteria of legal title to make a
claim are more harshly applied to environmental associations than in other situations: as seen
in Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and others v the Commission^, the criteria were applied as they
had been developed three decades previously.
Situations such as this spill over into the second, more serious category,' which concerns
those problems that stem principally from the fact that environmental issues are accorded low
political priority. Disturbing the economic forces that lie at the root of the environmental harm
is actively avoided; a short-term vision of economic gain is allowed to prevail over a longer
view of the economic and even social costs related to environmental deterioration. As seen,
environmental rules can be implemented relatively efficiently where they are not perceived as
being contrary to political and economic interest. In France LCP88/609 was not perceived as a
serious threat to energy policy2 and its practical implementation appears to have proceeded
1 Chapter 3 at point 2.1. Practical Illustration: T-585/93, Greenpeace and others v
Commission.
2 Since energy is supplied to a great extent through nuclear sources.
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fairly smoothly: unlike in Spain where the requirements of LCP88/609 are seen to threaten not
only the energy industry but also industries that require considerable energy. Frequently, the
odds that rules that are perceived as cumbersome or threatening will be implemented by "the
most appropriate forms and methods" diminish as the discretionary opportunities multiply.
The effects of this accumulate and are compounded as the next layer of discretion is added.
Clear statements of fundamental priorities have been visible, in terms of resources and
power accorded, in the three administrative contexts seen here. All three are unreasonably
understaffed. Again, although lack of personnel and financial resources is a frequent complaint
in any area of administrative or legislative intervention, the degree to which it is problematic
here is particularly severe3; certainly environmental expenditure does not meet environmental
costs4. Only occasionally have other policies3 incurred such general resentment, if not the
opposition, of economic forces. Even by comparison to other policies it has been seen that the
resources given to environmental protection are unreasonably scant.
In terms of authority of environmental administrations, deficiencies were also noted in all
contexts: DG-XI has always had difficulty imposing its authority as an equal, where its
interests may clash with those of other DG's or Community policies: for example, in effect the
Community has made a general statement of priority and given an indication of DG-XI's
comparative lack of authority by avoiding to review the integration of environmental
protection in the programmes financed by the Structural Funds. A similar abandonment of
vigilance would be unheard of in the area of the internal market6. Furthermore, the Legal
Affairs Unit's ability to initiate prosecutions of environmental offences in an atmosphere free
from political considerations appears to have been restricted by its relocation to DG-XI's
Directorate B.
3 Chapter 1, points 1, 2.1-2; Chapter 4, points 1.2.1 and 1.2.5; Chapter 7 point 1.2.2.
4 Com(92)23 vol.III The State of the European Environment, at p.82: figures for Germany,
one of the more environmentally conscientious of the Member States, place environmental
expenditure in 1990 at 2.2% of the GDP, while costs of environmental damage are estimated at
6% GDP. Relevant figures are not available for other Member States.
5 For instance, women's rights in the workplace gives a possible illustration.
6 Chapter 1, at point 3. Decision-making in other areas -- Integration of environmental
protection into other Community policies.
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Similarly the Spanish environmental administration is disjointed on various
administrative levels, and frequently attached to the administration of a competitor (despite
improvements in recent years). Where environmental authorities are called upon to make
decisions affecting other interests, they do not possess the autonomy necessary to carry out this
mandate effectively.
The French administrative context was until recently very similar: understaffed,
fragmented and frequently subordinate to the administration of competitors. The relative value
of environmental authorities was indicated when the Conseil d'Etat endorsed the common view
at the time: that the Environment Minister's opinion had no legal valued The French context
illustrates that where the political will can be found, some progress can be made: the
environment administration has recently been rationalised. Treatment of the Environment
Minister's opinion indicates also that positive change, when made, will frequently be minimal:
although it is now stipulated that the Environment Minister's opinion must be awaited, there is
nothing to indicate that it must be heeded.
The effect of low priority can be perceived in the multitude of decisions implied by each
stage of development and application of environmental rules; such effects are highly variable
and not systematic. At certain stages it is appropriate for political and economic considerations
to affect law, particularly when the rule is being formulated. Despite the fact that this may
lead to awkward or ill-suited legal rules, this is the stage at which, as a matter of general
policy, environmental and other interests are appropriately weighed.
As seen, however, political priorities find room to manoeuvre in a manner less appropriate
during formal implementation of environmental rules. Rules can be transposed to minimise
inconvenience to economic actors, to play down the power of environmental authorities or of the
public, or can be delayed so that other interests may be satisfied first. Inconvenient portions are
not implemented, such as the elaboration of criteria for submitting Annex II projects to EIA in
Spain, or are in some way diminished. For instance, regarding EIA one of the tools for taking
account of the general interests and potentially for encouraging the project's evolution towards
7 Chapter 4, at point 1.2.1. Legitimacy and Clarity of Mission.
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less environmental harm (always assuming that "taking the environment into account in the
decision making process" implies considering the imposition of conditions to minimise harm in
accordance with the Prevention Principle) was the consultation of the public. The Community
directive made certain suggestions but left considerable discretion on this matter. Both Member
States examined here found methods of distancing the public or of diluting its input: Spain, by
keeping the public uninformed; France by filtering its input through Commissioners of inquiry,
whose dedication to their duties may vary®.
Practical implementation in particular falls victim to low priority at national level.
Notably practical implementation is also the area where the Community cannot control the
Member States' practical performance. Generally, the number of problems and disputes that
arise over EIA rules highlights the inadequacies of administrative verification of the EIS: at ^
best this demonstrates a lack of meticulousness on the part of the administrators where such
issues are concerned; at worst a predisposition in favour of authorisation so strong as to make a
mockery of the rules. To take another example, in Spain a too literal transposition of LCP
obligations means that, regarding practical implementation, no indication whatsoever is given
as to how to meet Community obligations; arguably this indicates that there was little
intention of doing so. Also, at this stage weaknesses of the original Community legislation or
the national transposition are exploited, as with the Annex II difficulties. Moreover, whatever
positive elements existed in the legislation often remain unused or are emptied of substance;
thus in Spain, although the possibility to issue binding environmental declarations exists, in
practice negative declarations have not been issued.
It is common knowledge that economic and industrial interests are better defined and more
powerfully expressed than environmental^. In fact, that a procedure such as Environmental
Impact Assessment should be so plagued by problems of implementation stemming from low
priority is an indication of the depth of the resistance to incorporating environmental
8 And for instance, may choose to ignore 7000 letters of protest; see Chapter 5, point 1.2.3.
at Ambiguous conclusions.
9 Particularly given all the problems associated with public consultation, the means by
which the wider interest is articulated.
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protection, for in this case the goals set are timid: the procedure is neither costly10, nor is there
much risk that it will seriously alter the progress of the project in question.
The difference between merely technical and procedural problems and problems of political
priorities are perhaps most evident during enforcement. Moreover, the importance of effective
enforcement increases due to the lapses and deficiencies of the previous stages; this is the last
chance for the purpose of the rules to be ensured. Innovative solutions have been proposed to
address specific problems associated with the judicial defence of environmental interests (for
instance, the use of newly developed economic methods of determining the cost of environmental
damage; considering as-yet unrealised harm 'certain' for the purposes of civil courts once the
harmful elements have been set in motion). That these remain unused is perhaps due more to
hesitation on the part of judges to 'break rank' rather than to the low priority of environmental
issues11. On the other hand, occasionally the solution is readily available and does not involve
breaking new ground, and yet in environmental situations is not used because of fundamental
perceptions surrounding environmental defence. For instance, the greater powers of investigation
available in criminal procedures will not be used in environmental cases. Or, as seen in France,
where environmental legislation provides for severe penalties such as imprisonment, these are
typically avoided for environmental offences1-1. Where remedies exist that are particularly
well-suited to environmental problems, such as restoration of the site, these are very rarely
ordered; courts avoid the inconvenience and the use of resources (for follow-up) that ordering
such remedies implies. The perception of that which is important enough to merit using a less
convenient but more effective solution cannot be easily addressed by adjusting a legal rule.
If enforcement procedures have functioned appropriately, it is extremely damaging to the
effectiveness of environmental rules when, in the final instance, they are opposed by political
forces that are perceived to succeed: Ripa di Meana's shortened stay as commissioner could be
10 Introduction, point 4. at - Environment Impact Assessment directive.
11 Although this hesitation may be stronger where the issue is perceived as of low
priority.1 ^ In Spain, although imprisonment has indeed been ordered, the cases that make it to the
stage of a judgment are so rare as not to permit to establish a trend.
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cited as an example, as could Dr. Kramer's abrupt transfer in 199444. The non-execution
or administrative suspension of court decisions, problematic in all three contexts examined,
is another, as is the use of the appeal process in order to establish a fait accompli. Rules that
have been losing effect throughout formal and practical implementation, despite the fact that
they may have been upheld in court, are often no longer relevant by the end of the
enforcement process. Such cases imply an immense waste of the resources of both the court
and the applicant association/individual; discourage future applicants from embarking on
an attempt to seek judicial defence of environmental rules; and impair the respect for the
rule of law, at least where environmental law is concerned.
The Fifth Action Programme was absolutely correct in stating that it would require a
revolution in the thinking of society as a whole to resolve issues of low priority44. However,
lessons can be learned and improvements are possible, especially where the problems are of
a more technical nature.
2. Lessons learned — Amendments to the EIA legislation46:
The study of problems of implementation and enforcement can give indications not only
on how to formulate provisions in a manner that will be effective, but also more generally on
what issues must be carefully addressed in order to achieve the purpose for which the
legislation was adopted. Particular care must be taken not to leave discretion unwittingly, as
with Annex II EIA85/337, and to use language that imposes clear and enforceable legal
obligations. (As shall be seen, however, recent instruments use language that is less, rather
than more enforceable46.)
46 Chapter 3, at point 1.1. - Conciliation and political pressure, footnote 46; see also
Chapter 4, point 1.1, and footnote 12 for an earlier, similar example.
44 OJ 1993 C138/13. See Introduction, footnote 32.
45 Although an amendment has been made to LCP88/609, this is of a technical nature
(to reduce the threshold of combustion plants concerned by the legislation) and did not
include tightening definitions (see chapter 5, point 2.3. Problems encountered). The
amendment is not further investigated here.
46 Below, point 3.
Again the EIA rules offer an example: the Commission, somewhat understating the case,
has recognised that there have been "practical difficulties in implementing the Directive
owing to occasional differences in interpretation between the Member States and the
Commission. The latter has on several occasions found that Member States are failing to
apply the Directive in its entirety."12 It proposed amendments to resolve the confusion left in
the earlier text, at times treating ambiguities that the ECJ was also compelled to address
during enforcement proceedings18. As shall be seen, the proposed amendments, and the
version finally adopted1^, frequently do not measure up to the problems identified.
The proposal was extremely defensive ~ a necessity after the 1992 Edinburgh Summit.
Pre-empting criticism as well as emphasising the Commission's new commitment, it makes
several references to the cost-benefit profile of the proposal, to investment, and to the
Subsidiarity principle21. A sizeable section is devoted to "the impact of the proposal on
businesses"22. Again the vision of that which is truly important surfaces: despite the
integration requirement in Article 130r(2) EC, legislative proposals in other areas typically
do not include sections justifying their impact on the environment.
Projects covered: The most significant problem regarding projects caught by EIA85/337
was that Annex II projects often systematically escaped the procedure. Typically, Member
States exempted entire categories; as seen, in Spain, it is more accurate to say the Member
State exempted the entire Annex. The main element of concern is to clarify in the legislation
the requirements for subjecting Annex II to assessment28, which the ECJ has had to address
12 Com(93)575 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337 on the
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, p.2.
18 Com(93)575; see Com(95)720 for the amended proposal.
Directive 97/11 amending Directive 85/337, OJ 1997 L73/5.
20 To which section 2, pp.5-6 of the proposal is devoted.
21 Com(93)575, point 3, p.6; Although no mention is made of the appropriate level of
administration; rather, the text simply reassures that the new provisions "do not alter the
actual scope of the Member States' obligations under the directive".
22 Com(93)575, pp.22-24.
- 1 Although in the initial comments the Commission also mentioned the situation seen
in France: too many EIA procedures for relatively minor projects. It is noted that, although
the Commission may feel that too many projects are subjected to assessment in certain
Member States (including France), Article 130tEC as well as Article 13 of the original
EIA85/337, allows Member States to take stricter measures.
after litigation24. The margin of discretion has been restricted by the amending legislation: it
is now stipulated25 that reference be made to a new Annex III for the criteria for subjecting
Annex II projects to assessment, a considerable step towards improving the coherence of the
procedure across Member States and towards ensuring that projects likely to have
"significant effects" on the environment are subjected to assessment. Annex III outlines with
greater precision the elements that must be considered, the project characteristics and
location of the project, in determining whether EIA is required25.
Lessons learned in enforcement have also been applied. For example in Annex I, the
term 'integrated chemical installations', which had caused practical problems earlier22, is
clarified; as is the phrase 'modifications to projects'28, which had been an issue in Article 169
enforcement proceedings29. Other categories are also added to the projects covered25.
In sum, regarding projects covered by the legislation the adopted modifications are
occasionally positive, although retaining certain exemptions (projects subject to
parliamentary approval) appears difficult to justify22 and the addition to Annex II of Annex
24 Case C-133/94 Commission v. Belgium, judgment 6 May 1996, para.39.
25 Directive 97/11 Article 1(6) modifying EIA85/337 Article 4(3).
25 For instance, the location of the project must be considered with particular attention
to wetlands; coastal zones; mountain and forest areas; nature reserves and parks; areas
already classified under Member States' legislation; areas in which the environmental quality
standards laid down in Community legislation have already been exceeded; densely
populated areas; landscapes of historical, cultural or archaeological significance.
Case C-133/94 Commission v. Belgium, 1996 ECR 1-2323, para.24; see Chapter 1, at
point 2.5.1. Adopted version - Projects covered.
*' Defined in proposed Article 1 as: "any restructuring of a project which affects it
substantially or any substantial change in the conditions of execution or operation of a
project"; certainly some room for manoeuvre remains.
29 Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany, 1995 ECR 1-2211, paras.34-36.
25 Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, and temporary storage of
radioactive waste have been added to Annex I. Acknowledging the potential damage of
recreational activities a new category is also added to Annex II, 'tourism and leisure'. Also in
Annex II, agricultural projects are restructured for the sake of clarity.
It has been considered that these do not cover all those that might have been
usefully added. For commentary and suggestions for additional amendments to Annex II
projects, see Sheate, W.R., "Amending the EC Directive (85/337/EEC) on Environmental
Impact Assessment," 1995 European Environmental Law Review 77, at pp. 81-82.
22 See Sheate, 1995, p.81.
I projects "undertaken exclusively or mainly for the development and testing of new
methods or products and not used for more than two years" is extremely worrisome32.
Quality of EIS: Having noted that one of the problems of practical implementation was
that usually only the minimum information listed in Article 5(2) is supplied in the EIS,
without reference to the more complete information in Annex III, the Commission here
introduces the concept of 'scoping'33: providing access to information or data held by any
authority. As the Commission had indicated in its proposal34, the costs of introducing
scoping provisions, if carried out effectively, "will be more than offset by savings at later
stages in the development consent process." While this may indeed be so, it is interesting
that the legislation focusses upon this issue at all when, at least in the two national contexts
studied, preliminary contact posed little problem: in France co-operation between developer
and authorities was good, and Spain, legal provisions surpassed Community rules (although
practical difficulties did arise).
Provisions on scoping are an oblique means of addressing the poor quality of the EIS.
The root problem, the fact that the developer prepares the EIS, is not addressed by the new
legislation: no provision requires the verification of the EIS quality by an independent
professional body. (Notably, the Commission's goal of job creation and training personnel,
reiterated in the proposal, would have been thus advanced33.) Still less is an impartial body
required to draw up the EIS. Admittedly, given the current atmosphere it is unlikely that
such a provision would have been acceptable to the Member States. Nonetheless, the general
quality of the EIS will probably continue to be variable, and frequently poor, despite the new
provisions.
As for specific elements of the contents of the EIS, the proposed language of Article 5(1),
instead of requiring that the annexed information be provided where Member States
32 Annex II, point 13; It can be questioned if any effort to restore the site afterward will
be required.
Directive 97/11 Article 1(7) modifying EIA85/337 Article 5(2); see also Com(93)575,
p.3.
34 Com(93)575, p.6.
33 Ibid., p.6: "the Commission has already initiated a programme of technical assistance
to that end in conjunction with the Member States."
"consider" it relevant or that the developer may reasonably be required to provide it,
required the information "in so far as: (a) the information is relevant....; (b) and the
developer may reasonably be required to gather" it. Unfortunately, the final version repeats
the original vague wording88. Moreover, as seen, a stumbling block during practical
implementation was that in neither country studied did the developer really consider
alternatives to the original project. An amendment made to Annex IV regarding the
information to be supplied was ostensibly intended "to make the examination of the main
alternatives to the project compulsory."8'7 However, the final version reads: "An outline of
the main alternatives studied by the developer..."88, avoiding stating peremptorily "the
developer shall study alternatives. What is required in the event that the developer studied
no alternatives is unclear.
Public consultation: A change to Article 6(2)89 is intended to ensure that the public is
consulted before authorisation is accorded rather than merely before construction on a
project begins. As seen however, this was far from being the only problem concerning public
consultation. Particularly given the Community's emphasis on public participation, it is
disappointing that no effort has been made to address the modalities of public consultation:
to note the public's comments directly, rather than to filter them through an inquiry
commissioner; or to require the Member States to announce the period of public consultation
in a manner more appropriate than burying it in the official journal. If indeed the purpose of
the EIA rules is to apply the preventive principle, this is unfortunate: the public's input, that
could possibly encourage the prevention of environmental harm, can continue to be played
down without infringing the provisions. Environmental authorities are also explicitly given
an opportunity to express their opinion, although at what stage of the process is
unspecified^®.
Directive 97/11 Article 1(7) modifying EIA85/337 Article 5(1).
Com(93)575, p.13.
Directive 97/11 Article 1(7) modifying EIA85/337 Article 5(3) and Annex IV, point
Directive 97/11 Article 1(8) modifying EIA85/337 Article 6(2).







Consideration of EIS and public consultation prior to granting authorisation: An amendment
to Article 8 adds more precisely that "The results of consultations and the information
gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6, and 7 must be taken into consideration in the
development consent procedure." It is difficult to see how a duty as unspecified as 'taking
into consideration' could be enforced: any authority will argue that this was precisely what it
had been doing. A more stringent duty could have been added: for example, that independent
environmental authorities be more systematically called upon to give an opinion (prior to
authorisation, see above), the legal value of which is specified44; or that where
environmental authorities oppose authorisation, an impartial review of the opinions of
competent and environmental authorities be undertaken42. As it is, the new provision is not
likely to advance the prevention of environmental harm sought by the directive.
As modified, Article 9 makes a helpful contribution to the ability of associations and
individuals to monitor conditions and encourages their vigilance. Authorities are now
required to publish the decision, its contents and conditions, as well as the "reasons and
considerations on which the decision is based", omitting "where the Member States'
legislation so provides". It further adds "a description, where necessary, of the main
measures to reduce and, if possible, offset the major adverse effects."43
A crucial addition to EIA procedures would have been the insistence on monitoring any
conditions imposed in authorisations — by competent authorities, rather than once again
relying on individuals and associations. As seen44, without this, such conditions tend not to
be complied with. Nonetheless, no provision in the amendments requires the authorities to
monitor compliance with the conditions imposed in the authorisation. This is still less
44 EIA85/337 Article 6(1) had provided that: "Member States shall take the measures
necessary to ensure that the authorities likely to be concerned by the project by reason of
their specific environmental responsibilities are given an opportunity to express their
opinion on the request for development consent...". No indication is given of the value of
this opinion.
42 As seen in Spain, the effectiveness of this depends upon the autonomy of the
environmental organ.
43 Directive 97/11 Article 1(10) modifying EIA85/337 Article 9(1).
44 Chapter 5, point 1.2.4. at Lack of resources; Chapter 8, point 1.7. at Failure to monitor.
explicable given the Community's obligations arising out of the Espoo Convention45 and the
fact that the Commission apparently recognised the necessity of such measures46. The
provisions for notification and involvement of other potentially affected Member States were
greatly expanded by the amending legislation. However, with regard to adapting
Community provisions to the monitoring requirements of the Espoo Convention, the
Commission considered, in its proposal "that there is no need... to adapt the Community
Directive... by providing for systematic monitoring of the circumstances in which the
development consent decision was taken and the proposed corrective measures so as to
avoid, reduce or offset the adverse effects on the environment."4'' The new Directive adds
nothing to the existing provisions in this regard.
Despite certain improvements, the principal issues that needed to be addressed,
concerning monitoring eventual conditions of authorisation, improving public consultation,
and ascertaining the quality of the EIS, have been left untouched by the March 1997
amendments48.
3. Challenges: To improve the effectiveness of the Community's legal protection of the
environment, various actions are necessary. Environmental protection is a complex, inter¬
disciplinary area, and some improvements depend upon the intervention of other
45 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, OJ 1992 C104/7; Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion on
behalf of the Community of the convention on environmental impact assessment in a
transboundary context OJ 1992 CI04/5, Article 7 on Post-project analysis.
46 Com(93)575, p. 4: the Commission notes the usefulness of a provision concerning
"monitoring the effects on the environment due to the implementation of the project"
(whether this includes monitoring conditions imposed in the authorisation is unclear). The
Commission admits that "imposition of such monitoring would have a beneficial effect when
it comes to implementing the project by enabling the competent authorities and the
developer to take the necessary measures to soften or compensate for the impact at the
earliest possible stage...".
It had even recognised the necessity ofmonitoring when proposing the original 1985
directive (article 11, OJ 1980 CI69/14), although this was taken out by the Council.
47 Com(93)575, p.4. It goes on to indicate that "Before submitting specific proposals it
(Commission) intends to examine in greater depth the costs and benefits of such adaptation
and its compatibility with the subsidiarity principle".
48 See forthcoming articles by W.R. Sheate, The Environmental Impact Assessment — A
Small Step Forward?" European Environmental Law Review, autumn 1997; and Nigel
Haigh, ENDS Report August 1997.
disciplines49. For instance, accepting the fact that decision-makers take decisions on the
basis of utility, methods of attaching a price to use of the environment so that environmental
costs can be incorporated into decision-making must urgently be developed; these are
questions for economists rather than lawyers and legislators. However, seeing that this
environmental cost is indeed paid, preferably by the polluter, is a matter for the legal
discipline50.
From the Community perspective, improvements to the effectiveness of environmental
rules, and specifically their implementation and enforcement, can be made by addressing the
more technical problems — necessarily, by their diverse nature, in a piecemeal manner. For
instance, allowing access to information without having to prove an interest54 and imposing
time limits on national administrations for the provision of environmental information52,
were important advances in making the public's involvement in environmental regulation
meaningful (although this cannot actually improve the administration's attitude). Since the
Community seems recently more willing to intervene in the conditions for obtaining interim
measures55, it would be helpful if it were to encourage the development of harmonised
delays for deciding questions of interim protection. In addition, on the sensitive issue of
criminal sanctions, on the occasion of a Member State challenge regarding Community
intervention, the ECJ recently seemed to take a wider view of what is within the
49 And perhaps on changes of approach among environmentalists as well. For instance,
it would be useful if environmental associations were to clarify and rationalise their
approach to certain issues. The immense scope of environmental causes evoked when
speaking of environmental protection can cloud the important issues: it would be helpful to
prioritise environmental issues, and to distinguish serious problems — the daily, enormous
loss of human life due to lack of water suitable for drinking, the loss of a species — from
volatile and relatively minor issues that tend to catch the media's attention. Furthermore,
some environmental organisations have relegated themselves to the sidelines through a
stubborn adherence to unrealistically costly standards and goals (Financial Times, 2 August
1993 "High Costs of Going Green"). Nonetheless, this is not a question to be examined here.
50 Certainly internalisation of costs can also be encouraged by economic and voluntary
instruments. However, given the political situation, proposals for economic incentives could
meet the same fate as the abandoned Proposal for a Council Directive introducing a tax on
carbon dioxide emissions and energy; Com(92)226; OJ 1992 CI96/1.
54 Directive 90/313, Article 3(1).
52 Directive 90/313, Article 3(4).
55 Chapter 3, point 1.2. at Time and interim measures.
Community's competence to require54. Therefore, more specific reference to sanctions and
penalties in Community directives could help ensure that adequate penalties at national
level are attached to infringements; at present this is often not the case55.
Ultimately, for real improvement in implementation and enforcement of Community
environmental rules, the more intractable problems rooted in low priority56 must be
addressed. Any discussion of resolving these must begin by acknowledging that there is a
strong element of wishful thinking here, yet complete pessimism can only exclude answers.
Rather than discussing whether a 'top-down' or a 'bottom-up' approach is preferable, it is
here accepted that these approaches are not mutually exclusive and that the need to act on
all levels is urgent. A variety of possibilities exist, some involving tools that are already in
place or are slowly developing, others that would involve significant changes (and here the
possibilities of the IGC are not to be ignored). The Community must simultaneously
encourage use of options available at grass-roots level, by emphasising the role of the public
and associations, and encourage a top-down approach by demonstrating its willingness to
apply seriously such requirements as the integration of environmental protection to other
policies, or transparency, to itself.
An absolutely primordial requirement is that the administration in charge of
environmental rules be given the power and resources to act effectively. It defies logic to
expect that, by heaping further tasks upon an inadequately supported administration, the
effectiveness of the rules will improve. However, vast changes in proportioning of the
budget are unlikely in the immediate future; and because of this lack of resources and
power, it seems that difficulties will persist at both Community and national levels in
54 Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission 1992 ECR 1-5423.
55 In fact the Commission has indicated that it is "considering
the introduction of a standard clause on sanction in EU environmental
legislation following a memorandum by the French Presidency";
Com(95)642, p.108.
56 And which are perhaps evolving slowly as new generations of decision-makers enter
positions of authority.
monitoring implementation. At present it may be more logical to try to rationalise and
improve the coherence of the existing instruments before taking more tasks on board.
Three areas are concentrated upon here, briefly: enforcement, integration and meeting
political challenges. One manner of consolidating results of existing rules is to prioritise
enforcement, to ensure that at least in the final instance, the rules are treated seriously.
Obviously difficulties in implementation affect the enforcement process, nonetheless
improvements are possible. Specifically civil liability is emphasised, as a tool both for giving
effect to the polluter pays principle and for alleviating the public authorities' burden of
monitoring. Also, since most environmental degradation has an economic source, it is
essential that the duty to integrate environmental protection be supported. Finally political
challenges must be met, or at least separated from the implementation and enforcement of
the law. A choice must be made between the positive political image fostered by adopting
environmental rules, and the damage done to the credibility of Community environmental
law that comes of allowing implementation and enforcement to remain so poor.
Unfortunately, in many areas it is already apparent that the will to meet the challenges is
lacking.
3.1. Stricter enforcement:
The Commission preference for preventive measures and for resolving disputes
amicably — through negotiation, package meetings52, et cetera — rather than making costly,
time-consuming applications to the Court is both a well-known and in many ways well-
founded policy58. Emphasising exchange of information networks such as IMPEL and the
EEA are also important initiatives5^. However, resentment of the costs and inconvenience
associated with environmental rules permeates many levels of action and will not be
overcome by encouragement and negotiation only.
At present, the likelihood that offenders will be deterred by the prospect of enforcement,
either at Community or Member State level, is insufficient60. At Community level, in 1994
environmental infringements counted for 25% of all irifringements of Community law
registered, yet only three cases were referred to the ECJ for failure to notify, and one referral
was made regarding the conformity of national implementing measures61. A more specific
example concerns Annex II projects in Spain: a reasoned opinion was sent in 1992, yet a
referral to the ECJ had still not been made in early 199762, although Spain had still not
adopted relevant provisions. Almost a decade has passed65 during which this substantial
violation of EIA85/337, with immense practical consequences, has been tolerated. Generally,
at Community level and in Spain, the number of environmental cases that make it to
judgment are very few; in France, although the numbers may be greater, the results are
frequently unsatisfactory. With environmental matters as elsewhere, "in the ultimate
52 Mentioned again in the Thirteenth Application Report (Com(96)600, p.81.
58 See Chapter 3, point 1.1. at - Conciliation and political pressure.
50 See Chapter 2, point 3.2. Creation of information sources; see also Com(95)624:
Progress Report on Implementation of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme.
60 This has seemingly been forgotten since the Fourth EAP, which identified, inter alia,
the need to initiate infringement procedures against delinquent Member States; Section 2.2
on Implementation of Community Directives.
See also PE 116.085, 1988, at p.16; Collins and Earnshaw, p.233, expressing concern
that conciliation is used occasionally where enforcement proceedings are more appropriate.
61 Com(95)500 final, Twelfth Application Report, p.59 points 1.2. and 1.3.
62 Garcia Ureta, A., "The E.C. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive Before the
European Court of Justice," 5 (1997) Environmental Liability 1 at p.3 note 24,25.
65 Since the entry into force in 1988 of EIA85/337
instance one can think that the polluter shall weigh the cost of compliance with the norms
against the probability of being sanctioned for non-compliance"64. In the ultimate instance,
all the parties involved realise that the threat of enforcement is small regarding
environmental infringements.
It is submitted that prevention and negotiation aimed at amicably resolving disputes
cannot be effective without a serious threat of enforcement; to make this prospect real,
enforcement actions must be more energetically pursued. It must be demonstrated that the
"stick in the cupboard" will indeed be used. Furthermore, the various stages of
implementation and enforcement are not strictly separate but influence each other: as the
prospect of enforcement proceedings is gradually taken more seriously, this will bolster the
incentive to reach amicable settlements.
Admittedly, an individual vision is not enough. An occasional victory in an isolated case
cannot counteract the accumulation of problems of implementation, and of enforcement
itself, that have undermined environmental rules up to this point. Even in the individual
case concerned, the ruling frequently arrives too late to be more than symbolic and for the
goal of environmental protection to be served. However, despite limitations regarding what
can be expected of enforcement, judicial decisions can encourage the evolution of social
interests and perceptions. Stricter enforcement, at both national and Community levels,
must be stressed if environmental rules are to achieve their purpose.
One of the Community's great advantages lies in its two-tier enforcement system, in the
possibility to enforce rules at Community level and within the national legal system. The
Community must be willing to play to its advantages, and it appears that national judges are
relatively more willing allies than national administrators66. Furthermore, at the
enforcement stage more than during transposition and practical implementation, certain
64 Estevan Bolea, 1991, p.339.
65 For instance, certain French administrative judges (and notably the Conseil d'Etat's
earlier negative attitude has somewhat evolved), and Spanish judges generally seem
disposed to make interpretations of existing rules in order to give them meaning in an
environmental context. Where judges are unwilling to take a stronger stance, this may be
more due to lack of audacity than to low priority of the environment.
problems stem more from poor adaptation of procedural rules that do not discriminate
against environmental concerns than from low priority. The Community can encourage the
treatment of these.
Decentralised enforcement: To ameliorate decentralised enforcement of environmental
rules the Community must continue to support the efforts of environmental associations and
individuals on the one hand, and national judges on the other.
Absence of effective enforcement confirms the suspicions of citizens and environmental
associations that participation in such procedures as EIA, and generally, monitoring
compliance with environmental rules and attempting to secure their judicial protection, is
costly and futile. As seenbb, the public quickly tires of exerting itself when it perceives its
cause to be doomed in advance. The Community must continue to see that information can
be obtained: for instance, complaints regarding Directive 90/313^ must be of particular
concern. Here, the Community must also be seen to be willing to apply to itself the
requirements of transparency and co-operation with the public, an issue which remains
problematic6®. Not only should existing means be emphasised, the Community must
consider placing new tools in the hands of its allies, and perhaps be more willing to stress
the input of individuals in procedural rules, and to consider increasing their power: as seen,
such issues received disappointing treatment in the proposed EIA amendments. Above all,
access to justice in environmental matters — rather than simply access to justice for
consumers, which has received attention in recent years69 — must remain an issue at the top
of the Community environmental agenda.
Regarding the ability of national courts to uphold Community environmental rules, it
may seem evident that the Community must take specific care in formulating legislative
bb Chapter 5; point 1.2.2. at Extreme reactions; Chapter 8, point 1.5. at Apathy.
6^ Still numerous, according to the Thirteenth Application Report, p.82 at point 1.5,
particularly regarding Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
6® Bates, Stephen, "Secretive EU institution forced to go public about not being open,"
The Guardian, 27 November 1996.
69 Com(96)13 final, "Action Plan on consumer access to justice and the settlement of
consumer disputes in the internal market."
texts, to use language that is clear, precise and enforceable, yet this appears to be presenting
increasing difficulty'70. Despite the limitations of the enforcement process, precedents set by
the ECJ not only give would-be defenders of the environment important tools on which to
rely, they can encourage initiative on the part of national judges. As mentioned, the failure of
national courts to use the means at their disposal is possibly due to lack of judicial
audacity'7^. jn such cases, the judges may be susceptible to Community influence. For
instance, ruling that environmental interests cannot be subordinate to economic, or that
economic interests cannot be taken into account when making certain decisions (as in the
Santona Marsh''2 or the Lappel Bank2-! cases) will not alter the reality of decision-making;
nonetheless this supports the seriousness of environmental goals and provides valuable
grounds for judicial review. Attempting to limit the possibility for administrative discretion
and insisting on scientific rather than economic criteria74 are crucial factors in redressing the
balance of interests, not so that administrative presumptions systematically favour
environmental considerations, but at least so that they do not continue to favour
systematically economic considerations.
70 Below, point 3.3.
71 For instance, in using innovative economic methods for assigning market value to
environmental goods where compensation is at issue.
72 C-355/90 Commission v Spain 1993 ECR 1-4272: para.17: "The Spanish Government
takes the view that the ecological requirements laid down in that provision must be
subordinate to other interests, such as social and economic interests, or must at the very
least be balanced against them." Para 18: "That argument cannot be accepted. It is clear from
the Court's judgment in Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany 1991 ECR 1-833 that, in
implementing the directive, Member States are not authorized to invoke, at their option,
grounds of derogation based on taking other interests into account."
73 C-44/95 Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds (Lappel Bank) 1996 ECR 1-3805, para. 31: "a Member State may not, when
designating an SPA and defining its boundaries, take account of economic requirements as
constructing a general interest superior to that represented by the ecological objective of that
directive."
Admittedly the EC] seems to take away with one hand what it gives with the other:
in para.39 it notes that it is possible for "Member States to adopt, for imperative reasons of
overriding public interest and subject to certain conditions, a plan or a project adversely
affecting an SPA and so made it possible to go back on a decision classifying such an area by
reducing its extent...".
74 C-355/90 Commission v Spain 1993 ECR 1-4272: para.26: "...Although Member States
do have a certain margin of discretion with regard to the choice of special protection areas,
the classification of those areas is nevertheless subject to certain ornithological criteria
determined by the directive, such as the presence of birds listed in Annex I, on the one hand,
and the designation of a habitat as a wetland area, on the other."
- Civil Liability: Any strategy that aims to reinforce the decentralised
enforcement of Community law must, more concretely, reinforce civil liability for
environmental harm. The Community declared its interest in civil liability for environmental
harm for many years in general statements78 and began to lay the groundwork with specific
legal texts76. (However, the main hope for action in this area, a proposal on civil liability for
waste77, has lain dormant since 1991.) The Community must encourage the resolution of the
debate launched with its Green Paper on Civil Liability for environmental damage.
Establishing a general approach to civil liability for environmental harm could produce
benefits from several perspectives: it would give effect to the polluter pays principle
embodied in Article 130r(2). Lack of harmonised rules in this area encourages forum
shopping for Member States where rules are more lax78 (thereby providing the necessary
justification for Community intervention) and possibly distort competition79. Development
of a Community-wide approach to civil liability would ensure that environmental interests
are not the last to receive treatment in an eventual academic movement to unify European
private law8®: Betlem suggests the adoption of an EC Regulation (which would require no
75 Starting with such texts as the Fourth EAP OJ 1987 C328/15 at 2.5.5, which speaks of
the "better definition of responsibility (including the possibility that the polluter should
assume extended liability...)" and encourages the "coordination of instruments".
76 For instance, the 1984 Council Directive 84/631 on the supervision and control
within the EC of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste; OJ 1984 L326/31, Article
11(3) commits the Council to determining the conditions for implementing the civil liability
of the producer in case of damage.
77 Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liablity for Damage caused by waste; OJ
1989 C251/3; Amended proposal OJ 1991 CI92/6.
78 Betlem, G., "Environmental Liability," in Towards a European Civil Code, Hartkamp et
al editors, Ars Aequi Libri, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London 1994.
79 Industry argued that this was not the case, in all probability to avert Community
intervention; the Community officials were unconvinced by their arguments; Report of joint
European Parliament/ EC Commission hearing on 3,4 November 1993 on civil Lability.
8® It is acknowledged that political feasibility of this is problematic. Nonetheless, see
generally DeWitte, B and forder C., The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal
Education, Kluwer, Maastricht, 1992; hartkamp A.S., et al, Towards a European Civil Code,
Hartkamp et al editors, Ars Aequi Libri, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London 1994; Landbo,
Ole, "Principles of European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a Precursor of European
Legislation?" 40 (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law 573; Reimann, M., "American
Private Law and European Legal Unification — Can the United States be a Model?" 3 (1996)
Maastricht Journal 217; van Gerven, "The Case-law of the European Court of Justice and
Member State elaboration) on civil liability for environmental harm81. However, the reason
for which emphasising civil liability is strongly supported here is that, as seen, many
problems arise in practical implementation because the administration has neither the
resources nor the initiative to monitor carefully compliance with environmental rules:
improved mechanisms for civil liability would help to remedy a great deal of the problems
of practical implementation and ease the burden of an overworked and under-supported
administration, by encouraging auto-application82. (Of course, certain negative effects must
also be expected and, if possible, avoided83.)
As Mclntyre comments, "civil liability is an issue where the devil is very much in the
detail."84 Certain issues would need to be emphasised: notably, many of these issues concern
adapting legal rules to environmental issues. The debate has already been engaged, it is
simply a matter of continuing to promote "greener" options83: for instance, strict rather than
fault-based liability, joint-and-several rather than joint responsibility86, and mainly,
reparation for 'pure' environmental damage (rather than only to property interests or where
National Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanisation of Private Law," 1995 European
Review of Private Law 367.
81 Which could then be inserted as is into a European Civil Code; Betlem, pp.333-44.
82 The preventive principle, Article 130r(2), would thereby also be given effect.
83 For instance, increased awareness of risk of lender liability can lead to a restriction
on the development of contaminated land, with the result that, unless the public sector
helps, such sites remain untreated. This also leads to an increase in pressure for the
development of 'green fields', or uncontaminated areas. The costs of borrowing is higher
where risk is higher; again the site is more likely to remain untreated. Finally, since lender
liability can be incurred from having "knowingly permitted" the contamination, this may
lead to the removal of environmental clauses from loan applications, et cetera, in order that
the lending institution may claim to have known as little as possible; see Rowan-Robinson, J.,
Theron, C., and Ross, A., "Policing the Environment: Private Regulation and the Role of
Lenders," 4 (1996) Environmental Liability 114-18.
In particular the American experience with CERCLA could provide a useful
indication of areas to approach with caution; Sidley & Austin, "United States Environmental
Law Developments Affecting Lenders in 1995," 2 (1996) Journal of International Banking
Law 49-61.
84 Mclntyre, O., "European Community Proposals on Civil Liability for Environmental
Damage -- Issues and Implications," 1995 Environmental Liability 29, at p. 31.
s
Many of which would be in keeping with the Lugano Convention; see Martin, G.,
"La Responsabilite civile pour les dommages a l'environnement et la Convention de
Lugano," RJE, 2-3/1994.
86 Although on this matter, the Lugano Convention is unclear, and the joint-and-
several solution appears to apply only where the damage is indivisible (Articles 6.2 and 6.3
Lugano Convention); see commentary, Martin, "La Responsabilite civile..." 1994, pp.129-30.
human health is affected)87. However, what is most urgently needed is wider access to
justice for representatives of collective interests. Environmental groups would also need to
modify their stance somewhat, perhaps by acknowledging that qualms about who should be
entitled to receive compensation for damage to a collective good are justifiable. It is
unrealistic to demand, as in the Spanish situation, an actio popularis. Nonetheless, by
adjusting the remedy sought (restorative rather than financial), or by accepting that duly
registered associations can be given standing to claim for collective interests, advance can be
made. Finally, the point of the exercise is to remedy environmental harm, rather than to
undermine economic actors or drive them into bankruptcy: as Mclntyre suggests, limitations
of liability and defences88 would need to be carefully determined, and it would be necessary
to establish compensation funds where civil liability cannot be determined89.
Once an actual financial cost is attached to harmful behaviour and exacted from the
polluter, a significant step will have been taken in training the business mentality to include
environmental calculations in management decisions, and consequently in alleviating the
verification burden of administrative actors.
Centralised enforcement: Despite Commission preferences for a non-confrontational
approach to ensuring compliance with environmental rules, Community-level enforcement
must itself be improved in order to be more effective and to be so perceived. Again, the
Community must maintain the advantages that it already has and encourage the use of tools
87 Martin, "La Responsabilite civile..." 1994, pp.124-25.
'
Mclntyre suggests (p.30) inter alia an Act of God defense and the defense of having
complied with administrative authorisations. The latter is not supported here, specifically
given the laxity of administrative actors, seen throughout this work, when according
authorisations and their inadequate follow-up of environmental restrictions imposed in
authorisations. Moreover, to exonerate the polluter entirely encourages laxity on his part
once he has complied with minimal administrative requirements. Also, the exoneration of
the polluter if scientific knowledge at the time did not confirm the danger of the activity, as
provided in the Lugano Convention, is dubious. It is in contradiction with the precautionary
principle, and Martin points out that the polluter should be exonerated only if nothing in the
debate at the time permitted doubt concerning the environmental danger to arise; "La
Responsabilite civile..." 1994, p.131.
89 Mclntyre, 1995, pp.33-35, 37; Martin, "La Responsabilite civile..." 1994, p.129.
Here again, however, the American experience is instructive: it has been found that
much of the trust fund has been eaten away by litigation over liability rather than in actual
clean-up of the sites; Rowan-Robinson, J., Theron, C., and Ross, 1996, p.115.
that are already in place, such as the complaints procedure. Complaints received at
Community level91' must be treated with care; this has not been the perception of
associations in recent years91, and the number of complaints has fallen9^.
Furthermore, as seen, regarding infringement proceedings DG-XI can find itself at odds
with the various other Community departments and policies, or find itself the target of
political efforts by Member State representatives. It is necessary to alleviate political
pressure on the enforcement procedure. Discussions regarding possible amendments to the
Treaty on European Union provide an opportunity not to be missed. In this regard, Dr.
Kramer makes an interesting suggestion, supported here for the most part91, which could
help bypass both the Commission's discretion in enforcement, as well as the difficulties of
meeting the Article 173 test for legal title. He suggests that Article 169 be reworded to read:
1. The Commission is obliged to start proceedings under Article 169, where it considers
that a Member State failed to fulfil an obligation, and to issue a reasoned opinion. 2. The letter
of formal notice and the reasoned opinion shall be published. 3. Where a group, acting in the
public interest, has asked the Commission to bring a matter, for which a reasoned opinion
has been issued, before the Court of Justice and the Commission has failed to do so within
ninety days after receipt of that request, that group shall be entitled to bring that matter
before the Court. 4. The European Parliament and the Council shall determine the details of
the procedure and in particular the conditions, with which a group shall comply in order to
be considered to act in the public interest.
As at Member State level, pressing for an actio popularis at Community level is not
considered reasonable. Yet the proposed wording leaves less to the Commission's choice and
opens a route for approved associations to challenge the Commission's inertia. In this
manner the Commission would no longer be the only actor empowered to (or responsible
for) bringing infringements to the ECJ, a role which it cannot be expected to fulfil impartially
Whatever the shortcomings of the procedure; Chapter 2 point 2.4 at - Individuals and
groups or associations.
91 For example, of the non-governmental organisations responding to a questionnaire,
all believed that external political pressure played a part in the outcome of their complaints;
Williams, R., pp.364-65.
See also comments recognising the inadequacy of EU action; Com(95)642, p.108.
91 Thirteenth Application Report, p.81, point 1.4.
Perhaps a term less forceful than 'obliged' would be appropriate at point 1,
especially since another group would be entitled to bring an action, and since retaining some
element of Commission discretion is probably desirable.
where its own decisions are under dispute. This solution, applicable to all areas of
Community policy, would be particularly useful regarding environmental issues.
3.2. Integration of environmental protection into other policies:
Again, significant advance could be made by using the tools that are already in place: in
this case the requirement embodied in Article 130r(2), that environmental protection be
integrated into the definition and execution of other Community policies. Given that most
environmental problems can be traced to an economic activity, it is imperative that the
Article 130r(2) be emphasised. Unfortunately, the ECJ seems willing to relegate Article
130r(2) to the position of mere policy determination. It has stated that "...Article 130r is
confined to defining the general objectives of the Community in the matter of the
environment94." It is ironic that this requirement, introduced at the same time and in the
same Treaty article as the Subsidiarity principle, should be thus dismissed, while on the
other hand, Subsidiarity has both been elevated to Article 3B of the Treaty and is being
allowed to undermine Community environmental initiatives96. This imbalance should be
addressed.
In preparation for the Inter-Governmental Conference, the European Parliament
consulted the Member States on environmental issues. Germany, supported by Finland,
made the interesting suggestion that integration of environmental protection should not be
tucked into the Environmental Title, but should be added to an Article applicable to the
entire Treaty96. This has been taken up in the Dublin II, general outline for a draft revision of
the Treaties9''. Indeed, its position in the Environmental Title, precisely where its application
is somewhat redundant, is ill-suited to its purpose: namely that it guide the elaboration of
94 Case C-379/92 Criminal Proceedings Against Peralta 1994 ECR 1-3453, para.57.
95 Below, point 3.3.
96 Briefing on the European Environmental Policy and the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference, PE 165.967, at pp.9,12,17.19.
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Brussels 5 December 1996, Conf. 2500/96: The European Union Today and Tomorrow,
Adapting the European Union for the Benefit of its peoples and preparing for the future — A
general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties, Dublin II, which proposes a new Article
3d in the TEC.
other Community policies. The point is one to retain, even if environmental matters are not a
topic of discussion at the IGC^, since integration of environmental protection is a means of
introducing the topic of environment during the discussion of other policies.
As a matter of general policy, the true long-term economic costs of failure to integrate
environmental protection^ — the simple fact that clean-up is more expensive than
prevention — must be underlined. And first, the Community must itself be seen to give
substance to the requirement. As a minimum, it is in no way excessive to require the
Commission to stop funding projects that violate Community environmental policy and
rules!*-®. j^s Kramer suggests, EIA should be mandatory for Community co-financed
projects — "and the assessment would have to be a serious one."!®! The Commission must
stop viewing such demands as impractical or unreasonable!®2.
More actively, the integration of environmental protection could be reinforced.
Competition policy illustrates that environmental requirements could be incorporated
theoretically without much difficulty. Apart from the generation of new instruments!®-^, the
tools for integrating environment into competition already exist. Effective competition!®^
leads to efficient allocation of resources — which could include natural resources if the
98 Which would be a serious indicator of governmental priority.
11 Started to in 5AP OJ 1993 C138/96-97 "failure to make these investements (on which
future generations depend) could ultimately put whole regions and ultimately civilization
itself out of business."
!°® Kramer, JEL 1996, p.8.
!®! Ibid, p.8; to this effect see also the Dublin II, Outline for a draft revision of the
Treaties, proposed Declaration to the Final Act, p.50.
!®2 For instance, recently the Commission indicated that: "The requirement ... to make
projects on tourism financed by the Structural Funds subject to environmental impact
assessments (EIA) runs counter to the EIA Directive of 1985 and the provisions included in
the Structural Funds Regulations of 1993"; Com(96)648 final, Amended proposal for a
European Parliament and Council Decision on the review of the European Community
Programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development
"Towards Sustainability", p.3. To state that this "runs counter" is strong language,
particularly since tourism projects are among the proposed additions to the amended EIA
legislation.
103 Particularly economic instruments, environmental taxes and levies, which are
apparently being increasingly used in the Member States; European Commission, The Week
in Europe, 30 January 1997, WE/04/97.
1®4 See generally Jacobs, R., "EEC Competition Law and the Protection of the
Environment," 1993/2 LIEI 37-67; and Com(93)162 final XXII, Report on Competition Policy.
polluter pays principle were ruthlessly applied (and costs thereby internalised)^^. The
draconian rules that guard effective competition themselves provide for exemptions into
which environmental considerations could be made to fit-*-^. Jacobs makes the interesting
point^'^ that ecological benefits should be considered among the criteria for Article 85(3)108
exemptions; that the 'ecological record' of a product is part of its immaterial value10^; and
that even if the product is physically not distinguishable from another similar product, its
quality is higher if it was produced in an environmentally sound manner or if its disposal is
less environmentally harmful^0. Ecological improvements in the long-term should be
considered progress that allows consumers a fair share. Conversely, the Article 130r(2)
requirement that the environment be integrated would dictate that block exemptions for
agreements that potentially meet conditions for exemption, but which cause significant harm
to the environment, be withdrawn (individual exemptions could then be considered)!!'.
105 The Commission puts forth that the effectiveness of the polluter pays principle
"depends in particular on the proper operation of the price mechanism, which ought to
translate into costs the negative effects of a particular process on the environment"; Com
(93)162 final, p.48. To function, of course, such ideas do also depend on the development of
economic valuators for environmental goods.
106 Practices prohibited under Article 85(1)EC may be exempted under Article 85(3) if
they contribute to "improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit" and if, simultaneously, they do not impose restrictions that are "not indispensable",
or offer the possibility of "eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question".
107 Jacobs, R. pp.50-59.
108 Article 85(3): "The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit and which does not
a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives
b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question."
11® Much as prestige has been recognized to be of immaterial value in fashion and
perfume (Commission Decision 92/33 of 16 December 1991, Yves St. Laurent parfums OJ 1992
LI2/24 at 31-32).
11° A cradle-to-grave approach endorsed by the Commission in the Eco-label scheme.
HI Jacobs, R. pp.59-60.
With similar logic, the environment should be considered in the application of Article 86
EC. More formidable in that no exemptions are permitted, Article 86 flatly prohibits abuse of
a dominant position. Nonetheless, environmental considerations could influence the
decision to qualify a firm's practice as 'abusive'112. Finally, mergers and concentrations that
benefit the environment should for this reason be viewed with more leniency by the
Commission1 1 5.
The ideas exist: it becomes a matter of mustering the will to take a more active stance.
The Commission itself agrees that the "mechanisms of competition have an indispensable
role to play in facilitating dynamic developments such as the adaptation of the productive
system to environmental requirements."114 Disappointingly, however, it goes on to state
that "agreements which restrict competition continue to be prohibited by Article 85(1) even if
the parties invoke environmental protection in order to justify them."115 Although the logic
of incorporating environmental protection into decisions concerning breach of competition
rules appears sound, again the vision of what needs to be done has preceded the political
will to do it.
112 For instance, a dominant firm that demands higher (environmental) quality products
from its supplier does not abuse its position, it integrates environmental concern; nor is a
higher price that genuinely reflects environmental costs abusive; Jacobs, R. p.63.
115 Jacobs, R. p.65.
114 Com (93)162 final, XXII Report on Competition Policy, at p.41.
115 Ibid., pp.47-8.
3.3. Distancing politics from law:
As noted, at certain stages the interaction of politics and law is not only inevitable but
appropriate, as during the formulation of norms. However, it has been seen that in other
stages the intrusion of politics can be excessive. Efforts must be made to distance politics
from the application of the law, for instance, to see that those entrusted with enforcing the
law are not simultaneously called upon to fulfil political functions. The intrusion of politics
detracts from the results achieved by implementation of the rules, of course, but also from
the respect for the obligatory nature of these rules. Again this complaint, valid in the
application of law in many areas, is particularly severe in degree where environmental rules
are concerned. At present one of the most serious challenges to Community environmental
law is being articulated in terms of "subsidiarity."
The principle of subsidiarity^ attempts to organise concurrent competences among
various levels of authority, attributing to each level those powers that it can most
appropriately exercise. The principle was introduced to the Environment Title of the Treaty
by Article 130r(4)H' of the SEA, although similar notions had existed, without academic stir,
since the elaboration of the first EAP's principle lO^8. Subsidiarity's application was
116 The concept is born of the notion that "it would be unjust and socially harmful to
withdraw from the lower groupings and confer on a larger entity those functions which the
former can well perform themselves"; Papal Encyclical "Quadregesimo Anno," Pope Pious
XI, 15 May 1931, cited in Constantinesco, V. "Who's Afraid of Subsidiarity?" 11 (1991)
Yearbook of European Law 33 at pp.34-35. See also Communication of the Commission to the
Council and Parliament, of 27 October 1992, "The Principle of Subsidiarity," Bull.EC 10-1992,
pp.116-126; Kramer, L. "The Single European Act and Environmental Protection: Reflections
on Several New Provisions in Community Law," 24 (1987) CMLRev 659, p.665; Judge, D.,
'"Predestined to Save the Earth': the Environment Committee of the European Parliament,"
in A Green Dimension for the EC?, Judge, D., ed., 1993, at p.208-9; Golub, J., "Sovereignty and
Subsidiarity in EU Environmental Policy," European University Institute, EU1 Working
Paper RSC No.96/2.
1' ^ Article 130r(4) EEC: "The Community shall take action relating to the environment
to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at
Community level than at the level of the individual Member States. Without prejudice to
certain measures of a Community nature, the Member States shall finance and implement
the other measures."
First EAP, C112/7: "In each different category of pollution, it is necessary to
establish the level of action (local, regional, national, Community, international) that befits
the type of pollution and the geographical zone to be protected should be sought.
Actions which are likely to be the most effective at the Community level should be
concentrated at that level; priorities should be determined with special care."
extended to the entire Treaty by the Maastricht amendments!^; Article 3b EC requires the
Community to take action "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States". A clear shift has taken place in the
burden of proof: the Commission must now demonstrate that legislation meets the
requirements of subsidiarity and supply a written justification of each new piece of
legislation, as seen in the proposed EIA amendments.
Member States have used subsidiarity to challenge Community competence and to
repatriate competence in certain areas of Community law. At the Edinburgh Council, in the
wake of British, Danish and French doubts in approving the Maastricht Treaty, the challenge
posed by the principle was made more explicit and a resolution was put forth to revise
certain pieces of legislation^2®; 'hit lists' of legislative texts to be scrapped were drawn up^l.
This in itself is not negative; as seen, sometimes the quality of the adopted legislation
requires its clarification or revision. However, two factors concerning subsidiarity spell
trouble for Community environmental policy and law. First, it was extremely noticeable that
environmental law was a main target of the move to revise and to abandon pieces of
legislation^22. Secondly, the debate concerning revision of existing law or the validity of new
policy initiatives does not involve the effectiveness of action at one or the other
11" Article 3B: "The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty."
120 Commission report to the European Council on the adaptation of Community
legislation to the subsidiarity principle, Com(93)545, pp.15-17, p.24.
121 As Albert Weale points out, "environmental directives have been high on the British
government's list of measures that it thought prime candidates for elimination by application
of the principle of subsidiarity"; Weale, A., 1995, p.22; see also Golub, 1996, p.10; Wurzel,
JEPP 1996, pp.285-86; Francioni in Markesinis, pp.220-21.
122 European Council of Edinburgh Presidency Conclusions, Europe no. 5878
Sunday/Monday 13/14 December 1992; Com(93)545 European Commission Report to the
European Council on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle;
see also Golub, 1996, p.10.
administrative levels or the appropriate form of legal rule122, as the definition of
subsidiarity would imply. Rather, as Collier indicates, a Member State's interpretation of
subsidiarity "will invariably be based on political expediency rather than environmental
needs"124. In fact, Golub reports125 that a former head of Britain's Department of
Environment Central Unit on Environmental Protection indicated that in terms of British
strategy, the subsidiarity principle was "really just being thrown in to object to something
[we] did not like...not a matter of high principle but of low cash, basically."
The European Parliament, months after the Edinburgh Summit, was prompted to
demand
that the Commission uphold the interests of the environmental improvement of the
Community as a whole and strongly resist attempts to undermine that principle by
inappropriate definitions of subsidiarity which seek merely to repatriate legislative
responsibility to the nation states and which are based on narrow or nationalistic
considerations.12(1
The effect of the political challenge, put most emphatically by the United Kingdom127
has been, first, to decrease Community legislative activity generally, but most strikingly in
the area of environment128. To illustrate, a 1976 Directive on discharge of dangerous
substances129 requires that further directives on specific substances ("daughter directives")
continue to be elaborated: activity here has come to a total standstill and no proposal has
been tabled in five years120. On a more general basis, not one new piece of environmental
legislation was adopted in 1995. Where environmental legislation has been adopted since the
Edinburgh Summit, this is more due to concern for effects on the internal market rather than
for environmental protection. For instance, between Maastricht and 1995, six directives were
122 Directives are considered to uphold the subsidiarity principle by leaving a large
margin of discretion to the national authorities regarding choice of implementing measures.
124 Collier, op. cit., p.136.
125 Golub, 1996, p. 7.
125 European Parliament, Resolution on Subsidiarity, environment and consumer
protection, OJ 1993 C42/40 at point 12.
127 Weale, 1995, pp.20-24; Kramer, "Recent Developments...", London Conference, 1995
(above).
128 Golub, 1996, p.22.
129 OJ 1976 LI08/41.
120 Kramer, "Recent Developments...", London Conference, 1995 (above).
adopted and eleven proposed regarding chemicals, because of the impact regulation can
have on the competitive position of the concerned industries. By comparison, only one
directive was adopted in the area of nature conservation434. Again, a decrease in legislative
activity is not entirely negative433. One could argue that it is necessary to consolidate first
the acquis of the previously adopted environmental rules, to ensure that these are effectively
applied before adopting other measures433.
However, the second, more serious, consequence of the challenge framed in subsidiarity
terms, and of the Commission's new-found timidity must be viewed as quite negative:
environmental goals that have been set since the Summit are still more ambiguous and less
enforceable than previously. The political atmosphere is being allowed to dilute the quality
and above all the precision of the legal standards. For instance, the proposed Directive for
Ecological Water Quality434 (intended to replace the shellfish waters legislation) has been
criticised435 for avoiding actual figures and adopting a procedural approach that allows
Member States to define their own targets. Thus, Article 8 requires Member States to "ensure
that the measures and practices required under the integrated programmes are legally
binding on natural and legal persons, both public and private". On the other hand, Member
States can choose in certain sectors not to use legally binding instruments at all but rather to
434 Ibid.
433 Although a selection of environmental problems remain to be addressed through
legislation. Golub validly cautions against overly facile insistence that environmental
problems are by nature transboundary and therefore justify Community intervention;
Golub, 1996, pp.10-13.
433 Furthermore, it has been argued that "it will almost always be possible for the Court,
if it wishes, to find grounds for upholding the [challenged] measure"; Hartley, T.c., The
Foundations of European Community Law, second edition, Clarendon Law Series, 1988, p.217.
However, this fails to reassure: if the Commission continues to avoid proposing rules, or if
legislation continues to be snuffed out while in the proposal stage it seems unlikely that the
occasion will present itself for the ECJ to uphold such rules.
434 Com(93)680 final; OJ 1994 C222/6.
435 Kramer, "Recent Developments...", and Mr. David Freestone, "The Impact of
Subsidiarity," Conference: The Impact ofEC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom, London,
3 November 1995; Cross, Gerry, "Enforcement of Environmental Rules: the UK Experience,"
in Enforcing European Community Rules: Criminal Procedures, Administrative Procedures and
Harmonization, eds., Harding, C and Swart, B., Dartmouth Publishing, 1996. This is not an
isolated example: the proposed framework directive on quality of air has also been criticised
for failing to fix precise standards, setting instead umbrella-type goals.
use (Article 8(2)) "economic instruments designed to encourage natural persons and public
and private undertakings to comply with the provisions of this Directive." The Commission
has argued in the past that "[t]he main choice where subsidiarity is concerned is between
binding and non-binding measures"136 yet here it appears paralysed by the debate and
unable to make this fundamental choice. As David Freestone emphasises13'', such general
terms and obligations are completely unenforceable by conventional means. They pose
entirely new problems related to policing the effectiveness of the measures. The recently
proposed Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (IPPC)138 also uses
similarly loose phrasing and indeterminate goals (e.g. the undefined 'high level of
protection', Article 8) which Freestone points out are virtually impossible to police13^.
Recently proposed rules demonstrate that political resentment of Community
intervention has overshadowed the lessons taught by implementation and enforcement. This
challenge is particularly unsettling in that it affects not isolated individual instances or
breaches, but rather the basic quality of Community environmental legislation. Given
present political hesitations regarding European integration, the willingness to defend
environmental law is lacking, since this is the Community's youngest and far from strongest
policy area. However, subsidiarity-termed arguments overlook the fact that, were it not for
Community intervention, only certain Member States would have a body of environmental
rules. Where a few Member States might indeed be better equipped to regulate the
environment, all Fifteen would have to be before Community intervention could be
justifiably abandoned for reasons of subsidiarity. Many would not adopt environmental
legislation, and such arguments tend to forget that the result would be not only greater
environmental deterioration but also, what is perhaps more significant from this perspective,
136 Bull. EC 10-1992, p.123.
13^ Freestone, "The Impact of Subsidiarity," (above).
138 OJ 1993 C311/6; amended: OJ 1995 C165/9.
13<1 Freestone, "The Impact of Subsidiarity," (above); cf: Mr. Richard Macrory
commented that such ideas idea of self-executing legislation were a promised land, i.e.
unattainable; Richard Macrory, "The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law Against
Member States," Conference: The Impact of EC Environmental Law in the United Kingdom,
London, 3 November 1995.
distortion of the highly prized internal market. It is ironic that no serious challenge
regarding the need for environmental rules was made in the absence of a Treaty foundation,
yet now that a solid Treaty base exists, the pressure applied by a few Member States
threatens to erode the tenuous acquis communautaire in this domain140.
140 This may be partly explained by the fact that, now that unanimous voting has
largely been replaced by qualified majority voting, the content of the rules is less firmly in
the grip of Member States.
4. Final comments:
Despite previous inadequacies and the many challenges facing it, the Community still
has an important role to play. As seen, much of the legislation would not exist in these
Member States at all without Community intervention141. Community environmental goals,
once adopted, are less likely to sway with the push and shove of the arrival and departure of
political majorities in national legislatures; Community-wide rules rein in the ability of
national majorities to lessen the goals set at Community level142. Finally, international
commitments are given the force of national law through the Community's intervention in
the national legal orders.
In the worst case, it would be less damaging to stop issuing Community-wide
environmental rules than to succumb to political challenge and issue rules of dubious
quality, which are then inadequately monitored and enforced. Yet obviously, rather than
bailing out of a worthwhile and necessary programme, it would be better still to continue to
issue Community legislation, ensuring that high standards143 are maintained and that
adopted rules are specific enough to be monitored and enforced. Maintaining Community
environmental standards in other policy initiatives must be encouraged.
And once rules exist, it must be known that, in the ultimate instance, their violation will
indeed be sanctioned, either at Community or national level. To act otherwise fundamentally
diminishes environmental law: it contributes to a widespread view that environmental law
is somehow less 'mandatory'144 than other areas of law and undermines the small amount of
respect the area has gained in the two-and-a-half decades of its existence. Legitimacy of
Community law also ebbs as a whole if it appears that its environmental rules are
meaningless or that they can be violated with impunity.
141 In Spain, EIA was introduced at the Community's initiative, in France and Spain,
LCP measures were thus adopted.
142 See Chapter 6, point 6. Conclusions.
143 Cf: the 'high level of protection', Article 130r(2); and Article 100a(3).
144 Tenth Application Report 1992 (Environment Offprint) p.4.
The Community cannot allow itself to be swayed by every adverse pohtical breeze. At
minimum, it cannot collapse on crucial issues such as the verification of comphance and
enforcement of rules to which it has already committed itself. On the contrary, since for the
most part the tools for reinforcing the effectiveness of Community environmental law exist,
the Community must demonstrate a willingness to use them, and to apply them first to its
own initiatives. The Commission has stated that "the credibility of the industrialised world
including the Community, from the viewpoint of developing countries will be
commensurate with the extent to which it puts its own house in order"145. It is submitted
that the Community's credibility in the eyes of its own Member States is also at issue.
Fifth EAP, OJ 1993 C138/12.
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Appendices
Appendix A — Institutions of the Member States
France
The legislative body is composed of the Assemblee Nationale, elected by direct universal
suffrage, and the Senat, elected by indirect vote to ensure territorial representation
(senatorial seats are divided among the departements). The two assemblies deliberate
separately as a rule, although provisions allow for common debate under certain
circumstances.
The Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) is the advisory body (below).
The Conseil Constitutionnel, created in 1958, has certain electoral duties and pronounces on the
conformity of organic laws with the Constitution, as well as laws referred to it by the
President, the Prime Minister or the President of either the Senat or the Chambre des
Deputes (as the Assemblee Nationale is also known). There is no appeal against its
decisions.
Administrative Courts
The courts of first instance with jurisdiction in administrative disputes (contentieux
administratis, are the tribunaux administrates, each of which takes the name of the
town in which it is seated.
The Cours Administrates d'Appel, were created in 1989; most appeals of administrative
disputes now go to one of the five Cours Administratives d'Appel (in Paris, Bordeaux,
Lyon, Nancy and Nantes).
The Conseil d'Etat was created in "l'An VIII" (1799) to advise the government on issues of law¬
making, and developed into a court as ministers grew accustomed to heeding its
conclusions, especially in matters to do with complaints from private individuals
against the administration. It continues to exercise a dual role of advisor to the
government and judge. Five of its divisions conduct advisory work; the sixth, la section
du contentieux, which is divided into 10 sous-sections, hears disputes. The Conseil
d'Etat can be a court of first instance for judicial review of decrets and other
administrative decisions, in matters reserved for it because of their importance; an
appeal court for the administrative courts, or a court of last instance for appeals to
have a decision struck down on a question of law (facts can no longer be at issue). It is
also a court of appeal and of last instance for several specialist courts.
The Commissaire du gouvernement is a feature of administrative jurisdictions; s/he
independently proposes a solution from the point of view of the law.
Judicial System (civil and criminal)
Courts of first degree: In criminal matters, police courts (tribunaux de police) deals with
contraventions, minor offences. The tribunaux correctionnels deal with more serious
offences (delits); a tribunal correctionnel is a division of the Tribunal de grande
instance, which also has civil divisions. The Cour des Assises (composed of three
judges and a jury of nine lay persons), hears the most serious violatios, crimes.
-Vi
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Courts offirst degree: In civil matters, Tribunaux de grande instance have replaced the earlier
tribunaux de premiere instance, since 1958. The president of a tribunal de grande
instance has jurisdiction to make provisional orders on summary procedure.
Civil and criminal courts share the courts of second degree, the Cours d'Appel. The chambres
correctionnels hear appeals from the tribunaux de police and the tribunaux
correctionnels; other chambers hear appeals, subject to de minimus rule, from civil
courts.
Seated in Paris, the Cour de Cassation is a court of third instance, and has the responsibility to
ensure uniformity in application of the law throughout the French territory. It is
composed of six chambers: one distinct criminal chamber, and three civil chambers.
(The remaining two are the commercial and financial chamber, and the social
chamber.) An appeal (pourvoi) can be made against the decision of any court on grounds
of violation of enacted law or the general principles of law; it cannot review fact. It
cannot substitute its own decision for that which it examines; rather, if it considers the
decision to be affected by a violation of the law, it sets it aside and refers the case back
to a court of the same order and degree.
The Ministere Public (public prosecution) is an institution common to criminal and civil
procedure. Agents accredited to a court constitute the Parquet. Agents of the
prosecution, having the same training as judges, are known as the magistrature debout
(the standing magistracy) as opposed to the judges on the bench, the magistrature
assise (the seated magistracy). A procureur de la Republique (Procurator of the
Republic) is attached to a tribunal de grande instance and can give instructions to his
assistants, who include the avocats generaux. The Procureur general, attached to a
Cour d'Appel, receives his instructions from the Minister of Justice.
Spain
The representative body is referred to as the Cortes Generales, bicameral parliament composed
of a Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Deputados: proportional representation) and
a Senate (Senado: territorial representation). Although the Senate has the power to
veto or amend legislation, Congress may overrule the Senate decision; the primacy of
Congress is thus preserved.
The Autonomous Communities also have legislative assemblies, elected by universal suffrage,
and a Governing Council, the president of which is elected by the Assembly, from
among its members.
The Consejo de Estado (Council of State) is the highest consultative body for assessment of the
government and the administration in legal matters.
The Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court), is the supreme authority in the
interpretation of the Constitution; it rules on the constitutionality of certain acts,
hears appeals on the unconstitutionality of law, and regulations with the force of law.
It also hears appeals for the protection of constitutional rights. Judges may submit
issues of unconstitutionality to this court whenever a rule before them appears
unconstitutional. There is no appeal against its rulings.
Judicial System: Various criteria exist on which jurisdiction is assumed: the subject matter of
the litigation or the value of the claim; the functional jurisdiction, based on the
different phases of the proceedings; and territorial jurisdiction.
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Juzgados de paz (justices of the peace courts, with non-professional judges) are appointed in
some small municipalities without a court of first degree. They are the lowest courts
within the system, possessing jurisdiction in certain civil cases (e.g. matters regarding
a value of less than 8000 pesetas) and criminal cases of minor importance.
Courts offirst degree: The Juzgado de Primera lnstaticia e Instruccion, with both civil and penal
jurisdiction, are courts of first instance for most civil matters; the Courts of instruction
hear only criminal cases. In each province, a Juzgado de lo Contencioso-
Administrativo, a lower administrative court exists.
Courts of second degree: Audiencias Provinciates, Provincial courts, with both civil and penal
jurisdiction, are courts of first instance in certain criminal matters (appeals of which
are heard by the Tribunal Supremo), or can hear appeals against criminal judgments of
a Juzgado (above); they are appeal courts against civil judgments given at first
instance.
Tribunates Superiores de las Comunidades Autdnomas (the superior courts of the Autonomous
Communities) have civil, penal, and administrative divisions (salas). They are the
highest courts in matters reserved expressly for the autonomous regions (for example,
housing and welfare, roads, industry).
The Tribunal Supremo, the highest court with jurisdiction for all of Spain, is competent in all
matters except those reserved for the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The court
of final instance (except in certain cases, where it is a court of first instance in civil or
criminal actions against highest public officials), it is composed of five divisions
(salas). The first division decides appeals (casacion) in civil matters; the second
division hears appeals and other remedies in penal matters; the third division
decides remedies against administrative acts, and has jurisdiction for those remedies
for which the Tribunales Superiores are not competent (the other divisions hear labour
and military matters).
The Ministerio Fiscal (Public Attorney's Office) promotes justice and defends legality, bringing
the charges in penal cases; it also intervenes to defend those persons who lack the
capacity or legal representation to defend themselves in court.
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Appendix B - Cited rules and case-law: original language version
FRANCE:
Nature Protection Act -- Loi 76-629, du lOjuillet 1976 relative d la protection de la
nature
Loi 76-629, Article 1: La protection des espaces naturels et des paysages, la preservation des
especes animales et vegetales, le tnaintien des equilibres biologicjues auxquels ils participent et
la protection des ressources naturelles contre toutes les causes de degradation qui les menacent
sont d'interH general.
II est du devoir de chacun de veiller a la sauvegarde du patrimoine naturel dans lequtl
il vit. Les activites publiques ou privees d'amenagement, d'equipement et de production doivent
se conformer aux mimes exigences.
La realisation de ces objectifs doit egalement assurer I'equilibre harmonieux de la
population residant dans les milieux urbain et ruraux.
Loi 76-629, Article 2: Les travaux et projets d'amenagement qui sont entrepris par une
collectivite publique ou qui necessitent une autorisation ou une decision d'approbation ainsi que
les documents d'urbanisme doivent respecter les preoccupations d'environnement.
Les etudes prealabies a la realisation d'amenagements ou d'ouvrages qui, par
I'importance de leurs dimensions ou leurs incidences sur le milieu naturel, peuvent porter
atteinte a ce dernier, doivent comporter une etude d'impact permettant d'en apprecier les
consequences.
Un decret en Conseil d'Etat precise les modalites d'application du present article.
II fixe notamment:
D'une part, les conditions dans lesquelles les preoccupations d'environnement sont prises
en compte dans les procedures reglementaire existantes;
D'autre part: Le contenu de I'etude d'impact qui comprend au minimum une analyse de
I'etat initial du site et de son environnement, I'etude des modifications que le projet y
engendrerait et les mesures envisagees pour supprimer, reduire et, si possible compenser les
consequences dommageables pour Venvironnement;
Les conditions dans lesquelles I'etude d'impact sera rendue publique;
La liste limitative des ouvrages qui, en raison de la faiblesse de leurs repercussions sur
I'environnement, ne sont pas soumis a la procedure de I'etude d'impact.
II fixe egalement les conditions dans lesquelles le ministre charge de 1'environnement
pourra se saisir ou etre saisi, pour avis, de toute etude d'impact.
Si une requite deposee devant la juridiction administrative contre une autorisation ou
une decision d'approbation d'un projet vise a lalinea ler du present article est fondee sur
1'absence d'etude d'impact, la juridiction saisie fait droit a la demande de sursis a execution de
la decision attaquee des que cette absence est constatee selon une procedure d'urgence.
Classified Installations Act — Loi 76-663 du 19 juillet 1976 relative aux installations
classees pour la protection de Venvironnement
Loi 76-663, Article 14: Les decisions prises en application des articles 3, 6, 11, 12, 16, 23, 24, et 26
de la presente loi peuvent etre deferees a la juridiction administrative:
1. Par les demandeurs ou exploitants, dans un delai de deux mois qui commence a courir
du jour ou lesdits actes leur ont ete notifies;
2. Par les tiers, personnes physiques ou morales, les communes interessees ou leurs
groupements, en raison des inconvenients ou des dangers que le fonctionnement de I'installation
presente pour les interets vises a Particle ler, dans un delai de quatre ans a compter de la
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publication ou de I'affichage desdits actes, ce delai etant, le cas echeant, prolonge jusqu'a la fin
d'une periode de deux annees suivant la mise en activite de Vinstallation.
Les tiers qui n'ont acquis ou pris a bail des immeubles ou n'ont eleve des constructions
dans le voisinage d'une insallation classee que posterieurement a I'affichage ou a la publication
de I 'arrite autorisant I'ouverture de cette installation ou attenuant les prescriptions primitives
ne sont pas recevables a deferer ledit arrite a la juridiction administrative.
Loi 76-663, Article 18, added by law 85-661 (Sanctions penales): Quiconque exploite une
installation sans I'autorisation requise sera puni d'une peine d'emprisonnement de deux mois a
un an et d'une amende de 2000F a 500 OOOF ou de I'une de ces deux peines.
En cas de recidive, il sera prononce une peine d'emprisonnement de deux mois a deux ans
et une amende de 20 OOOF a 1 million de francs ou I'une de ces deux peines.
En cas de condamnation, le tribunal peut interdire I'utilisation de I'installation.
L'interdiction cesse de produire effet si une automation est delivree ulterieurement dans les
conditions prevues par la presente loi. L'execution provisoire de I'interdiction peut ttre
ordonnee.
Le tribunal peut egalement exiger la remise en etat des lieux dans un delai qu'il
determine.
Dans ce dernier cas, le tribunal peut: a) soit ajourner le prononce de la peine et assortir
I'injonction de remise en etat des lieux d'une astreinte dont il fixe le taux et la duree maximum;
les dispositions de Varticle 19 concernant I'ajournement du prononce de la peine sont alors
applicables; b) soit ordonner que les travaux de remise en etat des lieux seront executes d'office
aux frais du condamne.
Loi 76-663, Article 20 (Sanctions penales): I. Quiconque exploite une installation en infraction a
une tnesure de fermeture ou de suspension prise en application des articles 15, 23 ou 24 de la
presente loi ou a une mesure d'interdiction prononcee en vertu des articles 18 ou 19 sera puni d'une
peine d'emprisonnement de deux mois a deux ans et d'une amende de 20 OOOF a 1 000 OOOF ou de
I'une de ces deux peines.
II. Quiconque poursuit I'exploitation d'une installation classee sans se conformer a I'arrSte de
mise en demeure d'avoir a respecter, au terme d'un delai fixe, les prescriptions techniques
determinees en application des articles 3, 6, 7, 10 ou 11 sera puni d'une peine d'emprisonnement
de dix jours a six mois et d'une amende de 2 OOOF a 500 OOOF ou de I'une de ces deux peines.
Sera puni des mimes peines quiconque poursuit I'exploitation d'une installation sans se
conformer a un arrete de mis en demeure pris en application de I'article 26 par le representant de
I'Etat dans le departement sur avis du maire et du conseil departemental d'hygiene.
Loi 76-663, Article 22-1 (Sanctions penales): added by loi 85-661: En cas de condamnation pour
infraction aux dispositions de la presente loi ou des reglements et arretes pris pour son
application, le tribunal peut ordonner, aux frais du condamne, la publication integrate ou par
extraits de sa decision et eventuellement la diffusion d'un message, dont il fixe explicitement
les termes, informant le public des motifs et du contenu de sa decision, dans un ou plusieurs
journaux qu'il designe, ainsi que son affichage dans les conditions et sous les peines prevues,
suivant les cas, aux article 51 et 471 du code penal, sans toutefois que les frais de cette publicite
puissent exceder le montant maximum de I'amende encourue.
Loi 76-663, Article 22-2, (Sanctions penales): added by loi 85-661: Toute association
regulierement declaree depuis au moins cinq ans a la date des faits, se proposant par ses statuts
la sauvegarde de tout ou partie des interets vises a I'article premier de la presente loi, peut
exercer les droits reconnus a la partie civile en ce qui concerne les faits constituant une infraction
aux dispositions de la presente loi ou des reglements et arrites pris pour son application et
portant un prejudice direct ou indirect aux interets collectifs qu'elle a pour objet de defendre.
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Loi 76-663, Article 23 (sanctions administrates): Independamment des poursuites penales qui
peuvent etre exercees et lorsqu'un inspecteur des installations classees ou un expert designe par le
ministre charge des installations classees a constate I'inobservation des conditions imposees a
Vexploitant d'une installation classee, le prefet met en demeure ce dernier de satisfaire a ces
conditions dans un delai determine.
Si, a I'expiration du delai fixe pour I'execution, I'exploitant n'a pas obtempere a cette
injonction, le prefet peut:
Soit faire proceder d'office, aux frais de I'exploitant, a I'execution des mesures
prescrites:
Soit obliger I'exploitant a consigner entre les mains d'un comptable public une somme
repondant du montant des travaux a realiser, laquelle sera restituee a I'exploitant au fur et a
mesure de I'execution des travaux; il est, le cas echeant, procede au recouvrement de cette somme
comme en matiere de creances etrangeres a I'impdt et aux domaines;
Soit suspendre par arrSte, apres avis du conseil departemental d'hygiene, le
fonctionnement de I'installation, jusqu'a execution des conditions imposees.
Loi 76-663, Article 24 (sanctions administratees): Lorsqu'une installation classee est exploitee
sans avoir fait I'objet de la declaration ou de I'autorisation requise par la presente loi, le prefet
met I'exploitant en demeure de regulariser sa situation dans un delai determine en deposant
suivant le cas une declaration ou une demande d'autorisation. II peut, par arrtte motive,
suspendre I'exploitation de I'installation jusqu'au depot de la declaration ou jusqu'd la decision
relative a la demande d'autorisation.
Si I'exploitant ne defere pas a la mise en demeure de regulariser sa situation ou si sa
demande d'autorisation est rejetee, le prefet peut, en case de necessite, ordonner la fermeture ou
la suppression de I'installation. Si I'exploitant n'a pas obtempere dans le delai fixe, le prefet
peut faire application des procedures prevues a I'article 23 (3e et 4e alineas).
Le prefet peut faire proceder, par un agent de la force publique, a I'apposition des
scelles sur une installation qui est maintenue en fonctionnement soit en infraction a une mesure de
suppression, de fermeture ou de suspension prise en application de I'article 15) de I'article 23 ou
des deux premiers alineas du present article, soit en depit d'un arrete de refus d'autorisation.
Public Inquiries Act -- Loi 83-630,12 juillet 1983 relative a la democratisation des
enquetes publiques et a la protection de I'environnement
Loi 83-630 article 4: Le commissaire enqueteur ou le president de la comtnission d'enquete
conduit I'enquete de maniere a permettre au public de prendre une connaissance complete du
projet et de presenter ses appreciations, suggestions et contre-propositions.
II peut recevoir tous documents, visiter les lieux concernes, a I'exception des lieux
d'habitation, apres information prealable des proprietaires et des occupants par les soins de
I'autorite competente, entendre toutes personnes dont il juge Vaudition utile et convoquer le
mattre d'ouvrage ou ses representants ainsi que les autorites administratives interessees.
Sous reserve des dispositions du dernier alinea de I'article 2 de la presente loi, le maitre
d'ouvrage communique au public les documents existants que le commissaire enquiteur ou le
president de la commission d'enquete juge utiles a la bonne information du public. En cas de refus
de communication oppose par le maitre d'ouvrage, sa reponse motivee est versee au dossier de
I'enquete.
Le commissaire enqueteur ou la commission d'enquete se tient a la disposition des
personnes ou des representants d'associations qui demandent a etre entendus.
Le rapport et les conclusions motivees du commissaire enqueteur ou de la commission
d'enquete sont rendus public. Le rapport doit faire etat des contre-propositions qui auront ete
produites durant I'enquete ainsi que des reponses eventuelles du maitre d'ouvrage, notamment
aux demandes de communication de documents qui lui ont ete adressees.
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Loi 83-630, Article 6: "Les juridictions administratives saisies d'une demande de sursis a
execution d'une decision prise apres des conclusions defavorables du commissaire-enquSteur ou de
la commission d'enquite, font droit a cette demande si I'un des moyens invoques dans la requete
parait, en I'etat de I'instruction, serieux et de nature a justifier I'annulation.
EIA Decree 77-1141 — Decret 77-1141 du 12 octobre 1977
Decret 77-1141, Article 1: ...Les preoccupations d'environnement sont prises en compte par les
documents d'urbanisme dans le cadre des procedures qui leur sont propres.
Decret 77-1141, Article 2: Le contenu de I'etude d'impact doit etre en relation avec Vimportance
des travaux et amenagements projetes et avec leurs incidences previsibles sur I'environnement.
L'etude d'impact presente successivement:
1. Une analyse de I'etat initial du site et de son environnement, portant notamment sur
les richesses naturelles et les espaces naturels agricoles, forestiers, maritimes ou de loisirs,
affectes par les amenagements ou ouvrages;
2. Une analyse des effets sur 1'environnement, et en particulier sur les sites et paysages,
la faune et la flore, les milieux naturels et les equilibres biologiques et, les cas echeant, sur la
commodite du voisinage (bruits, vibrations, odeurs, emissions lumineuses), ou sur I'hygiene et la
salubrite publique;
3. Les raisons pour lesquelles, notamment du point de vue des preoccupations
d'environnement, parmi les partis envisages, le projet presente a ete retenu;
4. Les mesures envisagees par le rnattre d'ouvrage ou le petitionnaire pour supprimer,
reduire et, si possible, compenser les consequences dommageables du projet sur I'environnement,
ainsi que 1'estimation des depenses correspondantes.
Decret 77-1141, Article 7: Le ministre charge de I'environnement peut se saisir de sa propre
initiative ou a la demande de toute personne physique ou morale des etudes d'impact. II donne
alors son avis au ministre dans les attributions duquel figure Vautorisation, I'approbation ou
1'execution de Vouvrage ou de Vamenagement projete.
Classified Installations Decree 77-1133, Decret 77-1133 du 21 Septembre 1977
Decret 77-1133 , Article 43 (Decret no. 86-1289 du 19 decembre 1986, art.6): Sera puni de la peine
d'amende prevue pour les contraventions de la 5eme classe;
1. Quiconque aura exploite une installation soumise a declaration sans avoir fait la declaration
prevue a I'articles 3 de la loi du 19 juillet 1976; 2. Quiconque n'aura pas pris les mesures
imposees en vertu de I'article 26 de la loi du 19 juillet 1976 sans qu'ait ete pris, en raison de
I'urgence, I'avis du maire ou du conseil departmental d'hygiene; 3. Quiconque aura exploitee une
installation soumise a autorisation sans satisfaire aux prescriptions prevues a 1'article 7 de la
loi du 19 juillet 1976 et aux articles 17 et 18 du present decret; 4. Quiconque aura exploite une
installation soumise a declaration sans satisfaire aux prescriptions generates ou particulieres
prevues aux articles 28, 29 et 30 du present decret; 5. Quiconque aura ornis de proceder aux
notifications prevues aux articles 20 (ler alinea) el 31 (ler alinea) du present decret; 6.
Quiconque aura otnis de faire la declaration ou la notification prevue a 1'article 34 du present
decret; 8. Quiconque aura ornis de fournir les informations prevues aux articles 35 et 36 du present
decret; 9 Quiconque aura omis d'adresser la declaration prevue a I'article 38 du present decret.
Public Inquiries Decree — Decret 85-453 du 23 avril 1985
Decret 85-453, article l.II: En cas de realisation fractionnee d'une meme operation,
I'appreciation des seuils et criteres mentionnes a ce tableau tient compte de 1'ensemble de
Voperation.
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EIA Decree 1993 — Decret 93-245 du 25 fevrier relatif aux etudes d'impact
Decret 93-245, article 1 adds to the earlier decree: Le deuxieme alinea de I'article ler du decret
du 12 octobre 1977 susvise est complete ainsi qu'il suit: "Dans tous les cas, la denomination
precise et complete du ou des auteurs de Vetude doit figurer sur le document final".
Decret 93-245, Article 2, I adds: to Article 2 "Une analyse des effets directs et indirects,
temporaries et permanents du projet sur Venvironnement, et en particulier sur la fuane et la
flore, les sites et paysages, le sol, I'eau, I'air, le climat, les milieux naturels et les equilibres
biologiques, sur la protection des biens et du patrimoine culturel et, le case echeants, sur la
commodite du voisinage (bruits, bivrations, odeurs, emissions lumineuses) ou sur I'hygiene, la
securite et la salubrite publique.
II : Une analyse des methodes utilisees pour evaluer les effets du projet sur I'environnement
mentionnant les difficulties eventuelles de nature technique ou scientifique rencontrees pour
etablir cette evaluation.
Afin de faciliter la prise de connaissance par le public des informations contenues dans
I'etude, celle-ci fera I'objet d'un resume non technique."
Ill: Lorsque la totalite des travaux prevus au programme est realisee de maniere simultane,
I'etude d'impact doit porter sur I'ensemble du programme. Lorsque la realisation est echelonnee
dans le temps, I'etude d'impact de chacune des phases de Voperation doit comporter une
appreciation des impacts de I'ensemble du programme.
Decret 93-245, Article 9, modifying decree 77-1141, annexe II: ...a 1'exception: - des terrain de
golf vises a 1'annexe III, - des bases de plein air et de loisirs d'un montant de 12 millions de
francs et plus; - des terrains amenages pour la pratique de sports ou loisirs motorises vises a
I'annexe III.
LCP arrete — arrete du 27 juin 1990 relatif d la limitation des rejets atmospheriques
des grandes installation de combustion
Arreie du 27 juin 1990 relatif a la limitation des rejets atmospheriques des grandes installations
de combustion et aux conditions d'evacuation des rejets des installations de combustion.
Arrete du 27 juin 1990, Article 29: Le rejet vers I'atmosphere des gaz de combustion est effectue de
maniere contrdlee, par I'intermediate d'une cheminee. Celle-ci a pour objet de permettre une
bonne diffusion des gaz de combustion de fagon a limiter la teneur de I'air en produits polluants
resultant de la combustion.
La forme des conduits de fumee, notamment dans leur partie la plus proche du debouche
a I'atmosphere, est congue de fagon a favoriser au maximum I'ascension des gaz de combustion
dans I'atmosphere. Les contours des conduits ne presentent notamment pas de point anguleux et
la variation de la section des conduits au voisinage du debouche est tres continue et tres lente. La
partie terminale de la cheminee peut comporter un convergent realise suivant les regies de lart
lorsque la vitesse d'ejection est plus elevee que la vitesse choisie pour les gaz dans la cheminee.
Arrete du 27 juin 1990, Article 30: La hauteur de la cheminee (difference entre I'altitude du
debouche a I'air libre et Valtitude moyenne du sol a I'endroit considere exprimee en metres) est
determinee, d'une part, en fonction de la puissance thermique de I'installation et du niveau des
emissions de polluants a I'atmosphere, d'autre part, en fonction de 1'existence d'obstacles
suceptibles de gener la dispersion des gaz de combustion.
Elle est definie dans les articles 31 et 32.
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Arrete du 27 juin 1990, Article 31:llne etude des conditions de dispersion des fumees adaptee au
site peut itre realisee par Vexploitant afin de determiner la hauteur de la cheminee,
conformement aux articles 29 et 30.
Cette etude est obligatoirement realisee pour les installations de puissance thermique
superieure ou egale a 100 MW.
Elle est egalement realisee, quelle que soit la puisance thermique, dans le cas ou I'un des
obstacles definis a Varticle 36 est un immeuble de grande hauteur au sens de Varticle R.122-2 du
code de la construction et de I'habitation (c'est-a-dire dont le dernier plancher bas du dernier
niveau est situe a plus de 28 metres de sol).
Arrete du 27 juin 1990, Article 32: En labsence d'etude des conditions de dispersion des fumees,
la hauteur de la cheminee est fixee par les articles 33 a 35.
Civil Code
Code Civil, Article 809: Le president peut toujours (Deer. no.87-4344 du 17 juin 1987) 'mdme en
presence d'une contestation serieuse', prescrire en refere les mesures conservatoires ou de remise
en etat qui s'imposent, soit pour prevenir un dommage imminent, soit pour fair cessser un trouble
manifestement illicite....
Code Civil, Article 1382: Tout fait quelconque de I'homme, qui cause a autrui un dommage,
oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, a le reparer....
Code Civil, Article 1382.36: Chacun des responsables d'un meme dommage doit etre condamne a
le reparer en totalite, sans qu'il y ait lieu de tenir cornpte du partage des responsabilites auquel
les juges du fond ont procede entre les diverses responsables, qui n'affecte que les rapports
reciproques de ces derniers et non Tetendue de leurs obligations envers la partie lesee. II en est
ainsi mbne si Tun des responsables est demeure inconnu.
Code Civil, Article 1383: Chacun est responsable du dommage qu'il a cause non seulement par
son fait, mais encore par sa negligence ou par son imprudence.
Code Civil, Article 1384: On est responsable non seulement du dommage que Ton cause par son
propre fait, mais encore de celui qui est cause par le fait des personnes dont on doit repondre, ou
des choses que I 'on a sous sa garde.
Code Civil, Article 1384.33: Le gardien de la chose qui a ete Tinstrument du dommage, hors le
case ou il etablit un evenement de force majeure totalement exoneratoire, est tenu, dans ses
rapports avec la victime, a reparation integrale, sauf son recours eventuel contre le tiers qui
aurait concouru a la production du dommage.
Code Civil, Article 2270-1: Les actions en responsabilite civile extra-contractuelle se
prescrivent par dix ans a compter de la manifestation du dommage ou de con aggravation.
Code de la Construction et de CHabitation, Article L. 122-16:"...les dommages causes aux
occupants d'un bdtiment par des nuisances dues a des activites agricoles, industrielles,
artisanales ou commerciales n'entratnent pas droit a reparation lorsque le permis de construire
afferant au bdtiment expose a ces nuisances a ete demande ou I'acte authentique constatant
Calienation ou la prise du bail etabli posterieurement a I'existence des activites les
occasionnant des lors que ces activites s'exercent en conformite avec les dispositions legislatives
ou reglementaires en vigueur et qu'elles se sont poursuivies dans les memes conditions."
Code Penal
Code Penal, Article 153: "Quiconque aura contrefait, falsifie ou altere les permis,
certificats,...ou autre documents delivres par les administrations publiques en vue de constater
un droit...ou d'accorder une autorisation, sera puni d'un emprisonnement de six mois a trois ans et
d'une amende de 1500F d 20,000F.
...La tentative sera punie comme le delit consomme.
Les memes peines seront appliquees:
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1. A celui qui aura fait usage desdits documents contrefaits, falsifies ou alteres..."
Decret 71-94, Article 3 regarding the minister of environment's use of external services from
other ministries"peut en tant que de besoin, faire appel aux services et organismes places sous
Pautorite d'autres ministres et provoquer les inspections qu'il estime necessaires".
EIA Circular
Circulaire 93-73, point 1.1.2. on use of financial thresholds: "je vous demande de veiller tout
particulierement a ce que les estimations annoncees par le petitionnaire ou le maitre de
I'ouvrage ne soient pas erronees ou obsoletes et qu'elles prennent bien en compte la totalite des
depenses prevues pour Pamenagement, toutes taxes comprises. Dans le calcul du codt de
Pamenagement, il convient, d'une part, d'englober le cotit des acquisitions foncieres (...), d'autre
part, de prendre en compte toutes les phases ou parties du programme, lorsque la realisation des
travaux est fractionnee."
Circulaire 93-73, point 1.1.3.: Je vous demande de veiller a ce que, lorsque la reglementation en
vigueur le permet, les actions d'accompagnement du projet prevues dans I'etude d'impact au titre
des mesures de suppression, de reduction et de compensation soient reprises dans la decision
d'approbation ou d'autorisation de I'ouvrage et de faire contrdler, par vos services, le respect
des engagements pris. II vous appartient egalement, lorsque cela s'avere necessaire, de prevoir
un suivi de la realisation ou du fonctionnement de I'ouvrage....A defaut de ligne
jurisprudentielle claire, il parait sage, a la fois pour respecter I'esprit des textes et pour eviter
des annulations contentieuses, de retenir une interpretation extensive de la notion de realisation
fractionnee et de I'appliquer chaque fois que les differentes phases ou categories de travaux,
engagees ou non par le meme maitre d'ouvrage, constituent une unite fonctionnelle et que le
principe du programme a ete decidee de fagon certaine.
Circulaire 93-73, Point 2.2.2. discussing the contents: "Ces notions...constituent plutot une
explicitation dont Penonce doit conduire les auteurs de I'etude d'impact a traiter de maniere
exhaustive la nature, Pintensite, Petendue et la duree de tous les impact d'un projet."
Jurisprudence:
Tribunal des Conflits, 25 janvier 1988: "la poursuite des travaux malgre I'annulation de la
declaration d'utilite publique, alors meme qu'elle nuirait a Penvironnement, n'a pas porte
atteinte a une liberte fondamentale."
CE 22 decembre 1978 Cohn Bendit Rec, p.524, a claimant "ne pouvait jamais utilement se
prevaloir d'une directive communautaire a I'appui d'un recours dirige contre une decision
individuelle."
CAA de Paris 29 decembre 1989, M. et Mtne. Chavasse, no.89 P.A.O. 1811 CPEN p.8507, "si le
prefet conserve le choix des moyens a employer pour assurer Pexecution de la loi, il est tenu, en
Vabsence de circonstances exceptionnelles, de prendre les mesures adequates pour mettre fin a
une situation irreguliere. Ainsi, le fait pour le prefet de ne pas avoir pris toutes les mesures dont
il dispose pour faire disparaitre les nuisances provoquees par un atelier de photogravure est de
nature a engager la responsabilite de VEtat."
Coin de Cassation, consistent rulings: "Pour Vapplication de Particle 1384, alinea 1 du Code
civil, la chose inanimee doit etre la cause du dommage; mais du moment ou il est etabli qu'elle a
contribue a la realisation du dommage, elle est presumee en etre la cause generatrice, sauf au
guardien a en rapporter la preuve contraire."
Cass. Civ., 27 novembre 1844, S. 1844.1.211: "Si on ne peut meconnaitre que le bmit cause par une
usine lorsqu'il est porte a un degre insupportable pour les proprietes voisines soit une cause
legitime d'indetnnite, on ne peut considerer d'un autre cote, que toute espece de bruit cause par
l'exercice d'une industrie comme constituant le dommage peut donner lieu a une indemnite."
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Cass, civ., 26 mars 1873, DP 1873.1.353: "Les tribunaux ordinaires sont competents soit pour fixer
les indemnites dues aux tiers leses, soit pour prescrire les mesures propres a faire cesser le
prejudice, pourvu qu'elles ne soient pas en opposition avec celles prescrites par Vautorite
administrative dans un interit general."
SPAIN
Constitucion 1978
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 2: La Constitucion se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la
Nacion espaflola, patria comun e indivisible de todos los espafloles, y reconoce y garantiza cl
derecho a la autonomia de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre
todas ellas.
Constitucion, Articulo 9.2: Corresponde a los poderes publicos promover las condiciones para que
la libertad y la igualdad del individuo y de los grupos en que se integra sean reales y efectivas,
remover los obstdculos que impidan o dificulten su plenitud y facilitar la participacion de todos
los ciudadanos en la vida polttica, economica, cultural y social.
Constitucion, Articulo 15: Todos tienen derecho a la vida y a la integridad fisica y moral, sin
que, en ningi'm caso, puedan ser sometidos a tortura ni a penas o tratos inhumanos o degradantes.
Queda abolida la pena de muerte, salvo lo que puedan disponer las leyes penales militares para
tiempo de guerra.
Constitucion, Articulo 17.1: Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad. Nadie
puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de lo establecido en este articulo y en
los casos y en la forma previstos en la ley.
Constitucion, Articulo 18: 1. Se garantiza el derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y
familiar y al a propia imagen. 2. El domicilio es inviolable. Ninguna entrada o registro podra
hacerse en el sin consentimiento del titutlar o resolucion judicial, salvo en caso de flagrante
delito.
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 20: 1. Se reconocen y protegen los derechos:...d) A comunicar o recibir
libremente informacion veraz por cualquier medio de difusidn....
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 23.1: Los ciudadanos tienen el derecho a participar en los asuntos
publicos, directamente o por medio de representantes, libremente elegidos en elecciones
periodicas por sufragio universal.
Constitucion, Articulo 24.1: Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los
jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legitimos, sin que, en ningun caso,
pueda producirse indefensidn. 2. Asimismo, todos tienen derecho ... a un proceso publico sin
dilaciones indebidas...
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 45.1.Todos tienen el derecho a disfrutar de un medio ambiente
adecuado para el desarrollo de la persona, asi como el deber de conservarlo. 2. Los poderes
publicos velardn por la utilizacion racional de todos los recursos naturales, con el fin de proteger
ye mejorar la calidad de la vida y defender y restaurar el medio ambiente, apoyandose en la
indispensable solidaridad colectiva. 3. Para quienes violen lo dispuesto en el apartado
anterior, en los terminos que la ley fije, se establecerdn sanciones penales o, en su caso,
administrativas, asi como la obligacidn de reparar el daflo causado.
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 53.2: Cualquier ciudadano podra recabar la tutela de los libertades y
derechos reconocidos en el articulo 14 y en la Seccion lera del Capitulo segundo ante los
Tribunales ordinarios por un procedimiento basado en los principios de preferencia y
sumariedad y en su caso, a traves del recurso de amparo ante el Tribunal Constitucional...
Constitucion 1978, Articulo 53.3: El reconocimiento, el respeto y la proteccion de los principios
reconocidos en el Capitulo tercero informardn la legislacion positiva, la practica judicial y la
actuacion de los poderes piiblicos. Solo podrdn ser alegados ante la jurisdiccion ordinaria de
acuerdo con lo que dispongan las leyes que los desarrollen.
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Constitution 1978, Articulo 93: ... Corresponde a las Cortes Generates o al Gobierno, segun los
casos, la garantia del cumplimiento de estos tratados y de las resoluciones emanadas de los
organismos internacionales o supranacionales...
Constitution 1978, Articulo 105: La ley regulara: a) la audiencia de los ciudadanos,
directamente o a traves de las organizaciones y asociaciones reconocidas por la ley, en el
procedimiento de elaboration de las disposiciones administrativas que les afecten. b) El acceso
de los ciudadanos a los archivos y registros administrativos, salvo en lo que afecte a la
seguridad y defensa del Estado, la averiguacidn de los delitos y la intimidad de las personas.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 125: Los ciudadanos podrdn ejercer la action popular y participar en
la Administration de Justicia mediante la institutcion del jurado en la forma y con respecto a
aquellos procesos penales que la ley determine, asi como en los tribunales consuetudinarios y
tradicionales.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 130: Los poderes publicos atenderdn a la modernization y desarrollo
de todos los sectores economicos y, en particular, de la agricultura, de la ganaderia, de la pesca
y de la artesania, a fin de equiparar el nivel de vida de todos los espafloles.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 138.1 : El Estado garantiza la realization efectiva del principio de
solidaridad consagrado en el articulo 2 de la Constitution, velando por el establecimiento de un
equilibrio economico, adecuado y justo entre las diversas partes del territorio espaflol ....
Constitution 1978, Articulo 139.2: Ninguna autoridad podra adoptar medidas que directa o
indirectamente obstaculicen la libertad de circulation y establecimiento de las personas y la
libre circulation de bienes en todo el territorio espaflol.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 131.1: El Estado, mediante ley, podrd planificar la actividad
economica general para atender a las necesidades colectivas, equilibrar y armonizar el
desarrollo regional y sectorial y estimular el crecimiento de la renta y de la riqueza y su mas
justa distribution.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 148.1: Las Comunidades Autonomas podrdn asumir competences en
las siguientes materias:...3) Ordenacion del territorio, urbanismo y vivienda...9) La gestion en
materia de protection del medio ambiente....
Constitution 1978, Articulo 149: El Estado tiene competencia exclusiva sobre las siguientes
materias: 23) Legislation bdsica sobre protection del medio ambiente, sin perjuicio de las
facultades de las Comunidades Autonomas de establecer normas adicionales de protection. La
legislation bdsica sobre montes, aprovechamientos forestales y vias pecuarias.
Constitution 1978, Articulo 149.3: Las materias no atribuidas expresamente al Estado por esta
Constitution podrdn corresponder a las Comunidades Autonomas, en virtud de sus respectivos
Estatutos. La competencia sobre las materias que no se hayan asumido por los Estatutos de
Autonomia corresponderd al Estado, cuyas normas prevalecerdn, en caso de conflicto, sobre las
de las Comunidades Autonomas, en todo lo que no este atribuido a la exclusiva competencia de
estas. El derecho estatal sera, en todo caso, supletorio del derecho de las Comunidades
Autonomas.
E1A Act
RDL1302/1986, preamble: ...sin otro tramites que los estrictamente exegidos por la economia
procesal y los necesarios para la protection de los intereses generales....
RDL1302/1986, Articulo 3.1. El estudio de impacto ambiental sera sometido, dentro del
procedimiento aplicable para la autorizacion o realization del proyecto al que corresponda, y
conjuntamento con este, al trdmite de information publico y demds informes que en el mismo se
establezcan. 2. Si no estuviesen previstos estos tramites en el citado procedimiento, el organo
ambiental procedera directamente a someter el estudio de impacto a un periodo de information
publico y a recabar los informes que en cada caso considere oportunos.
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RDL1302I1986, Articulo 4.1: ...en la que determine las condiciones que deban establecerse en
orden a la adecuada protection del medio ambiente y los recursos naturales.
RDL1302I1986, Articulo 5: ...el que ejerza estas funciones en la Administracidn Publica donde
resida la competencia sustantiva para la realizacion o autorizacion del proyecto.
RDL1302/1986, Articulo 9.1. Si un proyecto de los sometidos obligatoriamente al trdmite de
evaluation de impacto ambiental comenzara a ejecutarse sin el cumplimiento de este requisito
sera suspendido, a requerimiento del organo ambiental competente, sin perjuicio de la
responsabilidad a que hubiera lugar.
2. Asimismo, podrd acordarse la suspension cuando concurriera alguna de las
circunstancias siguientes: a) La ocultacion de datos, su falseamiento o manipulacidn maliciosa
en el procedimiento de evaluacion. b) El incumplimiento o transgresidn de las condiciones
ambientales impuestas para la ejecucidn del proyecto.
EIA Regulation
RD1131/1988, preamble: ...lejos de ser un freno al desarrollo y al progreso, supone y garantiza
una vision inas completa e integrada de la actuaciones sobre el medio en que vivimos, una mayor
creatividad e ingenio, mayor responsabilidad social....evitando dilaciones innecesarias.
RD1131I1988, Articulo 6: La evaluation de impacto ambiental debe comprender, al menos, la
estimation de los efectos sobre la poblacion humana, la fauna, la flora, la vegetation, la gea, el
suelo, el agua, el aire, el clima, el paisaje y la estructura y funcion de los ecosistemas presentes
en el area previsiblemente afectada. Asimismo, debe comprender la estimation de la incidencia
que el proyecto, obra o actividad tiene sobre los elementos que componen el Patrimonio
Histsorico Espaflol, sobre las relaciones sociales y las condiciones de sosiego publico, tales como
ruidos, vibraciones, olores y emisiones luminosas, y la de cualquier otra incidencia ambiental
derivada de su ejecucidn.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 7; Contenido — Los proyectos a que se refiere el articulo 1. deberan incluir
un estudio de impacto ambiental que contrendra, al menos, los siquientes datos:
Description del proyecto y sus acciones.
Examen de alternativas tecnicamente viables y justification de la solution
adoptada.
Inventario ambiental y description de las interacciones ecoldgicas o ambientales
claves.
Identification y valoracion de impactos, tanto en la solution propuesta como en sus
alternativas.
Establecimiento de medidas protectoras y correctoras.
Programa de vigilancia ambiental.
Documento de sintesis.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 11: ... El programa de vigilancia ambiental establecerd un sistema que
garantice el cumplimiento de las indicaciones y medidas, protectoras y correctoras, contenidas
en el estudio de impacto ambiental.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 12: El documento de sintesis comprenderd en forma sumaria:
a) Las conclusiones relativas a la viabilidad de las actuaciones propuestas.
b) Las conclusiones relativas al examen y election de las distintas alternativas.
c) La propuesta de medidas correctoras y el programa de vigilancia tanto en la fase
de ejecucidn de la actividad proyectada como en la de su funcionamiento.
El documento de sintesis no debe exceder de veinticinco paginas y se redactard en
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terminos asequibles a la comprension general.
Se indicaran asimismo las dificultades informativas o tecnicas encontradas en la
realization del estudio con especificacion del origen y causa de tales
dificultades.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 17: ...comunicara al titular del proyecto los aspectos en que, en su caso, el
estudio ha de ser completado, fijandose un plazo de veinte dias para el cumplimiento,
transcurrido el cual, procedera a formular la declaration de impacto en el plazo establiecido en
el articulo 19.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 18.1: La declaracion de impacto determinara, a los solos efectos
ambientales, la conveniencia o no de realizar el proyecto, y en caso afirmativo, fijara las
condiciones en que debe realizarse.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 18.3: Las condiciones a que se refiere el apartado 1 de este articulo
deberdn adaptarse a las innovaciones aportadas por el progreso cientifico y tecnico que alteren
la actividad autorizada, salvo que por su incidencia en el medio ambiente resulte necesaria una
nueva Declaracion de Impacto.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 25.1: Corresponde a los organos competentes por razon de la materia,
facultados para el otorgamiento de la autorizacion del proyecto, el seguimiento y vigilancia del
cumplimiento de lo establecido en la Declaration de Impacto Ambiental. Sin perjuicio de ello, el
organo administrativo de medio ambiente podrd recabar information de aquellos al respecto,
asi corno efectuar las comprobaciones necesarias para verificar dicho cumplimiento.
RD1131/1988, Articulo 27: Valor del Condicionado ambiental. — A todos los efectos, y en
especial a los de vigilancia y seguimiento del cumplimineto de la Declaracion de Impact
Ambiental, el condicionado de esta tendrd el mismo valor y eficacia que el resto del
condicionado de la autorizacion.
RD1131/1988, Annex 1: Impacto ambiental severo — Aquel en el que la recuperation de las
condiciones del medio exige la adecuacion de medidas protectoras y correctoras, y en el que, aun
con esas medidas, aquella recuperacidn precisa un periodo de tiempo dilatado. Impacto
ambiental critico — Aquel cuya magnitud es superior al umbral aceptable. Con el se produce una
perdida permanente de la calidad de las condiciones ambientales, sin posible recuperacion,
incluido con la adoption de medidas protectoras o correctoras.
LCP Regulation — RD646I1991 por el que se establecen nuevas normas sobre limitation a
las emisiones a la atmosfera de determinados agentes contaminantes procedentes de grandes
instalaciones de combustion.
RD646I1991, Articulo 3(4)...el organo donde resida la competencia sustantiva para la
autorizacion de las instalaciones, determinant las modificaciones de los topes de emisiones y/o
las fechas que figuran en los anexos I y II de este Real Decreio, que habran de ser propuestos a la
Commission de la CEL.
RD646/1991, Articulo 10: La explusion de gases residuales de las instalaciones de combustion
deberd realizarse de forma controlada por medio de una chimenea.
La autorizacion contemplada en el articulo 4 establecerd las condiciones de expulsion de
dichos gases. En particular, la Administration competente se encargara de que la altura de la
chimenea se calcule de forma que se salvaguarde la salud humana y el medio ambiente.
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RD646/1991, disposition transitoria: En las centrales termicas que quemen carbones de baja
calidad, los grupos que sean grandes instalaciones de combustion existentes a los efectos de este
Real Decreto, continuaran compliendo los niveles de emision, que en cada caso hayan sido
determinados por la Direction General de la Energia....
MINER Order, 26 December 1995, fourth disposition: Los titulares de la centrales
termoelectricas que deban medir en continuo deberdn justificar el cumplimiento de las Normas
Europeas (EN) o de las Normas UNE que les sean aplicables, segun el apartado anterior,
mediante certification expedida por una entidad colaboradora en materia de medio ambiente.
Este certificado debera ser expedido y presentado a la autoridad competente antes de
los seis tneses despues de su puesta en marcha, y en lo sucesivo, al menos cada tres ados.
Para las centrales termoelectricas puestas en marcha con anterioridad a la
promulgation de esta Orden, el certificado a que se hace referenda en los pdrrafos anteriores
deberd expedirse y presentarse, por primera vez, en el plazo de un ado desde la entrada en vigor
del presente Orden....
Autonomous rules:
Aragon Decreto 118/1989, Articulo 8: La declaration de impacto ambiental sera revisable en via
administrativa, bien a traves de la impugnacion del acto de decision o autorizacion en el que se
integre, bien directamente cuando la declaration es si misma el acto de decision.
Catalunya Ley Orgdnica 4/1979, 18 December, Articulo 9.10: Montes, aprovechamientos y
servicios forestales, vias pecuarias y pastos, espacios naturales protegidos y tratamiento
especial de zonas de montada, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el numero 23 del apartado 1 del
articulo 159 de la Constitution.
Canarias Ley 11/1990: La obligation de realizar una evaluation de impacto eximira de la otra u
otras de inferior categoria, cuando estas resulten concurrentes para el mismo proyecto o
actividad.
LJCA, Articulo 122.2: Procedera la suspension cuando la ejecucion hubiese de ocasionar dados o
perjuicios de reparation imposible o dificil.
Law on the Juridical Regime ofPublic Administrations and of Common Administrative
Procedure — Ley de Regimen Juridico de las Adminstraciones Publicas y
del Procedimiento Administrativo Comun (LRJPAC)
LRJPAC, Articulo 4: 1. Las Administraciones Publicas, en el desarrollo de su actividad y en sus
relaciones reciprocas deberdn:...c) Facilitar a las otras Administraciones en la information que
precisen sobre la actividad que desarrollen en el ejercicio de sus propias competencias, d)
Prestar, en el ambito propio, la cooperation y asistencia activas que las otras Administraciones
pudieran recabar para el eficaz ejercicio de sus competencias....3. La asistencia requerida solo
podra negarse cuando el Ente del que se solicita no este facultado para prestarla o cuando, de
hacerlo, causard un perjuicio grave a sus intereses o al cumplimiento de sus propias funciones. La
negativa a prestar la asistencia se comunicard motivadamente a la Administration solicitante.
4. La Administration General del Estado, las de las Comunidades Autonomas y las Entidades
que integran la Administration Local deberdn colaborar y auxiliarse para aquellas ejecuciones
de sus actos que hayan de realizarse fuera de sus respectivos dmbitos de competencias.
LRJPAC, Articulo 37.7: El derecho de acceso sera ejercido por los particulares de forma que no se
vea afectada la eficacia del funcionamiento de los servicios publicos....
LRJPAC, Articulo 43.2: Cuando en los procedimientos iniciados en virtud de solicitudes
formuladas por los interesados no haya recaido resolution en plazo, se podran entender
estimadas aquellas en los siguientes supuestos: a) solicitudes de concesion de licencias y
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autorizaciones de instalacidn, traslado o ampliation de empresas o centros de trabajo....c) En
todos los casos, las solicitudes en cuya normativa de aplicacion no se establezca que quedaran
desestimadas si no recae resolution expresa.
LRJPAC, Article 71.1: ...si asi no lo hiciera, se le tendrd por desistido de su petition,
archivdndose sin mas tramite, con los efectos previstos en el articulo 42.1.
LRJPAC,Article 92.2: No podra acordarse la caducidad por la simple inactividad del
interesado en la cumplimentacidn de tramites, siempre que no sean indispensables para dictar
resolution. Dicha inactividad no tendrd otro efecto que la perdida de su derecho al referido
tramite.
LRJPAC, Articulo 111.1: La interposition de cualquier recurso, excepto en los casos en que una
disposition establezca lo contrario, no suspendera la ejecucion del acto impugnado....2. No
obstante lo dispuesto en el apartado anterior, el organo a quien competa resolver el recurso,
previa ponderacion, suficientemente razonada, entre el perjuicio que causaria al interes publico
o a terceros la suspension y el perjuicio que se causa al recurrente como consecuencia de la eficacia
inmediata del acto recurrido, podra suspender de oficio o a solicitud del recurrente, la ejecuciou.
del acto recurrido, cuando concurra alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: a) Que la ejecucidn
pudiera causar perjuicios de imposible o dificil reparation, b) Que la impugnacion se
fundamente en alguna de las causas de nulidad de pleno derecho previstas en el articulo 62.1 de
esta Ley. 3... Al dictar acuerdo de suspension podrdn adoptarse las medidas cautelares que sean
necesarias para asegurar la protection del interes publico y la eficacia de la resolution
impugnada. 4. El acto impugnado se entendera suspendido en su ejecucidn si transcurridos treinta
dias desde que la solicitud de suspension haya tenido entrada en el organo competente para
decidir sobre la misma, este no ha dictado resolution expresa, sin necesidad de solicitar la
certificadion que regula el articulo 44 de esta Ley. ...
LRJPAC, Articulo 119.3: Transcurrido el plazo de tres meses desde la interposition del recurso
extraordinario de revision sin que recaiga resolution, se entendera desestimado, quedando
expedita la via jurisdictional contencioso-administrativa.
LRJPAC Articulo 136: Medidas de cardcter provisional: Cuando asi este previsto en las normas
que regulen los procedimientos sancionadores, se podrd proceder mediante acuerdo motivado a
la adoption de medidas de cardcter provisional que aseguren la eficacia de la resolution final
que pudiera recaer.
LRJPAC Articulo 137.2: Los hechos declarados probados por resoluciones judiciales penales
firmes vincularan a las Administraciones Publicas resyecto de los procedimientos sancionadores
que substancien.
LRJPAC Articulo 133: Concurrencia de sanciones. No podrdn sancionarse los hechos que hayan
sido sancionados penal o administrativamente, en los casos en que se aprecie identidad del
sujeto, hecho y fundamento.
LRJPAC Article 139: principios de la responsabilidad. 1. los particulares tendran derecho a ser
indemnizados por las Administraciones Publicas correspondientes, de toda lesion que sufran en
cualquiera de sus bienes y derechos, salvo en los casos de fuerza mayor, siempre que la lesion sea
consecuencia del funcionamiento normal o anormal de los servicios publicos. 2. En todo caso, el
daflo alegado habra de ser efectivo, evaluable econdmicamente e individualizado con relation a
una persona o grupo de personas.
Civil Code
Codigo Civil, Articulo 1902: El que por action u omision causa daflo a otro, interviniendo culpa o
negligencia, esta obligado a reparar el daflo causado.
Codigo Civil, Articulo 1908.1. Por la explosion de mdquinas que no hubiesen sido cuidadas con la
debida diligencia, y la inflamacion de sustancias explosivas que no estuviesen colocadas en
lugar seguro y adecuado. 2. Por los humos excesivos que sean nocivos a las personas o a las
propiedades. 3...4. Por las emanaciones de cloacas o depositos de materias infectantes,
construidos sin las precauciones adecuadas al lugar en que estuviesen.
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Codigo Civil, Articulo 1214: Incumbe la prueba de las obligaciones al que reclama su
cumplimiento, y la de su extincion al que la opone.
Penal Code
Codigo Penal, Articulo 50.4: La cuota diaria tendrd un minimo de doscientas pesetas y un
mdximo de cincuenta mil. A efectos de computo, cuando se fije la duracidn por meses o por aflos, se
entenderd que los meses son de treinta dias y los ados de trescientos sesenta
Codigo Penal, Articulo 347-bis: Sera castigado con la pena de arresto tnayor y multa de 175.000
a 5.000.000 de pesetas, el que contraviniendo las Leyes o Reglamentos protectores del medio
ambiente, provocare o realizare directa o indirectamente emisiones o vertidos de cualquier
clase, en la atmosfera, el suelo o las aguas terrestres o maritimas, que pongan en peligro grave la
salud de las personas, o puedan perjudicar gravemente las condiciones de la vida animal,
bosques, espacios naturales o plantaciones utiles.
Se impondrd la pena superior en grado si la industria funcionara clandestinamente, sin
haber obtenido la preceptiva autorizacion o aprobacion administrativa de sus instalaciones, o
se hubiere desobedecido las ordenes expresas de la autoridad administrativa de correccion o
suspension de la actividad contaminante, o se hubiere aportado informacidn falsa sobre los
aspectos ambientales de la misma o se hubiere obstaculizado la actividad inspectora de la
Administracion.
Tambien se impondrd la pena superior en grado si los actos anteriormente descritos
originaren un riesgo de deterioro irreversible o catastrofico.
'
En todos los casos previstos en este articulo podra acordarse la clausura temporal o
definitiva del establecimiento, pudiendo el Tribunal proponer a la Administracidn que
disponga la intervencion de la empresa para salvaguardar los derechos de los trabajadores.
Nuevo Codigo Penal, Articulo 325: Sera castigado con las penas de prision de seis meses a cuatro
aflos, multa de ocho a veinticuatro meses e inhabilitacion especial para profesion u oficio por
tiernpo de uno a tres ados el que, contraviniendo las Leyes u otras disposiciones de cardcter
general protectoras del medio ambiente, provoque o realice directa o indirectamente emissiones,
vertidos, radiaciones, extracciones o excavaciones, aterramientos, ruidos, vibraciones,
inyecciones o depositos, en la atmosfera, el suelo, el subsuelo, o las aguas terrestres, maritimas o
subterraneas, con incidencia, incluso en los espacios transfronterizos, asi como las captaciones de
aguas que puedan perjudicar gravamente el equilibrio de los sistemas naturales. Si el riesgo de
grava perjuicio fuese para la salud de las personas, la pena de prision se impondrd en su mitad
superior.
Nuevo Codigo Penal, Articulo 326: Se impondrd la pena superior en grodo, sin perjuicio de las
que puedan corresponder con arreglo a otras preceptos de este Codigo, cuando en la comision de
cualquiera de los hechos descritos en el articulo anterior concurra alguna de las circunstancias
siguientes:
a) que la industria o actividad funcione clandestinamente, sin haber obtenido la preceptiva
autorizacidn o aprobacion Administrativa de sus instalaciones
b) que se hayan desobedecido las ordenes expresas de la autoridad administrativa de correcion o
suspension de las actividades tipificadas en el arttculo anterior.
c) que se haya falseado u ocultado informacion sobre los aspectos ambientales de la misma.
d) que se haya obstaculizado la actividad inspectora de la Administracion.
e) que se haya producido un riesgo de deterioro irreversible o catastrofico.
f) que se produzca una extraccion ilegal de aguas en periodo de restricciones.
Nuevo Codigo Penal, Arttculo 329: 1. La autoridad o funcionario publico que, a sabiendas,
hubiere informado favorablemente la concesion de licencias manifiestamente ilegales que
autoricen el funcionamiento de las industrias o actividades contaminantes a que se refieren los
articulos anteriores, o que con motivo de sus inspecciones hubieren silenciado la infraccion de
Leyes o disposiciones normativas de cardcter general que las regulen sera castigado con la pena
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establecida en el articulo 404 de este Codigo y, ademas, con la de prision de sies mese a tres aflos
o la de multa de ocho a venticuatro meses...
Nuevo Codigo Penal, Articulo 330: Quien, en un espacio natural protegido daflare gravemente
alguno de los elementos que haan servido para calificarlo, incurrira en la pena de prision de uno
a cuatro ados y multa de doce a veinticuatro meses.
Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ): Ley 6/1985) Articulo 7.3: Los Juzgados y Tribunales
protegeran los derechos e intereses legitimos, tanto individuales como colectivos, sin que en
ningun caso pueda producirse indefension. Para la defensa de estos ultimos se reconocerd la
legitimacion de las corporaciones, asociaciones y grupos que resulten afectados o que esten
legalmente habilitados para su defensa y promocion.
Hunting Act (Ley de Caza) Article 33.5: ...si no consta el autor del daflo causado a las personas,
responderdn solidariamente todos los miembros de la partida de caza.
Mining Act (Ley de Minus) Article 81: "...sera responsable de los daflos y perjuicios que se
ocasionen todo titular o poseedor de derechos tnineros reconocidos en esta ley.
Congreso de los Diputados, Comision de Industria, Obras Piiblicas, Servicios, 4 May 1988,
pp.9474 and 9476: "...no puede dejar de pensar en la necesidad de expansionar sus actividades
economicas, industriales y de otro tipo. Por tanto no podemos hacer de la necesidad de
incorpo'rar el valor medioambiental un corse o un impedimento para crecer economicamente para
invertir, para desarrollar las regiones con mas dificultades y mas carencias".
Case-law:
Constitutional Court — Tribunal Constitucional
STC 62/1983 11 July ...aquellos en que la satisfaccidn del interes comun es la forma de satisfacer
el de todos y cada uno de los que compone la sociedad, por lo que puede afirmarse que cuando un
miembro de la sociedad defiende un interes comun sostiene simultdneamente un interes personal,
que puede o no ser directo...
STC 5/1981, 13 December ...de resolverse en virtud del principio de competencia para
determinar que materias han quedado constitucional y estatutariamente conferidas a los
organos legislativos de las Comunidades Autonomas y cudles corresponden a las Cortes
Generates del Estado.
STC: 15 July 1987: "...en el tramite de ejecucion puede plantearse, y en su caso deben resolverse,
problemas relativos a una ejecucion faudulenta o simulada del fallo judicial, en la medida en
que impliquen un incumplimiento efectivo de lo sentenciado, pues repele a la efectividad de la
tutela judicial que, mediante actuaciones de aquella naturaleza, pueda arrojarse sucesiva e
indefinidamente sobre el afectado la carga de promover nuevas acciones o recursos para obtener
la satisfaccidn completa de sus derechos e intereses reconocidos por sentencia firme."
STC 28 October 1987: "...la insinceridad de la desobedencia disimulada de los drganos
administrativos".
Tribunal Supremo
STS 5 April 1960: "...la proteccion de los derechos civiles... tambien debe extenderse, llegado el
menoscabo, a las medidas de prevencidn que razonablemente impidan ulteriores lesiones
patrimoniales...".
STS 14 May 1963: "No puede excusar de responsabilidad al causante de un daflo, el haber
cumplido formulariamente todos los requisitos reglamentarios a que viene obligado, cuando la
realidad se impone demonstrando que las medidas adoptadas no dieron resultado".
STS 12 December 1980: "...indemnizacion prescindiendo de toda idea de culpa por tratarse de
responsabilidad con nota de objetiva."
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STS 12 December 1980: ...en esta zona de tangencia entre la jurisdiccion comun y la contencioso-
administrativa hay que distinguir entre lo que es materia que atafle a la propiedad privada y a
su proteccion, de incuestionable caracter civil, y lo que afecta a los intereses generates o publicos,
de inequivoca naturaleza administrativa, aspectos que es preciso separar
STS 12 December 1980: ...segun la doctrina de esta Sala, la jurisdiccion ordinaria es fuente o raiz
de todas las demds y por ello tiene vis atractiva en los casos dudosos...
SSTS 17 March 1981, 23 September 1988; 16 January 1989; "...exigiendo, en todo caso, el
resarcimiento del daflo y en su caso la adopcion de medidas para evitarlo o ponerle fin, ambos
aspectos competencia de la jurisdiccion del orden civil."
STS 17 May 1981: "...la antijuricidad...no se elimina al presuponer un acto conforme a las normas
sino que se integra por faltar al mandato general de diligencia al actuar frente a biencs ajenos
juridicamente protegidos...aun en los casos de funcionamiento de una industria previas las
precauciones seflaladas en los Reglamentos, su ejercicio ha de guardar el debido respeto a la
propiedad ajena, de modo que debe indemnizar a los perjudicados por los daflos anormalmente
derivados de esa explotacion permitida, radicando entonces el deber de indemnizar, mas que en
la antijuridicidad del acto, que hasta cierto punto no seria contrurio a Derecho, en la exigencia
de justicia conmutativa de que aquel ha defendido su interes en perjuicio del derecho de otro,
aunque autorizado, ha de resarcir a quien hubo de soportar la perturbacion o menoscabo de su
derecho de propiedad...".
STS 14 July 1982 "...que seflala como causa aquella que, aun concurriendo con otras, sea la
decisiva y la determinante del evento dafloso, en relacion con las circunstancias del caso y el
buen sentido".
STS 17 February 1984: ...la eficacia de la Administracion es un bien juridicamente protegido
aunque. es de rango inferior a los derechos fundamentals.
STS 9 May 1986: ...los principios rectores tienen valor normativo y vinculan a los poderes
publicos cada uno en su respectiva esfera, a hacerlos eficazmente operativos.
STS 3 December 1987: ...la jurisdiccion civil entra en juego incluso en las cuestiones derivadas de
actos en que la Administracion no actua como poder en el ejercicio del ius imperium.
STS 23 September 1988: "...sean o no potables, y se consuman o no de hecho por el personal de la
finca y los ganados del actor."
STS 25 April 1989, Ar.3233: Como el artlculo 45 de la Constitucion reconoce a 'todos' el derecho a
disfrutar de un medio ambiente adecuado para el desarrollo de la persona, estableciendo,
ademas, el deber de los poderes publicos de proteger, defender y restaurar el medio ambiente,
negar la legitimacion de don Gabriel P.S. es negar lo evidente. ...los preceptos contenidos en el
capitulo tercero del Titulo I de la Constitution, pese a girar bajo la riibrica de 'principios rectores
de la politica social y economica' no constituyen meras normas programaticas que limiten su
eficacia al campo de la retorica politica o de la iniitil semantica propia de las afirmaciones
demagogicas.
STS 25 April 1989 el Ayuntamiento tiene que cumplir lo que se le ha solicitado, lo que implica
ademas, la obligation de incluir en sus presupuestos, si fuese necesario, las partidas, para
realizar las obras que sean adecuadas para poner fin a la situacidn actual de atentado al
derecho del recurrente a un medio ambiente adecuado".
STS 30 November 1990: "El procesado en ningun momento puso en marcha los mecanismos
necesarios para interrumpir la emision contaminante o reducir su intensidad a modulos tolerados
por el entorno afectadc, instalando aparatos correctores....
"...el Tribunal se alinea con un concepto de irreversibilidad excesivamente literal
considerando que en el actual nivel tecnologico siempre es posible volver desde el estado de
deterioro a que se llega al estado anterior a la degradation, estimando que el concocimiento
humano no conoce limites para reparar los daflos ecologicos.
Tal afirmacion no concuerda con el espiritu y contenido del precepto que eleva la pena en
funcion de la intensidad del daflo causado y la extension de la zona afectada, adjetivando el
daflo como catastrofico o irreversible, cuando el proceso acumulativo de los efectos degradantes
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del medio ambiente afectan sensiblemente a los bienes protegidos .... la extension afectada nos
permite afirmar que la necrosis y clorosis de que se escribe en el hecho probado puede alcanzar
los caracteres de catastrofica en cuanto a su entidad y efectos, todo ello sin perjuicio de que una
accidn costosisima que renovase el manto de tierra afectado y lo sustituyese por otro procediendo
a la plantacion de nuevas especies arboreas que, a muy largo plazo, pudieran devolver el
equilibrio ecologico a la zona, siempre que se interrumpiese el funcionamiento de las fuentes de
la contaminacion."
STS 20 December 1990: "La necesidad de servirse del proceso para obtener razon no debe
volverse en contra de quien tiene razon...Pero este Tribunal Supremo debe afladir que los
estrechos limites del articulo 122 de la Ley Reguladora de esta jurisdiccion tienen hoy que
entenderse ampliados por el expreso reconocimiento del derecho a una tutela judicial efectiva en
la propia Constitucion (art. 24), derecho que implica, entre otras cosas, el derecho a una tutela
cautelar".
STS 20 December 1990: Nuestra Derecho nacional — al margen, incluso, de su inesquivable
insercion en el sistemu comunitario - alberga ya en sus seno ese derecho a la tutela cautelar, que
estd inserto en aquel. Lo que, visto por su enves, significa el deber que tienen tanto la
Administracion como los Tribunales de acordar la medida cautelar que sea necesaria para
asegurar lu plena efectividad del acto terminal (resolucion administrativa o, en su caso,
judicial".
STS 17 January 1991: "la apariencia de buen derecho ha de ser la base determinante en la
configuracion de las medidas cautelares".
STS 1 April 1993 (Ar. 9165): "No puede entenderse que la acusacion de FAPAS no se halla
legitimado para llevar al Tribunal la pretension indemnizatoria a que se ha hecho referenda.
La rnuerte del oso puede dar lugar a la indemnizacion civil correspondiente... en el caso
estudiado se ha sacrificado efectivamente un bien juridico, no de una persona individual, pero si
de sociedades concretas ... Nos hallamos, pues ante un bien en el que la colectividad humana se
halla interesada. La responsabilidad civil era perfectamente postulable por cualquiera de los
ejercitantes de la accion penal."
AT Oviedo: 3 November 1978, "...esas medidas que se encuentran plenamente justificadas para
conseguir — dentro de los conocimientos tecnologicos del momento — una disminucion de la
degradacion del Medio Ambiente y de los resultados daflosos que esta produce en las
propiedades de los particulares...".
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AccesstoJusticeonEnvironme talMatter— acaseofDoublStandard ? GreepeaceandOth rsvCommissionoftEur peanCommunities
(CourtfFirstInstancetheEuropeanCommunities,FirstCha ber,J.LruzVil ca, President,A.KaloOgeropoulosandV.TiilithAu ust1995) Order TheCourtmadetfollowingrd rnadmissibility: FactualBackgroundtheDispute 1On7March991,othebasisfCoun ilReg lat on(EEC)N1 87/84fJune1984 ontheEur peanRegio lDevelo m ntF nd(OJ1984L[69,,'thbasicr ulation') asamendedbyCouncilRegulation(EEC)No3641/85fzDecemb r1985(OJL 350,p40)theCommissionadopt dDecision(9144grantingtheKingdomfSpain financialassistanceromtheEur peRegion lDevelo entF nd('thERDF')p amaximumofECU108,578.419,forinfrastructureve entThpr jectconcerned wasforthebuildingofopow rstationinCan yIsl s,GranCa dn onTenerife,byUnionEl ctricadCa a asSA('UNELCO'). 2TheCommunityfinancertconstructionfwop w rstationswastbes read overfouyears,r m1991t 94,andbpaiiny rlytranch s(A iclesa d3f, andAnnexesIIIIto.hdecision).Thefina cialcommitm ntfortfiryear (1991),forECUz8,953,000Articlefthedecision),waspay blentde nda t' adoptionofthedecision(AnnexIII,paragraphttdecis on).Subsequendi ¬ bursements,asedonthfin ncialplanorop r tiondthpr g ssfi implementation,w retocoverexpenditurr la inghop rationsinquest on,legally approvedintheMemb rSt tconcerned(Articl sa d3fthdecision).UndeArti l 5ofthedecision,Commi sioouldred cersuspentha dgrant dop ratio inssuefanexaminationwertorevealirreg l rityandparticul rsignificant changeaffectingtwayinichsc rriedoutf w ichthCommission'sapproval hadnotbeenrequested(s lsop ragraphsAz ,tanCofnn xIIIth decision). 3Byletterda dZ3D cember1991.AuroraGonzalezlndP droM li nCast , thefifthandsixthpplicants,informetCommissiohaeworksca ri doutn GranCan riawereunlawfulbecausUNELCOh dfailedtou dertakeenvir nm ntal impactassessmentstudynaccordancewithCouncilDire t ve85/337/EECfzyJu 1985ontheassessmentfelfectscertainpubl candprivatpr j c sothenviron¬ ment(OJ1985L75,p401andskedittointervenestophwor s.Theirle tea registeredaNo4084/92. JournaloJEnvironmentalI-awl ttS1©t)\J d/me uitPresstf/r/i
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4Bvletterda d23November1992,D mingoYi raGonzalezths condapplicant,ought the.Commission'sas ista ceonegrou dth tUNELCOh dlr adystartew rk GranCan riaandTe erifewithouttheomisi ndUrbanismoyMedioAmb e te Canarias(C naryIslandommissionf rP ningdtheEnviro m nt.' UMAC') havingissuedtsdeclarationofenvironme talimp ccc rda cewiththpplic bl nationallegislation.Thatlet erwasregisteredN5151/92. 5On3December1992,CUMACissuedtwod larati nsofnvironm talimp ctrela ing toheconstructionfpowerstationsnGrCan riaandTe e fe,ublish di BoletinOficialdCanar so26Feb uaryand3March1993r spectively. 6On26March1993,TagororEcologistaAlternativo('TEA')theeighte nthapplic nt localenvironmentalprotectionass ciatiba doTener fe,l dgdminis ra ive appealagainstCUMAC'sdecl r tionofenvironmentalimp crela ingthj cf r theconstructionfapowerstationnTenerif .O2A il1993,Comi ian ria contralaContaminacion(Ca ryIsl ndsmmissionagain tPollut ,herei fter 'CIC'),theninete nthapplicant,localenvironmen alprote tionssociatba d GranCan ria.alsobroughtdmini tr tiveproceedingsag instUMAC'sdecl rat onf environmentalimpactrela ingthwoconstructionproje sGraCan iaa d Tenerife.
7On18December993,Gr enpeaceSpam,ae viron entalprotectionss ci tion responsibleatthenationallevforac ievementlo lftobjectiv s StichtingGreenpeaceCounc l('Gr enpeac '),thfi sappli ant,natureco s vancy foundationhav gitse dofficeheNetherlands,broughtl g lpr ceedingsc a l ging thevalidityofadministrativeuthorizationsiss etUNELCObyCan ryI l d RegionalMinistryofIndustry,CommerceandConsu ption. 8Byletterof17March993addressedthDirectoG ne alfCommission'sirect¬ orate-GeneralforRegionalP licies('DXYI"),Greenpeacask dthComm ssio confirmwhetherCommunitystruct ralfundshabeenpaidthRegio alGov rn nt oftheCanaryIsla dsf rco structionftwop w rstationinformhe timetableforherele sfthosefund . 9Byletterof13April993,theDirectoG ne alfDGXVIrecomm ndedthatr e ac 'readtheDecisionC(91)440'which,hs i ,onta ned'd ta lsft espec icondit ons toberespectedyUNELCOinordertbtainCommu itysup ortandthfin cing plan'. 0Byletterof17May993,Greenp aceaskedthCommissionf rulldiscl uref informationelatingtom sureshadt kenwithreg rdthc nstructiof twopowerstationsinhCana yIsl ds,acc rdancewi hArti le7ofCouncil Regulation(EEC)No2052/88of4June198nthtasksStr cturalFunds andtheireffectivenessocoordinat onfth ira tiv t sbe w nthemselv snd withtheopera ionsfEur eanInvestmentBanka dtho rxis i gfi anci l instruments(OJ1988L85,p9)whichp ovides:'MeasurfinancedbythFu ds orreceivingassistancefr mthEIBfroanoth rex t ngfinancialinstruments al beinkeepingwiththeprovisionsofTr ati s,withtheins rumen sadop edpursuant theretoandwithCommunitypolicies,includi gth soncernin.environ ental protection.'
1Byletterda d23June993,hDirectoG neralofGXVIwrotesfoll wst Greenpeace:'Iamun bletosupplythisinformationsinceconc rnstin r al decisionmakingproceduresofthCom i sio.butIanassureyth Commission'sdec nwastakeonlyft rfullc nsult tionbetweenhv rious servicesoftheconcerned.' 2On9ctober19 3ame tingt okplacetthCommission'sprem sesinBrus ls betweenGr enpeaceandDGXVI,concerninghfina i gytERDFofthconstruc¬ tionofhep werstationsGrCan riaandTenerif .
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13On21December99 ,theapplicantsbroughction,registeredthC rt ofFirstInstancesCa eT-585/93,seekingnnulm ntfthdecisionall g dthav beentakenyhCommissioodisburseSpani hGov r ment,inadd t ot thefirstrancheofECU28,953,000,furt r1 ,000,000ineimbursem nof expensesincurredthconst uctionftwop w rstationsithCana yIsl ds (GranCanariaandTenerife).h tdecisiow sallegtoh vbt kenbetw 7March1991,whenDecisioC(91)440asdopted,nd2October19 3,when theCommission,atbovementionedingwithGreenpeace,ilr fu i gt provideGreenpeacewithdetailinformationegardingthf a c gfconstruc¬ tion' fhewopowerstationsiCa a yIsl nd ,c firm dth tto lfECU 400 0hadlreadybeendisburs dtohSpanishGov r m ntpursua tt DecisionC(91)440. 14Byseparatedocumentl dg datthRe is ryofC u tFirsIns nce22Feb ry 1994,theCommissionrai danobjecti ntdmi sibilityunderAr icl11fth RulesofProcedure.Thapplicantssubmittedt irobservationnthabj ct on10 MaV'994- 15On30March994,theKingdomofSpainsoughtle vtintervensupportfth Commission.Byorderf8Jun1994,thPresidentSec ndCha b rfthurt ofFirstInstancegrant dheKin domfSp ileavtinterveupp rtoh Commission.Theintervenerl dgedstat mentintervention13July994.Th applicantssubmittedtheirobservationsntstat einnterventionofhSpani h Governmenton27Septe ber1994. [6Bydecisionof25July1991,theCourtFirIns ancereferr dthcch mberf threejudg s. FormsfOrderS ught 17Intheirapplication,eplican scla mt aCours ould: —declarevoidtheisionad ptedbyefendanttwee7March1991d29 October1993disbursethKingdomfSpainECU12,000,000oucher sumspursuanttoiDecisionC(91)440,nreimb seme tofex en esincurredby theKingdomofSpainitc nstructionwpow rstations(oGrCa ria andTenerife): —orderthatdefen ntp ytapplicants' costsi ection. 18TheCommission,intobjectionad is bility,c nt ndst atC urshoul —declaretheapplicationinadmissible;and —declaretheapplicantsliablfori scosts. 19Theintervenercont ndst atCourts ould: —declaretheapplicationinadmissible;and —'orderthapplicantsoytc sts. 20Theapplicants,int eirobservatio sntobject onasdmis b lity,cl imtha Courtshould: —requiretheCommissiontopr d ceallhsuppo tingdocu ents,efin dbyArt¬ icle38(2)ofCommissionRegulation8fi/fito/EEC,Euratom.CSCftDece b r 1986layingdowetailedrul sf rthimplementationfcertp ovisio sft e FinancialRegulationof21D cember1977(OJ986L360,p),r ti gthe expenditureoffundspursuanttDecisionC(91)440; —requiretheCommissionog vafullacco ntoftheanninw ichhdisburs d fundsunderDecisionC(91)440.iparticularthedatesofc mmitm t,valida-
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tion,auth rizationandpavementofe chdisbursementndDecisioC(91)440 andtheamountsofe chsudisbursem nt;
—dismisstheobjectionastadmis bility;nd —declareth teCommissionisl ablef rthapplicnts' ostrela ingthobj ction andthatSp inisl ableforthapplicants'costsireplyi gti sta mentn intervention.
PleasinLawandArgumentsofthParties
21TheCommissionputsforwardt opleainlachall ngingt edmissibili yfthi application,thefirstconc rningthenaturofthea tiquestia dthesec n applicants'la kofocusst ndi. Thepleaofinadmissibilityconcerningthnatur fthea ti question 22TheCommissionsubm tsthaeprocedurelaidownf rthimplementatiofDecisi n C(91)440cannotinvolvethead ptioofdecisiapablofb ngchallengedin annulmentproceedingsunderArticl173ofthECTreaty,sincetheimplem ntatioof anERDFfinancingdecisiooesottakepl cbyme nsoffor lacts.InthCommis¬ sion'sv ew,annalysisofthprovisioftheFinanciRegulatiof21December1977 applicabletohegener lbudg tofthEurope nCommunities(OJ1977L356,p,'the FinancialRegulation),lastame dedbyCou cilRegulatio(Euratom,E SC,C)N 610/90of3March990(OJ1990L7 ,p)showsth tw enanERDFfinanci g decisionitake ,hlegalrequirementsfothcommitm ntfthexpenditureinqu stion areconsideredthavebeenmet.Thpayme tofp rtfthERDFassist nceithusn morethaneadministrativeconsequencfthoriginalcommitm ntdecisi—ithe presentca e,DecisionC(91)440. 23TheCommissionsubm tsthatt eapplicantc nnotthusseekannulmentofth pavmentm dpursuanttoArticle51oftheFinancialRegulationwithoutch llenging thelegalityoftheriginac mmitment,na lyDecisi nC(91)440.Therefore,havin failedtochallengeDecisiC(91)440wi h nthepr scribedper o ,thea plicants areoutftimunlessthCo rtdecidesth timplemen ationofthefinanci gdecisi n, DecisionC(91)440.doesconstituteadecisionwithithmea gofArti l173f theTreaty. 24Theapplicantssubmittha ,ifonelo ksatthesubstanceandn ttheformfaci ordertdeterminewhethericonstitutesadecisionwithinthm aningofArti l173f theTreaty(CasT-83/92ZuniHoldinga dOthersvCommission[199 ]ECRII-i16 ),the fourstagesprovid df rintheFinanci lRegulationfothedisbursementfCommu i y funds—commitment(Articles36t 9),validation(Articles40to2),auth riz t on (Articles43to50)andp yment(Articles51to3)—mustberegardedasc swhichcan bereviewedythCourtund rArticl173Trea y.headdt tisapparent fromArticle1fDecis onC(9 )440thatedecisi ntoauthorizcommitmentsfor'e c subsequentyearinotautomaticb tdependsboththefinanci lpladonth progressinthimplementationoftheop ration. 25Theapplicantsfurt erstressthatintimplemen ationofDecisionC(91)440thCom¬ missionwasunderadualobligationt'monitor'compliancebytheKingd mfSpain withCommunityenvironmentalpolicy,inparticularwithDirective85/337,an<^torefuse todisbursefur herf nditheventofafailurtc mplyw tth tpolicy.Th yconc ude thatsinceeCommissionwasrshouldhavebeenwarthatusoftfundw s, inthiscase,contrarvtCommunitye vir nmentalpolicy,iwasobligedundDecisi
C(91)440torefusepayheamo ntinssue,ofrd rECUit,000,000t 12,000,000.
Thepleaofinadmissibilityconcern ngt applicants'la ko usta d
26TheCommissionsubmitst aapplicantrnodire lyndindividua lco cerne bythecontesteddecision.Istressesthai contest ddecisiononc rno ly thereleaseofaancheERDFfinancing,thlegalp sitiofa pli ts,w ose interestsrelatesol lynvir nmentalp ot ction,can otbdir c yaffected.Th y cannot,thereforelaimobaff ctedytcontestedecisioints mw ya the-addressee,eSp ni hGovernment.Nortpplica tsindivi uallyconcern d bythecontestedde ision,si ciconc rnslyrela nsbetweCommis ion andSpainco fersnorightdim sobli at ow tregarthird parties. 27TheCommissionfurth rarguest atneith rs condapplicantD ingoVieGonz ¬ lez,northefifthapplicant,AuroraGonza ezzalezsh uldberecognizedash ving locusstandiotheolegr untt yhadsubmittcomplai ttheCommi i n.I addsthaterelevantleg lulover ingitsrelationwi hthM mb rStat s,w ich providetheframeworkinwhichcontesteddecisi naad pted,n tconf ry subjectiverigh sonindiv dual ,whothushavnolocstandie therund rArti les173 and175oru derArticl69ftheECTre ty. 28Finally,theCommissioncon id rsth tepre ntactiosh uldn thavebeeroug t beforethCommunitycou tsubef rt enationalcou ts,whichal ncrulenthe questionwh thert egrantofplan ingermis ionfothop rstationsinthCan ry Islandswalawfulithreg rdtoDirect ve85/337. 29Theapplicantsconsidert a yrdire tlconcernedbecauthontestedec si n leavesthSp nishGover mentnodiscrettohusfefundsadva cedfrom theERDF(Cas62/70Bock0Commis ion[19 1]R8 7andC se11 82Piraiki-Patraik 0Commission[1985]ECR2 7). 30Inordertestablishth tyarindividuallyc ncerned,tapplic ntssubmit,prima ily, thatallindividua swhoh vesuffer dopot ntiallywi lsufT rdetrimentrlo sare ult ofaCommunitymeasurewhichaffe tstheenvironmenthast di gtbri gnc io underArticl173ofthT eatya d,ineal ern tive,thalindividu lsw ohav sufferedopot ntiallywills ffer'particular'detrimentrlo sesultosuchmea r havethatstanding. 31Theyaddt atrequirementt tinor restablishlocustandiapplicantm st showthatheiaffectednsamw yst eaddr s eeofdecisioni oborut bythecase-lawofC urtJusticeandcit ,inthatregard,ijudgementstf eld ofStateaids,recognizingthatc mpe itorsfbeneficiariesahavst ndi gtbr anctionunderArticl173oftheTreatyal houghthe rinte stsrnoaff ted samewayastheddre seeofdeci ion,w ichitM mb rStatconcerned(C C-tgS/giook0ommission[1993]ECRI-2487). 33TheapplicantssktCourodoptliberalapp chnt iissuandrecog izethat, inthepres ntcase,th irlo ust ndidepeotoaur lyecon micint r tbut theirinter steprot ct onofnvironme t,abando ingtap a had pti thepastinc s sconc rningurelye omicinterest . 33Insupportofthatargument,t eapplic ntsrelyonComm i yp lica dcase-law inrelationtoenvironmentalprotection,thCommunity'sinternati alco mi ments inthatfieldanderelevantlawpracticeofMemberStat sndfot r countries,inparticulartheUnitedStat sofAme ic ;i haconnection,t ypr du e asnnnextoheirapplicationreportdr wupin1992bytInstituteforApplied Ecology,entitled'AccesstJustice,FinalRep rt'.Th treport,a ordingt
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applicants,showst atineveryMembStateindividu lswhocestablishsuffic ent interestmaybringlegalproceedingsag instdmi istrativedecis oll gedth v beentakeninr achofenvironmentalrules.Mor v r,majorityfe b rSt t s alsol owenvir nmentalassociationswhichruff ientlyrepresentativeftinte ¬ estsoftheirmemberswhichhavb nsubj cttomefor alaccreditation registrationtob ngsuchactions.
34Onthebasisofoseco siderations,tapplicantsmaint nah yhave hsuff red particularandspecialh msresultofthetsndmi ionsll g dgain t Commissionandthus,icaserelatingtoee vironme t,h yme tcriteriafo locusstandiunderArticl173ofhT e ty. 35Theapplicantssubmittheconstruct onfowerstationGrCan iaus causesharmto: —theapplicantDomingoVierGonzalez,l c lresidedsecr aryofCa t l delRomeralassociationoffish rme ,inasmuchstwadverselyffe tthl veli¬ hoodsfl calfishermen; —theapplicantP bloGued sr ia,localres deandfarm r,inas uchstwill adverselyffectthliveli oodsoflocalfarmanr aconc ned,whi hpr ¬ ducesthelarg ttomator pnCanaryIsl ds; —theapplicantJosIgnacioTroj olaChav z,whi employedttourisnd stry, inasmuchastwilladverselyffectthresidents'he lt ,ourisin ust y,fish r¬ menandfar rs; —theapplicantAurorGonzalezp esideofSa chB lanos residents' association,inasmuchswillh vedet iment lffeohqua tyf lifeofocalresidents; —theapplicantPedroMeliaCastro,loc lresid ntialt xdriv r,in smuchsw l harmtheenvironmentanddamagouristind stry; —theapplicantCaridadS nch zArti s,lo alesidenddo tor,in smu hs willhavedetrimentaleff ctsoresidents' alth;and —theapplicantJosuanMeliali ,loc lre id ntndh t achert CastillodelRomeralinfants' ch ol,ina muchswillh rmheenvironmentnd havedetrimentaleffectsochildr n'seducation. 36Theconstructionftpowerstationnenew llauseharm: —theapplicantCarmGuada upeo zstro,localesid ntwhob ughth s intheareaforbenefitoherlthcauseshuff redr miousr thing problems,inasmuchstwillh vand erseff toee lth; —theapplicantCl rDonateHer andez,loc lresid ntnfa m r,inas u hs willhavedetrimentaleff ctso realthndfarml n ; —theapplicantBalbinaMartinEspfnola,in smu hsw lldv rselyf e there t ; —theapplicantJosHernandezMori ,trunionistiCa ryIslWorkers' Union,inasmuchastwillh vendverseeff tothliveli oodforkers touristsector;;, —theapplicantGermaP nHernandez,localresid nteprese tativoftL ■AbrigosdeGranadillaonaresidents' c llective,ina mu hstwilh v adverseeff ctonthhe lthfr sidentsndlivelihoodt seempl yedn touristandfarmingsectors; —theapplicantAntonioCabreraExp sit ,fiscalresid ntndGra dilltownh counsellorforthenvironment,inasmuchwilhdetrime taeff ctshe environment,ot u is ,farmingandhe lth; —theapplicantValentiHerna dezquero,whisc argofservifopr ¬ ventivemedicineinalocalhospital,na muchstwillvedetri ntaleff c s thehealthoflocalresidents;
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—theapplicantPet rReinha d,loc lres dent,inasmuchswilh vdetr mental effectonwindsurfinghichisthereasonhc meolivTenerif ;a d —th"applicantJul oGonzalezD mfnguez,nor ith logist,inasmuchswi lh v adetrimentaleffectolocaflorndauinpa ticularthb rd population.
37Asregardsthelocusstan iofapplicantassociations(Gre np ce,TEACIC)t applicantsoi toutherelevantcase-l wfC rJust ep rtd ny standingtouchorganizationslywherehe rmembearnotthems lveindividually concernedby.thCommunitymeasurec all ng .Wh nore be sfa associationreentitl dtbringannulme tproceedi s,ther f re,ssocirepres¬ entingtheirin r stsshouldal obntitle . 38Theapplicantsconsiderthaoswonditi nremiprese taby first,eighteenthandninetpplicants,amelyGre n ce,TEACIC.h y explainthatGreen eace,whoseh adofficisNetherl nds,al g lp rsonality andthati sobject,u d rArticle2fbylaws'promotingc nservationf Nature'.Inaddition,ofh6828membersGreenpeaceSpa n,whichisres onsible atthenationallev lforachievementfGree peace'sobj c ivtloc l (seeparagraph7bove),1266rr sidentinthCan ryIsl sdmaofthos areindividuallyconcernedbythcont stdecisio .TEAnen ironme alass ci¬ ationgovernedbySp nishlawndasTene ife;Articl2fitstatutespr id s thati saimsre,interliaopr mote,encour gendsupporudionatu theenvironmenti ge eral,andma yofs154emb rsl oindividuall concernedbythcontesteda t.Finally,CIC,lsoassociati nwithlegpersonality governedbySpanishlaw,s dGraC naria,hitimshpr tectiond defenceofhistorical,culturnatscenic,ecologi ala de vironment lvalu s heritage. 39Inthealternative,pplican ssubmitare r se tativeenvi onm ntalo ganiza¬ tionsshouldbeconsideredindivi uallycernyreasonfpartic l r importantroleth yhavpl vnrocessfleg lc ntrolbyepresentingg n al interestssharedbyanumberofi dividualfocusendcoordinma n(Opinion ofAdvocateGeneralL nziCas297/86IDAandOth rsuo ci[1988]ECR3531, point15). 40Theapplicantslsorej ctCommissio 'rgumentthatp e ectisub idiary toproceedingsbroughtinhSpanishcourt ,str ssingt ae kjudi ialrev ewft oftheCommission,akeninbreachfrelevantmu ityrul s,ndotcts theSpanishuthorities. 41Finally,theapplicantssubmiatCommissio 'rgu entoeffect admissibilityofnctionf rnnulme tdependswhethertpplicacquirsub¬ jectiverightsasesultofthecontes dctisunsupporteeit rbywrdingArt l 173orthecase-lawfCommunityourts. 42TheSpanishGovernment,inte v ner,dr wsistinctionbe wehl custandiof applicantassociations—Gree peace,TEAndCICndthofp twhr naturalpersons. 43Asregardsthelocusstan iofapplicantssoci tions,imaint i st ,h v gregard toheirp sitioninrelatiecont stedde i o ,nonfmpo s ssescharacter¬ isticswhichouldenablebassimilateheddres eoftdec s onndubmits thateCourofj sticehaeldt tnassociationorganizationepdefe d collectiveinter stsfacategorypersonannotbnsider dthdir tlyddi¬ viduallyconcernedbyameasureff ctingthgen alin er tsftat gor(Joi d Cases163and\7/ 2ConfederationNatio led sProduct ursFr iaO h rvcil[9 ECR471).
44Asregardsthelocust ndioft o etheapplicantswhoarenaturalrsons,tS ni hGovernmentstressesthao efmcl i syfi anciali t r twhichm g tve underlaintheadoptionofthecontesteddecis onathusnablet embplac dn thesamefootingstKingdomfSpai .Further ore,hef ctatomftheapplic¬ antsh dsubmittedco plaintsthCom sioni rel tionhmatterin tsufficient togivethemlocusstandi,inceisettl dlawhatthCom issionaobl gation initiateTreaty-infringementp oc di gsa ai stMemberSt t(C e87/89So itoandOthersvCommission[1990]ECR1 81,pa agraph6). FindingsoftheC urt
45UnderArticle114(3)ofthRulesPro dure,t eremaind rofthproc edingsthe objectionastoadmissibilityistb ralunlesshC urtde desothe wi e.I epr ent case,theCourtconsid rst atith ssufficientinf rmationfromthd cu e tsb f rei andh sdecidedthatt ereisoedtop nhalproc ure. 46TheCourtwillexaminefirsh thertappl cantsvlocustanditob i gac ion,beforec nsideringwhethtactwhicht yrc aile ingconstitutesde i ionwith themeaningofArticle173thT e ty. 47Indoingso,theC urtwillconsiderfirthl cusstandiftapplicantswhorer vate individualsandthent tofthosewhicharssocia ions. Thelocusstandioft applicantswhorepriv teindividuals 48Ithasbeenconsistentlyheldthatpersonsoth rthaddresseesmayclaimt decisioniofdirectcon erntthemlythatdecisionaf ectst mbvreasonfr ain attributeswhichrpec liaroem,rbyreasonff ctu lir mstancesw ichdiff r n¬ tiatehemfro lloth rpersonsndtherebydistinguisht mindivi uallyhea e wayastheper onaddr ssed(Ca25/62Pl uma nvom ission[19 3]ECR5,C e231/ 82Spiker0Commission[1983]ECR559,Ca e97/85Deut cheLeben mitteluerkea dOth sv Commission[1987]ECR2265,Ca e-19 /91o k,c t dabove,seC-225/gtMatrav Commission[1993]ECRI-3203,Ca eT- 1/93.4i>Fr ncevCommiss on[1 94]ECR1- 3 andC seT-465/93ConsorzioGruppdAzi neLocal'Mu giaMessapica'C mmission[19 4]ECRII-361).
49Beforeconsideringwhethtconditionslaid withatli fauthorityrem t thepresentinstance,appropriatxaminefithmeritsftapplicants' rgu¬ mentthawhendetermi ingad iss bilityoft iractioeC urtshouldfit f fromtherestrictionsthoseauthoritiesimp se,wh chat atthird-partyapplicantsmust establishthateyaraffectedbythcontestedm a urei s mwaystaddr ssee ofthedecision,andconc ntraterathertholef t atyh vsuff redp en iallv willsufferdetrim ntolossfr mthehar fulenvironmentalff ctsarisingtfu lawful conductnthepartftCommunityinstitutions.Asnot d'aboveIseeparagraphs30 and32),theapplicantsstr sshe eth irin e tsaffec edbyhconte tedd i ion arenoteconomic,ashb enthea ei almostlltjudg n sdeliv redi re ation toArticle173fthTreaty,buofqui ediffer ntk nd,rela ingtoenv ronmentald healthprotection.
50TheCourtobs vesthatwhilstabovementionedlin fauthorityco prisesjudg ents givenmostlyincasesconc rning,i pri ciple,eco omici t r ts,tthl sru thattheessen ialcrit rionappl edinthosejudgme ts—substance,combi ationf circumstancessufficientfortht ird-partyapplicanttobbleclaimth thff c edbythecontesteddecisioniamannerwhichdiffer nt ateshimfro llh rperso s-
remainsapplicablewh tev rtn ure,economicorth rw se,ft applicants' interestswhichareaffect d. Consequently,thcriterionwhichthappl antss ekth va plied,r strictedm rely toheexist ncefharmsufferedtobuffered,ca notalo esu fictc f rlo sta i onapplicant,si esu hh rmm yaffect,gen rallya di thbstractl gumber ofpersonswhocann tbdetermi edi dvancewayhichdistinguishesthem individuallynthesamewaastddress eofdecision,i accordancewiththca -l w citedabove.Thatconclusionc nn tbaffec edythf t,pforwarapplica ts (seeparagraph33bove),th tinpracticeofn tionalc urtsmat rr latingt environmental,pr tectionlocussta dim yd p nderelyth irhavi g'sufficient' interest,sincelocutandiu d rthfo rthp ragraphofArti le173hT tyd nds onmeetingthconditionsr lati gtoheapplicant'sbdir lyndindiv duallyaff ¬ tedbyhecontestedde ision(sparagraph48abov ). Theapplicants' argumentthatt irloc sstandithic eshouldbasse s dn lightofcriteriatherthanosealr adys td wnintcas -l wot,t eforeb accepted. Itmustthereforebconside dwheth rtapplicantsri isnstancediv dually concernedbythcontestedde isionrea onfce taiattr buteswhichrp c l art them,orbyreasonffactualcirc mstanceswhichdiffe n iatethemro llotherper o andtherebydistinguishthemindivi uallyhsa ewaaddr ss eoft t decision. Theapplicantsresixte nr va eindividualswholye t eroth ibj c vest tusa 'localresident','fisherman' or'f rmer' ntheirpositionaserso sc nc r edby consequenceswhichtbuildingfwopow rtationsm g thavlocalto rism, thehealthofCanaryIsl ndresidentsaothv ronment.T vd ,t refore, relyonattributesubstantiallydis incfromthosfa lepeoplwhol v rpur ue anctivityintheareasco c rnedndsof th mo testedde ision,ia grantsfinancialassist nceorthecon tructionftwpowertations011GC r a andTenerife,ismeasurewhoseffectsarlik lytimpingeon,bje tively,g n rally andinthebstract,variousc tegoriesofpersonndif ctnyp rsonr dings ay temporarilyinheareasconcerned. Theapplicantsthuscannotbaff ctedythco testedde si nth rti s me mannerasyothlocalresid nt,fish rman,fa m rtouriswhoi ,ightb thefu ure,insamesituation(C s231/82Sp k r.cit dbove,par graph9n T-t17/94Associazionegricoltoridel aPr vinciaR tigondOthersC mmission,rd rf21 February1995,notyepublishedithECRparagraph25). Norcanthefactatsecond,ifthndsix hpplicantshavesubmittedomplaint toheCommissioncon t tuteasp cialircumsta cedist g ishinghemindividuallyfr allotherpersonsndtherebygivingt mlocusta dibriactiounderAr cl173 oftheTreaty.Nospecificproc duresrepr vid df wh rebyindivi alsm ybassoci¬ atedwiththeadoption,implementa iona n toringfdecisionsakeithfi ldf financialassistancegrantedbytheERDF.Mer lyubmittingcompla ntub¬ sequentlyexchangingcorrespondencewiththCommissionca ott er foregivom¬ plainantlocusstanditobr gactionunderA cle173.thCou tfJ sticeh sel , althoughpersonwhoasksnins ituti n,notta edeci ii respectfh mb openaninquirywithregardtoh rda t es,mabco sideredth vindirect interest,hsnevertheless' oit epr ciselegalpositionftha tualrp tenti l addresseeofmea urewhichaybannull du d rArticl173ofT ty(C s246/ 81LordBethellvCommission[1982]ECR2277). Itfollowsthatecircumstanceswhichheapplic ntlyrnotsuffi i ntdifferenti¬ atethemfro llo herp rsonsandthusdis ing isht mindividuallysa eway astheaddresseeofthdeci ion.
148CASEL WAN LYSIS 58Theclaimsoftapplicantwhorprivateindividu lsmusthereforbh ld inadmissible. Thelocusstandift applicantassociation 59Ithasconsistentlybeenldthatass ciationformrtprotectionfh collectiveinteres sfacat goryofpersonsc nnotbnsideredtd r ctlya individuallyconcernedfothpurposesffourthparagraphfArti l173the Treatybyameasureffectingthgen r linter stsohacat gory,andistherefore notentitledtobringacti nforannulmentwhe eitsmembersaynods individually(JoinedCas s19to22/62FederationNati naldlBoucherieGru CommerceenGrosdVand sandOth r0Council[1962]E R491;Case72/74Unio Syndicatevcouncil[1975]ECR401;Case60/ 9Producte rsdeVi sTablein PaysvCommission[1979]ECR242 ;Case82/85DEFtvCommis on[19 6]E R2469; Case117/86UFADE0Councila dCommission[1986]E R325 ,par graph ;and JoinedCas sT-447/93,8/93dT-4 9/AITECandOthers0Commission,judg e t of6July1995,notyetp blishedithECR,paragrap s58a d9).Furthe m r , specialcircumstancess chathrolplay dbnasso iationinproced rwhich ledtoheadoptionofnctwithinthemea i gofAr icl173fthTre ym v justifyholdingadmissiblenact onbroughtyassociat nwh ememberarn directlyandindividuallconcernebythcontestedmeasu e(JoinCas67,38 and70/85VderKooyandOth rsuCommissi n[1988]ECR219andCas-313/90 CIRFSandOthers0Commission[1993]ECRI- 125). 60Thet r eapplicantassoc ations,Greenpeac ,TEAa dCIC,cl imth teypre nt thegeneralinterest,mattofenvironme talprotection,ofpe plresidingGra CanariaandTenerifendth tt rmembe sraffectedbythcont stedde isio ;t y donot,howeveradducnyspecialcircumstancestdemon tratetindivid ali teres oftheirmembersasopposedt nyo rpers nresidingintha .Tpossible effectonthlegalpositionthmembersotapplicantassociationsc nn t,th ref r , beanydifferentfromthatall gedherbythapplicantswhorpriv teindividu s. Consequently,i ofarastheapplicantsithpre ntc ew oaprivatindividu ls cannot,astheCourtheld(s epar graph58above),bconsideredtindividually concernedbythcontesteddecisio ,n rathemembersofthappli a tasso iatio s, aslocalresidentsofGr nCan riaanTenerife. 61Sinceonfthec nditionsrequiredfoactiobroug tundeArticl173ya associationtbeadmiss bleisnotmthic e,imu tbeconsider dwh h rthe exchangeofcorresponde ceanthem ti gw icto kpl cebetweeGr enpea ,on ofthehreeapplicantassoc ations,andtheCommis i nwitreg rdtohefinanc gf theproj ctfortconstructionftwpowerstationsintheCana yIsl dconstitute specialcircumstancessuchatog vilocstanditobri ganctioassociation, intheVanderKooyndCIRFSjudgme ts,citedab v . 62Inthepres ntca e,unliktCIRFScas ,thCommissiondidnot,prtheadoption ofthecontesteddecision,ini iaa yprocedurein-wh hGree pea eparticipated;or wasGreenpeaceianythinterlocutorofheCommissionwithregardthadopti ofthebasicDeci ionC(91)440and/orofthec ntesteddecision.Gr enpeaccan t, therefore,claimohavnyspecif cinter stdistin tfromthatfi memberstju i y itslocusstandi(CIRFSandVderK oy,citedabove). 63Furthermore,ecorr spondencew ichto kplacebetweenGr en candth Commissionanditsubsequenteeti gwithmem ersfthCommission'sstaffwere forpurposesfinf rmati nnly,sincetheCommissionwasundend tye hert consultrtheaheapplicantsinthecontextofthimpleme tationofDecisiC
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(91)440seeparagraph56above).Greenpeace'sap ro chestthCommi si ncann t, therefore,giveilocusstanditobri gaionunderthfou thpar graphfArt cle 173oftheTreaty.
64Itfollowsromalltheforegoingthatneith reapplic ntsw oaren uralpe s nsn thosewhicharessociationsrindividuallyconce nedbythdecis onallegedtohave beenadoptedythCommissionbetwee7March1991nd2Oct ber19 3tdis urs toheKingdomfSpainsumftheord rfECU11,000,000r12.00 ,00aERDF assistanceinreimbur ementofexpen esincurredthonst uctionftwopowes atio s intheCanaryIsl ds(GranCanariaTenerife). 65Consequently',withouttherebe gandtocons dewheth radecisionapableof beingchallengedinaactiounderArti173ofthTre tyexis sinthp sentca andwhetherthapplicantsrdirectlyconcernedbythcon est ddecisi n,the applicationmustbedecl redinadmissible. Costs 66UnderArticle87(2)ofthRulesfProce ure,thunsuccessfulpartyistbeo der d paythecostsifthavbeenppliedforinthsuccessfulp rty'spleading .Sinct applicantshavebeenunsucc ssful,theymustorderedtp ytcosts. 67UnderArticle87(4)ofthRulesfProcedur ,MembSta swhichhavinterven proceedingsartbeartheiowncosts.ThKingdomofSpains llthereforebeait owncosts. Onthosegrounds, THECOURTOFFIRSTINSTANCE(FirstChamber) herebyord rs; 1.Theapplicationisdismiss dainad is ible. 2.Theapplicantsshalljoint ya dseverallybe rthcosts. 3.TheKingdomofSpainshallbe ritownc sts. AnalysisbNicoleGerard' 1.Introduction Itiswidelyrecognisedthateapplic t onofenvironmen allawsuffersbeca s modernlegalsystemshavb enconstruct dar unthid aofproper y,frame¬ workinthichenvironmentallafitswitgr atdiff culty.Fund men allegal perceptionsmustchangebeforeadequateprot ctioofenviron nt lvaluesc beobtainedincourtsflaw.Si ceitsetanenvironment lge dainthe rly 1970s,theEuropeanCommu ityhasburdenedits lfwithb dyfseco dary legaloblig tionsintheenvironm ntaldomaina dh smodifiedthTreaty includeanE vironmentTit e.Despittheseadvanc s,tabovor rbythe CourtfFirstInstancedemonstratesthatenforcementofCommu i yenviron- Theauthorwouldliketth nkMrsChristinBochandDRobertLaneft eihelpfulc mm ntsoan earlierdraft.
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mentallawhasnoevolvedi ccordancewithstatedCommunityP li y,it secondarylegislationorArticl s13or-tfthTr atv.hicommentaryatte ptst illustratewhy,fromanenvironmentallap rspective,thedecisioiparticularly disappointingndtoeekpossibilitiesforuturevolution. Asseen,thcasinvolvesthCommissiondecis on(C(91)4407Marc 1991),takenunderthRegio alFunds,tacc rdSpm xim mofEcu 108,578,419fortheconstructionftwoelec ip wers a io sinthCanary Islands,oGrCanarydTenerife.heprojectwasundertak nbyUn lc (UnionElectricadeCana ias,SA).Import ntly,s oafterthfundswer authorisedtheCommissi nreceivedcompl ints:thaworkonGrand Canaryh dcommencedillegally,'withouttheEnvironmentalImp cAssess¬ mentrequiredbyDirective85/337;' and'thatUnelcohadundertakenth constructionwithouttheEnvironme talDeclaratiorequiredbynat allegis¬ lationimplementingtheCommunitydirectivinquestion.4Var usnational levelactionswereundertakeco ce ingthproje t:administr tirevi wwa soughtftheDeclarationsissuedaft rthwo kshadcommence ,inviolati n ofnationalrules;5andGreenpe ceSp ibegjudicialproceed ngstchall g thevalidityoftheadministrativeau h risationaccordedtUnelco.8 AtCommunitylevel,thArticl173actionbroughtyGreenp aceand eighteenot rapplicantss ughtannulthCommis i ndecis onalloc ti g afurtherEcu12,000,000,ont pftheini i l28,953,000,treimburseSpain fortheconstructionfthewop w rs ati .Thedeci i naissuewastaken between7March1991,thdaonwhichCfgijqqowasadopted,nd29 October1993,thedatoftmeetingduringwhichtheCommissi nimpl ed thatEcu40millionhadbeenallo atedinapplicationofdecisionC(g1)440. Theapplicantsargued'thatt eCommissionw sunderthdoublobligation toensurehatSpainrespectedCommu i yenviron entalpolicy,s ecif ly Directive85/337;and,inthec sofviolationfthp licy,trefusoall cate funding.Theappl cantsfurt errequestedthCo rtrd rthCommissio toreleasehdocumentsrelatingtohfunding. 1Letterof23Decemb r1991.froMrsAuroraGonzal zGonzaleza dMrPedM li nCastro(5thnd 6thapplicants). 2CouncilDirectivef27June1985otheassessm ntoftheffectsofc rt npublicandprivateprojectso theenvironm nt85/337/EEC,OJ1985Li7 /40. 3Letterof23Novemb r1992,frM.DomingoVieraGonzal z,sec ndapplicant. 4Therelevantnationalo ga(ComisiondeUrbanismovMediAmbie tedCanaria )issu dthdecl ra¬ tionsinquestiono26Februarvand3March1993♦morcthaayeftthCommissionreceiv dthfirs complaintthatt ew rkshadbeencommenced.Theore icallytpr j csh uldhavebeensuspendedtthi point:RealDecretoLegislativo1302/1986(thbasiclegislationtr nsp singthCommun tydirec ive).A ticl 9,stipulatestha ,ifaprojectrequiringEnvironm ntalImpactAssessmenticommencedwithouthavingcom¬ pletedthproc durei'shallbesuspended'('s rsuspendido')\howev ,thautomaticn turoft iappears mitigatedbytheadditionof'attherequestotheenvironmentalorga '. 3TagororEcologistaAlternative),loc lassociati nbas dinTenerife,b ganadministrativrecour eag i t thedeclarationofCUMACrel ti gttheTen rifepow rstationo26Marc1993.On2April19 3,Comision CanariacontrlCont min cion,notherlocalassociation,introdu edanoth radmi istr tiveacti nag in t theDeclarationofCUMACrel ti gtbodeclarations. "On18December1993.ThisdidnotpreventtCommissionIrargui g(par g aph28)th tecase shouldhavebeenroughtnotbeforethCommuni ycourtsbuteforthenati nalcourts,si ctheyalone couldpr nounceothelegalityftheau h ris tion.Theapplicantsrefutedthis(paragra h39)bypoint nou thatt isact on( sopposedthevariounationalacti s)w saimedthejudic lreviewofCommissions actsdop edinviolationofCommunityrules,n tthreviewofactsadoptedbySpanisauthor ties. Paragraph25.
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Severalargumentswerep tforth.8Inact,howev r,hm ttcen r d
thepleaofinadmissibility(locustand )rais dbythCommissioandw e her theapplicantsweredire tlyandindividu llconcernebythc lleng d decision,asrequiredbyArticl173.TheCourtfFi stinstan eexaminedt issueofadmissibilitypriortexaminingwhetherthc allengedactw s decisioninthesenseofArticl173.9 TheCourtbeganyinvokingtPlaumann10formul ,devel pedthred cad s agointhecont xtfcommonmarket.Iconsider dthapplicants' invitationtodis anceit elffromthee rliercas -lawandc ncentrateowhether theapplicantscabeonsideredt'individuallyconcerned'sinceth yhav undergoneomayun oaprejudicersp cifilo sbec fthme s re. Theapplicantsmadetwoextremelyimportantargumentsfoqu lifyi gth Plaumanntests,accordingowhichthepplicantmu tes blishth thas beenaff ctedinthesamm nnerstpersonaddres ed.F r t,thapplicants notedthat,imat rsofstaids(ci ingcaseC-198/91Cook!Commission 3 RecatI-2487)thelegalinterestofhcompetitorsfrecipi ntsofstataids hasbeenrecognised."Se ond,theyp int doutth tt irinter stcanno dependsolelyoeconomicint rest,butrather,oth irinte stprotecti g theenvironment.Howev r,theC urtsummarilystatedth taltho ghth case-lawwasinde ddeveloper tiontecon micint r sts,hcriteri establishedbythatca e- aw'..remainsapplic lewhatevertn tur ,eco¬ nomicorotherwise,fth setapplicants'interestwhicaffected'.1" Thelogicbe indtassumptionaecase-lawr mainsapplic bl ,althou h thecont xta dinterestsinvolvernapplicable,isunexplained.ThCo rt thenfoundt at,si ceearliercase- ww sapplicabl ,thcriter aproff red bytheapplicantswasinsufficienttoestablishi landinterest sinceuchharmmayaffe t,gen rallydinthab tra t,larnumberopersonswh cannotbedeterminedinadvancew yhichdistinguisheshind vidu llyt ame wasastheaddresseeofdecision,inaccordancew ththc se-lawciabove.13 TheCourtconcludest atitlmakaclaimustbeexami edinlighof establishedcase-law,14namely,tode erminewhetherthapplicantsm ybin i¬ viduallyconcernedbecausthdecisioatissu'afiectth myrea onofc rt i attributeswhichepeculiartoh mobyre sonfci cums ancesinw icth y aredifferentiatedfromlltherp rsons,andbyvirtuefthesfactdistinguishe themindividuallyjustastcaseofper onaddressed'.15Again tthest, thelocalresid nts,fisherm ,farmersornithologists,tindividua swihealt problems(andadmittedly,owindsurfer)efou dtbenotdisting ishabl fromanytherlocalresident,fisherman,armer.T yt e fo el ckleg linte st HSecparagraphs22,3,58and39. Practically,isdifficulttoeewhatelsetha tcouldbon d reddhoeltheC urtcoupro ed. Logically,h wever,itsawkw rdthatithoutdec dingwhe ertchall ng dactuldbconsidereda decision,theCourtproceededapplythst i tArti l173cri eriaasthoughthih dbe nassumed. Case25/62Plaumann1963ECR9 .Theformulisdiscussedbe ow. "Paragraph31. 12Paragraph50. "Paragraph51. 14Paragraph52. 11Case25/62PlaumannndoCommis ion9 3E R9t107.
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tomakeaclai .16N rw shefacttcertainpplica tsh dpreviouslyfor¬ wardedcomplaintstthCommissionsuffic tcon deremindiv ually concerned.'7Thestandingfindividualapplicantswastrulut. Next,xaminingtheleg litlandin resoftssociations,C urrecalled that,againccordingcase-law,associ tionsdefendiollectivein er stsnot beacceptedshavinginter stlightofArti l173hTreaty.yc nnot beconsideredtmorindivi uallyaffectethanindividualsfwhichv arecomposed.Sincithisins ancetdividualshavbeenrule t,swer thet r eassociations.18 FinallytheCourtexaminedwheth rcorrespondencebeGree p ac andtheCommissionregardingfin cinofprojectsc uld'c nstitutespe¬ cialircumstancess chatog veilo standibri gtioass ci¬ ation'.19Si cethssociationenter dintdial guewithCommissionnlv afterthchallengeddecisio swert k n(i. .,oncGr enp acdisc v r d allegedbreachofCommunitylaw,ratherthanbeforsudisc v ry)uld notbeconsideredthavninter st. Asaresult,thectionwasdismi edndapplicantsorder y costs. 2.TheCourt'sApproachtL cuS andi Theapplicants' asefounderedontqu stionfl cstandi.20questi ofwhatasareview bleact—whetherthCommissiondecis onntinu fundingwasiactadecisionthesenseofArt l173andtheref r susceptibletojudicialreview—waslefunansw red.Thgr undsforrevi theviolationsfDirective85/337onp rtSpainandtCommission' failuretosuspendundingi acc rda cewithArti l130^2)—rlsounre¬ solved.ThCourt'sdecision,f ni gtapp oachsimil rituationin future,hasgravconsequences.Tbegi ,thCo tse msendors paradoxicalsituationbywhichthemoreeople21adv rselyaffectedCo ¬ munitydecisionsandbre cheofCo munilawym u ityinstitutio s, thelesschanceyhavofbei gard.Thfosimplereasont aretoonumerousbconsidered'individually'conce n d. Theunderlyingprobl mist atco c p sfindividuali te esafundament¬ allyntitheticaltohe vironment.Environmen ali ter sts,byna ure,acol¬ lective,concerningthma yraththanef w.TCourth rs ys,inesse ce, thatenvironmentalint restsofanaturallegalpersoncan ote erus fully.be invokedagainstCommunitydecisionb useth yw llnoteeef r 16Paragraphs54nd5. 17Paragraphs56and7. 18Paragraph60. 19Paragraph61. 20ApparentlythCourtofFirsInstancec n id rssbeo'manifestlyinadmissible'( :Ar icl i1,RulesofProceduretheCourtF rstInstanctEur peanCommunitiesf2M y1991OJL136/ 1at20)thatitssuesreasonedord r,ratherthjudgment. 21Forexample,the1266residentmemb rsfGreenpeace,t 54m mbersfthTenerife-basedEA.n t tomentiontheEuropeaaxpayerwhh sputc40illiont ardsall g dlyillegalp j c .
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admissibility.Heldupagainstth ,eCommission'sowe phasinacc st justiceforenvironmentala soc ationsitheFifthActiProgramme22seemsnaive oreveningenuous. Infacttheprobl mismuchteste bodiediAr icle173ath Court'sinterpretationf.Aparag aph50heCour call dth t: Ithasbeenconsi tentlyldthaperso sothert aaddres eem yclaimt tdecision isofdirectconcernth mlyift atdecisiona f tsthembyrea onofc rtaiattribut s whicharepeculiartoth m,orbyreasonffactualcircumstancesw icdi feren iateth fromalltherpersonsndther bydistinguishhindividuallyitamewasthperso addressed.'3 Asmentioned,environmentalinter sts,b i gcoll c ve,ca noteverdistinguish theclaimantfro'allth rpersons'.TheCourts bbor lyadheresthlan¬ guageofPlaumann,despitethefacthatTre yh sev lvedtinc udenviron¬ mentalobliga ions,despiteitowrecognitionhatcircumst ncesunderwhich thisestwadevelopedn tapplyher ,24 ndfin lly,d spitethfacth case-lawhasevolved. Here,theCourttreatspr vioucase-lawsbinding.Theoretic lly,howev , theCourtmaydepafr mitswncase-law'5andind ehoocc sion departedfrome li rrulings.Further o e,t ecas -lawsu roundingArti le 173hasbeenareawh rethCourth ss ownits lfparticularlyinclined toakenactivr linnterpretation.Theconsiderablevolu ionhacon¬ cernedthareasofwhichtypfctcabchallenged;"0a instwhi institutiontheacticanbedirected;27 tandingforsemi-privilegedapplicants;"8 standingfornon-privilegedapplica tsithere sfanti-dumping,"'9co peti¬ tion,30and(asinv kedbythapplicants)statid .31 Asearlyas1986,inCofaz,32theEurope nourtfJusticacc ptedindivid al concernfthirdparti sbecaust yh dpl yedrolintheproced re investigatingapossibleviolat onfCommuni yrules,andbeca'theirposi¬ tiononhemarketisignificantlyaffect dbytheS tdwhichisthubje t ofthecontesteddecision'.33ThcommentsAdvocatG ner lVerL renva Themaatarerelevant.Ref rringtoheeff ctofaidt atm ybincomp tibl withthecommonmarket,hecommentsth'[wj rco p titionisdistort d 12 'Individualsandpublicinterestgroupssh lhapract cableccestohcou tior ertenth theirlegitimateinteres sareprotectedandthapresc ib denviron nt lme sur saeffec iv lyenfo cedand illegalpracticesstopped;'OJ1993C138/82. 23Paragraph48. 24Paragraph50. 25See.forexample,Edw dandLan .ur peanCommu ityL :AIntr duction,seco de iti .Edinburgh 1995,at54,paragraph32. 26Case22/70Commissionvouncil1971ECR263;Case-39/ 3PSyndicatFrancoide{'ExprInte national (SFEI)vCommission1994ECRI-2681. 27Case294/83P rtiEcologist'Les.Verts'vEur peanParli ment(19H7)CMLR343. 28Case302/87EuropeanPa liamentvouncilCComitology')1988R5615;C-70/8EuropeanParli me tvCounc l ('Chernobyl')1990E RI-2041. 29Case239/82nd275/AllieCorporationvmmissi19 4E R1005;Cas26 /82TimexCorporatiov Councila dommission1985ECR840. wCase26/76Metro-SB-GroftmarkteGmbHndKvCom ission19 7ECR1875. 21Discussedbelow. 12Case169/84ofazvommission986ECR3 1. 11Paragraph25.
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inthatmanner,undert ki gswhicha eccordedfavourabltreatment theircompetito sareutomaticallyconc rnedsamext nt;tdisadvant¬ agesforthlatterrcounterpartfadvantagesconfe r dth former'.34Thisisu therupportedbyothrulings."ICook,16thoswith interestaredefin dhos'aff ctet eirinteres s'byaid,' otably thecompetingundertakingsandprofessionalorga isations'.Infa ,thCo t ofFirstInstancehit elfacceptedrel xationothPlaum ntest.37 Furthermore,t ecase-lawdevelop dinwidercontextofCommunityla isapplicablehere.InapplicationofArticle5EC,38thCourhasc nsistently heldthat anyprovisionofnationallegalsystemndylegi l tive,administr tiojud c alpractic whichmightimpairtheeffect v nessofCommunitylabywit oldingfrthnation lcourt havingjurisdictiotoapplyuchlawhepow rtdeveryt innecessarytthmom nofi applicationtosetsidenationallegisl t vprovis o swh chmightpre ,event m rarily, Communityrulesfrhavingu lo cndeffectrincompatiblewiththosrequire nt , whicharethveryess n eofCommunitlaw.39 Unfortunatelyfortheutcomeftprese tcas ,thCourtfailedapply itselftheobligationtasideru eshawouldobstr ctapplicat onfCom¬ munitylaw. ItisthedutyoftCo rJustic'en rethati eint rpre at on andpplicationofth sTre tyelawisobserved'.40Onthp esentocca io therigidityofCourtfFi stInstancconcerningthearbitraryndinappro¬ priatebarr erof'individualconcern' nditsfailu es tasidobst uct v technicalrulesesultedinasizeabltwo-foldviolatioComm nitylaw41 beingtolerated.Thjudic alcontroftuseoEurop anfunthatis urgentlyrequiredwasdeni d.Thisisespeciallyiro icwh nr callsthe dynamicpro-environmentsta cad ptedbythCourattimw enno Treatyfoundationrsuchapositionexi ted.Pri rthado tionft e SingleEuropeanActanditsEnviro m nTi lethCourtr ledb hth t 'environmentalprotection...iso fthCommunity'ss e tialobjectives'42 34 169/84Cofazvommission1986ECR3 1at403. 35SeealsoC323/82AIntermillsvCommission1984E R3809,paragraphsand16;C se-225/91Mat vCommission1993ECRI-3203,seepart cularlythinionfAdv c eGeneralaGeratI-3221-26. 36Case-198/91ookdCommission9 3RecatI-24 7,p ragraph:1Lesinttresse ,aus ndParticlyj, paragraphe2,dutr iteontetedefinisplCouc mmelespers n e ,ntreprisesoassociatio seientuellementaff c edan leursinter<pIsparI'octroidI aide,c' sl-a-di eo ammentlen r pris sc currentestlesorgani ationsprofessionnelles.' 17T-2/93AirFrancevCommission1994ECR11-323,par graphs44through8;CaseT-435/ 3ASPEC,judg-' mentof27April1995,ataragraph64. 38Article5EC:MemberSta esshallkllapp opriatm asure ,whethegen alorparticula ,tensure fulfilmentofthobligationsarisi goutfthTre yoesul gfromacti nt k nbythins i utionoft Community.Theyshallfacilitatetachieveme tfthCommun ty'st sk . Theshallabstainfromnymeasurew ichcouldjeopardi ethattainmentfthobjectivesfthisTreaty. 39C-213/89RvSecretaryoftatfoTranspor ,xpartFact rt mendhers(N2)1990ECRI-2433,p ragr ph 20;seealso106/77Ammini traziondellFinanzl oStatvim en h lpA1978ECR629atp ragraph22and3. 40Article164. 41Spain'sviolationoftheEIAdirectiv85/337;andtheCommission'sfailuretoensurth ttintegra ion requirementinArticle130^2)ECa dtherequirementinthStructuralFundsi egulation2052/88wer respected. Case240/83ADBHU1985ECR531tparagraph13.
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andthat'protectionftheenvironm ntisama d toryrequirem twhich maylimittheapplicationofArtic e30ftheTreaty'.43Today,althoughArticle i3or(2)givesthCourtTrea yauthoritfordynamicinterpretation,th Courtappearstbenolongerwillingtaksuchp sitivestance.Oneca detecttheeff ctsofachangintheCommunity'spoliti alat sph re,eviden inageneralretreatoenvi onm ntalissuesincthEdinburghSummitin '992" 3.FutureOptionsandDevelopments Thequestionariseswhetherany ingcanbedone,atCommu itylevel43t remedvthpr sentsituation.Anappealcanbe(andhasbee 4")madtohe EuropeanCourtfJusticnp intsoflaw.4'Still,intheabsenceofinterim measures,48bythetiadecisioni reached,almostc inlythpowerplants willbecompleted.Althoughsu hanctionwo ldbevaluableintermoflega precedent,inthisparticularinsta cthebenefitothvironmentoftheCanary Islandswouldbenil. AnactionunderArticle170,wher byonMemberStatecanbringanother beforetheCourtfaviolati noCommunitylaw,is,practic lly,oufthe question.49 Alternatively,theCommissioncouldinitiateArti169enforce entproce d¬ ingsagainstSp iforitsbreachftheEnvironmentalImpacAssessment Directive85/337.However,inrd rtbringacastheComm ssio 'Environ¬ mentDirectorate,DGXI,mustp oceedwiththagree entofthCommission's LegalService( iceJuridiqu ),whichhandl sthtec nicalaspectsoft Article169procedureforallthDGs.Givenitsexcessiveworkload,iattempts topursueinfringementsthatarrelev nttosev ralMemb rSta s,wheth questionedbehaviourismorsystematic;itreluctanttopurs eisolated infringements.50Furthermore,it eEnvironm ntDirectoratGene lwished topursuethebreachimusthave,notonlythaccordoft eServJuridiqu , butalsothaoft eoth rDirectorates-Gen ral,includingDGXVI,thDirector¬ ateinvolvedithiscase.Iseemslik ly,th n,atsuchaendeavourwould 43Case302/86CommissionvDenmark( a ishBottle )1988ECR4607ap ragr ph9. 44Cf:ouncilfEdinb rghPreside yConclusi ns.Europeo5878Sunday/Monday13 14Decembe1992 ati.Sincethist me,v r tyofen ro entalobligatio shavbeenreviewedandam nded,andtCommu ty hasbecomemarkedlymo ehesit ntinprop singandadoptingenvironmentallegislatio .Whehasadopted newe vironmentalrul s,ithasoptedforbr ad r,lessspecificanda gu blylesenforceablsta d ds;Cf:Th ImpactofEC'Envir nmentalLawitheUnitedKingdom.' co ferencheld3Nov b riq95>particularly commentsmadbvDrLudwigKramer.'RecentDevelopmentsinECEnvironment lLaw,dDa idFreeston , 'TheImpactofSubsidiarity'. 43National-levelactionh sbeenundertake :seeparagraphs6and7ofthidecision. 46Case-321/95P. 47ECTreatyArticlei68a(i)and'StatuteoftheCoufJusticeart cles49-5 . 48Theawardofwhichisextremelyunlikelygiventhadvanc dstatoftheprojec .Cf:as57/89RCommission vGermany1989ECR284 :interim asu esw -erefus dipartbecaus'largp toftheworksh dalr ady beencompleted'(paragraph17U 49Article170haslmostneverbe nus d.Furth rmoreinar aconcerningCommunityfunds,itsunreal¬ istictohopethatneMemberStatwillblowt ew is lonano her;si cao epoi talMemberStates benefitfromsuchaid,c rtainamountosolidaritycon ern gitspotentialmisuseistbeexp cted. *"Thisisnott aythatoneisolatedinfringementwillneverbpu sued.
founderonthtensionsb tweenCommis iondirectoratesa dtheirdifferent—andttimes,conflic ing—areasofCommunitypolicy.5' Amoregeneralquestionconcernsthep ssibilityfshift ngt eCour 'sf cu
infuture.EventhePlaumanndecision,i portionthati relycit d,suggeststhattheestcouldbrelaxed: TheprovisionsftheTr atyregardingtherightfctionofinte estedpartiesmustobinterpretedrestrictivelv;whertTr atyissilentlimitationnhisrespectmayotb presumed. Coulditnotthenalsobargued,thataiiventhroughheEu p anR gionalDevelopmentFundisotsdifferentffectr maidgivenbyheS ate,sith casesreferredtoabove?Thapplicantsarenotaffectediths nsefconomiccompetition,butheyaredv rselyaff ctedinrmsfco p titionf rlimitednat¬ uralresources.TborrowthewordsfAdv cateGeneralV rLor nvTh maat
inCofaz,tcouldbearguedthatdis dv ntagesorthnvironmentalssocia ionsandtheindividualsarguingthic erthcount rpartftheadvantagesco ¬ferred,intheformofagrantadeun rthRegionalFunds,uponU lco.Evenif,asVerLorenvaThemaatsuggests,32admissibilitywerelim tedtoh sewhoha earliersubmittedco plaintstoheCo mission,hepre entcasecouldavpro¬ ceededtoiscussthgroundsf rr view,i cethrapplicantshadformul edom¬ plaints.Moreover,iseemsr asonablerguth tt isconditionm ghtalsob relaxed,forasAdvocateG neralTes uropointsoutinC k, Itappearscompletelyillogicaltosubjectthrighttoatheconditionattheapplicanthavetak npartithepreliminaryadm nistrativeprocedure,s mplybec ushi dpartv,theapplicant,couldhavebeeintotalig rancefthf ctathpr liminaryprocedurehadbeencommencedbythCommission.33 Indeed,theCourt'sf cuisnottheonlylementwhichcabcr ticisedi hiscase.ThttitudeofthCommunityinstitutio saswholes uldber ¬ examined.S veralsp ctsoftheCo mission'sconductreworthyfo e,b gin¬ ningw thitsfailureadequatelyov rifeconformitythSpanishprojectwithArticlet3or(2)ofhTreaty54 rArticle7ofRegulation2052/88othefunctioningoftheStructuralFunds."Ii nfortunatendeedth tCommissionnotonlydidnotsuspendaidfitwnaccordo cehab enotifiedfth ''Forinstance,hefactt atcasewasbroughtgainstDenmark'shigh-levelenvironmentalpolicyhefirstplacellustrat sthatDGXIlosttheinternalCommissiondi putethInt r alM rketDG.,J 169/84CofazvCommission19 6ECR391t405.Case-198/91CookdC mmission1993R catI-2487,I-2512(itheabs ncefaoffi ialtra sl tion,thecitationhasbeeran latedyhau horanshouldtbtakensautho itative).H shyp h sisi supportedbyAdvocateGeneralv nGerv niM tra,tI-3225,note14.ATherelevantportionfArticlei*3or(2)read'...Environmentalprotectionrequi ementssh llbco pon¬entoftheCommunity'so herpolicies'wh nein tiald ci ionwasad pted,Environmentalprotectionrequirementsmustbintegratedi tothd fi itionndi plementationfherC mmunitypolicies' afterMaastrichtwasratified. >sRegulation2052/88othetasksfheStructuralF dsandtheire fectivenessandoc ordinationftheiractivitiesbetwe nthemselvesa dwithhoperationsftheEurop anInv stmentB ka dheotherxistingfi ancialin truments(whichisapplicable,teralia,oEuropeanReg onalDevelopmentFu d)OJ1988L185/9,atL18 /13.Article7(1):'Measuresfin nc dbytheStru turalF n sorceivinga sistancefromthEIBorfr motherexistingfi ancialinstrume tshallbik epingwithheprovisionsftheTreatiesw theinstrumentsadop edpursuantthere oandwi hCommunitypolicies,inc dingthoseco c rningthrulesocompetition,theawardofubliccontractsdenvironmentalprotection.'
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allegedviolationsfCommunityl w(whichsempowereddbyArticl5ofdecision0(91)440),butchosein teadtallocatefurth rEcu12million.Furthermore,whenGre np aceequest dinformationlatingtheasures theCommissionhadtaker gardingtheconformityftheSpa ishc struction withRegulation2052/1988,theCommissionre pondedathrequestedinformationconcer edthin ernaldecis -makingproceduresftheC mmission andcouldnotbeprovi ed.Thus,i spitefrep atedC mmis ioncallsf rgreater transparency,'6theCommissiondrewthecurtainstighterwh nicamerev al¬ inginformationrelatedthfundingoft seprojects."TCommission'sr a ¬ surancethati s'decisionwast k no lyf erfulconsultationbetw eh variousse vicesofthconcerned"8ishardlycomforting;theC ufAudit rshasfoundthat' eCommunitydepartmentsreldomawareofhx ctde ils oftheindividualoperationsfundedbythestructurali st umentsd cisionse essentiallytakennatioorr gionallevea d,im nycases,duri gth executionoftheprogrammes'.'9Obv uslyinthisinstanceheCommis ion actionsfellshortofitsas urances,i cethasspentEcu40millionroj ct thatviolatesCommunityenvironmentallaw.60 Thecasegenerallyr is ss v lis u sthata ecriticaltoheffe ivenforce¬ mentbyCo munityinstitutio sofenvir nmentallaw.R peatedlyhC mmun¬ ityhasemphasisedtoM b rStatestim rtanceft kingflexiblapproach toissuessuchalocustandiacesstonvironmentalinformation.Aill tratedhere,owever,thCommunityinstitutio sexpectacerta ns andardfb h viourfromtheMemberStat sregardinglocusst ndi,accessonviro mentalinforma¬ tion,andthes tasi efrulesobstructingtheffectiveapplicationofCommunity- law,thateyapp arunwillingtopplythemselves. Theadequateenforcem ntfnvironmentall wb foreurtsflaw,b hCommunityandnational,requiresfu dame alchangei raditionall g thinking.Inst tut onalresistancea dtendencyoalloweconomicint r sts overrideoth r,lessquantifiableinter sts,mustbov rcomeyfactorm r reliableth npoliticalpalaver;concreteevolutionnthiss fstandingtinCommunityCourtswouldprovi eaexcell ntstartingpo nt.F rinsta ce,theCourtcouldbringits lftoco siderthatnvironmentalinteres sareinter sts suigeneris,whicharrantninnovat veapproachdonsid rableelement offlexibility.Generally,ar urntohenovativeandc ivestancethatCommunitywasoncewillingtoakeisorder,leitwhatben fitshavebeenthusfaracc uedyitenvironmentalp licy. 36See.forexample.C mmunication93/C166/04,OJ1993C 4. j7Paragraphri.Perhapst itendencyoguarditwsec etsillbalTcc edthde isiona opted pursuanttoCa eT-194/94JohnCarvela dGu rdianNewspapersLtCouncil,j dgmentof19October19 5,i whicht eCouncilwasco demnedf rhavingsi ilartt tudetowardsrevealingin rnali formation.'*Paragraphit. '9CourtfAuditorsRep rtOJ1992C245/7.Furthe more,hereportfoundtha'[a]hnationall v lheCourt[ fAuditors]checksdidn t.e tablishthaeformfhFundsb ughtboutnyappreciable progressinproceduresdesi nedtoivmoreatt ntionenvironme talp bl msithedraf ingpr grammes', atC245/13(specificxampleslis ed:C245/15-16). Amorerecentpor .Sp cialreportn4/94ftheEurop anC urtfAudi ors'TheUrbanEnvi onment. revealsth tt rehasb nlittlimprovementnco-ordinationb tw ed partme tsandregardingchecksf conformitywiththerECpolicies. ""Itispresumedherthatthp oj ctsfallwithinthescopefDire ive85/337;m reabsencef environmentalimpactassessmenti violatiofthDir ive.
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